WHERE COOPERATION MEETS POLITENESS: 
REVISITING POLITENESS MODELS IN VIEW 
OF THE GRICEAN FRAMEWORK

Abstract
The Gricean model of Cooperative Principle, together with the subordinate maxims and implicatures emergent from flouts thereof, forms the bedrock for pragmatic politeness theories (Lakoff 1973, 1977, 1989; Leech 1983, 2003, 2005; Brown and Levinson 1978, 1987), as well as the complementary impoliteness framework (Culpeper 1996, 2005; Culpeper et al. 2003; Harris 2001; Bousfield 2008; Bousfield and Locher 2008; cf. Lachenicht 1980; Austin 1990). Also, several proponents of politeness based on the Gricean view champion the concept of politeness implicature (e.g. Haugh 2002, 2007) or politeness maxims (Burt 1999, Kallia 2004). Despite the growing literature on politeness and proliferating critiques of pragmatic politeness theories, with a few notable exceptions (e.g. Fraser 1990, 2005; Braun 1988; Held 1992; Watts 1992a; Terkourafi 2003; Bousfield 2008), authors rarely address the problem of the models’ (in)adequacy as regards their unsound foundation in the Gricean framework. This theoretical paper presents a critical overview of politeness models in the light of their treatment, frequently ill-advised, of the Cooperative Principle and its subordinate maxims.

Key words
Cooperative Principle; implicature; maxim flout; politeness; politeness model; rationality

1. The Gricean framework of conversational cooperation
Grice’s (1989a[1975], 1989b[1978], 1989c) philosophy is the cornerstone of linguistic pragmatic models of communication. In his seminal lecture, Grice (1989a[1975]) propounds the Cooperative Principle (CP) and Quality, Quantity,
Relation and Manner maxims. Nota bene, contrary to popular opinion, Quality, Quantity, Relation and Manner are not maxims but maxim categories, which embrace supermaxims and maxims (Dynel 2009). As argued elsewhere (Dynel 2008, 2009 and references therein), the Cooperative Principle (CP) is proposed as a tacit mutual agreement, a communicative sine qua non for producing and understanding what is said and implicatures. The process of computing conversational implicatures rests on the assumption that the speaker invariably obeys the CP, while the subordinate maxims grouped into four categories may be either observed or flouted, i.e. unostentatiously violated, to yield implicatures. Flouts of maxims, which generate implicatures, by no means contravene the CP, which always holds by default (Bousfield 2008). Accordingly, it is unwise to equate maxim (flouts) with the CP (flout), which cannot be infringed in the Gricean view.

Introducing the notion of the CP, Grice presents communicational cooperation, stating that talk exchanges “are, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts” (Grice 1989a[1975]: 26). “Cooperation” is then a technical term which should be understood not as a joint communicative effort towards a common goal (Thomas 1986) but, as interlocutors’ rationality underlying communicative exchanges (Davies 2000, 2007; Dynel 2008, 2009). Grice’s cooperation resides in logicality, providing rational and intention-based bases of meaning, maxims and the CP. It is not so that the CP is “linguistic goal sharing”, as Thomas (1986) and Bousfield (2008) suggest, since such a perspective would also presuppose that interlocutors are verbally cooperative, there being no room for disagreements or interruptions. This is, however, not the case (see the next paragraph). Overall, Grice’s underpinning tenet is only that the speaker and the hearer are rational (Grandy and Warner 1986), which is also their mutual presumption. The hearer holds a view that the interlocutor is rational and that a logical interpretation of his/her utterance is to be sought, even if it should flout maxims. In other words, communicative rationality does not necessitate that the speaker should produce only literal utterances free from implicitness. Nor does cooperation intrinsically entail the speaker’s benevolence (Leech and Thomas 1990) to the interpreter manifesting itself in the speaker’s avoidance of requiring any processing effort to be made by the hearer, as some commentators (wrongly) suggest (see Davies 2007). Furthermore, the CP does not state that utterances, whether implicit or explicit, must be polite (Thomas 1986^2, Bousfield 2008).

Moreover, the Gricean rationality model is not reliant on the stipulation that the sole reason for communication is the exchange of informative content (see Dynel 2008, 2009). Having found himself misunderstood, Grice (1989c) clarifies that irrespective of whether the aim of a conversation is specified or if it is indeterminate, or whether the interlocutors concur or at cross purposes, the CP will obtain. Grice also explicates that, although participants in an interaction have a common immediate aim, their ultimate respective aims may be “independent and even in conflict” (Grice 1989a[1975]: 29). Goals are very broadly conceptualised and may also be second-order ones, as in the case of a casual chitchat, in which “each party should, for the time being, identify himself with the transitory
interests of the other” (Grice 1989a[1975]: 29). The model can, therefore, cover interactions produced as a form of the Malinowskian phatic communication, performed merely in order that politeness routines should be completed, with no other informative content to be conveyed.

What is most significant here, Grice (1989a[1975]) hesitantly suggests that there may be complementary maxims, notably those pertinent to politeness.

“There are, of course, all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as ‘Be polite,’ that are also normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate nonconventional implicatures. The conversational maxims, however, and the conversational implicatures connected with them, are specially connected (I hope) with the particular purposes that talk (and so, talk exchange) is adapted to serve and is primarily employed to serve.” (Grice 1989a[1975]: 28)

In the light of the quotation above, it is not Grice’s contention that a Politeness maxim should be placed on equal footing with other maxims subsumed under the four categories. Being polite is more of a social and moral rule or a backgrounded assumption independent from the CP model. Therefore, linguistic politeness, which can manifest itself in a variety of ways, will correspond to maxim and maxim flouts also in a variety of ways, just as any other intentional meanings communicated. It is perhaps due to this marginal remark made by Grice that several authors appear to have based their politeness and impoliteness theories on the Gricean framework.

