



JOSEF SOLAR

IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, AND NUCLEAR WARFARE

I. THE EXISTING SITUATION

The years which have passed by since the end of World War II have seen far-reaching changes in the world, changes which have re-shaped the whole face of the social structure: the maps of political power and the charts of the class structure of mankind have altered, and new problems have arisen for science, politics and ideology. The possibilities of rapid development in the material life of all the nations of the world have been increased a thousandfold, but at the same time the further possibility of the ruin and destruction of these achievements has also arisen. We find ourselves in a period of history in which the swift expansion of the productive forces and the extension of social relationships has reached a point where the new and the old, the world of tomorrow and the world of yesterday, begin to differ from each other in quality. The basic feature of the new situation is the coexistence of socially antithetical state systems, with all that modern science and technology can give at their command, and such a coexistence that its ideological content consists in the collision of contradictory conceptions of the entire development of society.

The revolutionary changes which occurred after World War II consist mainly of the following: a) the beginning and development of a socialist group of countries on a world scale; b) the extension of, and internal changes in the international labour movement; c) the intensified and rapid growth of the national liberation movement, along with the development of scores of new national states (and the successive constitution of new nations) which are only at the beginning of their political development; d) the re-grouping of the powerful forces of the imperialist states, whose governments are trying to find, under new global conditions, a new strategical orientation for their politics and ideology; e) the expansion of the scientific and industrial revolution which is proceeding in the name of automation, mathematization and kybernetization, in the increasing use of atomic energy and the first steps of mankind into free outer space. These changes are in no sense final: research workers in various fields and of various political opinions all agree that the human situation on this earth is something of a historical makeshift and is merely the initial stage of a new epoch on which mankind is entering.

This new social situation involves many elements of ideological crisis; the concept of ideological crisis is of course a very wide one which can be interpreted in different ways. The connection in which we view it is especially

concerned with the fact that social theory so far gives no satisfactory explanation of what has taken place in the development of science and the development of politics in the last half century. It is generally felt that social theory in all the special spheres of philosophy, sociology, etc., has not yet with sufficiently scientific accuracy hit upon the laws which govern the relationship of social development under these new conditions. The natural and technical sciences appear to be more successful and to have advanced further in their solution of current problems than either the social sciences or political practice. The ideological conceptions of the social sciences and of politics are under critical fire in all countries for their rigidity, their schematic character, the dogmatic nature of their premises, and the lack of breadth and depth in their vision of reality. These critical objections are for the most part justified and there can be no doubt that this very backwardness of social theory when compared with the theories of natural science and of technology is itself an element which has helped to bring about this new social situation.

The question at issue is not that of ideological conflict between the Marxist and non-Marxist conception of social development; but of the conflict within these conceptions themselves. The undoubted fact that the theoretical and methodological conception of historical materialism is historically and logically an advance on unscientific theories of society, does not relieve social science of the task of understanding and interpreting itself in the course of solving the new, concrete historical situations which arise. A scientific theory of society can preserve its gnoseological and moral standard only if it endlessly and critically analyses and synthesizes not only the object of its study but also its own theoretical and methodological principles.

The new existing situation of our time, from whichever point we set out, leads us to the central question on whose correct solution depends for the most part the future of mankind: the question of war or peace. The problem of war and peace in our time is not purely a question of practical politics, it is also a question demanding a theoretical solution of a new kind.

This novelty is shown above all in the fact that the problem is formulated as a dilemma of life and death of the type "either-or", in relation to the future of mankind, that is to say not as a mere alternative of this or that solution of social development, without decisive importance for the aims of that development as formulated by politics.

The dilemma "either-or" may seem to be too dramatically accentuated. It can be minimized by for example underrating the effect of nuclear weapons,¹ or by a deliberate transfer of the dilemma to a different sphere,² or by stressing the "heroic outlook on life"³ or in other ways, but it is impossible to avoid completely its presence in theory, and even less so in the social practice of international relationships.

A further element in the new formulation of this problem of war or peace in our time is the changing content of conflicting ideas as to the concept of peace and its attainment in various spheres of the mutual existence of the two systems. One of the historical experiences of mankind is that of different varieties of peace, of which many have meant only slavery and exploitation under another name. The peace known to class-differentiated societies always included victor and vanquished; both sides understood peace to be a period of preparation for a further decision as to the division of power: by means of war.

However we may assess the subjective political intention of the ruling classes of states of the old type, the fact remains, that the periodical alternation of peace and war appeared in the history of class society up to the present as a necessity, so that there was a rational justification under those circumstances for the cynical statement that the main cause of war is peace.

