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MILOSLAV TRAPL

I. A. BLÁHA ON HISTORY AND HISTORICAL SCIENCE

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Critical realism was I. A. Bláha's principle in science, ethics and social philosophy. In it he was the successor of T. G. Masaryk's thought: like Masaryk he laid emphasis on objects (*res*), safely known realities and facts. Therein he is in agreement with A. Comte and the English and French positivists of the 19th century. Like Masaryk he could have used as his motto: objects, not development; realism, not historicism.¹ In his philosophical, and especially historical, writings, analyses of the present state of society prevail over historical treatises and discussions. Excepting the monograph *Město (The Town)* which beside the subtitle "A Sociological Study" could bear the name of a *historical study*, there is hardly any other work by Bláha which could be designated as a work of history. In his sociological monographs (on the sociology of the worker and peasant, the intelligentsia, the crisis of the family life), the reader is sometimes almost struck by Bláha's ahistorism which is manifest in his nearly exclusive emphasis on problems of his days and partly of the future. Bláha's interest in the past is secondary.²

However, he could be no good sociologist, if he had not seriously thought over the past and if he had no complete idea about it. This is true especially with regard to the relation of sociology to history. To explain it clearly we shall start from Bláha's methodological principles of his classification of sciences which, in principle, does not differ from the theses of Masaryk's *Konkrétná logika (Concrete Logic)*³ notwithstanding many a supplementary and deeper analysis by Bláha.

¹ The view that I. A. Bláha takes up Masaryk's critical realism is maintained by J. Obrdlíková in her article "Sociologická metoda In. Arnošta Bláhy" (Sociological Method of I. A. Bláha) in the Volume *Brněnská sociologická škola* (the Brno Sociological School), Brno 1966, pp. 22 ff. J. Macků attempts to weaken this dependence of Bláha on Masaryk in his study "Brněnská sociologická škola a její místo v dějinách naší sociologie" (The Brno Sociological School and its Place in the History of Our Sociology), *ibid.*, pp. 6 ff.

² Especially in monographs on the sociology of the worker and the peasant we miss strongly a historical aspect. Cf. comprehensive studies of J. Hanáček "Sociologie dělníka" (Sociology of the Worker) and T. Čep "Sociologie města a venkova v díle prof. dr. In. Arno. Bláhy" (Sociology of the Town and the Country in the Work of I. A. Bláha) in: *Sociologická revue*, vol. 1939.

³ Cf. a high appreciation of the *Concrete Logic* in a French study by Bláha: *T. G. Masaryk, philosophe du synergisme* in the Volume: Herben, Hartl, Bláha: *T. G. Masaryk. Sa vie, sa politique, sa philosophie*, Praha 1923, pp. 109 ff. In many respects however, Bláha is quite independent in his methodology. Especially in his *Sociologie* he makes use of the results of modern sociology and sociology of knowledge.

In one respect, however, Bláha's conception of social science differs substantially from that of Masaryk. Bláha would not have endorsed Masaryk's sentence from the *Naše nynější krise* (*Our Present Crisis*) in which among statements of facts Masaryk includes an ethical evaluation — he takes as a scientific datum that John Hus died for truth. Such an ethical evaluation belongs by Bláha's view to the sphere of social philosophy and philosophy of history.⁴ Of course, Bláha was no adherent of the watchword "science for science". Even for him such a science which would remain pure theory without consequences in real life, without the scientist's social commitment, would be sterile.

The meaning of every scientific research lies, according to Bláha, in the application of its results to practical problems. Notwithstanding, he maintains that every science worth of this name is an objective science which truthfully ascertains certain realities; however, such a knowledge of realities, namely of details and of causal connections, enables theoretical social scientists to interfere successfully in politics, moral practice, education, etc.⁵

Of course, Bláha knows very well from marxism and the "Wissenssoziologie" that all science, but social science predominantly, is determined in its problems and analyses of social relationships by the class origin of its creators. But beside the class-determined truths, Bláha says, there exists scientific knowledge which is beside and above social classes.⁶

Bláha distinguishes sociology as a veritable theoretical, objective science, founded on an exact empirical research, from social philosophy, based on speculation about the existing social realities and containing strong subjective elements and ethical evaluations. Accordingly, philosophy of history is a part of social philosophy.⁷

