A NOTE ON THE *TO*-ADJUNCT AND THE *FOR*-ADJUNCT IN THEIR EVALUATIVE USE

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In a series of studies (1968, 1972 and partly also 1959) Ivan Poldauf directed his attention to evaluative predications, which he submitted to a revealing and thought-provoking analysis.

In his conception, the general idea of evaluation is "*y* strikes *x* as being so--and-so" or, in wider terms, "*x* finds (regards) *y* (as) so-and-so". This implies "immediate, necessarily apprehended, not merely sensuous, positive or negative, effect on man" (Poldauf 1968.2-4), which evidently represents a constitutive semantic feature in the evaluative predication.

An important role in the evaluative predication is played by the evaluator, the bearer of the evaluative attitude or reaction. The evaluator is implemented by a noun/pronoun (+ human) in the syntactic positions of subject or direct object or by a noun/pronoun in a *by*-adjunct or a *to/for*-adjunct. This raises a number of problems, one of which, as pointed by Poldauf, is the use of the prepositions *to* and *for* "under conditions not quite clear" (Poldauf 1972.85). The present paper is a modest attempt to throw some light on this particular problem. It will focus its attention on the evaluators of the types that may be called adjectival evaluative predication (*it is interesting for me*) and verbal evaluative predication (*it smells nice to me, it appeals to me*).

The process of evaluation may be projected on an axis, one pole of which is taken up by a stimulus (the phenomenon to be evaluated on account of the set of its properties) and the other by the evaluator (the receiver and decoder of the signals suggested by the stimulus).

A. Adjectival evaluative predications

In dealing with the adjectival evaluative predications let us first concentrate on those containing the *to*-adjunct, for instance: *The play is surprising/amazing/ interesting/astonishing to me.* As they effect a mutation in the evaluator's state of mind (*The play made me surprised/amazed*, etc.), the adjectives *surprising, amazing*, etc. may be called 'effect-producing'.

In opposition to the surprising type of adjective, adjectives such as *rude, kind, helpful, careful, naughty, good*, etc. refer to "transitory conditions of behaviour or activity" (Quirk et al. 1985.75). Hence, if added, the *to*-adjunct denotes a patient affected rather than an evaluator proper (*John was rude to me, John*

was rude towards me — *towards* accentuating the transitory character of the be-haviour).

In regard to the evaluative axis mentioned above, the examples adduced are to be interpreted in the following way. The stimulus pole of the axis is taken up by *the play/John,* and the evaluative pole by *me.* The dynamic relationship be-tween the poles is established by the property (e.g., 'surprising', 'rude') effecting an evaluative reaction in the evaluator ('me'). The verbalization of these facts foregrounds the directional, and hence dynamic, character of evaluation. The directional *to* completes this act of foregrounding.

In addition to the adjectival evaluative predications employing the *to*-adjunct, there exist adjectival evaluative predications employing the *for*-adjunct, for in-stance: *It is interesting for me, It is surprising for me.* The fact that certain ad-jectives admit the use of either of these prepositions, while others admit only one of the two, establishes a justifiable basis for the assumption that the choice between the *to*-adjunct and the *for*-adjunct is not fully lexically conditioned and may be explained in terms of semantic generalizations. It seems that whereas *to* effects what may be termed 'internalization', *for* effects what may be termed 'externalization'. In other words, *to* refers to internal conditions and *for* to ex-ternal conditions in the evaluator's mind (at least as perceived by the evalua-tor). The preposition *for,* on account of its potentiality to effect externalization, can thus also refer to external circumstances in which the evaluator finds him-self.

Consider:

It is important for me to read technical books. It is important to me to read tech-nical books. (The choice of preposition, bringing about a slight difference in meaning, depends on the subjective conception on the part of the evaluator.)

He is a nuisance to us. It is a nuisance for us. (The quality is nominalized.)

It is strange for me to be back here again. It is strange to me to hear him say that . . .