Non-Marxists, and especially those who approach questions of peace and war in our time from the positions of religious ideologies, refer to this type of peace of which we are speaking (namely peace between states) as "the little peace" in distinction to "the great peace", which they consider to be attainable in the spiritual sphere of mankind's union with God.⁴

Historical materialism considers that every peace in antagonistic society is a "little peace", from the standpoint that "great peace" can be attained only by ridding ourselves of classes and of the states associated with them, that is to say not by any one-sided change in moral consciousness. No ideological outlook on the world can however be considered as fundamentally incompatible with the existence of a "little peace". Anticommunist propaganda which holds that Marxist ideology is a basic obstacle to the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems calls in as evidence the reputed contradictions between the remote and the immediate aims of socialist policy. W. Leonhard⁵ and G. Wetter,⁶ for example, assert that the socialist political doctrine of peaceful coexistence contradicts the Marxist-Leninist ideology of irrevocable class warfare. In particular they point to the fact that communists demand peace between states, but refuse peace between classes and between class ideologies.⁷

We are bound to take into account the fact that a considerable difference between the view-points of socialist and imperialist foreign policy lies in the fact that the socialist outlook enables the practical realization of a "little peace" and thus creates the basic pre-requisite conditions for attaining the "great peace". The latter in the opinion of Marxists is not attainable by some ideological agreement, or ideological capitulation, but is a matter of the normal regular development of society.

Nor do the socialist states fix any conditions such as for example that political agreement between the two social systems should contain some ideological or philosophical conditions, such as a definition of freedom, of exploitation, or the like, and this not because we refuse to discuss these questions, but because it is impossible to demand that an initial condition of peace should be the forced acceptance of one or the other ideological conviction, which after all would be opposed to the most general conceptions of freedom.

The socialist doctrine of coexistence thus consciously eliminates the sphere of ideology from the group of questions relating to peaceful coexistence. On the other hand, the doctrine of the cold war consciously turns the unavoidable ideological differences into an initial obstacle to peaceful agreement about the banning of nuclear war.

In our opinion ideological conflicts are no threat to the present or future existence of humanity. They are a phenomenon which accompanies and is the reflection of more fundamental contradictions; ideology can of course both mitigate and increase international tension, not because it is ideology, but because it in point of fact and relatively truthfully defends certain political interests, or else because it practises deception by defending such political interests as are incompatible with the life and progress of mankind.

The ideological conflict on the question of whether revolutionary socialist ideology is or is not compatible with the thesis of peaceful coexistence, must be considered not only from the viewpoint of ideology, but also from the wider standpoint of life and reason, so far as ideology claims to set out from the demands of life and reason. Besides this we must also realize that it is precisely the loudest apologists of ideological conciliation as the first condition of coexistence of the two systems, who so far have made no serious attempt to stop, or at least to diminish the violent ideological (and not only ideological) attacks against the socialist countries.

The argument about ideological conflict or conciliation has however one aspect in which it would be possible to attain at least some agreement: first of all it would be necessary to agree that the spreading of false accusations, false reports and aggressive incitement to international or inter-racial hatred and the instigating of acts hostile to peace, should be rendered impossible or at least as difficult as may be. Secondly it is necessary to extend in all directions international scientific and cultural exchange, directed towards the enlargement of mutual knowledge among the nations, towards scientific, cultural and other co-operation and to the defence of the principles of peaceful coexistence. With regard to both these questions a great responsibility falls upon the appropriate international organizations, the governments of states and finally upon individual scientific and political workers.

II. POLITICS AND NUCLEAR WARFARE

The development of science and technology has caused war in our time to become a phenomenon of quite a new quality. The technical means of destroying people, inclusive of the destruction of the very social and biological conditions for human life, have for many years attained such a degree of effectiveness that they can no longer be used to achieve the aims for which these means were created.⁸ In this sense, war has ceased to be a classic instrument of policy. The risk of unlimited nuclear war is itself unlimited: therefore today no one can hope to attain his political aims by unleashing unrestricted nuclear war.

The qualitatively new effects of such a war entail only its rational absurdity, by no means its real impossibility. Nevertheless, precisely this fact, that nuclear war has got out of the control of reason, has forced politicians to a sober view of the facts — and has also obliged the policy of aggression to consider the question of how to use the new situation for old aims. As a political weapon there always remains one important aspect of nuclear war, namely the threat of such a war.

The policy of the threat of nuclear war in international relationship with the socialist countries naturally runs up against the answer of the counter-threat. The very fact that in international politics the state uses forceful means to defend its real or imagined interests is trivial, just as moralizing over this fact is also trivial. Anyone who is disgusted by the power-wielding aspect of the international policy of states, should also be antagonized by the very existence of states and by the existence of the ruling classes whose weapon is the state. The socialist states exist on the same planet, and that a constantly diminishing one, alongside the non-socialist states, and must, regardless of their political

intentions towards peace, adapt themselves to the real situation. It is precisely this situation in international relationships that is so disturbing: socialist foreign policy is endeavouring to achieve a situation, in which threat and counter-threat, as methods leading to the direct measuring of forces against each other and so to international tension, would be eliminated from relationships between socialist and non-socialist states.⁹

Ideological speculations about the state and state sovereignty as the fundamental sources of international tension, threats, and danger of war, are antagonistic in their initial philosophical conceptions: the Marxist conception of this problem, in distinction to the various contemporary sociological and philosophical theories of the world state or world society, take account of the facts that a) the abolishing of the state cannot be achieved without abolishing the class organization of mankind; b) the abolishing of the states is possible only as the result of historical development on a global scale; c) states have not yet completed their historic role: in extensive regions of the globe there are states (and nations) which are just entering on the process of formation; d) the liberation of mankind is conceivable only as a liberation from all states, including the world state.