In agreement with Comte and Masaryk, Bláha makes a distinction between sociological *statics* and *dynamics*. He takes both as different aspects of one reality. They are separated because of methodological requirements, while in social reality they form a unity. Social statics, a theory of the structure of social patterns, of necessity has to take into account their developments. Although it is social statics, it cannot deal with unchangeable realities, but only with relatively stable and permanent social bodies.⁸

The complex development of mankind forms the subject-matter of both sociology and history. When seeking to establish the relation of these two scientific disciplines Bláha practically follows Comte's and Masaryk's classifications: History is a concrete science, sociology an abstract one. Sociology orders concrete phenomena and ranks them under general categories, relations and connections seeking for what is typical in them. The subject-matter of historical science is

⁴ *Sociologie*, p. 31. In two his reviews of P. E. Sorokin's *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (*Sociologická revue*, Vol. IX, pp. 83 ff., Vol. XIII, pp. 31 ff.). Bláha appreciates — beside a broad basis of facts — historic-philosophical consequences which Sorokin deduces. Cf. also J. Obrdlíková, op. cit., p. 47. Masaryk's reflections on the statements of truths are to be found in his *Česká otázka* and *Naše nynější krise*, Praha 1948, pp. 323 ff.

⁵ *Sociologie*, pp. 171 ff.

⁶ op. cit. pp. 162 ff. Cf. also Bláha's polemical answer to R. Foustka's "Po staru", *Sociologická revue*, Vol. XIV, pp. 306 ff.

⁷ *Sociologie*, pp. 39 ff.; "Sociologie a dějiny" (*Sociology and History*), *Tvořivá škola* 1938, pp. 102 ff.

⁸ *Sociologie*, pp. 43 ff.

human history formed by a series of concrete, genetic phenomena proceeding in a string of constant changes. The bearers of historical processes are men and their purposeful activities. History is set into movement by a complex of internal and external forces; the former are partly individual, partly collective.⁹

The explanation of a historical process does not only include its analysis into its component parts which can be rationally, scientifically known, but it also implies a philosophical approach which asks about programmes, ideals honoured by a certain period and its people. In this way the science of history is, of necessity, supplemented by the philosophy of history.¹⁰

In general the science of history can be said to individualize, while sociology makes generalizations. History is rather descriptive, while the sociological thought is abstract, trying to find general relations. History seeks for a true picture of social reality and the unique development, while sociology seeks for formulations of universal generalizations, of a total mechanism of social processes.¹¹ History, for instance, deals with every revolution in its unique course, while sociology is interested in general traits of all revolutions.¹²

Bláha's sociological analysis helps us to understand the substance of social dynamics. The fundamental concept of social dynamics is the social process, a proceeding string of changes which take place between two groups or between an individual and a group. The terms "process" "structure" are no anti-poles, but they are related and complementary (a structure is a complex of processes). Bláha distinguishes between two kinds of processes: positive and negative. The former lead to assimilation, integration and socialization of groups and other social wholes, while the latter (dissimilation, disintegration and individualization) effect estrangement, distance and conflicts among individuals and groups. Processes of opposition manifest themselves in a more moderate form as controversies and discussions, in a sharper form as protests, conflicts and struggles. Class struggles represent an important case of conflicts, They are manifestations of a crisis of the normal development of the society and, at the same time, an attempt to overcome this crisis; they are a factor which quickens the development of history and enables the establishment of a new economic and legal order.¹³

In the course of history revolutions originate in class-struggles. As a rule, a revolution represents a violent change, a sudden break in the continuity of the development which issues from violent conflicts and conflicting interests of various social classes. Bláha points out the differences between various revolutions according to their specific goals. They have mostly the character of a political and social revolution at the same time; beside a new division of power they bring about new relations between various classes. A long time before its outbreak, a truly important revolution has been prepared in political, social and ideological spheres.

Every revolution brings about a new organization of social life. The change of the capitalistic society into a socialistic one has been accompanied, Bláha

⁹ Cf. "Sociologie a dějiny", *ib.*,

¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² *Sociologie, ib.*, p. 44.

¹³ *ib.*, pp. 16 ff.

contends, by very penetrating changes in the social structure, much more radical than, for instance, the change of the feudal order into capitalism. In the struggles of antagonistic revolutionary forces counterrevolutions originate, backed mainly by the layers of those who have been deprived of their economic and power positions.

