Experimentální filosofie o otázce kompatibility svobodné vůle s determinismem

Title: Experimentální filosofie o otázce kompatibility svobodné vůle s determinismem
Variant title:
  • Experimental philosophy about the compatibility question
Source document: Pro-Fil. 2014, vol. 15, iss. Doplňkové číslo, pp. [36]-49
Extent
[36]-49
  • ISSN
    1212-9097
Type: Article
Language
License: Not specified license
 

Notice: These citations are automatically created and might not follow citation rules properly.

Abstract(s)
Jednou z důležitých otázek týkajících se svobodné vůle je tzv. otázka kompatibility. Táže se, zda jsou svobodná vůle a morální zodpovědnost slučitelné s platností determinismu. Existuje řada postojů k dané problematice. Na jedné straně se můžeme setkat s inkompatibilismem, který tvrdí, že svobodná vůle a morální zodpovědnost nejsou kompatibilní s kauzálním determinismem (ať již mluvíme o libertariánství či přísném determinismu), na straně druhé máme kompatibilismus, který se sloučením těchto dvou koncepcí nemá problém. Můj zájem je zaměřen pouze na současnou debatu týkající se svobodné vůle, která prozatím nedošla k jednotné odpovědi na danou otázku. Jedním ze způsobů podpory stanovisek (ať již jedné či druhé strany) je odkaz na jejich intuitivnost. Lidské intuice jsou ale empiricky testovatelné, proč tedy tvrzení filosofů neověřit? Tuto otázku si pokládají zástupci poměrně mladého filosofického směru, kterým je experimentální filosofie. Ta ve svém znaku nese hořící křeslo, aby demonstrovala vymezení vůči závěrům získaným skrze čistě apriorní přístup a snahu o empirická přezkoumání dosavadních poznatků filosofie. Za pomoci experimentálních metod se zástupci experimentální filosofie snaží mapovat intuice laiků (tedy nefilosofů), kteří nejsou zatíženi teoretickými závazky jako samotní filosofové, a nedochází tudíž k nechtěnému zkreslení výsledků. Mým cílem je představit výsledky experimentální filosofie ohledně otázky kompatibility. Aby to bylo možné, je nutné se zběžně seznámit se základními odpověďmi na otázku kompatibility. Dále shrnu nejvýznamnější experimenty, které do dané diskuse přispěly. Chci zároveň poukázat, že debata experimentálních filosofů nabrala velice rychle svébytného směru, čímž, dle mého názoru, má potenciál původní diskusi posunout a obohatit.
One of the important issues concerning free will is so called compatibility question. It explores whether free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. There is a wide variety of positions on that issue. On one hand we have incompatibilists who insist that free will and moral responsibility is not compatible with causal determinism (both libertarians and hard determinists), on the other hand we have compatibilists who do not have a problem with agglutination of these concepts. I am going to focus only on the current debate which has not reached a homogenous answer to the given question so far. One usual way to support one or other position is to refer to its intuitivness. But intuitions can be empirically tested, so why should we not valuate philosophers claims in this way? For this purpose a new field of philosophy developed at the turn of the millennium. It carries a chair in flames in its crest in order to demonstrate its demarcation against the conclusions reached through strictly a priori approach and its pursuit of empirical re-examination of existing philosophical findings. I am talking of course about the experimental philosophy. With the assistance of experimental methods experimental philosophy attempts to map intuitions of folks (non‑philosophers), who are not burdened with theoretical commitments as philosophers are. What I am looking at in this paper is if experimental philosophy is able to contribute to debate about (in)compatibility. To answer this, it is necessary to briefly look at different solutions of the compatibility question. Next, I am going to summarize the most influential experiments so far. I am going to point out that the debate in experimental philosophy soon started to go in its own direction, by which, in my opinion, it has enriched the whole debate.
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