


ON THE SPEAKER'S ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE CONTENTS OF HIS UTTERANCE

1. The attitude of the sender of a message toward its receiver may be threefold: the sender may either entirely disregard the receiver (in expressive sentences such as *boli!* 'it hurts!') or announce him the contents of the sentence (e.g. *Piotr śpi* 'Peter is asleep')¹ or else appeal to him by the contents of the sentence (e.g. *Śpij!* 'sleep!'. *Rozkazuję ci spać!* 'I order you to sleep!' *Czy śpisz?* 'Are you asleep?')². Thus here a binary classification will go as follows:



2. Within an annunciative sentence the sender may communicate various attitudes of his own toward its contents. Let us compare the sentences:

- (1) *Twierdzę, że Piotr śpi* 'I affirm that Peter is asleep'
- (2) *Chcę, żeby Piotr spał* 'I want Peter to sleep'
- (3) *To źle, że Piotr śpi* 'It's a bad thing Peter is asleep'
- (4) *Cieszę się, że Piotr śpi* 'I'm glad Peter is asleep'

In sentence (1) the speaker states that Peter is asleep, i.e. he establishes how the combination — not yet formed into a statement sentence, and further labelled SP — of a subject (= argument, *Peter*) with a feature (*asleep*) — is related to reality. (SP) may be considered as a sentence with a non-stating modality (null as to truthfulness, v. p. 4) which in the act of speech will be (/ has been) or will not be (/ hasn't been) transformed into a statement sentence SP.

In sentence (2) the speaker declares his will that Peter might sleep, i.e. that the (SP) *Peter asleep* might become reality.

In sentence (3) the speaker assumes an evaluative attitude toward the fact that Peter is asleep.

¹ This corresponds to the modal frame *chcę, żebyś wiedział* 'I want you to know' in the papers of A. Wierzbicka, cf. e. g. *Dociekania semantyczne*, Wrocław 1969, 36.

² Appeal is the attitude toward the receiver which may be interpreted as *I want you to act*.

At last, in sentence (4) the speaker assumes an evaluative and emotional attitude toward the fact that Peter is asleep.

The mere phrasing of the above interpretations is enough to prove that there is a basic difference from the attitude of the sender in sentences (1) and (2) to that in sentences (3) and (4). These sentences form two distinct groups. In (1) and (2) the sender establishes the relation of (SP) to reality (R): he either states that (SP) is conform to R (in (1)) or declares his will that it should be (in (2)). In sentences (3) and (4) he expresses his attitude (evaluative or both evaluative and emotional) toward an SP already stated, i. e. already related to R. This, i. e. the fact that the sentence *Peter is asleep* is a presupposition³ of sentences (3) and (4), can easily be tested by interrogation and negation. Namely, the sentence *Peter is asleep* is also implied by the sentences

(5) *Czy to źle, że Piotr śpi?* 'Is it a bad thing that Peter is asleep?'

(6) *Nieprawda, że się cieszę, że Piotr śpi* 'I am by no means glad that Peter is asleep', etc.

while among the consequences of sentence (2) *Chcę, żeby Piotr spał* 'I want Peter to sleep' there is neither the sentence *Peter is asleep* nor *Peter is not asleep*.

Thus the only attitudes of the speaker that consist in relating (SP) to reality are his attitude toward the truthfulness of the message and his volitive attitude. These two alone will concern us from now onwards. We shall start from the attitude toward truthfulness which we shall further refer to as the truth-concerned attitude.

3.1. The speaker can, first of all, phrase his sentence so as to imply the declaration *I do not state that (SP)*. This he does by using an alternative, e.g. *albo on mnie kocha, albo nie kocha* 'he either loves me or not' or *może kocha, może nie kocha* 'maybe he loves me, maybe not', these are generally jocular uses. The lack of any statement is also implied by the predicate *nie wiem* 'I do not know' and many other predicates, as well as by some subordinate conjunctions (e.g. *żeby* 'in order that', *gdyby* 'should it be that'). Nor does the speaker state anything about truthfulness when formulating a hypothetical proposition, e.g. *przypuszczam, że Piotr ma rację* 'I suppose Peter is right'; *prawdopodobnie Piotr ma rację* 'probably Peter is right'; *wątpię w to, czy Piotr ma rację* 'I doubt that Peter is right' (a hypothesis of negation)⁴.