It is pleasant for me to see you again. She made herself pleasant to the visitors (and also *pleasant to the eye, to the taste*). The adjectives *difficult, easy, tragic* combine with *for* because they refer to external conditions in the evaluator's mind, while *pleasing, agreeable, appealing* combine with *to.*[1] *Clear* and *known/ unknown,* in comparison with these adjectives, do not combine with *for* either, but on account of their semantic contents they represent a rather special case and hence will be dealt with in greater detail. In *It is clear to me* the semantic role of the evaluator is agentivized; it acts not only as a receiver but also as a decoder of the signals in the sense that it presupposes intellectual effort and hence suggests the meaning of "I understand it". Nevertheless, the recipient character of the evaluator remains dominant. The evaluator assumes the syntac-tic position of lower order, i.e. that of a prepositional adjunct, as opposed to the higher position of its more active counterpart, i.e. the subject. (Note the role of the directional preposition *to.*)

With *It is known to me* the situation seems rather complicated. Superficially, it is a passivized counterpart of *I know it.* However, the existence of *It is known by me* induces us to interpret *It is known to me* against the background not of *I know it,* but of *It is known by me.* On account of the presence of the direction-al *to*-adjunct, the construction *It is known to me* is clearly recipient and inter-nalized. These two features, recipiency and internalization, bring it close to the sphere of impression represented by such constructions as *It is known/familiar to me, It strikes me as familiar.* (For a discussion of this type, see the section

'Verbal evaluative predication through impression' below.) This interpretation leads us to correlate *I know it* not with *It is known to me,* but with *It is known by me.*[2]

It seems that only an adjective indicating a change (of whatever kind) in the evaluator's mind can link with an evaluative adjunct, a *to*-adjunct denoting an evaluator internalizing the change and a *for*-adjunct externalizing the change. To illustrate: something can be *important for/to us, tragic for us, appealing to us,* but cannot be *red/beautiful for/to us;* nor can somebody be *clever/intelligent for/to us.*

It is, however, worth noting that the constructions *too red (beautiful, clever, intelligent) for us* or *(too) long, expensive, small, high for us* are meaningful and grammatical. A closer look at the adjectives used reveals that they do not suggest a mutation in the person's mind, in other words they do not convey the semantic feature of "immediate, necessarily apprehended, not merely sensuous, positive or negative, effect on man" (Poldauf 1968.4). The *for*-adjunct no longer expresses a person experiencing a mutation in his/her mind — an evaluator — but a person who expresses his/her judgment about the degree of the intensity of a quality and in this sense acts as a delimitator. In consequence, the constructions under discussion no longer operate in the sphere of evaluation, but have entered the sphere of delimitation. They do not admit of the *to*-adjunct, but accept the *for*-adjunct only. In the light of the internalization/externalization distinction discussed above, the use of the preposition *for* in delimitation is easily understandable: *for,* on account of its capacity of co-expressing externalization, also refers to external circumstances around a person.[3]

At the close of the discussion of the adjectival evaluative predications it may not be out of place to recall one important fact borne out by this discussion. Adjectives form a hierarchy with systemic relations that cannot be described within the framework of independent lexical entries.

B. Verbal evaluative predications

In dealing with verbal evaluative predications, our attention will once again be focused on predications containing an adjunct that expresses an evaluator and is introduced by *to* or *for.* An analysis of such predications makes it possible to establish two distinct types that can be referred to as (a) verbal evaluative predication through perception and (b) verbal evaluative predication through impression. Apart from these two types a somewhat heterogeneous group, to be dealt with here under (c), is formed by a small number of verbs taking an evaluative *to*-adjunct, but expressing neither evaluation through perception, nor evaluation through impression. Finally, special attention will be paid to the verb *find* because of its evident relationship to the verbs under discussion.

(a) Verbal evaluative predication through perception

This type can be exemplified by such constructions as *It smells nice to me, It tastes good to me, It looks good to me, It sounds good to me.*

In terms of the evaluative axis, evaluation through perception can be characterized as follows. The evaluator, implemented by a *to*-adjunct, functions as a receiver and decoder of signals through sensory organs. The clearly recipient character of the evaluator excludes an agentivizing interpretation, for the perception (i.e. the receiving of signals) involves a comparatively low degree of

mental processing. (Note also the directional and internalizing role of the preposition *to*.) Though by no means inoperative, mental processing asserts itself to a low degree owing to the dominantly recipient role of the sensory organs. This is reflected by the evaluator assuming a syntactic status of lower order, i.e. one of a prepositional adjunct, as opposed to the higher status of its more active counterpart, i.e. the subject. The subject status of the evaluator (as in *I can smell something burning, Do you smell anything unusual?*) relegates the feature of recipiency to the background, foregrounding the operation of mental processing to a comparatively higher degree.