Non-Marxist thinking, dealing with these themes in relation to the new situation of mankind under the threat of nuclear war, may be divided into two main streams: first of all that of the apologetics of the theory of world government by one capitalist state and that the most powerful — the United States of America.¹⁰ These theories are now losing ground, because the hope of a one-sided monopoly of atomic terrorism has disappeared. The second is the pacifist theory of a world society.¹¹ These theories, to be sure, do refer to the historic necessity of continued existence, their arguments however are above all moralistic and are not based on any analysis of social and political reality. It is true that the abolition of all states of any kind is urged, however no suggestion is made that class antagonisms and their contradictions should be removed in the "world society", or at least the question of their preservation is passed over in silence.

Characteristic of the change which has taken place in the development of international relations and international political ideology in the last ten years is the fact that now in non-Marxist literature we more and more frequently come upon voices arguing against the state or governmental unity of the world. The formation of a single government is objected to, because it would mean the too great concentration of power in the hands of a small band of rulers, and thus the possibility would arise of an unlimited despotism.¹² The idea of unleashing war with the object of attaining world dominion now only very rarely appears openly in bourgeois literature.¹³

Since unlimited nuclear war can now no longer be the instrument of attaining political aims, the policy of aggression is bound to seek means of rationalizing war. Military theoreticians in the West formulate the absurd strategic conception of "limited atomic war",¹⁴ which would not escape from the conscious control of the state and would thus remain somehow limited by rational considerations. Further, the western states are continuing with their intensive armament programme and even (1964) with experimental nuclear explosions.¹⁵ Thus the western powers prolong the paradoxical situation in which a tremendous amount of the energy of human labour and of science is systematically removed from

the sphere of production, and thus the material existence and intellectual life of the masses of mankind is crippled.

World nuclear war would have endlessly catastrophic consequences for the whole of mankind, regardless of whether it were a righteous war or not, aggressive or defensive, whether launched through ineluctable necessity or by chance. The policy which would permit the moral justification of nuclear war as a method of attaining aims cannot find support in any rational considerations of science, but is obliged to find an excuse for its intentions in irrational speculations. We see this very well for example in Jaspers's book *The Atom Bomb and the Future of Man*: in order to render the thought of atom war at all acceptable, Jaspers indicates various irrational, metaphysical, "transcendental" values, justifying the crime of mass suicide by means of the H-bomb.¹⁶

The reasonable or moral justification of such mass suicide is of course impossible. Nevertheless there does exist a hypothetical situation in which the use of those weapons would be understandable: namely as a reaction to attack, and only to such an attack in which the aggressor would use nuclear weapons.¹⁷

At this point we arrive at a dangerous crossroads, which can lead further either in the direction of sober reason or in that of crazy subjectivity. From the logical consideration that atomic terror would be answered by atomic counter-terror, the theoreticians of "limited atomic war" endeavour to calculate mathematical schemes of the development of such a conflict, to determine the probability of rational and irrational situations, introducing into the process of atomic destruction "rules of the game" which into the bargain are to be granted preliminary approval by all the players and controlled by international inspection.¹⁸

The dialectics of nuclear war however do not allow the reality of such reflections: once launched, a global atomic war would lead to an increase of terror and mass destruction whose limits cannot be mathematically predicted. It would be the imaginary "war to end war" which could become the end of everything which permits human existence on this planet. Above all, such a war would put an end to all the known forms of civilization, for the main centres would be submitted to physical destruction. If after such a hypothetical war any social problems would still exist, they would certainly not be political and ideological problems, but purely the problem of the conservation of the biological substance of humanity. It would indeed be such a war, as Khrushchov has said, after which the living would envy the dead.

Having regard to these perspectives, the policy of war in our time is a blind alley; and an ideology which chooses the aim of painting in rosy hues the hypothetical nuclear war is the factor least to be trusted in the ideological crisis of the contemporary situation.

The only sensible escape from the downward path of dilemma on which human existence has entered is the policy of peaceful coexistence. Peaceful coexistence of the socialist and non-socialist states at the period when by the mere pressing of a button it is possible to kill one half and cripple the other half of mankind is the unconditional ultimatum of necessity for all states.