In a similar way, Bláha analyses various conflicts between individuals and groups. He speaks of a lack of adaptability in some individuals, of antisocial persons, of fanatics, and of personalities who start new ways of the social progress.¹⁴

In agreement with modern trends of sociology, Bláha lays great emphasis on the dynamic aspect of the conception of society. He says: Whatever form of social life we may analyse, in all its spheres we find a constant stream, a constant forward movement. Only death is static. However, Bláha contends, all these dynamic components tend to a state of balance, of ripeness, of equilibrium. The totality of the development of society is a search for the social optimum; its attainment is accompanied by a certain degree of stabilization of the society.¹⁵

Rather critical is Bláha's attitude to the attempts of older philosophers of history and of the great builders of social systems in sociological dynamics in 19th century (A. Comte, H. Spencer, F. Giddings, L. Ward, and others¹⁶) to grasp the totality of the social becoming, the totality of human history, in unifying formulas of the laws of development. On the other hand, in several places of his writings Bláha criticized the New-Kantian logicians of history (e. g. W. Windelband, H. Rickert, W. Dilthey, M. Weber, E. Troeltsch etc.) who denied history the right to formulate laws of historical development. However, he did not hold the original positions of the positivists of 19th century and of Masaryk, predominantly not with respect to the problems of the laws of history. In agreement with empiricist historians he accepted the sober thesis: as long as the concrete materials of historical facts are not thoroughly examined, a critical sociologist cannot dare to formulate fixed and unchangeable laws as to the total development of mankind, or even as to partial, but complex and important, parts of this development.¹⁷ In this respect, again, Bláha shares the view of modern sociologists who soberly reject far-reaching conceptions just because they are aware of large gaps in the detailed knowledge of various parts of the social development. Being also aware that there is no unity as to the periods of the social development, and of the vast display of social patterns made apparent by the research work of cultural anthropology which emphasizes the impossibility of formulating large, generally valid laws of social development,¹⁸ Bláha — like other modern sociologists — replaces general theories of social development by the theory of social change. Many facts have been gathered about the course and determinedness of such changes and of shorter stages of development by sociologists and historians; on the basis of such data Bláha critically analyzes the importance and influence of various factors of social change. He puts forward a criticism of older theories and in his own analysis he makes use of his concept

¹⁴ *ib.*, pp. 19 ff.

¹⁵ *ib.*, p. 44.

¹⁶ *ib.*, pp. 45 ff.

¹⁷ *ib.*, pp. 57 ff.

¹⁸ *ib.*

of social situation, both *internal* and *external*, which is a synthesis of various factors (geographic, demographic, biological, psychological and sociological) and the real cause of social change.¹⁹

Thus we cannot safely state the laws of social development, but neither can its goals be foreseen. Yet, Bláha contends that if we overlook epochs of the past from a historical perspective, we can conclude that not only development but also progress exists. He opposes the pessimism of Oswald Spengler for instance: It is true that there are differences between various cultures, that they originate and disappear, but the culture as a totality goes on and mankind makes for progress in spite of epochs of decay. Powerful constructive forces fight against the destructive ones. History shows that eventually spiritual forces have always been victorious. Bláha quotes Leibniz here: "*On recule pour mieux sauter,*" although he shares the optimism of the German philosopher to a certain degree only.²⁰

Of consequence are Bláha's views as to the mutual relationship and instrumentality of sociology and history, as to the mutual support they should give each other. The science of history renders an immense service to sociology by supplying it with carefully tested data. By using them sociological interpretations can get a documentary, but also interesting and comprehensible character. And the sociologist should learn strict rules of the historical method from historians.²¹ In his review of Durkheim's work²² on the pedagogical development in France, Bláha is satisfied to state that the work exhibits the positive qualities of a man of science who is well versed in historical methods and has the knowledge of a sociologist. Durkheim is said to be right when emphasizing that the present time can be understood only when it is enlightened by the historical development, because in the past we can find elements of which our time is made.

