This paper may be regarded as the second instalment of the preceding one, entitled 'An ordered-triple theory of language' (pp. 159—186 of the present volume). The final version of the ordered-triple theory was prepared for print in autumn 1972 and those who read it have begun to raise questions, “pleasant” and “unpleasant”, most of them aiming at the sphere of internal pragmatics. After the initial impulse given to me by J. Firbas, who first put the question as to the mutual relation between internal pragmatics and semantics and later enlarged his sphere of interest to many specific problems of the attitudinal space, I have decided to run the risk of attempting to answer some of the most frequent questions on my own. It is quite natural that among the most prolific problem producers were the co-authors of the ordered-triple theory, P. Materna who this time oscillated between the role of an opponent and that of a supporter, and K. Pala who, apart from questions within his own province, mediated also those asked by D. Wilson, R. Kempson, and R. Sussex. To prevent misunderstanding, I should like to emphasize the fact that the present paper is intended to be not a more or less systematic treatment of problems concerning internal pragmatics, but a handful of notes, objections, and suggestions that in some way or other are relevant to it. As the paper on the ordered-triple theory appears in the present volume of Brno Studies in English, it is unnecessary to re-explain the terms employed in that paper or to sum up the conclusions offered by it.

Chapter One

INTERNAL PRAGMATICS V. SEMANTICS

In the course of any inquiry into phenomena of internal pragmatics (see pp. 166—171 of the present volume) the objection may be raised that the separate values of the co-ordinates within the attitudinal space A have their “meanings” and hence may be examined within the sphere of semantics. To make my approach to this objection quite clear, I have to admit that I regard such a solution as theoretically possible though methodologically rather inconvenient.
This view may be substantiated by the fact that the recent endeavour to solve the problems of what is represented by $A^2$, $A^3$, $A^4$ (not to speak of $A^5$) within logical semantics has not been greatly successful. I am not prepared to say that the conclusions arrived at in that field of research are not correct and thought-inspiring, but they are — in my opinion — based on the method of supplying a given formal language of logical semantics with further devices corresponding to those met in the natural language and in this way bringing the formal language closer to the natural language. If the "amendment" of the formal language is consistent with the rules (axioms) on the basis of which it is constructed, there can, of course, be no objection made to this procedure. But from the point of view of the natural language, this method may lead the investigator astray, as is to be shown later on. There is a point that should be made at this juncture on formal and natural languages. I subscribe to the idea that there is no theoretical difference between formal (artificial) and natural languages, but to my knowledge none of the present formal languages can — as to complexity — be compared with any of the natural languages (cf. R. Montague 1970). Raising the complexity of a formal language means more than just increasing the number of its elements (e.g., operators) that correspond to certain phenomena of a natural language, i.e. "improving" the formal language quantitatively. That approach also requires taking the qualitative aspect into account, and if a formal language is to model a natural language, then it is necessary to "improve" the formal language with respect to some general theory of a natural language in order not to miss certain qualitative changes caused by the introduction of new elements. For instance, a formal language may be supplied with operators to indicate whether a certain proposition ought of itself to convey certain information or whether it is meant to require some further information, in short, whether it ought to be a statement or a question. Within the formal language this solution may be regarded as a further step towards the improvement of its semantics, bringing the formal and the natural language closer to each other.

Let us suppose that by means of a certain natural language (English) we communicate about concepts represented by sets of identification procedures (see p. 163 ff.). If we have sets of procedures corresponding to 'table', 'window', 'grammar school', why could we not have other sets of procedures corresponding to our intentions to state, to ask, to give a command, to exclaim, to wish, etc.? All of these concepts may then be dealt with within semantics, and there seems to be no reason why it should be otherwise. But if the problem is viewed in the light of a natural language in the act of communication, i.e., in the light of a language which is used by a language user in a certain communicative situation, matters assume another aspect. If we examined some utterance events of English from the viewpoint of the formal conceptual notation that would include the concepts of stating, asking, etc., we should soon find that concepts of this kind have to be present in any conceptual notation. In short, if we want to communicate about any concept, this concept has to be accompanied by one concept out of the set of concepts expressing statement, question, etc. We come to the conclusion that while other concepts may vary perhaps infinitely, thus offering the language user an infinite number of options, the concepts of the set under discussion are obligatory and most probably finite in number. One of the members of this set must be present if a certain formal
expression is to retain the status of an utterance event. I think this point is fairly clear with verbal sentences, i.e. those containing a finite verb form. As to non-verbal sentences and/or the so-called elliptical sentences, I do not see any special problem either. If I sit quietly at the table for some time and suddenly pronounce the words a grammar school, I do not communicate about a grammar school, but only pronounce the words referring to a certain concept. In this case we cannot denote a grammar school as an utterance event. If in a different situation I am asked by my friend What kind of school does Peter attend?, and answer A grammar school., the words are the same as in the preceding example, but there can be no doubt that in the latter case one of the concepts representing statements, questions, etc. (under the circumstances, the concept of statement) has been employed. I do not think there is any necessity to express this obligatory concept more explicitly. Some primary school teachers would possibly require the answer The kind of school Peter attends is a grammar school. or Peter attends a grammar school., but I do not think that such sentences are more frequent in everyday conversation than the shorter ones. I regard the answer A grammar school. as quite complete in itself and would even hesitate to call it elliptic. If different people were to be asked what is left out in this sentence, they might well offer any of a range of different answers including such possibilities as:

The kind of school Peter attends is a grammar school.
Peter attends a grammar school.
The kind of school Peter attends is what the English call a grammar school.
He attends a grammar school.
He goes to a grammar school.

Despite the fact that the question is very suggestive as to the wording of the answer, different people give different wordings. What all of them are quite sure of, however, is that they are making a statement, i.e. employing a concept of obligatory character. It is these very obligatory concepts (even if implicitly expressed) and not the possible addition of words abolishing the "ellipsis", that cause the group of words to be an utterance event.

Let us take another example. The other day I travelled by train and could not find a smoker. So I went to the corridor of a non-smoker, opened the window and lit a cigarette. When the ticket inspector came, I told her I had not been able to find the plate SMOKER on any of the carriages. Being exceptionally not much of a talkative woman, she said: "The last carriage." If we try to make a verbal sentence out of this, we will find a larger number of possible wordings than was the case in the preceding example. Leaving the explicitly expressed concept 'the last carriage' aside, we cannot be sure of any other concept (not even 'smoker' if we think of the scornful remark "Such people like you should be seated in the last carriage.") except the one referring to the fact that a statement was made. From the semantic viewpoint the only difference I can see between the last carriage regarded as a naming element and The last carriage. regarded as an utterance event is that the latter includes one concept of the obligatory set of concepts, namely the concept of statement.

