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Γιαν Κόουρα. Διχοτομημένη Νήσος: Ψυχρός Πόλεμος και Κυπριακό την Περίοδο 1960–1974 [Jan Koura. *Partitioned Island: The Cold War and the Cyprus Problem in the Period 1960–1974*]. Μετάφραση Κώστας Τσίβος. Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Αλεξάνδρεια, 2021, 224 σελ. ISBN 978-960-221-922-5.

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Jan Koura's book *Διχοτομημένη Νήσος: Ψυχρός Πόλεμος και Κυπριακό την περίοδο 1960–1974* [*Partitioned Island: The Cold War and the Cyprus Problem in the Period 1960–1974*] is a thorough analysis of the Cyprus problem. The author analyses the dispute in conjunction with the overall atmosphere of the Cold War and the polarisation and separation of the world into Western and Eastern Blocs. Beyond the well-discussed role of the West and the two “motherlands” – which has been discussed extensively in the past by others – the author exploits the wealth of recently released declassified documents and analyses the role of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. In contrast to the Americans, who saw Makarios as a threat to their interests in the vital region of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Eastern Bloc saw Makarios as a basic factor for the island's independence. The book is now available to a wider readership thanks to Kostas Tsivos' translation into Greek from the Czech original (*Rozdělený ostrov: Studená válka a kyperská otázka v letech 1960–1974*).

In the prologue, the author aptly explains that the Cyprus problem and the partition of the island in 1974 should be seen in connection with a developing nationalism and other international factors: the island's colonial past, the Cold War and the conflicting interests of the two great powers (the USA and the USSR), and of course the critical role played by the two “motherlands”. The author's comment that the highest priority of American foreign policy was to maintain the stability of NATO, in particular its eastern flank, reflects the situation.

The author also explains the importance of the declassified documents and how they helped observers in the past to explore the role of the United States in the dispute. However, other documents remain classified. The author proposes a new approach to the Cyprus problem and goes beyond the one-dimensional analysis that saw the United States as the sole critical factor. The author examines the role of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia during 1960–1974 through recently declassified documents, with a special focus on the 1966 agreement

between Cyprus and Czechoslovakia for military equipment. The author also focuses on Makarios' political decision to join the Non-Aligned Movement.

In the chapter "At the Intersection of Three Continents", the author refers to the Greek roots of the island, which go back to 1400 BCE, and how a Turkish minority of 18 % had been created many years later – during the era of Ottoman rule (1571–1878). The author also explains that during the era of British rule that succeeded Ottoman rule, the British saw the island as an important pillar of their geopolitical interests in the area.

In the following chapter, "Under British Rule", the author expands on the role and actions of the British. Although the British had controlled Cyprus since 1878, they annexed the island in 1914 and proclaimed it a Crown Colony in 1925. Despite the initial actions by the British to create a common Cypriot identity, the two communities sought attachment to their "motherlands". Later, the British abandoned any attempts in this direction and built on the policy of "divide and rule", a policy that facilitated the Turkish Cypriots' collaboration with the British colonists. The author's references to political developments in Greece and other developments in world politics are very informative and shed light on the Cyprus crisis. In particular, the author focuses on the polarisation between the right and the left in the 1940s, which led to the Greek Civil War and the Truman doctrine of 1947. The latter was basically American financial support for Greece and Turkey to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence and communism. As the author rightly asserts, with the end of the Greek Civil War and the defeat of the communists, Greece became part of the Western sphere of influence, with the US playing a key role in the international developments of the wider region.

The chapter "The Eastern Mediterranean in the Swirl of the Cold War" deals with the way the Eastern Mediterranean was affected by the atmosphere of the Cold War and the conflicting interests of the two superpowers. With the Suez Crisis in 1956 and Gamal Abdel Nasser's decision to nationalise the canal, the US was particularly concerned that the Soviet Union would seek to expand its sphere of influence into the critical area of the Near East. Thus, Cyprus became even more important to Western interests.

In the chapter "From *Enosis* to Independence", the author explains that in the 1950s the Orthodox Church and AKEL, the communist party, aligned with the policy of *enosis*; consequently, the greatest part of Greek Cypriot society expressed a desire for union of the island with Greece. Although *enosis* was the Greek Cypriots' ardent desire, it was opposed by all other parties: the British, the Turkish government, and of course the Turkish Cypriot community. As regards the Greek government, it did not see *enosis* warmly. As the author aptly explains, things changed only when Papagos showed an interest in the claim of *enosis*.