The prevailing models of politeness appear to be grounded in infringement of the CP (and/or its maxims), attributing politeness to deviation from rational efficiency or cooperation (understood according to the common sense of the word). Evidence will now be adduced that this is an inappropriate starting point, on the strength of Grice’s conceptualisation of communication succinctly introduced above. The overview of politeness theories is restricted to problems of immediate relevance to the issue of the Gricean model, different criticism aside. Since the politeness theories are addressed consecutively, a few of the arguments will be brought to attention more than once, being expounded as the article develops.

It must be highlighted at the outset that in literature on (im)politeness the term “indirectness” is used in reference to/instead of “implicitness”, the latter appearing to be a more appropriate term, insofar as the theories are anchored in the Gricean account. Indirectness is only one manifestation of implicitness and is inherently associated with the Speech Act theory, in which it pertains to conveying one act by means of another, e.g. “It is hot in here”, where the assertive performs the role of a request.
2. Lakoff’s model

Lakoff (1973, 1977, 1989) deems Grice’s notion of Cooperative Principle as insufficient and argues in favour of the Politeness Principle as an indispensable appendage, whose aim is “to reduce friction in personal interaction” (Lakoff 1989: 64). Lakoff simultaneously assumes that while the CP is geared towards conveying information, the PP is dedicated to social issues. However, this dichotomisation is misguided since the Gricean principle does not exclude communicative goals other than relaying factual information and successfully holds for phatic language use as well. Additionally, Lakoff advances two rules of pragmatic competence, i.e. “be clear” (which embraces the Gricean CP and maxims) and “be polite”, which usually (but not always) conflict with each other, and espouses a belief that “it is more important in a conversation to avoid offense than to achieve clarity” (Lakoff 1973: 297). Consequently, Lakoff views politeness as manifesting itself in non-clarity, i.e. implicitness, vis-à-vis clarity, allegedly underlying the Gricean model. Although Lakoff rightly attests that if a Gricean maxim is not followed, interpreters seek a plausible explanation in politeness (yet, as is argued here, not a separate principle), it cannot be assumed that politeness is the sole reason for maxim non-observance, for implicatures may be motivated otherwise. In other words, implicitness need not be correlated only with politeness (with impoliteness rendered via implied meanings being the most striking example), while politeness may also recruit literal means of expression. Nota bene, this point will reverberate throughout the rest of article, where it will be elaborated. Secondly, it appears wrong to assume that the PP clashes with the CP, which is synonymous with rationality manifesting itself in all (politeness-oriented as well) utterances, whether or not couched in implicitness. Lakoff hence transparently fails to appreciate core of the Gricean framework, i.e. the presumption of the CP even if any of maxims should be flouted so that an implicature arises. Finally, it should be mentioned that the presumptuous evaluation of what is more important, i.e. being polite (whether by implied meanings or otherwise) or being clear is unfounded. The choice of a communicative strategy depends on a particular context.

Furthermore, Lakoff acknowledges the multifarious nature of politeness determined by relationship types and situations as judged by interactants (on what grounds Lakoff leaves unaccounted for). Thus, on a lower plane, Lakoff distinguishes between three sub-maxims of the “be polite” competence (differently formulated in consecutive papers, and here summarised), viz. R1 Formality/Distance: don’t impose or remain aloof, R2 Deference: give options, and R3 Camaraderie: show sympathy (by acting as equal with the addressee and making him/her feel good). Lakoff states that the PP usually supersedes the Gricean model in informal encounters, while Gricean “rules of conversation are in effect in non-R3 situation: that is R1 situations, cases of formality” (Lakoff 1973: 303). This claim wrongly suggests that the applicability of cooperative rationality is context dependent (R2 left unexplained). It cannot be denied that politeness will manifest itself differently depending on the nature of relationships or situations, i.e.
as solidarity or deference politeness (Scollon and Scollon 1983), yet it is not so that either infringes the Gricean communicative rationality, which is an all-encompassing concept.

Lakoff complicates the theoretical picture of politeness even more when she decides to subsume clarity (which, in her view, stands for the Gricean maxims) under the “don’t impose” rule, arguing that “we can look at the rules of conversations as subcases of Rule 1 [don’t impose]: their purpose is to get the message communicated in the shortest time with the least difficulty, that is to avoid imposition at the addressee” (Lakoff 1973: 303). Apart from the ill-advised interpretation of the Gricean framework as focused on information conveyance with minimal processing costs to be incurred on the hearer’s part, the problem here is that Lakoff perceives one rule of politeness which she has contrived as capturing the nature of communication in general, as if it governed the Gricean rationality model. If the two models are juxtaposed, it is rationality that will embrace polite behaviour, as well as politic behaviour (cf. Watts 1989, 1992a,b) and impolite behaviour (e.g. Culpeper 1996, 2005; Culpeper et al. 2003; cf. Harris 2001; Bousfield 2008; Bousfield and Locher 2008; Lachenicht 1980; Austin 1990).

In a more recent publication, Lakoff (in cooperation with Ide) still insists on the alleged correlation between politeness and implicitness, as well as on its superiority over explicitness.