For the present however this ultimatum of necessity is not sufficiently acknowledged, along with the consequences which arise from it, by all states. The practice and theory of aggressive international policy so far still cling to archaic notions of purpose, aims and methods. After the loss of the atomic

monopoly, which the United States possessed in the post-war years, the stubborn obstinacy of the western powers prevented any agreement about the prevention of war, but led to the outbreak of the conflict in Korea. In this war the world came close to the verge of atomic war. However as early as the years 1950—1953 the mutual balance of power in all its various factors was so even that President Truman and the aggressive circles closely associated with him rejected this terrible extremity. The hot war in Korea was however succeeded on the part of the western states by the cold war, a policy which was not given up even after such failures and defeats as was for example the Geneva agreement on Indochina of 1955.

The various phases of increasing and decreasing tension in international relationships in the post-war years were directly connected with the initiative of American diplomacy in taking steps to ensure the continuation of the tense atmosphere, and with the initiative of socialist diplomacy, which endeavoured to attain a more cordial atmosphere in international politics by means of mutually advantageous solutions of the main points at issue. Nevertheless, in the vitally important question of disarmament and removal of the threat of atomic war no agreement was reached; not until summer 1963 did the two sides take the very important step in this direction of signing the Moscow Pact on the halting of atomic tests.¹⁹

The situation which had developed in the world through the long-term piling up of dangerous nuclear weapons and the other means of scientific-technological warfare was characterized by the political ideologists of the West as “the balance of fear”. Some people imagine that in the present international situation, which does not yet give grounds for expecting any immediate and fundamental agreement on the points outstanding in dispute between the West and the East, this balance of fear is that looked-for factor which prevents both war and agreement on peaceful coexistence;²⁰ in other words the second-best solution for a policy of aggression, which has already lost nuclear hegemony and has not yet given up hope of a solution by force.

The balance of fear as a long-term means of solving international relationships has however dangerous elements. Above all it cannot count on the moral agreement of mass public opinion. Further it gives no secure guarantee against the accidents of political development. Fear of mutual destruction could become, in critical situations where forces are balanced against each other, that psychological and political element which would increase the probability of conflict instead of decreasing it. Finally, it is a well-known fact that theories of fear as the balancing factor of international politics tend logically towards the thought of preventive war, the first blow, speculation about a sudden, surprise terror and similar speculations of military doctrine, which exaggerate the technologico-psychological aspect and underestimate the moral and political aspect of the matter.²¹

Both Marxist and non-Marxist opponents of nuclear war have stressed of recent years the fact that the responsibility of science and education for the future of mankind is increasing.²² Since in actual fact all over the world the politically active interest of scientific and educational workers in the international struggle against the threat of atomic death is increasing, we may anticipate that this activity of intellectuals will have as its result the increasingly close approach of the nations to each other, along with increased

mutual understanding, and will thus strengthen the present favourable outlook for the peaceful coexistence of capitalist and socialist states.

The contradiction between aggressive international policy and the peaceful interests of the nations appears at the present time more and more as a contradiction between aggressive policy and science. Scientific workers in various fields of science and of different political convictions have, ever since the year 1945, been coming more and more sharply up against the problem of how to prevent the misuse of science by aggressive policies. Besides this it can be seen with constantly increasing clarity that the preservation of peace is not only a moral requirement for science but also an essential condition of its continued existence. It cannot be denied that the idea of peaceful coexistence is for the largest and best part of scientific workers in all countries the most attractive suggestion for solving the threat of war in the atomic age.

The pacifism of non-Marxist scientific intellectuals is of course felt by aggressive imperialist policy not only as an ideological but also as a political and material obstacle, restricting to a certain extent the "free speculations" of foreign policy.²³

Imperialist leading circles in Western Europe at one time conceived the notion of a "realistic foreign policy". This concept was used to enhance foreign expansion and aggression. A "realistic policy" in international relations meant that political practice ignored the so-called humanitarian, "weak" objections raised by morality, law, science and public opinion and ruthlessly, "realistically" moved towards its questionable aims, making use of all available means, including war.

In the present global situation, when the effects of all previous wars are absurdly slight in comparison with the effects of a global thermo-nuclear conflict, any "realistic foreign policy" of this type is a mere prehistoric relic. The new reality of the revolutionary expansion of science and society have made this "realism" absurd — and at the same time increased its danger to the world.

The doctrine of peaceful coexistence is political realism of a different kind. Only such an international policy is realistic as recognizes that given the qualitative changes in the conditions of coexistence, it is in the interests of all to subordinate the specific interests and aims of states to the general interest of preserving the most important norms of international peace, i. e. to be governed by sober reason, mutually to give up solution by force and not to confuse the struggle of ideologies with armed warfare.

Socialist foreign policy, defending the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations with the capitalist states, endeavours to ensure that the dispute between the two social systems should be waged on the fronts of work and ideas, not on the atomic war front.

Not so however the foreign policy of the United States of America and other Western powers. In spite of numerous proclamations of the peaceful aims and intentions of this policy, the ruling circles of the Western states have for years rendered vain any kind of agreement with the socialist states. The United States have directed their foreign policy under the leadership of Byrnes, Marshall, Acheson and especially John Foster Dulles, towards the strategy of the cold war, and have not given up the possibility of atomic warfare.