The counterparts *It has a nice smell, It has a good taste*, etc. of the evaluative perceptive predications *It smells nice, It tastes good*, etc., have essentially identical cognitive contents (cf. Daneš 1968.61) but differ in linguistic presentation (Daneš ibid.). In *It has a nice smell*, etc., the phenomenon perceived is, in opposition to its dynamic presentation as an emitter of signals in *It smells nice,* presented as a static phenomenon, as a set of properties.

The difference in meaning shows up in cooccurrence restrictions: while it is possible to say *It smells nice to me, It has a nice smell to me* is unacceptable. There are two reasons for this unacceptability: (i) on account of its static character *It has a nice smell* cannot link with the dynamic directional *to*-adjunct; (ii) *It has a nice smell* can be regarded, in accordance with Mathesius, as a possessive qualification[4] (see Mathesius 1975.114-8). This type of qualification presupposes a certain degree of generalization, which entails a certain degree of objectivization. It follows that on account of its objectivizing character *It has a nice smell* cannot combine with the internalizing subjectivizing directional *to*-adjunct.

These two cooccurrence restrictions do not apply to the *for*-adjunct, which owing to its externalizing feature can also operate within the sphere of objectivization. This is why, in contrast with the *to*-adjunct, the *for*-adjunct can appear in such constructions as *It is a surprising play for me, It is a clear message for me* (as a marginal case).

At this point, the question may be raised of the function of the *to*-disjunct and its correlation with the *to*-adjunct. The function of the *to*-disjunct is to identify the person reacting (Quirk et al. 1985.712): it expresses the bearer of the evaluative reaction, which it introduces. Simultaneously, it naturally expresses the bearer of a point of view. On account of its introductory position in the sentence, it functions as an element not firmly integrated in the syntactic configuration of the sentence shaping the meaning of the sentence as a whole. It is thus possible to say *To me, it has a nice smell/it is a surprising play/it is a clear message*, etc.

(b) Verbal evaluative predication through impression

We have already touched upon the concept of impression and its relation to the *to*-adjunct in the construction *It is known to me*, which was characterized as coming close to the sphere of impression.

Evaluative predication through impression is exemplified by such expressions as *seem/appear/look/sound* + *to*-adjunct (*look* and *sound* function as impression-indicating devices only metaphorically: *It looks very suspicious to me, It doesn't look to me as if we shall get there in time*).[5]

Impression is tentatively defined as mental content not firmly anchored in the person's mind due to low-degree intellectual processing of the phenomenon (phenomena) "processed" (a term introduced by Halliday 1968.193).

In the examples adduced above, the evaluator is introduced in the *to*-adjunct, which foregrounds the receiving phase in the processing of signals. Both the phase of receiving signals and that of decoding them (cf. what has been said on the evaluative axis on p. 138) are linked with low-degree intellectual processing. This yields the constitutive semantic feature of the evaluation through impression.

An interesting case of evaluation through impression is also represented by an impersonal construction with the prepositional verb *strike as: He strikes me as pompous/friendly, It strikes me as difficult/familiar,* etc. This impression-denoting construction does not admit of every type of characterization: the impossibility of *he strikes me as a friend* as opposed to the possibility of *I regard him as a friend* and *he strikes me as friendly* has attracted Chomsky's attention but has not been explained by him in semantic terms. He claims that "the close meaning relation between *regard* and *strike* . . . does not determine a corresponding similarity of distributional restrictions" (Chomsky 1965.229). Poldauf explains the unacceptability of *John strikes me as a friend* by the fact that *John is a friend* is a classification, whereas *John is friendly* is an evaluation.

Nevertheless, the acceptability of *John strikes me as a brilliant strategist, John strikes me as a miser,* etc. induces us to take a closer look at the relation between impression and classification.