“Interestingly, while Grice’s system seems (at least on some readings) to view utterances based directly on the Maxims as unmarked, with Implicatures marked and requiring explanation, in many types of discourse politeness-based implicature supersedes clarity-based Maxim-adherence. That is, in daily intercourse, when faced with a choice between clarity and politeness, people normally opt in favor of the latter. That suggests that politeness is not just a superficial addition to a grammar in which directness (i.e., non-politeness) is basic.” (Lakoff and Ide 2005: 8)

Firstly, it is dubious whether following maxims is the unmarked case. On the contrary, the CP framework is actually focused maxims’ nonfulfilment and resultant implicatures. Secondly, politeness need not revolve around implicitness, but literal meanings, whereas implicitness, indeed a prevalent phenomenon, need not bring about politeness. Thirdly, palatable as it may seem at first glance, the claim that language users in general choose implicatures geared towards politeness is an unsubstantiated generalisation. Actual choices lean on various contextual criteria and speaker’s idiosyncratic communicative preferences.

Finally, it is difficult to evaluate the status of the PP also because Lakoff (1975: 75) claims that females are preoccupied with indirectness and politeness, while males are guided in their communicative strategy by informativeness, thereby suggesting that the choice between the CP and the PP is gender-dependent. If one appreciates the actual premises of the CP, this appears to indicate that females are, by nature, irrational. What Lakoff could be aiming to indicate is, nevertheless,
that females use implicitness more than males. Whether this claim is substantiated is a different matter, which will not be addressed here.

### 3. Leech’s model

Leech (1983, 2003, 2005) presents his Politeness Principle, later renamed as the Grand Strategy of Politeness, as the Gricean Cooperative Principle’s coordinate, which “rescues the CP from serious trouble” (1983: 80). Leech (1983) thus introduces the complementary and indispensable Politeness Principle (PP) to explain some phenomena that are (allegedly) not captured by the Cooperative Principle, which cannot explain “why people are often so indirect in conveying what they mean” (Leech 1983: 80). This claim betrays Leech’s misunderstanding of the Gricean model, which does embrace, and is actually focused on indirectness, or rather implicitness, emergent from maxim flouts. Having provided examples of maxim “breaches”, which may be deemed as regular maxim flouts motivated by politeness-related intentions, by no means mutually exclusive with the CP, Leech repeats, “In being polite one is often faced with a CLASH between the CP and the PP so that one has to choose how far to ‘trade off’ one against the other” (1983: 83), “blatantly breaking a maxim of the CP in order to uphold the PP” (1983: 82). In essence, failing to appreciate that Grice does account for flout-based implicatures, Leech extrapolates a separate principle, “a necessary complement” (1983: 80).

In addition, Leech’s underpinning assumption is that politeness will correlate with indirectness (i.e. implicitness), as it decreases the feeling of imposition on the hearer. Nonetheless, as already suggested, indirectness need not invariably correlate with politeness (Blum-Kulka 1987, 1990, 1992; Fraser 1990; Turner 2003, Locher 2004, Bousfield 2008). Actually, Leech (1983: 171) himself notes that indirectness may lead to more face-threat and impoliteness. Nota bene, Leech’s (1983: 171) example of a customs officer’s question “Haven’t you something to declare?” emerges as being indicative of decreasing politeness, rather than impoliteness, since it is not an intentional attack on the hearer (cf. Culpeper 1996, 2005; Culpeper et al. 2003; Harris 2001; Bousfield 2008; Bousfield and Locher 2008), but still a relatively polite question, yet entailing a presupposition.

Moreover, Leech appears to misinterpret the CP, holding a social goal sharing view of it (Bousfield 2008). Leech claims that the CP

> “has the function of regulating what we say so that it contributes to some assumed illocutionary or discoursal goal(s). It could be argued, however, that the PP has a higher regulative role than this: to maintain the social equilibrium and the friendly relations which enable us to assume that our interlocutors are being cooperative in the first place.” (Leech 1983: 82)

Leech hence avers that his PP controls the CP in that it facilitates social interactions and cooperation. Nevertheless, the goal of the CP is not only to convey
information, while its pivot is rationality. Contrary to what Leech suggests, interlocutors need not always be “friendly” or even benevolently cooperative but still abide by the CP. Additionally, the CP is an unchangeable presumption, which is argued to be operative in all interpersonal encounters, while politeness is socially controlled and can be violated. It is thus simply wrong to assume that politeness regulates and is superior to conversational rationality, which is a broader concept. The speaker may be rational, and therefore cooperative in the Gricean sense, without necessarily being polite. A salient counterexample is an utterance displaying impoliteness. Also, an emergent question is if all encounters and utterances can actually be assessed for the politeness value (e.g. a teacher delivering a lecture). Beyond a shadow of a doubt, all social encounters are guided by etiquette norms, most of which are taken for granted and will be consciously observed on the first-order politeness level (cf. Watts et al. 1992; Watts 1992a, 2003; Eelen 2001) only if breached (cf. Kasper 1990; Fraser 1990, 2005; Jary 1998). Many interactions and utterances therein can hardly be considered politeness-oriented, and if at all politic (cf. Watts 1989, 1992a,b). Finally, isolating the PP would give rise to infinite proliferation of principles for various phenomena, which are easily captured by the CP (Brown and Levinson 1987).