And *vice versa*, critical sociology can help historians correctly and soberly to evaluate the importance of individuals, especially of outstanding personalities, for the historical development and to oppose one-sided theories of an extreme individualism (e. g. of Carlyle, Stirner, Nietzsche) and as extreme collectivism (L. N. Tolstoy²³). In a complete agreement with marxism-leninism, Bláha enhances the share of sociology in the democratization and socialization of views about history, for it can show historians that more important than battles and wars, the fates of kings and the like, is the history of the people and culture, that the loom, carriage or dance, poetry and science has its history too. Sociology teaches the historian to proceed from a concrete material to wider sociological relationships and connections, to see the general through the particular.²⁴

We could see that our overview of Bláha's relations with the science of history is not so scarce as could have been thought at the beginning. This result of our analysis will grow more evident, if our attention is turned to Bláha's ideas about some of the periods of the Czech history.

¹⁹ *ib.*, pp. 44 ff., 48 ff.

²⁰ "Sociologie a dějiny", pp. 103 ff.

²¹ *ib.*

²² Cf. Bláha's review of E. Durkheim: *L'évolution pédagogique en France*, Paris 1938, in: *Sociologická revue*, Vol. X., pp. 230 ff.

²³ "Sociologie a dějiny", pp. 102 ff.

²⁴ *ib.*, pp. 104 ff.

Bláha's ideas about the Czech History. Although his intention was to work in theory the immediate aim of which is objective truth; although he strictly distinguished the objective science of sociology from the evaluating, ethically coloured social philosophy and philosophy of history, Bláha was too deeply interested in political problems and the social and political fate of his nation to avoid thinking in the sphere of philosophy of history. Predominantly in periods of crises of which he had to live a number, he reflected in a penetrating way upon the Czech history, upon the painful periods of national decay and on severe crises of the Czech and Czechoslovak state. His urgent articles, though often full of genuine excitement, always keep the scientific standard; they are an application of Bláha's deep sociological knowledge and, in their time, they exerted considerable influence on the thoughtful public.

Interesting reflections on the Czech history and its crises can be found in Bláha's writings about T. G. Masaryk, especially in his French treatise about Masaryk as a philosopher of synergism.²⁵

The Czech national society, Bláha reflects, is a concrete example of a complex phenomenon, when the national whole, social organism, hit by hard political blows, was stopped in its development full of promise; when after an epoch in which the national milieu was rich in its developing civilization and the body of the nation full of life energy, a time of decadence came, of political oppression and of catastrophes which stifled the sources of social vitality; and when the organs of national life were crippled and limited to vegetation. In those times the nation consisted of poor strata of the country and town populations only. Yet, this very society proved its vitality through historical facts: after two hundred years of such a critical state this oppressed nation was capable of a revival, of regeneration in the time of the national renaissance.²⁶

The period of the ripe feudalism, viz. the 14th and 15th centuries, is in the Czech history a time in which Czech society was collecting powerful forces for an unexpectedly favourable development of its life. Bláha has in mind the time of the development of Czech towns, the time of Charles IVth and, above all, of the Hussite Movement and the Czech Reformation in general; that is why, to my mind, even the 16th century could be counted to this period. A remarkable progress took place mainly in the sphere of the town development of the Czech middle-ages as is richly documented by Bláha in his sociological and, simultaneously, historical study *Město (The Town)*. In this work, his sociological knowledge is supplemented in an excellent way by a good historical erudition.²⁷ His knowledge of the town problems and the scientific manner of his approach is documented here by a very careful analysis and criticism of theories on the origin and development of towns in general, but of course predominantly of the mediaeval European and Czech towns. He gives a nice description of the bloom of Czech towns in the 14th century, of the growth of their political power in the Hussite period and of the later decay. All his more general statements are documented by very many examples from the historical literature.²⁸

In contrast to the period of national ascent in the 14th, 15th and 16th centuries.

²⁵ Herben—Hartl—Bláha, op. cit.

²⁶ ib., pp. 101 ff.

²⁷ *Město. Studie sociologická*, Praha 1914.

²⁸ op. cit., chaps. II—VIII.

the 17th and 18th centuries are a time of a deep decline after the "Battle of Bilá hora", a "time of darkness". These two centuries were a long period in which the spirit of the nation kept silent in a series of disciplines. It was a silence which seemed to end in a spiritual death.