The author's references to Makarios' and Grivas' personalities are also very useful in understanding political developments on the island. In particular, the author notes Makarios' charisma in politics as, even though he was a priest, he did not go against the left and saw the necessity of their collaboration. On the other hand, as the author explains, Grivas was a supporter of the 4th of August Regime and known for his anti-communist beliefs and action during the 1940s, when he founded an anti-communist organisation. Despite their different philosophies, Grivas came to Cyprus in 1954 on Makarios' invitation to start his anti-colonial rebellion. Their organisation EOKA (*Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston*) started its operations in 1955, and in response the Turkish Cypriots founded their organisation to achieve *taksim* (partition) with the name *Volkan* – later renamed TMT (*Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı*). For the year when *Volkan* started its operations, the author gives 1956. According to other sources, however, *Volkan* started its action in 1955.¹

The author's reference to the Macmillan Plan and his claim that Ankara agreed to the plan, despite some initial hesitations, should be read against other accounts that say that Ankara rejected the plan.² Perhaps this is a point that needs further examination and analysis.

In this chapter, the author analyses Makarios' turn to independence in 1958, the result of his political aspirations and realism. The author also describes the Treaty of Establishment briefly, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Guarantee – the three important pillars of the Republic of Cyprus. The author's statement that the British military bases were a priority for the US is indicative of US interests in the region. In addition, the author explains that the constitution was not properly planned and resulted in turbulence, as it provided the Turkish Cypriot community with disproportionate rights, bearing in mind the size of their community. Thus, the Greek Cypriots sought a review of the constitution.

In the chapter "Cuba of the Mediterranean", the author engages in the way Cyprus sought the middle way between the West and the East. Critical to this direction was Makarios' decision to join the Non-Aligned Movement. Although the Cyprus government had not developed any particular bonds with the Eastern Bloc initially, this state of affairs changed. The Americans, who considered the island important for their strategic interests and their anti-communist policy, were concerned about this new situation and the fact that the island developed a trade relationship with the Soviets. As the author also explains, the Americans were also concerned about the presence and role of AKEL.

1 See Salih (2004: 2).

2 See Assos (2020: 196).

The author explains that Makarios saw his co-operation with the Cypriot communists as a necessity, given that they shared the same foreign policy for an independent and non-aligned Cyprus. Naturally, the Americans viewed Makarios' policy and his collaboration with the Cypriot communists with scepticism. On the other hand, the Soviets sought to strengthen their relationship with Cyprus and develop economic relations, while Czechoslovakia tried to exploit its good relations with AKEL in order to prevent American influence on the island.

In the next chapter, "Thirteen Proposals", the author deals with Makarios' intention for a review of the constitution. According to the author, Makarios' goal was the unification of the Cypriot state, but he did not take into consideration the opposition of some members of his government and did not consult with Greece. After Makarios' decision for thirteen amendments to the constitution, intercommunal violence between the two Cypriot communities erupted in 1963-1964. The Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries sought to exploit the explosive atmosphere and the potential rift between two important NATO allies: Greece and Turkey.

In the chapter "The Most Serious Crisis after the Caribbean one", the author explains how the Soviets were further involved in the internal affairs of Cyprus – against American interests. In addition, the author refers to Papandreou's decision in 1964 to send a Greek division to the island to protect it from Turkish intervention. A decision for a Turkish military action was made by Ankara some months later, but the Johnson letter came as a critical and deterrent factor. As the author explains, in addition to humanitarian reasons Ankara had more to protect as the island was important for the defence of the country and its NATO objectives.

The chapter "Towards a New Solution" revolves around the circumstances that "forced" Makarios to seek support from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. The author rightly asserts that Makarios' turn to the Eastern Bloc made the US see the existence of an independent Cyprus as a threat to their interests. The Acheson Plan was proposed as a solution, which would serve American interests, and envisaged union of the island with Greece and territorial compensations for Turkey; however, it was not seen positively by Makarios. In addition, as the author explains, the decision of the Greek government (the Papandreou government) to give Grivas increased military responsibilities was meant to counterbalance Makarios' power on the island. The Americans also started thinking about a replacement for Makarios and there is evidence of that in American and British declassified documents.

In the chapter “Prelude to a Catastrophe”, the author refers to the visit by Glafkos Clerides (the President of the Cypriot House of Representatives) to Czechoslovakia in 1966, after Makarios’ decision to discuss the purchase of military equipment – a decision that led to reactions by Ankara, Athens, and the Americans. As the author explains, Makarios wanted to equip the police forces, as the military forces were controlled by the Greek government to a very great extent. If anything, Koura’s analysis shows that the penetration of Athens into Cyprus’ military forces had started before the dictatorship of the colonels (the junta). In this chapter, the author also refers to the background story of this order for military equipment and how the Soviets intervened for the cancellation of the second part. The author also analyses the circumstances that led to the Greek military regime in Greece.