4. Brown and Levinson’s model

Regarded as a face-saving view (Fraser 1990, Eelen 2001), Brown and Levinson’s (1978, 1987) prevailing theory centres on not only Goffman’s (1955/1967) notion of face but also communication as a rational activity in the light of Grice’s (1989[a1975]) Cooperative Principle and maxims of conversation. This explains the fact that the model tends to be referred to as the Goffman-Grice account (Turner 1996). According to Brown and Levinson (1987: 1), politeness presupposes “potential for aggression as it seeks to disarm it and makes possible communication between potentially aggressive parties.” Politeness is hence presented as redressive action taken to counterbalance the disruptive effect of face-threatening acts (FTAs). Brown and Levinson (1987) classify realisations of FTAs (Brown and Levinson 1987: 60), also referred to as politeness super-strategies (Brown and Levinson 1987: 91) into five groups, presented in the order of intensified mitigation of FTAs causing increasing degrees of weightiness: (1) bald on record, (2) on record with redressive action: negative politeness strategies, (3) on record with redressive action: positive politeness strategies, (4) off record politeness strategies, and (5) don’t do the FTA. The choice of a super-strategy is determined by the estimation of face work required, which is contingent on the intensity of face-threat, i.e. the weightiness of an FTA, which is established by the additive value of three independent variables: the social distance between the speaker and the hearer (D), the relative power of the hearer over the speaker (P) and the absolute ranking of imposition (R). The calculation is, however, rightly contested (see Glick 1996, Fraser 2005). More importantly here, Brown and Levinson’s
conceptualisation is replete with problems when viewed against the backdrop of the Gricean proposal.

Brown and Levinson (1987) contrast politeness and the Gricean CP, which operates on the assumption that maxims are “guidelines for achieving maximally efficient communication” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 95) and that there is “no deviation from rational efficiency without a reason” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 5). “Politeness is then a major source of deviation from such rational efficiency, and is communicated precisely by that deviation” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 95), “requiring rational explanation on the part of the recipient who finds in considerations of politeness reasons for the speaker’s apparent irrationality or efficiency” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 4).

On the strength of the quotations above, it emerges that the authors are of the opinion that the Gricean model and politeness are at cross purposes, even if perhaps not mutually exclusive per se. On the other hand, it would be ill-judged to assume that the Gricean framework necessitates “rational efficiency”, understood as being literal (observing maxims). While the CP is indeed inherently associated with rationality, it legitimises maxim flouts. It should be emphasised once again that the Gricean model is not geared solely or primarily towards communicative efficiency, whether understood as literalness or rich communicative import. Accordingly, implicatures are the focal point of the model, while conversations need not entail informative exchange (Dynel 2009). Nor is it cogent to state that politeness is always “deviation from rational efficiency”, interpreted as maxim flouts. Indeed, implicatures may be grounded in politeness, in a sense that speakers flout maxims with a view to mitigating face-threatening force underlying their utterances. Nevertheless, a speaker may be polite but literal (a case in point being formulaic expressions, such as “Thank you” or “You’re welcome”). Needless to say, at no point does the hearer assume that the speaker is “irrational”, even only ostensibly. It is because the hearer presupposes the speaker’s rationality that implicatures, also those motivated by politeness, can arise. The Gricean framework, on which Brown and Levinson’s politeness framework is based, is premised on the assumption of rationality, which is practically synonymous with the Gricean cooperation (Davies 2000, 2007; Dynel 2008, 2009).

Essentially, irrespective of what the authors may suggest, the CP model and politeness are not contradictory, which Brown and Levinson also appear to support, inasmuch as two politeness super-strategies are presented as being dependent on the observation or non-fulfilment of the Gricean maxims, with the CP sustained. Also, Brown and Levinson (1987) explain politeness by means of notions underlying the Gricean model, i.e. human rationality and wants. It must be emphasised that it is still rationality that drives speakers to a given aim and that enables them to select the most adequate, in their view, means to achieve it. Redressive strategies are indeed intentionally and rationally applied by speakers for the sake of obtaining politeness, among other communicative goals. Surprisingly enough, only one super-strategy of politeness construed by Brown and Levinson, i.e. going off record, entails maxim flouts and communicates politeness. This
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is only one of the problems burdening the hierarchy of strategies advanced by Brown and Levinson (1987).

Brown and Levinson (1987) contend that the off-record strategy is employed when the face-threat is extreme, and yet the speaker does not refrain from uttering the words. The authors associate solely this politeness strategy with implicitness engendered by flouts of conversational maxims, which does not tally with their general assumption (presented above) that impoliteness on the whole is dependent on what they inaccurately dub “deviation from rational efficiency”. This may lead to a conclusion that politeness is only implemented by going off record. Arundale (2005) claims that many authors misinterpret Brown and Levinson, failing to observe that the latter ascribe politeness only to implicitness, i.e. going off record. However, this line of defence is untenable, insofar as the remaining strategies are also presented as realisations of politeness (Brown and Levinson 1987: 91), which would lead to an internal contradiction. The off-record strategy, apart from displaying the global problems revisited above, is rife with other shortcomings.