The results of the political practice of peaceful coexistence compared with the political practice of the cold war show that the policy of the cold war is

exhausted and outdated. On the other hand the policy of peaceful coexistence in relationships between the two systems is increasingly, even although with certain reservations and modifications, finding recognition as a realistic necessity of international relationships between the West and the East.

But is the policy of peaceful coexistence between the socialist and non-socialist world a realistic one, when we take into account the irreconcilability of the socialist and the capitalist social systems with their economic, political and ideological antagonisms? The realistic aim of averting nuclear war between the two worlds has its strongest support in the fact that such a form of warfare not only opposes the interests of all states, but even the objective interests of the different classes and class policy. The abolition of nuclear war from the catalogue of struggles in settling human relationships cannot have any ill effect on the necessary and justified struggle for class, national and racial freedom, cannot, in the eyes of reason, be any obstacle, for example, to the liberation of people from the remnants of colonial slavery, or from the terror of reactionary policy within the state.

We must also enquire whether the viewpoint of reason and general human interests will be applied in the international policy of the imperialist states and their ruling classes, which stubbornly defend the social status quo, according to which the freedom of property is placed higher than the freedom of human existence in society. In other words, whether the strength of common reason will be greater than that of exploitative class interests, which often lead in foreign policy to a subjective standpoint, to reckless hazards and thus to catastrophic decisions.

It is clear that such questions cannot be answered by any dogmatic axioms of general political theory. However not even the undogmatic scientific analysis of international development can give more than a prognosis of the probability, based on analogous historical experience and analysis of facts and active tendencies.

We could for example point to the fact that none of the great crises of international politics in the post-war period (the Korean war of 1950—1953, the Suez dispute and the Hungarian events of 1956, the Caribbean crisis of autumn 1962) led to nuclear conflicts.

The causes which in the end led to the compromise solution of these dangerous crises and to the averting of general war must be sought not only in the relatively balanced mutual ownership of deterrents, in the strength of anti-war public opinion, in the coolheadedness of the Soviet Union, etc., but also in the final political considerations of the leading U.S. circles. The subjective factor of the will of the American government in foreign politics has always appeared to observers in these crises as a very variable one, exposed to various contradictory influences of internal power politics; and this especially in the 1953 to 1955 period, when American foreign policy stood on the brink of the abyss, threatening to drag down with it the rest of the world. During the Caribbean crisis, although the actual situation was much more dramatic than at any other time in the post-war period, the attitude of President Kennedy, in comparison with that of Truman and Eisenhower in similar situations, was much more clearly based on responsible reflection and sober reason. Kennedy and Khrushchov, independently of each other but in the same sense, stated that the solution of the dangerous crisis in the Caribbean must be understood as a victory for

reason and the general interests of humanity, not as the assertion of the will of one or the other side. For the first time since the end of World War II, American relationships with the Soviet Union saw a significant relinquishing on the part of United States foreign policy of considerations of prestige.²⁴

The variability of American internal political development, caused by the violent struggle of the milder and the aggressive circles for a decisive say in the machinery of home and foreign policy, is a dangerous factor of uncertainty in international affairs. This is the reason why for the present we must not overestimate the positive elements in the American (and in a wider sense, in the Western) approach to agreement on peaceful coexistence, and why it is impossible to eliminate for the future the possibility of severe and even very severe international crises.

III. IDEOLOGY AND THE COLD WAR

So long as the foreign policy of the Western states insists on a standpoint which ignores not only the existence but even the moral and legal rationality of the new balance of social forces in the world, it cannot be hoped that a really significant breakthrough in the relationships between the two world systems will come about. The atmosphere of mutual trust in international relationships is in our opinion attainable most easily by practical steps in the policy of goodwill, not only, that is to say, by verbal proclamations without any subsequent practical steps. In our time it seems that certain elements do exist which would be capable of creating an atmosphere of international trust, supposing that they are further developed.

These elements are seen to be above all certain positive successes attained for example in the limiting of atomic tests, in the preserving of constant contact between the American and Soviet governments, in the considerably lightened tension after the solution of the Caribbean crisis, in the gradual opening up and extension of international trade relations, in the favourable development of international scientific and cultural cooperation, etc.

A very important element for the future is also the fact that American foreign policy itself is disappointed with the results of the conception of the cold war. The policy and the ideology of the cold war naturally met with the opposition of the socialist countries but besides, in recent years, they have met with such a strong home opposition and criticism that any continuance (at least in the old forms) is exceedingly difficult.

The concept "cold war" was formed in the USA shortly after the end of World War II. The expression was first used in 1947 by Walter Lippman²⁵ to characterize the acute deterioration in the attitude of the USA to the Soviet Union, which took place on the initiative of the then President Truman.