The 19th century is, on the contrary, an admirable period in the history of the Czech nation: The national and cultural consciousness revives in the transformed European atmosphere, stirred up by enlightening and democratic streams (the French Revolution); traditions of a Czech state are revived, too, together with new cultural efforts and the nation's own productivity in the spiritual and moral spheres. What has been left from the time of the rigid national oppression, starts to grow up hopefully owing to positive national traditions and enthusiastic endeavours of our national revivalists. The renaissance of the national language and literature is deepened and supplemented in the political and social spheres in the years 1848—1849. Since the sixties and seventies of the last century the renaissance has increased in the economic, industrial and commercial spheres. In this way the creation of a manysided and complex national organism is completed in all its parts and organs. National society becomes differentiated in the proper way, it functions in all substantial spheres of material, organic, social and spiritual life. In the development of the national whole the stage of mythical imagination and romanticism has been overcome for good; its place is taken by an era of exact scientific concepts, of philosophical synthesis and of a rich development of the internal forces of the nation.²⁹

The twentieth century is not so unequivocally positive as to our development as the nineteenth century was. Its first big event was World War I, appropriately called by Masaryk the world revolution.

This catastrophe which in millions of dead, mutilated and wounded brought much of physical and moral destruction, brought also very positive results. On 28th October, 1918, it brought our nation an independent Czechoslovak republic, fought out predominantly by Masaryk's revolt, and by our legions, both organized abroad. The epoch-making period of this war time were both Russian Revolutions, in February and October, one of which destroyed the czarist despotism and the other proclaimed peace and the selfdetermination of nations and started to build up socialistic society on one sixth of our globe.³⁰

To the negative consequences of World War I must be counted economic crises, especially the economic and social crisis of the thirties which afflicted the whole society and affected all the countries of the capitalistic world.

In the first period of this deep, all-European crisis Bláha wrote his excellent work *Sociologie inteligence (Sociology of the Intelligentsia)* in which we can find in what a penetrating way he understood the causes, incentives, importance and results of such social-crises. In this book Bláha speaks especially of the crisis of human society which takes place when individuals, the conscious component of society, do not get support from a system of spiritual stimuli, when the personality remains isolated in the frame of society. The society suffers from an atrophy of some of its parts, from a lack of important sources of forces, it cannot develop in a healthy way and live a full spiritual life. The crisis of the society means that the consensus, mutual harmony between the economic, po-

²⁹ Herben — Hartl — Bláha, op. cit., pp. 102 ff.

³⁰ I. A. Bláha: *T. G. Masaryk*, Praha 1923, pp. 5 ff.

litical and cultural components has been destroyed, that the social balance has been disturbed, that sections of social life have become congested, others anaemic.³¹

In this time of a general, world crisis, Bláha reflected upon the crisis of the intelligentsia. Without any doubt, there were some anomalies of the functions of some parts of the intelligentsia. It is the function of spiritual creation which is affected: the crisis of the scientific reason in one part of the intelligentsia is indisputable. Unhealthy is often the relation between politics and culture; culture has become a mere means, a serving instrument of politics. The principle of power, a value of order in men, has become predominant over all other values. Owing to irrational ideologies of fashism politics were lowered to the level of political physics or even of zoology. Even educational institutions are affected by the crisis: they do not serve spiritual aims, but proceed in a mechanical, not pedagogical way. Institutions propagating culture have plunged into this crisis too: beside good literature and art great influence is exerted by bad literature and art. An irrational intelligentsia appears, united mostly by the negation of the contemporary times and progressive tendencies, belated behind the development stage of the society. Aristocratism, a distance from the people, is characteristic of it.³²

But let us return with Bláha to critical periods of the Czech nation. An extremely deep crisis, which severely affected Bláha too, were events connected with Munchen. In 1939, Volume 9 of the *Sociologická revue* (*The Sociological Review*) was being edited. Bláha, as editor in chief, devoted to this heavy national crisis a series of treatises under the title: "In Hard Times of the Nation and State". In it we find significant essays by Czech and Slovak sociologists as well as contributions by well-known sociologists from abroad who all express full understanding and support for us in our fight for our very existence. As the first of the series comes Professor Bláha's paper "A Sociologist's Remarks in the Margin of the Days".³³ He explains here his concept of the social situation and of the national society as a system of many organs and functions. In every social situation appear various needs which are sometimes very urgent. Then the necessity comes for individuals to function under a norm, i. e. to fulfil various functional imperatives. In the time of Munchen the social situation of the state made the need of the collective self-preservation, the necessity to preserve the independent life of the nation and to survive the deep crisis, the fundamental functional collective norm. Under the pressure of this norm, sharp differences between classes and party dissonances were smoothed away, all partial interest groups became united on a higher level and grew aware of their common, fundamental connections. In this difficult historical situation all were afflicted in the very nerve of their national feeling. The territorial integrity of the state, its independence, sovereignty and the very existence of the nation was in danger. The consciousness of these inner connections of individuals with the roots of the nation had been here before, but more in a latent state. From the collective self-preserving need grew up a process of assimilation of various groups, a