The Gricean implicature, including that motivated by politeness, rests on the assumption that maxims are flouted, while the CP invariably holds. Brown and Levinson do appreciate that utterances do not need to conform to maxims, yet rather than admit that maxims are legitimately flouted thanks to the CP which invariably holds, as Grice envisaged, they propose:

“It is only because they [maxims] are still assumed to be in operation that addressees are forced to do the inferential work that establishes the underlying intended message and the (polite or other) source of departure – in short, to find an implicature, i.e. an inference generated by precisely this assumption.” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 95)

Brown and Levinson thus unduly raise the status of maxims, perceiving them as principles which always obtain. Moreover, off-record politeness conflates being indirect, by inviting conversational implicatures or by being vague or ambiguous. The former stems from “violations” of the Gricean Relevance (originally Relation), Quantity and Quality maxims of efficient communication, while the latter originates from Manner Maxim violation. Some of the particular sub-strategies are: hinting, presupposing, understating, overstating, tautology, irony, metaphors, ambiguities, contradictions, rhetorical questions, vagueness and incompleteness, overgeneralisation and ellipsis (Brown and Levinson 1987: 214). Such a view gives rise to several misgivings. First of all, implicatures derive from flouts, not (covert) violations. Secondly, Manner maxims are also conducive to implicatures, one of the underlying reasons being politeness. As a result, it is difficult to appreciate Brown and Levinson’s intention in distinguishing them as a distinct category. A few of the substrategies of going off record are also doubt-provoking, which may be partly because they are language and culture dependent, with many examples being hardly typical of politeness manifestations (cf. Blum-Kul-
ka 1987, Escandell-Vidal 1996, Kasper 1990, Fraser 2005). Most strikingly, it is hardly conceivable for irony conveying criticism to be recognised as a politeness strategy, as Brown and Levinson (1987: 222) suggest, e.g. “John’s a real genius,” said after John has just done twenty stupid things in a row. Such an utterance is more likely to increase face threat, unless rendered in special circumstances, such as humour-oriented teasing. Also, the three strategies subsumed under the Relation maxim, i.e. give hints, give association clues and presuppose, can hardly be associated with maxim nonfulfilment per se. For example, “It wasn’t me that did it.” with “me” stressed (Brown and Levinson 1987: 217) may be more a matter of Manner maxims, rather than the Relation maxim.

Finally, as earlier signalled on a number of occasions, politeness need not be associated with implicatures. It must be highlighted that indirectness is not a homogenous construct, but is divided into conventional and unconventional subtypes and showing degrees (cf. Holtgraves 2002). Distinguishing between conventional and unconventional indirectness, Blum-Kulka (1987) rightly postulates that while the former is normally associated with politeness, the latter need not be thus, especially that it may demand a superfluous inferential effort on the hearer’s part. Indirectness can decrease politeness, e.g. “Your work is just brilliant!” said ironically, which actually intensifies the force of the criticism, “Your work is poor.” This idea is further developed by Culpeper et al. (2003), who substantiate that impoliteness, e.g. terms of abuse, can actually be indirect by flouting the Gricean maxims. Also, if indirectness is purely conventional, it need not be perceived as polite but neutral (Blum-Kulka 1987), at least on the level of first-order politeness (Watts et al. 1992; Watts 1992a, 2003; Eelen 2001). On the other hand, being straightforward and blunt may sometimes indicate politeness, which is what happens when the on-record strategy is used in the case of minimal face-threat, e.g. a daughter may bluntly tell her mother who is preparing to leave for work, “Your blouse is dirty. You must change it”, which could be interpreted as a display of solidarity politeness and care about the mother’s positive face, notwithstanding the verbalisation’s unceremonious form. Dillard et al. (1997) point to the correspondence between explicitness and perceived politeness in close relationships. The emergent observation is that in their extrapolation for computation of face-threat and the requisite mitigation, Brown and Levinson do not allow for the distinction between solidarity and deference politeness (Scollon and Scollon 1995), suggesting that in close relationships less politeness is necessary. It may not be so that politeness is not necessary but that politeness manifests itself differently in close relationships.

Indeed, vis-à-vis the off-record strategy, Brown and Levinson place the bald-on-record strategy, which can be employed in situations where the speaker is powerful or not much face is at stake, e.g. in cases when maximum efficiency is needed (in the state of emergency). Brown and Levinson (1987: 94) see “bald-on-record strategy as speaking in conformity with Grice’s Maxims (Grice 1975)”. It needs to be highlighted that this directness/explicitness is still viewed as polite in given circumstances. This is why the bald-on-record
strategy may still be conceptualised as a politeness manifestation. Nota bene, in
the first-order politeness approach (Watts et al. 1992; Watts 1992a, 2003; Eelen
2001), i.e. not on the theoretical level, on-record utterances (e.g. a mother order-
ing a child to eat dinner, a customs officer asking passengers to form a queue)
stand little chance of being found polite by ordinary language users.

Positive politeness and negative politeness, depending on which face they
anoint, are the two remaining on-record super-strategies sandwiched between the
two addressed above. Negative politeness is redressive action meant to satisfy
the addressee’s negative face, i.e. his/her want to have his/her freedom of action
unhindered and intentions unimpeded. It refers to the communicative strategies
interactants use to express recognition of others’ need for freedom. Negative po-
liteness is similar to what people normally mean by “being polite” in folk knowl-
dge. On the other hand, positive politeness is redress directed to the addressee’s
positive face and his/her desire that his/her wants or actions, acquisitions and
values resulting from those should be thought of as desirable. Positive politeness
strategies are communicative ways of building solidarity, showing that the other
interactant is liked and his values are perceived as desirable, while his needs are
appreciated and approved of.

Within the super-strategy of positive politeness, Brown and Levinson distin-
guish three strategies and enumerate possible realisations of specific sub-strate-
gies, viz. claim common ground (e.g. noticing and attending to hearer’s interests,
needs, wants and goods, seeking agreement), convey that the speaker and hearer
are cooperators (offering and promising; being optimistic), and fulfil the hearer’s
want for something (e.g. give gifts, sympathy) (Brown and Levinson 1987: 102).
By contrast, the four strategies and ten sub-strategies of negative politeness are:
on record, i.e. being conventionally indirect (NB, both positive and negative po-
liteness on the whole are argued to be on record), don’t presume/assume (ques-
tion and hedge), don’t coerce (be pessimistic; minimise the imposition of FTA;
give deference), communicate speaker’s want not to impinge on hearer (e.g. by
apologising; impersonalising; stating the FTA as a general rule); redress other
wants of hearer (Brown and Levinson 1987: 131).