In the following years the term "cold war" became so widespread in political and ideological writing that it became a useful contraction indicating the direction and content of the policy of aggression towards the socialist countries. The antagonism of the two social systems thus showed itself through the antagonistic conceptions of their policies for foreign relations. The doctrine of the cold was set up against the doctrine of peaceful coexistence.

Certain Western historians in the newest history of politics²⁶ assert that the doctrine of the cold war crystallized slowly as the defence reaction of American

foreign policy against "Soviet expansionism" and that the doctrine of peaceful coexistence did not evolve until the post-Stalin period, so that, as they allege, it cannot be said that the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist world furthered this policy fundamentally and from the outset.

It is true that the formulation of the main principles of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence were first given for the new situation by the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR in 1956 (and given further interpretation in further documents). This does not however entitle us to deduce the reluctance of the socialist countries to accept a peaceful agreement in the great questions at dispute even before this period. If it is asserted that at an earlier period it was utterly impossible to achieve any successful negotiation on questions in dispute, then this assertion contradicts historical facts, above all the fact that after the death of President Roosevelt a clear anti-Soviet line of aggressive anti-communism prevailed in American foreign policy. The cold war did not arise as a defensive reaction of the so-called free world against the Soviet Union (which had come out of the war with enormous material losses, which had to be repaired, so that for this very reason the Soviet Union could not represent any threat to the U.S.A., which had not suffered materially), but evolved as an aggressive orientation initiated by American imperialist circles against the growing political and moral influence of socialism and the Soviet Union in the post-war world. The first aggressive step against international peace and against the interests of mankind was taken by the United States with the shocking atomic attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Hundreds of thousands of Japanese victims of the American atom bomb were the first victims of the new war: the continuing cold war against the socialist world.

It is understandable that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries were obliged as a result of the aggressive American trend of the cold war to adapt themselves to circumstances and undertake special defence and retaliation measures, which otherwise they would probably not have taken. It is not possible, without interfering with historical truth and without trespassing against the fundamental norms of morals, to use the argument, that the critique of Stalinist methods, carried out by Marxists, is of itself a denial of the principles and concrete acts of foreign policy of the socialist countries in their relationship to the capitalist states in the period 1945—1953. The criticism of Stalinist methods naturally also refers to the field of international politics, but does not affect the truth that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries endeavoured in the 1945—1953 period also to find a peaceful solution of controversial questions. The deterioration of international relationships in the period of which we are speaking was the automatic result of the aggressive initiative which the United States took in the mistaken hope that they had at their disposal means which could bring about a unique global situation — unlimited American world power. The central position among these resources was held by the temporary American monopoly of the atom bomb.

The historical development of science and of revolutionary social forces however thrust the conception of the cold war into ever-increasing difficulties and ever-increasing blind alleys, which instead of the hoped-for attainment of absolute American supremacy brought palpable losses to American military, political and moral prestige. Here too lie the roots of many non-Marxist critical opinions addressed to American foreign policy. American foreign policy, whose

post-war unrealistic aims and methods at first appeared to many western ideologists to be clear and attainable in the near future, became gradually problematical. And precisely this phenomenon has shown us that the political leadership itself was the last to realise the logic and range of this criticism. It would seem that the lack of sensitivity, even the blindness to facts is a regular feature characteristic of a subjective and risky international policy.

The periodization and assessment of the history of the cold war and its different stages is of course a question of political history and the ideologists who formulate it. It is of course necessary to realize that moot points in the history of the cold war do not arise from the periodization of the stages²⁷ but from questions which are closely bound up with the political opinions of the historians.

D. F. Fleming in his comprehensive work on the history of the cold war, sees its causes in the lack of sound sense in the political ideas of the leaders of western foreign policy. The American historian J. Lukacs considers that the causes lie in the conflict of the power politics of the USA and the Soviet Union. E. Fromm supposes that the quarrel between East and West has its cause in the pathological condition of international political opinion, which confuses possibility with probability. Non-Marxist ideologists lay great stress on national, racial, geographical and other characteristics of the historical development of America and of the Soviet Union, and especially in connection with the differences within the socialist world (China) often too hurriedly exaggerate these specific characteristics.

Apart from some exceptions,²⁸ those voices which prevail in the West by means of the strength of their arguments and by their effect on public opinion are those which agree in the view that the cold war did not achieve what was expected of it and that its further continuance would be a threat to mankind.²⁹

A matter of great interest is the fact of the wide difference of opinion among non-Marxist writers about the basic conception of coexistence as peaceful coexistence and the way in which these differences in conception correspond to the differences in the concrete historical situation of the different states, regions, classes and tendencies. While the American ideologists of international relationships, according to our opinion, lay more and more stress on the search for agreements and differences in the two conceptions of democracy and in the economic and civil condition of man under the two systems, the West-German ideologists of the cold war are outstanding above all in their emphasis on the racial, biological and cultural differences between "European" and "Asian" civilization; perhaps this is caused also by the fact that contemporary German anti-communists are powerfully hypnotized by the traditions of German militaristic expansionism.³⁰ The British anti-communist ideologists of the cold war do not play any particular role; even in their own country they remain without any particular influence. The French theoreticians of anti-communism are in a particularly delicate situation, if called upon to "defend" both bourgeois democracy and the aversion of atomic danger, since in both spheres there exist strong reasons for doubt as to the good sense of the present-day French tendency.