On the other hand, when stating the truthfulness of (SP), i.e. when communicating his certainty that P is in reality a feature of S, the sender can either content himself with a non-marked message like *Piotr ma rację* 'Peter is right' or recur to marked structures such as *twierdzę że Piotr ma rację* 'I affirm that Peter is right'; *uwązam, że Piotr ma rację* 'I consider that Peter is right'. These structures contain performatives which, alongside with mere truth-

³ I use this term with the acception it has, among others, in E. Keenan, *A Logical Base for a Transformational Grammar of English*. T. D. A. Papers N 82, University of Pennsylvania: S' is a presupposition of S \leftrightarrow S logically implies S' and \sim S logically implies S'.

⁴ Uttering a hypothetical proposition distinct attitude of the speaker is no like stating or not stating the truthfulness of (SP). This is so because under negation a hypothetical proposition may come to express a truth-concerned statement: cf., e. g., *Nieprawda, że wątpię w to, czy Piotr ma rację* 'I do not doubt that Peter is right'. Thus the non-stating of truthfulness is not a presupposition of hypothetical propositions. Cf. below, p.

concerning statement, convey information about the speaker having thought them over and mentally tested them.

The above distinction can be diagrammed by the following tree:



Thus we can speak about the following truth-concerned attitudes:

- 1) stating the truthfulness — without additional qualifications,
- 2) confirmedly stating the truthfulness (e.g. *uwazam, ze...* 'I consider that...'),
- 3) hypothetical,
- 4) "null" — devoid of any statement or even hypothesis.

Among the speaker's attitudes toward truthfulness I do not include the opposition „assertion vs. negation”. Negation does not imply a statement and is able to occur also where no statement exists, e.g. in such sentences as *przypuszczam, ze Piotr nie wróci* 'I suppose Peter will not return' or *Piotrze, nie wracaj* 'Peter, do not return'. It is a mental operation or the effect of such operation performed on a (SP) yet unstated, not yet constituting a proposition. It concerns the relation, as viewed through the speaker's hypothetical thinking or his wish, between the counterparts of S and P in extra-linguistic reality. This so far non stating (SP) or \sim (SP) will only in its turn be situated by the speaker with regard to reality, i.e. will be evaluated by him as to the truthfulness of the corresponding proposition.

3.2 In the antecedent and the consequent clause of conditional periods (except those called counterfactual) there is of course no truth-concerned statement. Between such conditionals as

(7) *Jeżeli na Marsie są rośliny, to mają kolor fioletowy* 'if there are plants on Mars they are violet in colour' and

(8) *Jeżeliby na Marsie były rośliny, to miałyby kolor fioletowy* 'if there were plants on Mars they would be violet in colour' the difference is that in (7) the speaker's uncertainty is neuter while in (8) it is marked and reinforced through being communicated twice, by the mood as well as the conjunction. Cf. the doubled communication of a command or question in such structures as: *rozkazuję ci: milcz!* 'I bid you: be silent.'; *pytam cię: kto to był?* 'I want to know from you: who was it?'.

Only the so-called counterfactuals, i.e., as far as Polish is concerned, such structures as

(9) *Gdyby go Niemcy byli złapali, dawno by nie żył* 'if the Germans had caught him he would now long be dead' imply statements with denied predicates on both antecedent and consequent clause. The implications of sentence (9) are:

1. *The Germans did not catch him.*
2. *He is not dead.*

4.1 Let us now consider the varieties of volitive attitudes and the linguistic structures through which they are manifested. The sentence *chcę, żeby Piotr spał* 'I want Peter to sleep' communicates a will of the speaker which might be named positive as distinguished from his negative will: *nie chcę, żeby Piotr spał* 'I won't have Peter sleep'⁶. These are two distinct attitudes; negative *will not* always can be reduced to a simple negation of positive: *I won't have Peter sleep* means more than *it is not true that I want Peter to sleep*; in view of *I want Peter to sleep* it is not a negation but an opposite.