Brown and Levinson (1987: 270) conceptualise negative and positive face and
politeness as “mutually exclusive”, which can be disconfirmed (see Bousfield
2008). The boundary between the two is indistinct, as one utterance is likely and
sometimes even bound to anoint (or attack) the hearer’s both positive and nega-
tive face (e.g. Baxter 1984; Craig et al. 1986; Strecker 1988; Tracy 1990; Lim
and Bowers 1991; Meier 1995; Turner 1996, 2003; Holtgraves 2002; Culpeper et
al. 2003; Bousfield 2008). Utterances easily deploy multiple politeness strategies
simultaneously. Moreover, a number of researchers rightly question the hierarchi-
cal organisation of strategies on the grounds that negative politeness and positive
politeness are qualitatively different and hence cannot be ordered on a one-di-
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politeness is oriented to interactions in general, while negative politeness strategies are pertinent to particular acts of imposition. Indeed, the original proponents of the dichotomy note that “positive politeness techniques are usable not only for FTA redress, but in general as a kind of social accelerator, where S, in using them, indicates that he wants to ‘come closer’ to H” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 103).

Moreover, it must be acknowledged that not all of the strategies are linguistic per se, even though the model is classed as a linguistic pragmatic one. Most significantly, those which emerge at the level of verbal activity show varied relationship to the on-record and off-record strategies, contrary to the underpinning assumption that they are on-record. Brown and Levinson (1987: 69, 94) posit that the strategy of doing an act baldly on record, i.e. without any redress, is synonymous with following Grice’s maxims, whereas going off record emerges as producing maxim nonfulfilment. However, one may protest that redressive action carried out via positive and negative politeness can actually be realised by flouting, not only following, Grice’s maxims, while off-record strategies are also face-directed. The five superstrategies (coupled with subordinate strategies) are distinguished by two independent criteria, which is why the strategies may be combined or even perceived as overlapping. Bousfield (2008) considers the problem a consequence of intertwining form (implicitness or explicitness) and function (depending on face-orientation) in the five-point model. Strecker (1988) also notes this query, stating that “off-record speech abounds in the strategies of positive and negative politeness” while “on-record strategies are often combined with off-record strategies” (Strecker 1988: 155). Brown and Levinson do concede that they “may have been in error to set up the three superstrategies, positive politeness, negative politeness, and off-record, as ranked unidimensionally to achieve mutual exclusivity” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 18) and that there is a “possibility that the off-record strategy is independent of, and co-occurrent with, the other two super-strategies is something which definitely requires closer investigation” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 21).

On the whole, the super-strategies are based on two unrelated criteria (observing/flouting the Gricean maxims and face orientation) and, consequently, are not indiscrete, which questions the methodological rigorousness of the hierarchy⁶. Maxim fulfilment vs. nonfulfilment giving rise to implicature is a distinguishing criterion for the on-record and off-record super-strategies, but is specious in reference to the negative and positive strategies, which cannot be only on-record, as the authors argue. Both negative and positive politeness may be communicated literally (on record) i.e. by means of what is said, or implicitly (off record) by dint of implicatures consequent upon flouts (cf. Bousfield 2008 for impoliteness). Moreover, depending on the context, one utterance may communicate a literal meaning (what is said) or an implication, showing different relations to politeness issues. For instance, “Lovely weather, isn’t it?” may be: 1) when uttered by one train passenger to another, a phatic and thus polite utterance communicating what is said (but which may be perceived as an FTA by the interlocutor who does not wish to be disturbed by idle chit-chat); 2) an implication by means of which
an employee politely suggests to the manager that he is not willing to work long hours; 3) an implicature based on sarcastic irony, whereby a man means to impolitely communicate to his wife that her insistence on a trip to the countryside on a stormy day was nothing short of stupid.

To complicate matters further, as already reported, albeit arguing in favour of a hierarchy of politeness strategies, whether or not entailing indirectness (implicitness), Brown and Levinson maintain that politeness immanently resides in and is accomplished by implicatures (Brown and Levinson 1987: 5, 22, 55, 95, 271), for instance:

“Linguistic politeness is therefore implication in the classical way [...] politeness has to be communicated and the absence of communicated politeness may, *ceteris paribus*, be taken as absence of the polite attitude.” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 5)

“Politeness is implicated by the semantic structure of the whole utterance (not sentence), not communicated by ‘markers’ or ‘mitigators’ in a simple signaling fashion which can be quantified.” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 22)

If politeness must be implicated, there is no politeness associated with on-record strategies, those corresponding to fulfilling the Gricean maxims (Fraser 2005). By contrast, going on record (in Brown and Levinson’s opinion, inclusive of the negative and positive strategies) is also presented as politeness oriented, which leads to a contradiction. One may solve this problem by conceding that what Brown and Levinson (1987) mean is a higher level of implicitness, i.e. that irrespective of whether an utterance as such is couched in implicitness, politeness is an implicated meta-message. To reformulate, politeness may be seen as a distinct level of meaning communicated, as if implicitly, above the primary meaning of an utterance. This strand of research is pursued by other authors.