It is the obligatory character of the above concepts that sets them apart from other concepts within semantics. This is the qualitative difference I had
in mind when speaking of the introduction of new operators into semantics, denoting the concepts of statement, question, etc. If they were to be dealt with within semantics, they would have to be kept apart from other concepts in order to illustrate the fact that, if a language user wants to communicate about anything, he is obliged to communicate at least about two things: the non-obligatory or optional concepts (operations on concepts) and the obligatory one(s). The term non-obligatory or optional is to be understood in a relative sense. If some concepts are called non-obligatory or optional, it does not mean that they can be omitted from the communication altogether. The language user has to choose his object of communication, he has to choose at least one of the optional concepts, but the number of options may be regarded as infinite. Once he makes his choice, however, he has (in order to communicate) to attach to it one (or more) concept(s) of the set of obligatory concepts, the number of which may be regarded as finite.

In the preceding paragraphs I have spoken only of obligatory concepts referring to statement, question, etc., but there are also other obligatory concepts referring to consent or dissent, modalities in the narrow sense, tenses, phenomena known under the name of functional sentence perspective (FSP), and very likely a number of others which, perhaps to a various degree, display the obligatory character. (Various kinds of obligatory concepts may form subsets of the set of obligatory concepts.) There still seems to be no satisfactory reason for not dealing with such a set of concepts within the sphere of semantics. Does the distinction between optional and obligatory concepts change anything concerning their semantic character? True enough, the distinction itself would not change anything except the internal structure of semantics. But let us examine the character of what the obligatory concepts refer to. In all cases it is something very closely connected with the particular language user, with his personal approach to the optional concepts being communicated about, with his, as it were, position in the act of communication. It may be through the obligatory concepts that a particular language user presents himself in this act, that his self is reflected in the system of language. This was the reason that led the authors of the paper on the ordered-triple theory to the conclusion that the set of attitudes, i.e. the set of what have been called here obligatory concepts, exceeded the scope of Morrisian semantics and should be rather regarded as part of pragmatics. The subsets representing different kinds of obligatory concepts (different kinds of attitudes) were introduced as separate co-ordinates of the attitudinal space A. This part of pragmatics was called internal pragmatics, being in a certain sense opposed to external pragmatics as explained in the above mentioned paper (p. 177).

A further examination of the obligatory concepts will show that they are ordered systematically, each subset representing a system of its own. What could be regarded as peculiar to these systems is the fact that they appear to be easily manageable from a language user’s viewpoint. I shall make an endeavour to illustrate these ideas in the following paragraphs.

It seems most natural that a language user presents himself in the act of communication by means of making a statement, asking a question, giving a command, expressing his wish, giving way to his feelings, etc. But it is also natural to think of other possibilities of a language user’s presentation. While communicating about something, he exists in space and time and hence the
spatial and temporal relations offer themselves to be used as other means to the language user's self-presentation. Let us examine whether this is the case in English.

In English the spatial relations are expressed by means of local adverbials and their functional equivalents. An analysis of an English text shows that they belong to the sphere of optional concepts. They may, or they need not, be present in the utterance. Their absence would not necessarily be a proof of their optional character if it had some definite place within the system of concepts referring to local relations, i.e., if the zero-presence represented one of the concepts in question. In my opinion, this is not the case in English. The language user employs a "local" concept only if he wants to specify some local relations. Unless he wants to, he is by no means obliged to do so. As for the question of a possible system, I do not deny that there is a possibility of finding systemic relations among the "local" concepts, but these relations will belong to different levels of abstraction, and the system will be a very complex one, having a large number of interrelated subsystems. In any case such a system is not easily manageable for the language user. He merely picks up certain items of this system without having in mind its complex structure. On picking a "local" concept, he may be aware of the systemic relations to its "immediate semantic constituents" at a certain level of abstraction (e.g., here — there — everywhere, on — over — under — before — behind — at — by — next to — in — out of, on the one side — on the other side — in the middle), but he does not take into account the relations to all the other levels. I do not think that there is any difference between "picking up" concepts referring to spatial relations and "picking up" those referring to objects. The system of concepts referring to object is similarly built up at different levels of abstraction and the language user picks up the concepts, not with respect to the whole system, but with respect to one of its subsystems relevant to the object in question. Even within the subsystem the language user is in most cases not sure of how many items the item picked up by him is related to. In this case I regard it as impossible for the zero-presence of an adverbial or its functional equivalent to play a definite role within the system. This leads me to the assumption that the possible absence of the "local" concepts in English utterances testifies to their optional character and that the "local" concepts cannot be connected with a language user's obligatory self-presentation.

In contrast to spatial relations, the temporal relations are expressed in English in two ways: (i) by means of time adverbials and their equivalents and (ii) by means of the system of tenses. The nature of such "temporal" concepts as expressed by means of time adverbials and their equivalents may be explained in exactly the same way as the "local" concepts. They have to be regarded as optional. On the other hand, the concepts expressed by means of what are called tenses undoubtedly form a system at one (or a small number of) level(s) of abstraction where even the zero-presence of the formal representation may refer to a definite concept, namely the concept of the Simple Present Tense as opposed to the limited number of other possibilities. This is, of course, the case with utterances expressed by means of verbal sentences, where the verbal element is — among other things — the formal representative of the respective "temporal" concept. With non-verbal sentences
the absence of the formal representative plays a different role. It relates the non-verbal sentence to some preceding verbal sentence, taking over its concept of a certain tense. If there are no preceding verbal sentences, the concept of tense must be derivable from the situation, otherwise the addressee will ask for it (or will not “understand” the utterance).

An objection may be raised that the distinction of the two ways of expressing the “temporal” concepts in English as adduced at the beginning of the preceding paragraph is all wrong, since the concepts represented by tenses may be regarded as equivalents of concepts expressed by means of adverbials. I admit that this is also a possible solution, but it does not change the fact that even in this case there is, within the general system of temporal concepts, a subsystem that behaves differently from the other subsystems in that one of its elements must be present in the utterance.

The close relation between internal pragmatics and semantics can be conveniently illustrated by the following remark on the development of the Future Tense in English. Originally there were only two obligatory “temporal” concepts in English — the Present and the Past. What is called a future event today was expressed by means of optional concepts represented by adverbials or verbs suggesting in some way or other the space of time after the moment of the utterance or the possible consequences in this space of time. Two of a large number of possibilities were the concepts expressed by the verbs “shall” and “will”. When used side by side with other similar concepts, they retained their optional character and referred to time only within the general scope of their reference, i.e., within the scope of reference to “duty” or “will”. In the course of time they became more and more the conventional means of expressing “future” events in respect of other possibilities; in their unmarked use the reference to time came to be regarded as their primary function, while the reference to “duty” and “will” became obliterated. At last they turned out to be the only “temporal” concepts at the same level of abstraction as the concepts of the “present” and the “past”; they began to function as the third item within the original binary system of tenses, thus changing it into a ternary one. (The problems of Future Tense as a not fully integrated item of the system of tenses in English are not to be dealt with here.)