³¹ I. A. Bláha: *Sociologie inteligence* (*Sociology of the Intelligentsia*), Praha 1937, pp. 203 ff.

³² *ib.*, pp. 132 ff., 220 ff. Cf. also *Živá slova* In. Arnošta Bláhy (*Living Words of I. A. Bláha*), ed. by L. Boček, Brno 1939, pp. 78 ff.

³³ Cf. *Sociologická revue*, Vol. 9, pp. 237—254.

unifying idea, a socializing process and a practical political effort at a collective cooperation. In the hard moments of this crisis the national consciousness and republican citizenship appeared as a solid, unifying tie which helped to overcome divisions in the nation. The society as a whole continued and asserted itself. The differentiating forces functioned side by side with the integrative ones.

Such times show that society is no mechanism, that the effort trying to unify through force and military intervention cannot lead to a permanent unity. Society is more of an organism, it is an organization the developmental tendency of which is determined by the coordination and cooperation of its internal forces.³⁴

In a shorter chapter on "The Difficulties of Adaptation" Bláha continued his analysis of the social and political situation of this period; he reflected here mainly on the relation of the German minority to our state. He divided the development of these relations into three periods: firstly, the period of revolt, secondly, the endeavour for political activity of the Germans in the Czechoslovak Republic, and thirdly, the victory of Hitler's national socialism in Germany and the consequences thereof for us (Henlein's movement). Bláha sought to explain, why the process of the beginning symbiosis, and maybe assimilation, of the Germans here had been changed into its negation. He did not see the hindrances in the tough mentality of the national minority only and in their lesser adaptability issuing therefrom. Rational arguments spoke for the cooperation of both nations, while feelings and irrational determinants had a contrary influence. In non-democratic Germans it was especially a feeling of a social and political superordination and racial theories about a higher "Herrenvolk" and about the redemptive mission of the Germans; in conservative Germans a direct fear of the people and of democratic orders. On our side, the hindrance lay in the generally shared historical-philosophical idea that the meaning of our history was the eternal struggle with the Germans. A partly different structure of the population had some influence too: Henlein's supporters were helped, for instance, by higher aristocratic circles. Of some influence was the difference of school and administrative systems. Our political isolation and the German emphasis on the right of the stronger was another disastrous factor.³⁵

Bláha's treatise, rich in ideas which cannot be reproduced here fully, is a good supplement to our above comments on his theory of social crises. In it he masterfully combined a general sociological analysis with the events of the period, present period for him which, however, becomes history in the hands of the writing author. In this way Bláha's reflections test his theory of the relation and mutual instrumentality of sociology and history in the best way.

³⁴ *ib.*, p. 243.

³⁵ *ib.*, pp. 244 ff.

Autor konstatuje celkový Bláhův ahistorismus s výjimkou jeho monografie *Město*, která by vedle podtitulu "studie sociologická" mohla nésti i podtitul "studie historická". Podtrhuje Bláhův metodologický objektivismus a z něho plynoucí zakotvení sociologie v sociální filosofii. Podává názory Bláhovy na vědu historickou a na vztah vzájemné nástrojnosti mezi historií a sociologií. Podrobněji rozebírá Bláhovu společenskou dynamiku, jejímž ústředním pojmem je společenský proces, a zejména Bláhovy názory na třídní konflikt a revoluci. Upozorňuje na Bláhovo odmítnutí velkých teorií sociálního vývoje a jeho přiznání se k teorii změny.

V druhé části své studie autor předkládá Bláhovy názory na české dějiny, jeho analýzu krize let třicátých a zejména Bláhův sociologický rozbor naší kritické situace z r. 1938. V Bláhově analýze vidí ověření jeho teoretických názorů na vztah sociologie a historie.