5. Further extensions

5.1. Politeness implicature

Following the postulate of politeness implicature, Haugh (2002, 2007) advocates a view that politeness arises by virtue of implying something, in addition to what is literally said. This coincides with the hypothesis advanced above, i.e. that Brown and Levinson (1987) perceive politeness as an extra layer of meaning. This suggests that implicature is always an additional level of communication, with the “what is said” being the primary intended meaning. (However, it should be noted that what is said need not be the speaker’s intended meaning, but may only form a basis for the central implicature). To illustrate this claim, Haugh (2007) provides an example of an apology issued by a museum attendant towards
a woman eating on the premises, which generates a politeness implicature signalling an FTA to be produced.

This line of reasoning appears to be fallacious. As Meier (1995: 387) rightly observes, sometimes politeness is the primary goal, rather than be “piggy-backed” to another act. Secondly, by contrast, politeness need not be an implicated, thus consciously conveyed and received message conceived of as Grice’s implicature (Fraser 1990, 2005; Jary 1998). A concession must be made that, in some cases, implicatures can be motivated by politeness, e.g. commenting on a student’s essay by writing “There is still some room for improvement” the teacher implicates that the work is quite poor, choosing verbal means mitigating the force of the face-threatening critical act, which the student concerned is bound to recognise. It would be wrong to assume, however, that polite intent is implied or consciously observed in all cases, inasmuch as politeness in taken by default and acknowledged only if violated (Kasper 1990; Fraser 1990, 2005; Jary 1998). As Fraser (1990) rightly protests, if politeness is an implicature, it must be a communicated message, which is counterintuitive, for politeness is frequently anticipated and accepted by default. Additionally, politeness “constitutes the unmarked way of speaking in a community, which accounts for use of polite forms passing unnoticed” (Terkourafi 2005: 109). Such observations are primarily pertinent to first-order politeness (Watts et al. 1992; Watts 1992a, 2003; Eelen 2001) but can also be transposed onto the level of second-order politeness. Looking for second-order politeness in all utterances would be a gross exaggeration and an otiose theoretical complication. This may also explain why authors decide to reorient their research and focus on facework (e.g. Terkourafi 2005) or relational work (e.g. Watts 2003, Locher 2004).

Needless to say, whether an implicature or a literal meaning (Grice’s what is said) is communicated, politeness may not come into play at all. If an utterance is hardly face-threatening, i.e. a presentation of a linguistic theory to students who do not know it yet but want to absorb knowledge, mitigation is not necessary and an utterance will not even be evaluated in the light of politeness, e.g. “The Cooperative Principle is premised on the speaker’s rationality”. Accordingly, politeness, regardless of which Brown and Levinson’s strategy is employed, frequently tends to be a matter of unmarked politic behaviour (Watts 1989, 1992a,b), alternatively called “appropriate behaviour” (e.g. Meier 1995, Locher 2004), which remains latent but is observed only if transgressed. Politeness, or rather politic behaviour, may then work only as a general presumption, a presumption that will not be appreciated, unless it is subverted, e.g. if the tutor suddenly offends the audience, e.g. “You must be retarded if you can’t get this”. In conclusion, some implicatures may be motivated by politeness but it seems unfounded to claim that politeness is invariably communicated implicitly beside other meanings. On the other hand, polite messages may equally be communicated without implicatures.
5.2. Politeness Maxim

Rather than contrast politeness with the CP or formulate a separate principle, two authors propound extensions of the Gricean CP, neither of which emerges as being viable.

Burt (1999) endorses a view that a single Politeness Maxim (PM) should be added to the CP model, since politeness is also based on rationality, as are other Gricean maxims, and by no means mutually exclusive with the CP. Rightly, she asserts that “politeness is an aspect of rational behaviour, not a departure from it, thus no clash between politeness and CP” (Burt 1999: 2). Burt affirms also that her politeness maxim will show features typical of other maxims. Thus, it may clash with other maxims, and the speaker may opt out of or flout it.

Similarly, Kallia (2004) proposes that politeness arises in the same way as other conversational implicatures and that the Maxim of Politeness should supplement Grice’s Cooperative Principle:

“Be appropriately polite (i.e. politic in Watts’ sense) in form (choice of how) and content (choice of what).
– Submaxim 1: Do not be more polite than expected.
– Submaxim 2: Do not be less polite than expected.” (Kallia 2004: 161)

Added to the Gricean maxims, this one can be observed or flouted, thereby producing different implicatures. The implicature revolving around the observance of the Maxim of Politeness is a standard implicature, a weak, usually unnoticed, background message that the rules are being followed. When the maxim is flouted either because of politeness or rudeness, multifarious politeness implicatures can transpire, expressing the speaker’s positive or negative attitude towards the hearer, respectively.

Both the approaches display a number of problems, all of which point to the fact that the politeness maxim does not share the status or importance of other maxims and question the necessity for such an extension, given that the classic maxims will also capture implicatures grounded in politeness. Contrary to the Gricean approach, which assumes that implicature rests on a maxim flout, here the observance of a maxim itself fosters an implicature. Secondly, politeness maxim flouts will overlap with other maxims’ flouts (e.g. the speaker may deliberately produce a long-winded, ambiguous utterance). Thirdly, while the Gricean maxims are legitimately flouted promoting implicatures, the flout of the politeness maxim will give rise to impoliteness, thus an anomaly in this conceptualisation. Nevertheless, impoliteness is by no means infrequent (Culpeper 1996, Culpeper at al. 2003), and its abundance in various discourses is yet another argument for not regarding politeness as a distinct phenomenon beside the CP (Bousfield 2008). Finally, isolating a separate category for politeness would provoke the question of granting other conversational phenomena (e.g. humour or verbal aggression) their own maxims, leading to an open-ended list of otiose maxims.
6. Conclusions: politeness as rational, cooperative activity

This theoretical paper was meant to corroborate that the three classic politeness frameworks, their merits notwithstanding, are replete with methodological problems rooted in the authors’ misunderstanding of the Gricean model. Contrary to what authors posit in their well-entrenched works on politeness, it was here argued that politeness and the Gricean framework are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the Cooperative Principle encompasses messages pivoting on politeness, dependent on both what is said and implicatures consequent upon maxim flouts, legitimate as they are in the light of the CP. In essence, the CP emerges as superordinate to any other principles (Kopytko 1993). Thanks to that, the alleged necessity for a separate politeness principle or politeness maxims can be safely invalidated.