The above example may also show one of the ways of the development of the system of internal pragmatics within a natural language. As this development is perpetually in progress, it is sometimes difficult to say whether certain concepts have already, or have not yet, passed from the sphere of optional concepts (semantics) to that of obligatory ones (internal pragmatics) and vice versa. As for the natural language, a system with a clear-cut border line can scarcely be found, because in addition to fully integrated items there are always such items in the system as are only partly integrated, being on their way in or out of it (cf. Travaux linguistiques de Prague 1966). Nevertheless, making an arbitrary division does not change the basic principles.

Coming back to the problem of whether the “spatial” and the “temporal” concepts are obligatory and form a manageable system by means of which the language user presents himself in the act of communication, I should say that the concepts referring to spatial relations are, from the viewpoint of the user of English, optional and no suitable system has been developed through
which the language user would be able to present himself in the act of communication. On the other hand, the concepts referring to temporal relations can be divided into two qualitatively different groups. The one is represented by optional concepts behaving in the same way as the "spatial" concepts. The other is represented by a rather self-contained system of obligatory concepts, which are — together with concepts referring to statements, questions, etc. — employed as means of the language user's self-presentation in the utterance.

It is interesting that though the "spatial" and the "temporal" concepts had the same chance of becoming one of the ways of the language user's presentation (as he always exists in space and time), it is only the "temporal" concepts or — more exactly — part of the "temporal" concepts that come to perform this pragmatic function in English and languages of similar structure. (In theory it is possible to conceive of languages where the pragmatic function is performed by the system of "spatial" concepts and the "temporal" concepts are merely optional.)

From the point of view of different natural languages, the attitudinal space may vary as to the number and quality of its co-ordinates. J. R. Searle (1970) made me believe that the co-ordinate representing the system of statements, questions, etc. (A in the preceding paper) was the essential one and could be invariably found in different languages. On the other hand there are co-ordinates that will only appear in the attitudinal space of a certain language or a group of languages. For example, in Czech (and, similarly, in some other Slavonic languages) the so-called category of aspect form a definite system and the respective concepts are as obligatory as any other dealt with previously. I cannot translate the English sentence *He jumped.* into Czech unless I know whether he jumped once or kept jumping for some time. As the "aspectual" attitude in Czech is part of my presentation in communication, I cannot dispense with it if I wish to perform the act of communication at all. It would be wrong to think that an English speaker, being not obliged to take the "aspectual" attitude, cannot express the concepts referring to aspects. He can do so by means of optional concepts as, e.g., "used to", to keep -ing", 'to start -ing', 'to stop -ing', 'once', 'all the time', and the like. Many of these means are quite common and one may argue that they form a system, but they are only used when the speaker wants to use them, they are by no means obligatory.

If there is one more co-ordinate in the Czech attitudinal space than in the English one, is it possible to say that the Czech space is richer than the English one? The answer to this question was given by V. Mathesius more than forty years ago (1935, Broadcast Course 1942). He has shown quite convincingly that since Czech has developed a fairly complex system of aspects, it employs a system of only three tenses, which in comparison with English is a very simple one. If I am to translate the Czech sentence *Ten film jsem viděl.* [the, film (object), particle (past + I) see + past] into English. I cannot do it unless I know whether "my seeing the film" has, or has not, some connection with the moment of my presentation. The translation would be either *I've seen the film.* or *I saw the film.* This example is a rather simple one. More complicated examples would show that English has developed a very refined system of tenses including — in a systemic way — even some phenomena
that can be found in Czech within the system of aspects. Hence the different number of co-ordinates is by no means a criterion of “richness” of the attitudinal space. The systems represented by various co-ordinates may display a different degree of refinement.

As a matter of fact there may be more than one criterion according to which the system is constructed. It would seem to be quite intuitive to say that the co-ordinates may be regarded, not as one-dimensional (as was — for simplicity’s sake — the case in the previous paper), but as m-dimensional spaces \((m = 0, 1, 2, 3, \ldots)\) represented by m-tuples of a certain kind of obligatory concepts. That is why I have referred to co-ordinates as self-contained systems in this chapter. (Theoretically, it is irrelevant whether the attitudinal space is given by an ordered n-tuple of one-dimensional co-ordinates or, say, by an ordered \(\frac{n}{2}\)-tuple of two-dimensional spaces. Practically, however, it is convenient to make full use of the formal system of a natural language and introduce the “co-ordinates” in accordance with it.)

It is perhaps worth mentioning that the concepts of the first, the second, and the third person may represent one of the co-ordinates of the attitudinal space if the above criteria of obligatoriness and systemicity are applied. This co-ordinate has not been included in the attitudinal space dealt with in the paper on the ordered-triple theory, because during the foregoing discussion, partly different criteria of the delimitation of the space \(A\) were employed, and the concepts ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘we’ on the analogy of ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘it’, ‘they’ were regarded as sigmalized concepts within the semantic sphere (see pp. 179—181).

To conclude this chapter, I should like to touch once again upon the question of pragmatics and its relation to semantics. In my opinion, the “classical” stream of modern logical semantics means a great step forward in revealing the basic semantic relations and constructing logical systems that open new horizons to research into natural languages. In one way, however, it is often misinterpreted. It is believed that it fully abstracts from the role of the user of the respective language, that it fully abstracts from pragmatics, and whatever bears features similar to the elements of a system of logical semantics may be added to it and organically absorbed. In fact the abstraction has to be regarded as the reduction of (at least internal) pragmatics to a constant. Let us take the co-ordinates of what is called here the attitudinal space \(A\): the values of \(A^1\) have been reduced to ‘consent’ (dissent being “solved” by means of negation), \(A^2\) has been reduced to ‘statement’, \(A^3\) to ‘100 % probability’, \(A^4\) to the ‘tenseless variant of the Present’, and \(A^5\) to a perspective given by the formal logical notation. The logical systems were originally constructed on the basis of the above reduction and represented a good starting point to research into semantics of any of the natural languages. The situation changed as soon as one of the constants was replaced by variables. Let us but consider the problems connected with more than one negation, the problems with questions and commands, various rates of probability, different tenses. The source of difficulties may be the fact that phenomena belonging to some other sphere of the sign system and representing a system of their own are of necessity integrated within semantics. The attempts made with these phenomena in the sphere of pragmatics (e.g., narrow modalities by Montague (1968), broad modalities by Searle (1970)) seem to be more
promising. In my opinion, one of the suitable solutions would be to construct the whole system of what has been termed the internal pragmatics of a certain natural language, which will vary according to different natural languages, and then to delimit its relations to the system of logical semantics, which may be considered to have general validity with respect to the natural languages.

While the present chapter has been mainly devoted to the general aspects of internal pragmatics, the following chapters are to deal with some minor points concerning the inner structure of internal pragmatics, viz., the separate co-ordinates of the attitudinal space $A$.