The author also refers to General Grivas’ role in the intercommunal violence of 1967–1968 and rightly states that Grivas possibly prepared the attack on the Turkish Cypriot communities of Agios Theodoros and Kofinou in advance. Nevertheless, the author’s claim that “everything started with the invasion by the Greek Cypriot forces” needs further analysis. In fact, TMT forces had been stationed in the area and blocked the main road from Nicosia to Limassol. Moreover, the word ‘invasion’ (‘εισβολή’ in the Greek translation) that is used in the book suggests an intervention – a military operation from outside – which was not the case for the crisis of 1967–1968. In addition, even if one assumes that these villages were mainly inhabited by Turkish Cypriots, they were still the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. Perhaps the word ‘attack’ would describe the situation here better.

The chapter “Everyone Against ‘the Red Priest’” is also very critical and discusses the efforts of the Americans to replace Makarios. The author also explains that the junta returned to the idea of *enosis*, even if this policy had been abandoned by Makarios. Thus, Grivas became the vehicle of this ideology in Cyprus and his organisation, EOKA B, became the incarnation of *enosis* in the 1970s. Since Makarios could not trust the Greek Cypriot military forces, which were controlled by the military regime of Athens, he sought to gain military equipment from Czechoslovakia. The author’s use of Czech archives is very productive and constructive and sheds light on the role of Czechoslovakia and its increased influence in Cyprus in the 1970s.

In the chapter “The Route Towards the Coup”, the author makes mention of Kissinger’s role and asserts that the American Secretary of State and National Security Advisor adopted an approach that one could characterise as “historical realism”. According to the author, this American approach was expressed through the politics of “*détente*”, while at the same time the US was very careful

with the eastern flank of NATO. Against the several conspiracy theories that flourished after the coup by the Greek junta and the Turkish invasion, the author is right to say that Washington's role in the Cyprus crisis remains "unspecified" – despite some pieces of information Kissinger had about a possible coup. The author is right to say that Washington underestimated the explosive potential and the entire situation on the island.

In the same chapter, the author also refers to the role of the CIA, which also remains "unspecified". Interestingly, the author explains that there were certain CIA agents of Greek origin who were based in Greece. The most likely scenario is that they were driven by personal incentives rather than following a formal American policy. The author cites Drousiotis and this gives validity to his view, as he cites another prominent source. The author's statement that Nicos Sampson, the *de facto* "president", was "an active member" of EOKA B should be read against other historiographies that describe Sampson as a passionate supporter of *enosis* – but without any involvement in EOKA B and the coup against Makarios.³

The next chapter is titled "Partitioned Island", which is very descriptive of the new situation after the Turkish invasion. The author aptly asserts that Washington maintained a controversial stance and did not condemn the coup. This American attitude was looked at with scepticism even by the Turkish press, which accused Washington of collaboration with the Athens military regime. In contrast, as the author explains, the Soviets condemned the coup and supported Makarios and the territorial sovereignty of Cyprus. The author is right to say that if the first stage of the Turkish invasion took place within the framework of the London-Zürich Agreements, the second stage of the invasion cannot be seen in the framework of any international agreement; it is similar with Ankara's decision to transfer settlers to the occupied parts of the island.

When the author refers to Güneş's proposal, perhaps a clarification is needed that this took place in the framework of the Second Geneva Conference (10–14 August). In addition to the proposal of the Turkish Foreign Minister, the Turks came with another proposal by the Turkish Cypriot Leader, Denktash, for two federal states: a Greek one and a Turkish one.

The short chapter "Epilogue Without End" explains that there was still tension between Greece and Turkey, despite Karamanlis' decision to put an end to *enosis*. The author also refers briefly to the unilateral proclamation of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", an illegitimate state that is only recognised by Turkey; the Annan Plan in 2004; and the 2017 negotiations – where

3 Drousiotis (2002: 413).

Antonio Guterres, the UN General Secretary, played the role of mediator. The chapter ends with the interesting claim that the Attila line can be characterised as a remnant of the Cold War.

Finally, in the epilogue the author summarises his research and asserts that one is inclined to focus on national, ideological, and international politics to identify the reasons for the partition. The roots of the problem go back in history, and beyond the role of the two communities one should also take into consideration the role of third parties. Notably, the involvement of Czechoslovakia, which the author analyses through the wealth of declassified documents, is a new element and an important outcome in research on the Cyprus problem.

Koura's *Partitioned Island* is an insightful study with a very rich bibliography. The analysis by the author is based on declassified documents, other archival sources, memoirs, the press, books, studies, and articles. This is an informative book, which meets its goals and the reader's expectations - highly recommended for specialists in the Cyprus problem and the different ethnic conflicts and lovers of history in general. This is a study that could be used as source material for a future historian.

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Κωνσταντίνος Τσίβος

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Στην ελληνική βιβλιογραφία σπάνια μελέτες ασχολούνται με τη νεότερη ιστορία της Τσεχοσλοβακίας, πόσο μάλλον με τα γεγονότα του 1968 που έμειναν γνωστά ως Άνοιξη της Πράγας. Το κρινόμενο βιβλίο αποτελεί την πρώτη απόπειρα