Watts (1992a, 2003) also observes that politeness models centre on a misunderstanding of the Gricean model:

“In point of fact, the mistake often made with Grice (1975) – and Lakoff, Leech and Brown and Levinson all fall into the same trap here – is to take him as postulating a model of conversation, in which the principle of optimal cooperation is the controlling principle. What the philosopher Grice was attempting to set up was a way of accounting for utterer’s meaning alongside utterance meaning, i.e. a way of logically accounting for the means by which addressees are capable of deriving unstated implications from utterances. In order to do this he created an ideal state of communicative cooperation, only to suggest that it is against this underlying principle that participants in interaction are able to evaluate deviations from that principle.” (Watts 1992a: xxxvi)

Regrettably, there is also a mistake underlying Watt’s observation, for it is not so that the Gricean theory allows for deviations from the principle. The principle always holds, while it is the subordinate maxims than may be, and frequently are, flouted to engender implied meanings.

Criticising the classic politeness models for their misguided treatment of the Gricean framework, Watts (2003) also labours under another misapprehension, reporting that these models assume that polite utterances “appear to violate one or more of the Gricean maxims” (while they actually flout maxims) and that “there’s an inherent contradiction […]: polite language is a form of cooperative behaviour but does not seem to abide by Grice’s Cooperative Principle” (Watts 2003: 203). Although Lakoff’s and Leech’s politeness theories are indeed evolved as departures from the CP, which is a problem on its own, Watts further complicates the issue by wrongly interpreting, as does Leech (1983), the Gricean cooperation as social goal sharing (Bousfield 2008). In actual fact, polite utterances conform to the CP, hinged on interlocutors’ rationality in their communication. Overall, politeness indeed involves rationality, while “interlocutors’ harbouring expectations
of politeness about each other follows from their mutually assuming each other’s face-wants and rationality” (Terkourafi 2005: 208).

In conclusion, albeit idealised, because it does not allow for any misunderstanding or miscommunication, the Gricean model has its undeniable merit of including practically all forms of verbal communication. This framework of prototypical rational and intentionality-based communication captures the workings of explicitly or implicitly communicated meanings, inclusive of those anchored in the speaker’s politeness intent. Nonetheless, the Gricean model is not preoccupied with the reception end. Nor does it conceive of social factors (e.g. distance between interlocutors, or power distribution) which are of fundamental importance to the workings of politeness, an intrinsically social phenomenon (Werkhofer 1992: 156).

Finally, several authors appear to have raised the issue of politeness implicature, sometimes arguing also that it is at cross purposes with the Gricean maxims. In opposition to this, an attempt was made to disprove the alleged correlation between politeness and implicature. Firstly, polite meanings can also be explicitly stated or may not be conveyed by dint of implied meanings, depending inter alia on the nature of the relationship between interlocutors; whereas implicitness can be motivated by reasons other than politeness (e.g. impoliteness). Secondly, politeness (together with politic behaviour) is not always communicated or acknowledged by the hearer but assumed by default.

Notes

1 Given the number of Bousfield’s (2008) observations to which I subscribe, I feel obliged to explain that the argumentation I present in this article was full-fledged before I familiarised myself with Bousfield’s work, and thus arrived at it independently. Nota bene, it is not so that I give full support to Bousfield’s (2008) view on Grice’s philosophy. For instance, Bousfield (2008) claims that the categories and maxims are loose, for features, such as informativeness or efficiency are subject to each individual’s assessment. However, it needs to be borne in mind that Grice’s theoretical model is based on the speaker’s intentionality, while the maxims (and thus informativeness and efficiency) are presented as presumptions to be overtly exploited in given contexts specifically to yield implicatures, and are to be judged idiosyncratically or in terms of their gradability.

2 However, Thomas (1986) also adds that the speaker need not even be truthful, which is not a view Grice (1975/1989b) endorsed, hypothesising about the higher status of the truthfulness maxim (see Dynel 2009).

3 In her criticism, Locher (2004: 65) uses the concept “violation of the CP”, which is what Leech does not mention. CP violation, contrary to maxim flout/violation, would be tantamount to irrationality, which is what Grice (1975/1989b) does not allow for (see Dynel 2009).

4 Brown and Levinson claim to have based their framework on Goffman, though the notion of face is reported to have been initially discussed by Asian authors (see Turner 2003).

5 Grice was averse to the concept of presupposition.

6 The positioning of the strategies is also questionable. For instance, as Fraser (2005: 79) rightly notes, “under some circumstances, say when you have been directed to criticize another’s work, saying nothing is clearly less polite than criticizing off-record.”
Postulating this, Terkourafi is preoccupied with cost-effect computation, which is irrelevant here, its (im)plausibility regardless.

References


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