Chapter two

**CO-ORDINATE $A^1$**

$A^1$ is the co-ordinate of the language user's consent or dissent with respect to the given semantic component of the respective ordered triple $<O, E, A>$. It has already been suggested (p. 168) that at first glance the value of consent ($A^{con}$) and dissent ($A^{dis}$) might seem superfluous, since the same problem may be solved by means of negation within the logical notation of $O$ in the semantic sphere. In my opinion, however, this is not so. Let us take, for example, the question of imperatives. If I say *Eat quickly.*, my attitude may relate to two different conceptual cores and—in consequence—to two different conceptual notations.

In one case, my starting point is the conceptual notation $\sim E(y, q)$, roughly corresponding to the proposition 'it is not the case that you (are) eat(ing) quickly' ($\sim$ = propositional negation, $E$ = 'be eating', $y$ = 'you', $q$ = 'quickly'. $q$ is regarded here as a member of the set of individuals represented by the adverbs of manner; an alternative solution would be to regard the proposition 'it is not the case that you are eating quickly' as a one-argument expression $\sim E(y)$, where $E_1$ = 'be eating quickly'. Adopting this alternative will change none of the following conclusions.). On condition the given proposition corresponds to a given state of things, I apply the attitude of dissent $A^{dis}$ (together with other attitudes, of course) to this proposition, since I want to change the state of things, I want to make the addressee, who is not eating quickly, change his way of eating, simply to make him eat quickly. Hence the application of the imperative attitude of dissent $A^{dis}$, to the conceptual notation $\sim E(y, q)$ results in *Eat quickly*:

(1) $<\sim E(y, q), Eat \: quickly., A^{dis}, A^{imp}, A^{0\%}, A^{pres}, A^{rise}, q>$$

In the other case, however, my starting point is the proposition 'you (are) eat(ing) quickly' ($E(y, q)$) and I take the attitude $A^{con}$ to this proposition, since I want to preserve the state of things, I want to show the addressee, who is already eating quickly, that I agree to this state of things, that I want him to go on eating quickly, that it is the proper thing to do at the given moment:

(2) $<E(y, q), Eat \: quickly., A^{con}, A^{imp}, A^{100\%}, A^{pres}, A^{rise}, q>$$

These two types of imperative, based on different attitudes to different conceptual cores really correspond to two different uses of imperative sentences.
in some natural languages, in our case English. The speaker wants either to change the state of things or to preserve it. If the conceptual notation reflects the actual state of things, the two different "meanings" of the imperative sentence Eat quickly may be explained by different attitudes. The same holds for Don't eat quickly. It can be the result of the attitude of consent to 'it is not the case that you (are) eat(ing) quickly' as well as the result of applying the dissent to 'you are eating quickly'. All the four possibilities are exemplified in (3)—(6):

(3) \( \langle E(y, q), \text{Eat quickly.} \rangle \left\langle A^{\text{con}}, A^{\text{imp}}, A^{100\%}, A^{\text{pres}}, A^{\text{rise}, q} \rangle \right. 

(4) \( \langle E(y, q), \text{Don't eat quickly.} \rangle \left\langle A^{\text{dis}}, A^{\text{imp}}, A^{0\%}, A^{\text{pres}}, A^{\text{rise}, q} \rangle \right. 

(5) \( \langle \sim E(y, q), \text{Don't eat quickly.} \rangle \left\langle A^{\text{con}}, A^{\text{imp}}, A^{100\%}, A^{\text{pres}}, A^{\text{rise}, q} \rangle \right. 

(6) \( \langle \sim E(y, q), \text{Eat quickly.} \rangle \left\langle A^{\text{dis}}, A^{\text{imp}}, A^{0\%}, A^{\text{pres}}, A^{\text{rise}, q} \rangle \right. 

The above ordered triples are not provided with the situational index \( S_i \) (see p. 177) and have to be regarded as parts of language "dead". If taken as such, i.e. if they represent "dead" sentences, which have not yet been uttered in an actual communicative situation \( S_i \), it is not possible to justify the introduction of both the propositional negation in semantics and the co-ordinate \( A^1 \) in internal pragmatics, since the formal results of applying \( A^{\text{con}} \) to a negative proposition and \( A^{\text{dis}} \) to a positive proposition are the same. From the point of view of external pragmatics, however, the justification may be illustrated by employing one triple in the situation \( S_i \) and the other in \( S_j \) (different from \( S_i \)). This was also the reason why I did not confine myself to the relation between sheer semantics and \( A^1 \), but tried to make the explanation clear by referring to the external state of things.

One important point is to be made here. In (3)—(6), the imperative attitude of \( A^2 \) is accompanied by the present-tense attitude of \( A^4 \). I hold that making a "command" is always connected with the language user's taking the "present" or "future" attitude and hence the value \( A^{\text{imp}} \) of \( A^2 \) restricts the range of possible values of \( A^4 \) to \( A^{\text{pres}} \) or \( A^{\text{fut}} \) (the latter case is not to be dealt with here). This is an instance of interdependence of co-ordinates and, as is to be shown later on, it is not the only one. The co-ordinates are interrelated in a certain way, some value of one co-ordinate may restrict the possible range of values of another. This fact considerably supports the idea that the attitudinal space is to be taken as one whole, that its co-ordinates cannot be substituted for by independent operators within semantics, but they must be investigated in their interplay, the result of which can be applied to the given conceptual core. What has been said about the dependence of \( A^{\text{pres}} \) on \( A^{\text{imp}} \) does not hold good for the values of the co-ordinates \( A^3 \) and \( A^5 \), despite the fact that they do not change in (3)—(6) either.

In (3)—(6) the attitude of \( A^{\text{con}} \) is connected with the 100 % value of \( A^3 \), and \( A^{\text{dis}} \) with \( A^{0\%} \). It is possible, however, to lower the 100 % probability or raise the 0 % probability of \( A^3 \) by, say, 10 %, which will result in Eat quickly, will you. or Don't eat quickly, will you. Further decrease in probability will be reflected by the tag would you added to the original (100 %) expression. This can be illustrated by the following diagram. (For imperatives based on the corresponding negative proposition, the values of \( A^3 \) in the diagram will of course, be reversed.)
In connection with Diagram 1, J. Firbas drew my attention to an interesting fact: While the change in probability of the “positive” imperatives may be reflected not only by will you? and would you? but also by some other tags, as can you?, can’t you?, won’t you? (in spoken language even pronounced with several different kinds of stress and intonation), the change of the “negative” imperatives is comparatively limited, since it is probably restricted to the use of only will you?. This phenomenon may serve as an instance of the systemic asymmetry of the imperatives with respect to the range of probability. (Can you? and Can’t you? could be solved within a new co-ordinate, whose introduction is suggested on p. 206.) The decrease in probability could possibly be further expressed by Will you eat quickly, and Would you eat quickly, but this problem cannot be discussed until questions are dealt with at some length (see p. 205).