4.2. Positive will may aim at various (SP) -s. I may say *chcę, żeby Piotr spał* 'I want Peter to sleep' but I may also say *chcę spowodować, żeby Piotr spał* 'I want to cause Peter to sleep' (i.e. 'I want that I might cause that Peter might sleep')⁷. The latter seems to be very near the semantic structure of the imperative which contains besides an element of appeal. The imperative *śpij!* 'sleep!' does not necessarily imply the sentence *the sender wants the receiver to sleep*; what it does imply is *the sender wants by his utterance to cause the receiver to sleep*. This semantic structure of the imperative accounts for the existence of such utterances as the following: *Mówię ci: jedź! To wcale nie znaczy, że ja chcę, żebyś jechał. Nie chcę tego, ale wiem, że to konieczne, i dlatego jeszcze raz ci powtarzam: jedź!* 'I say: go! That doesn't at all mean I want you to go. I won't have it but I know you must, and that's why I repeat once more: go!' — By addressing his imperative *go!* to the receiver the speaker wants to cause the latter's departure which, however, he is far from wanting.

The distinctness of appeal, of 'I want you to act' from 'I want to cause' is best marked in the 3. Pers. Imper. where the appeal is to the receiver while the third person is to be caused to act. Cf. e.g. the sentence *Niech pan X przyjdzie jutro na konsultację* 'let Mr X come tomorrow for consultation' of which the receiver is Mr Y. Mr Y is to act so as to help the speaker in causing Mr X to do the action which the speaker wants to cause (though, maybe, he again doesn't want it to occur).

4.3. In a question the speaker's will aims at a message from the receiver: *I want you to tell me whether...*⁸ Another implication of a question is the sen-

⁵ These examples are discussed by T. Lomtev in his paper *Sistema modalnych grammatyckich kategorii predloženiya* published in the volume *Sesja Naukowa Międzynarodowej Komisji Budowy Gramatycznej Języków Słowiańskich*, Wrocław 1971, 101–109. To T. Lomtev, partly in accordance with tradition, the sentences at issue exemplify the opposition of real vs. hypotheticalal.

⁶ Cf. A. Wierzbicka, *l. cit.*, 93 s. While agreeing on this point with A. Wierzbicka, I interpret the imperative in a way somewhat different from hers (cf., e. g., *l. cit.*, p. 38: *Come here!* = *I want you to come here*) and from I. Beller's, cf. *Niektóre postawy modalne w interpretacji semantycznej wypowiedzeń*. *Sesja Naukowa...*, 159.


⁷ By *I want to* I mean the will of the speaker leaving out of account any limitation that might result from outward necessity.

⁸ The speaker may of course merely pretend to want a message from the receiver. Stil

lence: *I suppose that you may know it* (= that there is a possibility of your knowing it)⁹. Setting didactic questions¹⁰ aside the sentence *I do not know whether...* can be looked upon as a third implication.

4.4. Volitive modality is sometimes taken as a subclass of zero truth-concerned modality.¹¹ Sure enough every sentence with *I want* or *I want to cause* presupposes the lack of any statement by the speaker on the reality of (SP). Thus if we were to classify the modal attitudes by all of their consequences — presuppositions as well as implications (which are their opposite and change under negation) we might start by dividing them into such of: A. statement of truthfulness and B. non-statement, placing the volitive attitude within B alone. In this paper, however, the classification of attitudes is not based on presuppositions, so volitive attitude is situated on a par with truth-concerned.

The classificatory scheme of sentences with volitive elements would thus be the following:



Structures like *proszę cię żebyś milczał* 'I beg you to be silent', *rozkazuję ci milczeć* 'I bid you to be silent', *pytam cię, czy zamilknieš w końcu* 'I ask you

like all linguists, I am setting aside the problem of lies and deal with the speaker's will such as he presents it in his message.

⁹ In I. Bellert (*l. cit.*, 167) this consequence goes as follows: 'The sender supposes that the receiver knows...'. This, however, would not suit the situation in which we put the same question to every person we meet not because we think he knows (e. g., where X-street is) but because we suppose or hope he may know, etc.

¹⁰ Cf. K. Ajdukiewicz, *Zdania pytajne*. — *Język i poznanie*, vol. I, 1960, 278—286.