Zimek (1963.76) states that in some cases class membership may also express qualification: *on je dobrák (he is a good-natured man), on je lakomec (he is a miser).* But *John is a friend* has not been arrived at via a mere nominalization of the corresponding adjective, since we cannot establish a semantic correlation between *friendly* and *friend* (*přátelský* and *přítel* in Czech) of the same kind as between *dobrý* and *dobrák* (*good/kind* and *good-natured man*), since, as a characterization, *a friend* involves a considerably higher degree of intellectual processing. In *John is a brilliant strategist* the quality ascribed to *John,* being outwardly manifested, is easily susceptible to impression. Compare also the possibility of *he strikes me as a miser, he strikes me as a good-natured man.*

To sum up. On account of the quality being outwardly manifested, genuine qualification (*he is friendly*) and qualification via classification (*he is a brilliant strategist, he is a miser, he is a good-natured man*) are easily reworded and enter into the impression-denoting construction *strike as.*

Classification (*he is a friend, he is a baker,* etc.) requires a considerably higher degree of intellectual processing than qualification. Furthermore, within qualification itself, two degrees of intellectual processing can be established. Qualification through classification requires a higher degree of intellectual processing than genuine qualification. This is due to the fact that, as it denotes a relatively permanent quality, qualification through classification (*he is a kind man*) presupposes generalization and hence a higher degree of intellectual processing than genuine qualification (*he is kind*), which potentially denotes no more than a temporary quality.

The scale thus created, reflecting a gradual decrease in intellectual processing, will be as follows:

classification − qualification via classification (referring to permanent quality) − qualification (referring to temporary quality).

As they involve high-degree intellectual processing, the evaluative verbs of the *regard* type will accept classification. By intuitive judgment, they express what we may call evaluation through reflection. They no longer operate within the sphere of evaluation through impression.

(c) Verbal evaluative predication taking an evaluative *to*-adjunct, but expressing neither evaluation through perception nor evaluation through impression.

This somewhat heterogeneous group is exemplified by a relatively small number of verbs (verbal phrases) such as *mean a lot (a great deal, everything)/matter/appeal to.*

Among these evaluative verbs (verbal phrases), employing the preposition *to*, the evaluator in the verb *appeal to* appears of special interest. Its semantic status will be considered against the background of the verbs (i) *please* and (ii) *like*, to which the verb (iii) *appeal to* is evidently semantically related.

(i) *Music pleases John*

In the light of the evaluative axis and the internalization/externalization distinction, *Music pleases John* yields the following interpretation. The stimulus pole of the axis is taken up by music, playing an active role (note its subject-status). It serves as an origin[6] of the evaluator's mental process, bringing about a mutation in his mind. The relation between the two poles of the axis is presented as transitory, passing from the phenomenon evaluated (*music*) to the evaluator (*John*). Due to the phenomenon evaluated functioning as an external causer "affecting" the evaluator (termed the 'recipient of affection' by Daneš 1968.61), the mental process (the conditions in the evaluator's mind) is presented as externalized.

(ii) *John likes music*

The evaluator here, a 'bearer of attitude' (see Daneš 1968.61), is presented as an "originator" of mental process (evaluation) in that the process originates in him (note its syntactic status − that of a subject), and comes back to him (is apprehended by him) in the form of evaluative reaction, which covers (refers to) the phenomenon evaluated (*music*). The phenomenon evaluated no longer functions as a sender of signals, but as a 'scope' of one's reaction (see Halliday 1968.193) or 'object of attitude' (see Daneš 1968.61). The conditions in the evaluator's state of mind are thus presented as internalized.

This does not, however, mean that the function of the scope of evaluative reaction as a stimulus of evaluation on account of the set of its properties is being denied. It only means that the facts of reality may be viewed in different ways, from different angles, and consequently worded in different ways. In fact, the dynamic relationship 'phenomenon evaluated' (as a stimulus) − 'evaluator' (as a receiver and decoder of signals) represents a presupposition of *John likes music,* which otherwise would not come into existence. The sentence *John likes music* is a linguistic presentation of the second (possible) phase of evaluation, i.e. the processing phase of evaluation resulting in an evaluative attitude. Schematically:

$$\begin{array}{c} \textit{likes} \\ \textit{music} \longleftarrow \textit{John} \\ \text{stimulus} \xrightarrow[\textit{pleases}]{} \text{receiver, decoder} - \text{processor} \end{array}$$

As Daneš pointed out (1968.61), the verbs *please* and *like* refer to an identical event, but the linguistic presentation is clearly different.

Although the evaluators in both the verbs *like* and *please* are 'affected',[7] the evaluator in *John likes music* assumes a more active role in that he functions as an originator of the evaluative reaction. It is not, however, within the scope of this paper to discuss the degree of "agentivity" in *I like* and the related verbs.