Another point worth mentioning in connection with A^1 is the problem of yes and no. It has already been proposed (see p. 179) that Yes. and No. may be represented by the ordered triples

(7) \( <Y/\mu\sigma, Yes., A> \)
(8) \( <Y/\mu\sigma, No., A'> \)

where \( Y/\mu\sigma \) is a concept that in any communicative situation identifies a certain proposition, viz., the one denoted by the sentence said immediately before the uttering of the Yes. or No., and A^1 has the value of consent or dissent respectively. (This general wording was originally suggested by P. Materna in the course of discussions on the ordered-triple theory.) The objection may be raised that the problem of Yes. and No. could be solved within the sphere of semantics by introducing two different concepts (e.g., \( Y/\mu\sigma \) for Yes. and \( N/\mu\sigma \) for No.) and the attitudes of consent and dissent could be dispensed with altogether. In that case, however, we should need (at least) two concepts of ‘yes’ and two concepts of ‘no’. Take the following examples:

(9) A: Charlie is a smoker.  B: Yes, he is.
(10) A: Charlie isn’t a smoker.  B: Yes, he is.
(11) A: Charlie is a smoker.  B: No, he isn’t.
(12) A: Charlie isn’t a smoker.  B: No, he isn’t.

In (9) Yes would refer to the concept \( Y' \) identifying the preceding (positive) proposition, while in (10) it would refer to \( Y'' \) identifying the negation of the preceding (negative) proposition. The cases (11) and (12) would have to be
solved analogically by means of two concepts for No. Further complications would arise in (13) and (14):

(13) A: Charlie isn't a smoker.
    B: Yes, he isn't. (In the sense "You are right, he isn't".)

(14) A: Charlie isn't a smoker.
    B: No, he is. (You are wrong, he is.)

If solved by means of ordered triples with the attitude of consent and dissent in the attitudinal space, the problem seems to be much simpler (see page 198):

Let us take a look at examples (15)—(20). In these cases Yes. and No. refer to one concept $Y$ (identifying the preceding proposition) and alter according to whether the attitude of consent or dissent is employed. In (15) and (16) it is, roughly speaking, the consent and dissent to the positive proposition $S(c)$, in (17) and (18) it is the dissent and consent to the same proposition $S(c)$, because the sentence Charlie isn't a smoker. is regarded here as the result of applying $A^{\text{dis}}$ to the positive proposition $S(c)$. If Charlie isn't a smoker. is regarded as the result of applying $A^{\text{con}}$ to the negative proposition $\neg S(c)$, Yes. and No. retain their $A^{\text{con}}$ and $A^{\text{dis}}$ respectively, which clearly shows that even such special cases as (19) and (20) (cf. (13) and (14)) can be easily solved without the status of the concept $Y$ being changed.

(It may have been noted that I only adduced such examples where the sentence preceding Yes. or No. was a statement and not a question. I admit that I did it on purpose, not because of 'yes' and 'no' (they would have behaved in exactly the same way as above), but because of the questions themselves, which in fact raise a number of specific problems, as is to be shown in the course of further discussion.)

Concluding the notes on $A^1$, I hope that the treatment of imperatives and the problems connected with 'yes' and 'no' have, to some extent at least assisted in justifying the introduction of this co-ordinate into the attitudinal space. It is not without interest that when dealing with illocutionary acts (which roughly correspond to different values of the co-ordinate $A^2$), J. R. Searle (1970) shows the necessity of distinguishing between propositional and illocutionary negation (which—in turn—reveals certain resemblance to the values of $A^1$).

**Chapter Three**

**CO-ORDINATES $A^2$ AND $A^3$**

The values of the co-ordinate $A^2$ are represented by the following attitudes of a language user to the given conceptual core: declarative ($A^{\text{dec}}$), interrogative ($A^{\text{int}}$), imperative ($A^{\text{imp}}$), desiderative ($A^{\text{des}}$), and exclamatory ($A^{\text{exc}}$). The aim of the present chapter is to comment on some of these values and their relations to the values of other co-ordinates with special respect to $A^3$. One of the most interesting and most discussed topics is that of questions. I shall first focus my attention on the so-called yes-no questions and the problems related to them.
In my opinion, “pure” yes-no questions are connected with the 50 % probability attitude of A³, while the attitude of consent or dissent of A¹ is neutralized (A[^{dis}]). If I ask Is Charlie a smoker?, I apply neither consent nor dissent to the given proposition since I do not regard it more probable that Charlie is a smoker than that he is not. It should logically follow that in such a case it is quite irrelevant whether I apply the interrogative attitude to a positive or a negative proposition. This is the case in Czech, where positive and negative questions do not seem to reveal any difference in probability attitude, which makes the problem of the respective positive and negative propositions irrelevant. For example, the questions Je Karel kufák? [Is Charlie a smoker?] and Neni Karel kufák? [literal translation: Isn’t Charlie a smoker?] are regarded as equivalent. This, however, is not the case in English.

For clarity’s sake, I shall first take up the problem of questions in which the attitude of consent or dissent is undoubtedly employed. I should say that the question Charlie is a smoker, isn’t he? is the result of applying A[^{con}] (apart from other attitudes) to the positive proposition S(c) with probability ranging, say, from 80 %—100 %. A more subtle division of the probability range can be achieved by distinguishing between question tags with question marks and those with full stops (corresponding to rising and falling intonation in spoken language respectively).

(1) $<S(c), \text{Charlie is a smoker, isn't he.}>$ 
(2) $<S(c), \text{Charlie is a smoker, isn't he?}>$
(3) $<S(c), \text{Is Charlie a smoker?}>$
(4) $<S(c), \text{Charlie isn't a smoker, is he?}>$
(5) $<S(c), \text{Charlie isn't a smoker, isn't he.}>$

Diagram 2

Diagram 2 is intended to illustrate the various degrees of probability in questions under discussion. (1) and (5) are sometimes regarded, not as questions, but as statements. This is due to the fact that the probability is close to 100 % or 0 % respectively, and the speaker, therefore, does not expect (and the hearer does not feel obliged to give) the answer yes or no. In my opinion, the slight decline from 100 % (0 %) signalizes that the speaker expects the hearer to respond in such a way as to carry on the given topic of conversation (It’s rather chilly today, isn’t it.). In (2) ((4)), the 80—90 % (10—20 %) probability shifts the examples further along the gamut towards the “pure” yes-no question of 50 % probability. On the one hand, this shift manifests itself in
the corresponding increase of the interrogative character of (2) and (4) with respect to (1) and (5); on the other hand, the attitude of consent (dissent) still has its force and may finally be interpreted in terms of suggesting the positive (negative) answer.