¹¹ Cf., e. g., I. Pete, *Typy syntaktycznej modalności w ruskom jazyke*, *Studia Slavica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, v. XVI, 1970, 224.

whether you will fall silent at last' are another type of appealing structures. Here, however, in distinction from *milcz!* 'be silent' or *czy zamilknieiesz w końcu?* 'will you at last fall silent?' the appealing attitude is explicitly announced by the speaker. Hence the possibility of such sentences as *ja nie pytam cię, nie proszę, ale rozkazuję ci, żebyś milczał* 'I do not question or beg but bid you to be silent'. Here the negation concerns the announcement: 'I do not announce you a question or an entreaty but a command'. Similarly *to nie prawda, że cię proszę o pomoc* 'it is not true that I am asking your help' means 'it is not true that I announce you that I am asking your help'. With other, i.e. non-appealing, verbs negation concerns directly the predicate of the sentence, e.g. *mówię wiersz* 'I am saying a poem'; vs. *to nieprawda, że mówię wiersz* 'It is not true that I am saying a poem'; *cieszę się z wyjazdu* 'I have pleasure in leaving' vs. *nie cieszę się z wyjazdu, ale przyjmuję go jako zło konieczne* 'I have no pleasure in leaving but I accept it as a necessary evil'.

5.1. Truth-concerned and volitive attitude can be communicated on the surface (in the Slavic languages) by the following linguistic devices:

1. special verbs

a) in the 1. Pers. Sg. Ind. Pres., the other predicate being part either of the same clause (*Chcę wyjechać* 'I want to leave') or of the verb phrase in a subordinate clause (*Chcę, żeby Piotr wyjechał* 'I want Peter to leave', litt.: "I want that Peter might leave")

b) in other persons, e. g. *Kowalscy mogą się spóźnić* 'the Kowalskis may just as well be late',

2. special verbal moods, e.g. *odchodzę* 'I am leaving' vs. *odejść!* 'leave',

3. special modal words, e.g. *prawdopodobnie zapomniał* 'he probably forgot'.

In this paper the speaker's attitudes are discussed at the level of deep structures, which here means such paraphrases as to express each attitude by an explicit predicate, while compound predicates, such as *chcę wyjechać* 'I want to leave' are viewed as structures of the type (*ja*) *chcę, żebym (ja) wyjechał* 'I want that I might leave'.

The predicates used here can be replaced by metalinguistic symbols, e.g.:

I state the truthfulness	ver
I state the confirmed truthfulness	ver +
I make the hypothesis	hyp
I do not state	~ ver
I want	vel
I do not want	~ vel
I want to cause	vel caus
I want a message	vel com
appeal	ap

Still, such symbols are but an operational device of secondary importance and themselves require explanation in a definite natural language.

5.2. The attitudes here discussed are the undeniable core of what is called modality. Whether the notion of modality should also include the evaluative and emotional attitudes, as well as negation and the attitudes toward the receiver (announcement vs. appeal), is a matter of convention. It might perhaps be convenient to have one term to denote any attitude of the speaker

expressed within a sentence, a term which could be further differentiated through added qualifications.

The notion of modal verbs as a lexical class is determined by their ability to express, in a sentence, one of the speaker's attitudes recognized as modal. This ability is usually peculiar to the 1 Pers. Sg. Ind. Pres.¹² The other forms will generally ascribe the attitude in question not to the speaker but to the subject of the sentence, e. g. *chciałem zostać malarzem* 'I wanted to become a painter', *Piotr chce zostać malarzem* 'Peter wants to become a painter'. If this be so, then e.g. the verb *chcieć* 'to want' whatever its inflexional form belongs to the lexical class of modal verbs, while alone its form *chcę* 'I want' is an exponent of subjective modality (I); the other forms of the same verb express a kind of modality which might be named objectivized (II). Within subjective modality two further subtypes might be distinguished: the former of these (I. 1) is sentence modality, which might itself be subdivided into R-relating modality (I. 1.a — truth-concerned or volitive)¹³ and evaluative/emotional modality (I. 1. b). The other subtype of subjective modality (I. 2) might be termed utterance modality. It would include the types distinguished above as annunciative or appealing.

¹² Apart from modal verbs such as *może* ('may', 'can'), *ma* ('is to'), *musi* ('must') which in some of their meanings communicate the attitude of the speaker irrespective of their inflexional form.

¹³ The division into predicative and dictal modality, as suggested by P. Adamec in his report: *Vztahy mezi modálností a aktuálním členěním* is relevant to the analysis of surface structure but ceases to exist in deep structure.

¹⁴ I would acknowledge my thankfulness to Irena Bellert and Adam Weinsberg for a number of relevant critical suggestions. To Adam Weinsberg I am also indebted for the English translation of this paper.