The ideologists of the Western countries often consider coexistence in the first place not as a political problem (the peaceful coexistence of states), but as an ideological and moral problem (the peaceful coexistence of communist and non-communist ideologies). So H. Brugmans, rector of the European Uni-

versity of Brugge, asserts that coexistence of states in peace is impossible because the aim of communist ideology is the military conquest of the world. "The meaning of coexistence is not then a peaceful agreement with the socialist states, but that care for the spirit which in the struggle with communism must not be defeated."³¹

Against this primitive anti-communism of Professor Brugmans, however, many non-communist voices are raised in acknowledgement that peaceful coexistence and the complete ending of the cold war are not only realistic and possible but essential in the interest of humanity. Thus W. Banning³² sees in the existing antagonistic systems of society a different principle at work in assuring the social existence of man, a principle which is historically and morally justified equally in each case. "I do not want a war of destruction," writes Banning, "I have no trust in the cold war . . . mutual negation is impossible, just as it is unmoral. Only one possibility remains: coexistence, directed towards the avoidance of war, the formation of international law and the building up of peace."

The wide range of different opinions which Marxists encounter in non-Marxist writings about coexistence, peace and war, is not of course identical with the range of real influence these opinions have on political power and public opinion in the Western states. Therefore we cannot conclude that the good or bad sense of individual ideologists is accurately reflected in the considerations affecting the governing circles, which in the West take the decisions as to international political action in relationship to our socialist states.

Marxist literature dealing with questions of international relationships and the problematics of coexistence has perhaps a less wide range of opinion: however our dependability in international politics is greater, because in the socialist countries there does not exist in the social structure of the state any serious force fatally thrusting towards war.

The absurdity of nuclear war as an instrument for solving international antagonisms between socialism and imperialism has brought us to the point where the foreground is held by a violent collision of ideologies. The significance of ideological strength for the results of the controversy has always been recognized in Marxist literature. Non-communist theoreticians well realize that the war of opinions and the war of outlooks is all the more important in our time because the masses of the people are taking an ever greater part in the internal and international policy of states. Lenin's thesis to the effect that ideas become a material force when they reign in the minds of the masses is actually supported by W. Lippman³³ when he demands the formation of a "people's philosophy" of capitalism. This of course is also an admission of the lack of philosophy of a society and state which has for years been carrying on the cold war under the very slogan of the defence of the ideas of civilization.

The old "classic" cold war, whose ideological sponsors were Winston Churchill and Foster Dulles, now belongs to the past. The controversy between the states belonging to the two systems and between their ideologies does however continue and the various forms it will take in the future must bring greater clarity as to whether the nuclear threat will be finally removed, just as it must clarify the question of what the socialist world of the future will be like.

The thread on which the nuclear bomb hangs like the sword of Damocles is none too strong. The knives which would cut it are not however in the hands of the classes and their ideological spokesmen, but in the hands of the political

leaders of the great states. The immense task of the ideological struggle which is just beginning is to convince the world that the central question governing our fate is to prevent aggressive policy from being the hand to cut the thread.

Translated by Jessie Kocmanová

NOTES

¹ Here we are thinking especially of the remarks of E. Teller and some other atomic scientists to the effect that the radio-activity caused by atomic explosions is a slighter danger than the radiation from luminous wrist-watch dials.

² K. Jaspers, *Die Atombombe u. die Zukunft des Menschen*, Munich, 1958, places against the dilemma peace — war, the dilemma freedom — communism.

³ Some Chinese opinions set up against the power of the bomb the power of the masses and assert that the doctrine of peaceful coexistence is an expression of cowardice and fear of imperialism.

⁴ In the collection *Coexistentie*, Hilversum 1962, the essay of F. Heer, "Coexistentie en Proccistentie".

⁵ W. Leonhard, *Sowjetideologie heute. Die politischen Lehren*. Frankfurt a. M., 1962.

⁶ G. Wetter, "The Soviet Concept of Coexistence", *Soviet Survey*, X—XII, 1959.

⁷ W. Leonhard, op. cit., p. 242.

⁸ N. Talenskij for example mentions in the paper "The Absolute Weapon and Safety", *International Politics*, 4, 1962, that an explosion of a 50 megaton bomb will absolutely destroy an area of 40 kilometres diameter and relatively destroy an area of 80 kilometres diameter.

⁹ This is the intention also of the Soviet government's proposal of January, 1964 on the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes.

¹⁰ The representative of these theories is often given as J. Burnham, especially because of his book *The Struggle for the World*, 1947.

¹¹ A very interesting theory of the world society is developed for example by the Dutch sociologist B. Landheer in his reflections on the sociological approach to international problems, Haag, 1962.