(iii) *Music appeals to John*

The internalization of one's evaluative reaction (mental process), signalled by means of the internalizing *to*, induces us to correlate this type with the *John likes music* type. The evaluators in both types function as 'processors' (the verbs denote mental process). But unlike the *like* type, in which the evaluator denotes an 'originator' (the person in whom the evaluative reaction originates), the *appeal* type presents the evaluator (*John*) as a recipient of the evaluative reaction.

The function of the 'originator' of the mental process being backgrounded is accompanied by a more active role played by the phenomenon evaluated (processed), which is presented as an origin (source) of the evaluative reaction. The active role of phenomenon processed represents the feature that both the *please* type (*Music pleases John*) and the *appeal* type (*Music appeals to John*) have in common.

To sum up. The interpretation of the evaluator with the verb *appeal* is equally applicable to the evaluators of the other verbs of the (c) type: the evaluators are presented as implementing the features of an internalized recipient processor of evaluation.

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Finally, in a separate section, our attention will centre upon the verb *find* because of its evident relationship both to the adjectival and to the verbal evaluative predications discussed above.

It is worth noting that the verb *find* can introduce the evaluator in all the above-mentioned evaluative types. It does so owing to (i) the fact that its constitutive semantic feature is personal 'experience' (cf. Mathesius's (1975.113) treatment of the verb as denoting "the subjective conception of the situation"), and (ii) the fact that it neutralizes the internalization/externalization distinction.

Let us observe this neutralization in the *find* sentences below:

It is painful to me (internalization). — *I find it painful.*
It is important to/for me (internalization/externalization). — *I find it important.*
It is difficult for me (externalization). — *I find it difficult.*

Having neutralized the internalization/externalization distinction,[8] the verb can proceed towards objectivization (generalization): *I find him a sensible man, I find work encouraging,* and, in the last phase of this process, can be complemented by a *that*-clause: *I find that work is encouraging, I find that it pays.*

Find is also employed as an introductory signal turning the proposition into a mere impression: *He found time passed too slowly, He found the tower-clock tolling at a particular slow pace that time,* etc. (In Czech *Čas mu ubíhal pomalu* [*time to-him it-passed slowly*], *Hodiny na věži mu tentokrát odbíjely zvlášť pomalu* [*clock on tower to-him this time it-tolled particularly slowly*]. Here the unattached dative *mu*, not being firmly embedded in the syntactic configuration of the sentence, is capable of modifying the meaning of the sentence as a whole (see Poldauf 1966.243). In English, the evaluator in impression-denoting constructions cannot be introduced solely by the *to*-adjunct, since the *to*-adjunct is firmly integrated in the syntactic structure of the sentence and as such cannot modify the meaning of the sentence as a whole. *He found* thus represents a functional (not a structural) counterpart of the Czech unattached dative.

Owing to its experiential character, the verb *find* can also be employed in such constructions as present the evaluator functioning at the same time as a "logical performer of the action" (a term used by Bauer and Grepl 1972.135): *I find reading the book easy, We found the last part of the route hard*

going. (It seems advantageous again to consider the corresponding Czech constructions *Kniha se mi dobře čte* [*book* refl. pron. *to-me well it-reads*], *Poslední úsek cesty se nám šel špatně* [*last part of-route* refl. pron. *to-us it-went badly*]. The unattached datives *mi* [*to-me*], *nám* [*to-us*] effect internalization: the datives function as 'experiencers' of the activity, evaluating the conditions under which it is performed as favourable/unfavourable.) Cf. Mrázek 1971.123.[9]

In English, the subjectivized perception of the quality ascribed to some activity is implemented by the experiential *find*. But the fact that the verb neutralizes the internalization/externalization distinction considerably widens the choice of evaluative adjectives:

I find it dull working at the kitchen sink all day. I find it exciting working here (extraposition of a clausal object). *I find studying mathematics boring/exciting/ easy.*[10]

As an introductory signal, *I find* enables the activity to be qualified not only with respect to its feasibility, but also with respect to its relation to the evaluator as a human being. (On the evaluation of activity see Poldauf 1959.184.)

The verb *find* can, due to the reasons adduced above, proceed towards objectivization (generalization): *I find working here encouraging.* — *I find work here encouraging.* In the latter, objectivized (generalized) case, the sentence does not necessarily have to refer to a concrete, i.e. temporally and spatially real activity.