As for the English negative question *Isn't Charlie a smoker?*, the speaker also suggests the positive answer; in other words, he would be rather surprised if he received a negative one. For this reason I should say that the negative question in English is the result of applying the attitude of consent $A^{con}$ (apart from other attitudes) to the positive (or $A^{dis}$ to the negative) proposition on the one hand, and the $A^3$-attitude with a lower degree of probability than 80 % (cf. (2)) but much higher than 50 % (cf. (3)) on the other. Tentatively, the probability would be 75 %.

(6) $<S(c), Isn't Charlie a smoker?, \quad <A^{con}, A^{int}, A^{75\%}, A^{pres}, A^{rise, s}>$

Other negative questions as

(7) $<S(c), Can't Charlie be a smoker?, \quad <A^{con}, A^{int}, A^{70\%}, A^{pres}, A^{rise, s}>$

(8) $<S(c), Couldn't Charlie be a smoker?, \quad <A^{con}, A^{int}, A^{65\%}, A^{pres}, A^{rise, s}>$

(9) $<S(c), May Charlie not be a smoker?, \quad <A^{con}, A^{int}, A^{60\%}, A^{pres}, A^{rise, s}>$

(10) $<S(c), Mightn't Charlie be a smoker?, \quad <A^{con}, A^{int}, A^{55\%}, A^{pres}, A^{rise, s}>$

will fill the range between 70 % and 50 %, while the corresponding positive questions might possibly be located in the other half of the gamut (below 50 %). The following diagram illustrates the possible relations between the discussed questions and the probability attitudes.

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>Charlie is a smoker, isn't he.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 %</td>
<td>Charlie is a smoker, isn't he.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80 %</td>
<td>Isn't Charlie a smoker?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 %</td>
<td>Can't Charlie be a smoker?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 %</td>
<td>Couldn't Charlie be a smoker?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 %</td>
<td>May Charlie not be a smoker?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 %</td>
<td>Mightn't Charlie be a smoker?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 %</td>
<td>Is Charlie a smoker?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 %</td>
<td>Can Charlie be a smoker?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>Could Charlie be a smoker?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>Might Charlie be a smoker?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charlie isn't a smoker, is he.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charlie isn't a smoker, is he.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Diagram 3

In Diagram 3, the probability attitude is applied to the corresponding positive proposition $S(c)$. If it were applied to the negative proposition $\sim S(c)$,
the order of examples would be reversed. I am well aware of the fact that the
adduced degrees of probability may be largely disputed and I am not quite
sure of the position of the positive questions with modal verbs (Might Charlie
be a smoker? and the like), but I hope the above treatment of yes-no questions
may stimulate further discussion on this problem.

As for the wh-questions, I only intend to insert a few remarks which may
be of general validity. Basically, I think that the wh-questions may be solved
on the analogy of declarative sentences. To use P. Materna’s suggestion, let us
have a conceptual notation $\exists x(F(c, x))$, where $F =$ finite form of to fly, $c =$,
Charlie, $x =$ one member of the set of individuals (individual concepts)
whose range are place indications, $\exists =$ existential quantifier, and a point $A$
given by $\langle A^{\text{con}}, A^{\text{dec}}, A_{100\%}, A^{\text{past}}, A^{\text{rise}, x} \rangle$. The outcome of applying $A$ to
$\exists x(F(c, x))$ will be the following declarative sentence:

\[(11) \quad \langle A^{\text{con}}, A^{\text{dec}}, A^{100\%}, A^{\text{past}}, A^{\text{rise}, x} \rangle \]

If we change the value $A^{\text{dec}}$ into $A^{\text{int}}$, we receive the following interrogative
sentence (question):

\[(12) \quad \langle A^{\text{con}}, A^{\text{int}}, A^{100\%}, A^{\text{past}}, A^{\text{rise}, F} \rangle \]

The analogy with declarative sentences may lead us to the idea that a posi­
tive wh- question is the outcome of applying $A^{\text{con}}$ to a positive or $A^{\text{dis}}$ to a
negative proposition, and a negative question is the outcome of applying
$A^{\text{dis}}$ to a positive or $A^{\text{con}}$ to a negative proposition (cf. p. 167).

\[(13) \quad \langle A^{\text{con}}, A^{\text{int}}, A^{100\%}, A^{\text{past}}, A^{\text{rise}, F} \rangle \]

\[(14) \quad *\langle A^{\text{dis}}, A^{\text{int}}, A^{100\%}, A^{\text{past}}, A^{\text{rise}, F} \rangle \]

\[(15) \quad \langle A^{\text{con}}, A^{\text{int}}, A^{100\%}, A^{\text{past}}, A^{\text{rise}, F} \rangle \]

\[(16) \quad *\langle A^{\text{dis}}, A^{\text{int}}, A^{100\%}, A^{\text{past}}, A^{\text{rise}, F} \rangle \]

After discussing the matter with P. Materna, I have to admit that the
application of the attitude of dissent in the case of wh-questions (as in (14)
and (16)) is nonsensical. A language user can hardly ask after a component
of a given proposition and at the same time take the attitude of dissent to the
validity of the same proposition. Hence I shall regard the value $A^{\text{int}}$ (wh­
question) of $A^3$ as firmly connected with the value $A^{\text{con}}$ of $A^1$ (which is another
instance of interdependence of separate co-ordinates, cf. pp. 196, 200) and
consider a positive wh- question to be the result of applying only $A^{\text{con}}$ to
a positive proposition (as in (13)) and a negative wh- question to be the result
of applying only $A^{\text{con}}$ to a negative proposition (as in (15)). (Negative “ques­
tions” of the type And what didn’t he do.—meaning as much as ‘Just fancy
what he did’—can hardly be regarded as interrogative sentences. I should
rather rank them among exclamatory ones.)
As for the values of $A^3$, the wh-questions are subject to changes in probability in the same way as declarative sentences (see p. 169). Take a few examples for illustration.

(17) $\langle \exists x(F(c, x)), \text{Where did Charlie fly to?}\rangle$, $\langle \ldots , A^{100\%}, \ldots \rangle$

(18) $\langle \exists x(F(c, x)), \text{Where can Charlie have flown to?}\rangle$, $\langle \ldots , A^{95-99\%}, \ldots \rangle$

(19) $\langle \exists x(F(c, x)), \text{Where could Charlie have flown to?}\rangle$, $\langle \ldots , A^{90-95\%}, \ldots \rangle$

(20) $\langle \exists x(F(c, x)), \text{Where may Charlie have flown to?}\rangle$, $\langle \ldots , A^{70-90\%}, \ldots \rangle$

(21) $\langle \exists x(F(c, x)), \text{Where might Charlie have flown to?}\rangle$, $\langle \ldots , A^{50-70\%}, \ldots \rangle$

As for the values of $A^4$, I hope that the parallel to declarative sentences is so evident that no exemplification is necessary.