¹² F. Heer, op. cit.

¹³ In the socialist countries for example the work of W. Schlamm, *Die Grenzen des Wunderns*, Zürich, 1959, was indignantly rejected and the question was asked, how could literature of this type be tolerated in the West.

¹⁴ H. A. Kissinger, *Necessity for Choice*, 1961, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, 1957. Further W. Hahn, J. C. Neff, *America's Strategy for the Nuclear Age*, R. E. Osgood, *Limited War*, 1957, etc.

¹⁵ U.S.A. after the signing of the Moscow agreements performed a series of further underground atomic tests.

¹⁶ K. Jaspers, op. cit.

¹⁷ This reason is also given by those atomic physicists who have been protesting in the U.S.A. for years against the misuse of atomic energy for producing weapons of mass destruction.

¹⁸ R. E. Osgood, op. cit. and others.

¹⁹ This agreement has not yet (January, 1964) been signed by France and the Chinese People's Republic.

²⁰ E. Teller expressed the opinion that only the threat of complete destruction can bring mankind "to reason" and that atomic armament is thus a guarantee that there need not be any war. He quotes R. Jungk, *Heller als tausend Sonnen*, Stuttgart, 1956.

²¹ The representatives of the Soviet Union have frequently proclaimed that that country would never use atomic weapons first under any circumstances.

²² Recently for example Prof. B. V. A. Röling, a sociologist specializing in international law at the University of Groningen. The question of the responsibility of science and education is given its broadest basis in the works of Prof. J. Bernal and L. Pauling, as also in the speeches of B. Russel on this question.

²³ In this direction a characteristically sharp attack is made by K. Jaspers on the German atomic physicists who refused to misuse their research activity for the political aims of the former Adenauer government.

²⁴ The question of prestige in foreign politics must not be confused with the relinquishing of fundamental principles of political morality.

²⁵ Quoted among other by J. Lukacs, *A History of the Cold War*, in Chapter III. New York, 1962.

²⁶ J. Lukacs, op. cit.

²⁷ The main landmarks of the cold war are given as 1950, 1956 and 1962 and the criteria of this periodization are the international political crises. The question of the periodization of post-war political history is not fundamentally dealt with in this work.

²⁸ In the opinion of the author the continuation of the cold war is demanded most vigorously by West-German anti-communist literature which brings with considerable cunning to the "common" war against communism a rationalization of the particular plans of aggression of West-German imperialism.

²⁹ D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins*, 1961.

³⁰ Part of this tradition is for example the special department of "Ostforschung", whose purpose is to find reasons for the historical and cultural right of Germany to rule Eastern Europe.

³¹ H. Brugmans, "Gesprek met de Communisten?" *Coexistentie*, 1962, Hilversum.

³² W. Banning, "Coexistentie: Onmogelijke noodzakelijkheid", *ibidem*, 1962.

³³ W. Lippman, *The Public Philosophy*, 1955.

IDEOLOGIE, POLITIKA A NUKLEÁRNÍ VÁLKA

V této úvaze o ideologii, politice a nukleární válce se autor zabývá některými základními aspekty koexistence socialistických a nesocialistických zemí v nové historické situaci. Změny, jež jsou obsahem této nové situace, jsou rozebrány v části I. (Výchozí situace), ve které je též stručně vyloženo, jaké stanovisko k novým faktům vývoje společnosti zaujímá socialistická a nesocialistická politická ideologie.

V části II. (Politika a nukleární válka) autor zastává tezi, že nukleární válka přestala být klasickým nástrojem politiky, neboť se vymyká racionální kontrole. Nástrojem politiky však zůstává hrozba a protihrozba takovou válkou. Nemarxistická politická ideologie však již nemůže spoléhat na překonané argumentace o možnosti dosažení světovlády silou zbraní. Nukleární válka je sice nerozumná, avšak její možnost trvá. Západní teoretikové rozpracovávají různé strategie omezené atomové války; nicméně světový nukleární konflikt by nemohl být spoután žádnými pravidly a vyústil by ve zkázu všech. Jediné východisko je mírová koexistence, tj. strážlivá a rozumná mezinárodní politika. Zkoumáme-li nejnovější historii velkých mezinárodních politických krizí, můžeme vidět, že rovnováha strachu je velmi nejistým činitelem zachování míru. Agresivní politika se dostává do neustálých konfliktů se zájmy míru, lidu i vědy. Cynická „realistická zahraniční politika“ je již neudržitelná. Činitelem nejistoty v mezinárodních vztazích je též labilita zahraniční politiky USA, jež v minulých krizích stále kolísala ve svých cílech i prostředcích.

V poslední části III. (Ideologie a studená válka) autor uvažuje o příčinách vzniku a o obsahu americké politiky studené války a stručně charakterizuje diferencovaný postoj nemarxistické ideologie k základním otázkám studené války, mírového soužití a koexistence.

Josef Solář