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Coming back to the question suggested by Professor Poldauf (1972.85) concerning the conditions under which the prepositions *to* and *for* are used in evaluative predications, we can summarize the preceding discussion as follows: whereas the preposition *for* conveys externalization and in consequence also operates within the sphere of objectivization, the preposition *to* conveys internalization and co-operates in foregrounding the receiving phase in the processing of signals.

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K SYNTAKTICKÝM POZICÍM 'TO-ADJUNCT' A 'FOR-ADJUNCT' V JEJICH EVALUATIVNÍM UŽITÍ

Článek se zabývá podmínkami, za nichž je sémantický participant evaluátor zaujímající syntaktickou pozici 'adjunct' uváděn předložkami *to* a *for*. Vychází se z pojetí evaluace jako osy stimulus (hodnocený jev jako soubor vlastností) — evaluátor (příjemce signálů a jejich dekódovatel). V závislosti na sémantické náplni příslušného adjektiva se předložka *for* podílí na externalizaci, předložka *to* na internalizaci evaluativní reakce. Pro svou externalizující funkci je předložka *for* schopna operovat rovněž ve sféře objektivizace (generalizace) evaluativní reakce. Internalizující předložka *to* je užita v syntaktických konstrukcích zvýrazňujících přijímatelskou fázi v procesu zpracování signálů, která podléhá poměrně nízkému stupni intelektuálního zpracování: jde o evaluativní predikace percepční a dojmovou. (Uvažuje se také stupeň intelektuálního zpracování v klasifikaci a v kvalifikaci pravé a nepravé z hlediska jejich možného zapojení do evaluativní predikace dojmové.) V typu slovesné evaluativní predikace reprezentované slovesem *appeal* je evaluátor-procesor chápán jako příjemce evaluativní reakce. Sloveso *find* může uvádět evaluátora ve všech uvažovaných typech evaluativních predikací pro svou sémantickou náplň neutralizující distinkci internalizace/externalizace.

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[1] *To* in *The village is visible/accessible to people* does not introduce an evaluator but a semantic participant which could perhaps be described as a potential agent.

[2] Poldauf classifies *known to* as belonging to surreception predicates, i.c. those that "imply an unreliable hold of the mental content, one so to speak only drifting on the surface of the mind" (Poldauf 1972.81). In Quirk et al. (1985.169) the construction is labelled semi-passive.

[3] At least one further note on the delimitative constructions should be added. It concerns the presence or absence of the intensifying modifier *too*. It is obligatory with adjectives termed by Katz "absolute" (*it is too red for me, she is too clever for me*) and optional with adjectives he calls "relative" (*it is too expensive/short/big for me*). Its obligatory use with absolute adjectives is in keeping with the fact that such adjectives abstract from the degree of the intensity of the quality denoted. On the distinction between absolute and relative adjectives see Katz (1972.254). Katz observes that "a relative adjective *relativizes* the judgment of the thing in question to the appropriate feature of *things of that kind generally*" (Katz 1972.255).

[4] The verb *have* functions here as a quality-denoting verb (on the copular *have* as a signal of inclusion of the complement in the sphere of the subject see Macháček 1959), not having a "full possessive meaning" (Piťha 1971.43).

[5] These verbs would come under the heading of Quirk et al.'s "verbs of seeming", but the latter cover a somewhat wider sphere than the former (Quirk et al.1985. 1174).

[6] The phenomenon evaluated (*music*) was treated as a 'causer' by Halliday (1968.193), Daneš (1968.61) labelled it the 'source (cause)' of John's affection.

[7] Fillmore (1968.30) treats the verbs as synonymous within the framework of "dative"

[8] Cf. also the use of *find* in delimitation: *I find the dress too long (The dress is too long for me).*

[9] Grepl and Karlík (1983.64), e.g., speak of the manner of experiencing the activity or process, lexically specified by such adverbial expressions as *dobře* [*well*], *špatně* [*badly*].

[10] The English *Mathematics comes easy to me* is an interesting counterpart of the Czech *Matematika se mi studuje dobře* [*mathematics* refl. pron. *to-me it-studies well*]. The English presentation of the facts of reality reshapes the evaluator-processor into an internalized recipient.