The same, however, cannot be said of $A^5$. It was actually J. Firbas who drew my attention to the fact that in the case of the wh-questions the values of $A^5$ represent a special problem. From the viewpoint of functional sentence perspective, there is no general agreement as to the character of the "question word". Having supported his grammatical and semantic arguments by the character of the prosodic features of the English "question words" (with respect to those of the other elements of the question), J. Firbas is not inclined to regard the "question word" as rheme proper of the question (except in some special cases), he would rather consider it part of the transition or the periphery of the rheme, the rhematic elements proper being expressed by the other elements of the question. (Cf. J. Firbas, pp. 9—56 of the present volume.) If I adopt this view, the value of $A^5$ in (12) will be—to some extent—restricted by the value of $A^3(A^{int})$. Under normal circumstances $A^{int}$ excludes $A^{rise,x}$, and the value of $A^5$ (in (11)) has to be changed, as a rule, in favour of the nearest rhematic element (in our case into $A^{rise,F}$). This "shift" in FSP between the statement and the wh-question represents another case of interdependence of the co-ordinates.

An interesting value of $A^2$ is represented by desiderative sentences. As I do not intend to go into detail, I should only like to mention one or two important points.

Take the desiderative sentence If only Charlie weren't a smoker. It may be regarded as the result of applying the attitude of dissent (apart from other attitudes, of course) to the positive proposition $S(c)$.

(22) $\langle S(c), \text{If only Charlie weren't a smoker.}\rangle$, $\langle A^{dis}, A^{des}, A^{100\%}, A^{pres}, A^{rise,a}\rangle$

In (22), $A^3 = A^{100\%}$. Popularly speaking, the language user is sure of the validity of $S(c)$ ('Charlie is a smoker') and desires its opposite. But if this example is further examined, it can be seen that the language user need not be sure of $S(c)$ at all. The degree of probability can be decreased to as low as 1 %, which amounts to the slightest probability of $S(c)$ and practically equals to 99 % probability of $\sim S(c)$ ('Charlie isn't a smoker'). In other words, the language user can employ the "negative" desiderative sentence if the probability rate of the positive proposition is different from 0 %. He cannot base the "negative" desiderative sentence on what is equal to $\sim S(c)$ ('Charlie isn't a smoker'), since in this case his wish is perfectly fulfilled and there is nothing to be desired.
If there is, however, the slightest doubt as to the 100 % probability of \( \sim S(c) \) (= 0 % probability of \( S(c) \)), the emplyoment of the desiderative sentence has its justification. Whatever the rate of probability within the range between 1—100 % may be, the desiderative sentence itself does not change. I should like to speak here of a specific case of neutralization of \( A^3 \) with respect to the value of \( A^{des} \) in \( A^2 \). (Another instance of interdependence!) The same conclusions hold good for “positive” desiderative sentences with respective vice-versa changes in terminology. The following diagram will show it more clearly:

\[
\begin{align*}
(23) \quad & \langle S(c), \text{If only Charlie weren’t a smoker.} \rangle, \langle A^{dis}, A^{des}, A^{1-100\%}, \ldots \rangle \\
(24) \quad & \langle \sim S(c), \text{If only Charlie were a smoker.} \rangle, \langle A^{dis}, A^{des}, A^{1-100\%}, \ldots \rangle \\
\end{align*}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( A^3 )</th>
<th>100 %</th>
<th>0 %</th>
<th>100 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Diagram 4

Desiderative sentences pointing to the past or to the future may be dealt with analogically.

\[
\begin{align*}
(25) \quad & \langle S(c), \text{If only Charlie hadn’t been a smoker.} \rangle, \langle A^{dis}, A^{des}, A^{1-100\%}, A_{past}, A_{rise,s} \rangle \\
(26) \quad & \langle \sim S(c), \text{If only Charlie had been a smoker.} \rangle, \langle A^{dis}, A^{des}, A^{1-100\%}, A_{past}, A_{rise,s} \rangle \\
(27) \quad & \langle S(c), \text{May Charlie not be a smoker.} \rangle, \langle A^{dis}, A^{des}, A^{1-100\%}, A_{fut}, A_{rise,s} \rangle \\
(28) \quad & \langle \sim S(c), \text{May Charlie be a smoker.} \rangle, \langle A^{dis}, A^{des}, A^{1-100\%}, A_{fut}, A_{rise,s} \rangle \\
\end{align*}
\]

There is another point connected with \( A^{des} \) that may throw some light on the character of the values of \( A^2 \). Take the following sentences:

\[
\begin{align*}
(29) \quad & I \text{ wish Charlie weren’t a smoker.} \\
(30) \quad & I \text{ wish Charlie were a smoker.} \\
(31) \quad & I \text{ wish Charlie hadn’t been a smoker.} \\
(32) \quad & I \text{ wish Charlie had been a smoker.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

From a certain point of view they may be regarded as equivalents of (23)—(26) and therefore as “true” desiderative sentences. Viewed from the angle of the whole paradigm of ‘to wish’, matters assume another aspect. Let us merely shift (29)—(32) into the past.

\[
\begin{align*}
(33) \quad & I \text{ wished Charlie weren’t a smoker.} \\
(34) \quad & I \text{ wished Charlie were a smoker.} \\
(35) \quad & I \text{ wished Charlie hadn’t been a smoker.} \\
(36) \quad & I \text{ wished Charlie had been a smoker.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

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In these cases the language user does not present himself through the desiderative attitude; he, in fact, reports on his ‘wish’ performed in the past. He makes a statement about ‘his wishing something’ in the past. This statement-like character of the above examples is more apparent when the language user reports on a ‘wish’ of someone else.

(37) Peter wished Charlie weren’t a smoker.

(38) Peter wished Charlie were a smoker.

etc.

It appears clear that I cannot present myself in the act of communication through the desiderative attitude of someone else. I can merely state that somebody has (had) such an attitude. The same holds good for imperatives. I can present myself through a command at the moment of communication, but I cannot do the same with my imperative attitude belonging to some moment in the past or with the imperative attitude of someone else. I can only state I ordered him to eat quickly. She ordered him to eat quickly. On the grounds of what has been said I hold that sentences with ‘to wish’ are statements that in one point (in the case of ‘I wish’) coincide with desiderative sentences in the sense given by \( A^{des} \) within the attitudinal space. In this connection it is worth mentioning that another point of coincidence may be found between imperatives and questions in the case of \( \text{Will you eat quickly}.? \). Against the background of \( \text{Eat quickly, will you}., \text{Will you eat quickly}.? \) can be regarded as an imperative sentence with a lower degree of probability than that of \( \text{Eat quickly, will you}; \) but if compared with \( \text{Will he fly to Prague tomorrow?} \) or even with \( \text{Will he be flying to Prague tomorrow?} \), it paradigmatically relates to questions.

Coming back to the problem of \( \text{he wished...} \) and the like, I think that all the sentences of the type \( \text{he thinks...}, \text{he believes...}, \text{he states...}, \text{he asks...}, \) etc., are basically statements. They are statements about somebody’s thinking, believing, stating, etc., something; in short, they are statements about attitudes. It is very important to distinguish the taking of an attitude from a statement about an attitude. In the preceding examples I should speak of taking the declarative attitude towards an attitude regarded as an object of communication, i.e. as a (non-obligatory) concept, and not as a way of the language user’s presentation in the act of communication.

As a matter of fact, the concepts referring to \( \text{he thinks}, \text{he believes}, \text{he states}, \) etc., represent part of the respective conceptual core to which I may apply any point \( A \) (given by the values of the co-ordinates \( A^{1} \ldots A^{5} \)) in exactly the same way as was the case with conceptual notations (cores) dealt with before.

(39) \( \langle B(h, s) \rangle \), \( \text{He believes that Charlie is a smoker.} \\
\langle A^{\text{con}}, A^{\text{des}}, A^{1\text{00}}, A^{\text{pre}}, A^{\text{rise}} \rangle \)

\( B = \) finite form of ‘to believe’, \( h = \) he, \( s = \) concept of the ordered triple \( \langle S(c), \text{Charlie is a smoker.}, \langle..,.>. \rangle \rangle \). As the way of applying different attitudes has been dealt with at some length, I will merely introduce some of the results for illustration.

(40) \( \text{He might believe that Charlie is a smoker.} \)
(41) He doesn’t believe that Charlie is a smoker.
(42) Does he believe that Charlie is a smoker?
(43) If only he believed that Charlie was a smoker.
(44) He believed that Charlie was a smoker.
   etc.

Generally speaking, what has been said about he believes, he thinks, etc.,
also holds good for other “persons” including I believe, I think, etc. I cannot
see any difference between

(45) She thought Charlie was a smoker.

and

(46) I thought Charlie was a smoker.

In both cases I take the declarative attitude to ‘her thinking that something’
or to ‘my thinking that something’ respectively. The same may probably be
said about

(47) She thinks that Charlie is a smoker.
(48) I think that Charlie is a smoker.

The above types of sentences, however, sometimes behave in a different
way if they refer to the attitude of the language user uttering the sentence.
The difference between his taking an attitude $A$ (as a means of presenting
himself) and the attitude that represents part of the conceptual core to which $A$
is being applied is blurred to such an extent that the expression corresponding
to the latter starts to perform the function of a certain point $A$ in the attitudinal
space. I think that in the example

(49) Charlie is a smoker, I think.

the I think in postposition performs a function similar to may in

(50) Charlie may be a smoker.

viz., the function reflecting a lower degree of probability at $A^3$. Viewed from
this angle, I do not exclude the possibility that (48) may sometimes be inter­
preted in the same way as (49), which, however, cannot be said about (47).
I think does not seem to be the only instance of this phenomenon, but I leave
this problem open to further discussion.

As to the co-ordinate $A^3$, I trust that the examples introduced in connection
with $A^1$ and $A^2$ have shown how it operates, and that there is no need to deal
with it in separate paragraphs. It is, however, to be borne in mind that $A^3$
does not exhaust the whole sphere of attitudes that are termed modalities in
the narrow sense of the word. It covers only one aspect of the narrow modalities,
viz., probability. Other aspects as ‘will’, ‘compulsion’, ‘necessity’ and the
like, will have to be represented by a separate co-ordinate, which has not yet
been introduced.
Chapter Four

CO-ORDINATE A^4

The values of A^4 are represented by different tenses. Some reasons for regarding tenses as part of internal pragmatics were given in Chapter One. Nevertheless, the discussions on the attitudinal character of tenses have given rise to a number of objections which have the following in common: How can tenses be regarded as attitudes with respect to a given proposition if they influence the truth-values of the same proposition in a decisive way? Should they not rather be regarded as part of the conceptual core?

In my opinion, these questions are due to the way in which tenses have been dealt with in traditional grammars and, to some extent, in logical semantics as well. In this traditional conception, a firm point of departure is the language user locating in time the extralingual events (referred to by propositions) with respect to himself. As for tenses, it is the moment of utterance that is the decisive criterion of attaching the truth-values to a proposition. Hence the propositions

(1) Charlie kissed Mary.
(2) Charlie is kissing Mary.
(3) Charlie will kiss Mary.

will attain different truth-values according to whether

1. uttered (by a language user) at a certain point of time, they refer to different extralingual events;
2. uttered at a certain point of time, they refer to the same extralingual event;
3. uttered at different points of time, they refer to the same extralingual event;
4. uttered at different points of time, they refer to different extralingual events.

If this conception were employed in the ordered-triple theory, the problem of tenses could not be solved within the framework of ordered triples, since there are two things, viz., the extralingual event and the moment of utterance, that are given by E-pragmatical indices and therefore belong to the sphere of external pragmatics. Thanks to the recent stimuli of logical semantics, the problem of the extralingual event may be solved without the interference of external pragmatics; the solution consists in the introduction of the notion of possible worlds. Thus Ò. Dahl (1971.1ff, cf. also references therein), for example proposes “a semantics where the history of the universe is thought of as a three-dimensional film and the state of the universe at every instant corresponds to one frame. Every such instantaneous world-state can be described by a set of propositions which can be said to be true at that instant or in that world-state”. Dahl tries “to apply this model to linguistic problems”. For him, the tenses reflect the relations between possible world-states (= possible worlds) and the “actual” world at the moment of utterance. One aspect of Dahl’s conception is important for our discussion. If a proposition is a member of
the set of propositions representing a certain possible world, it is true in this possible world and can be dealt with purely within semantics, while the questions of whether this possible world coincides with an actual "past", "present", or "future" world-state is irrelevant to semantics and has to be solved by external pragmatics. If, for example, the proposition $K(c, m)$ (corresponding to 'Charlie is kissing Mary.') is regarded as a member of the set of propositions representing the possible world $PW_1$, it is true in this world and can be dealt with as such within the semantic component of the ordered triple

$$(4) \langle K(c, m)_{PW_1}, E, A \rangle.$$ 

The ordered triple (4) is not provided with the situational index $S_i$ (see p. 177) and therefore belongs to language "dead". The fact that the possible world $PW_1$ coincides with the actual world-state on 1st April 1973 at 20.00 hours GMT is of no relevance in this case.

The second aspect of Dahl's conception, namely the introduction of the "actual" world-state of a language user's utterance, is—in my opinion—due to the traditional linguistic approach which paid little attention to the distinction between semantics and pragmatics and, in consequence, lead to the employment of what has been termed here E-pragmatic indices in semantics. The proposers of the ordered-triple theory have attempted to separate (as far as such a separation is possible at all) the sphere of semantics from that of pragmatics and to distinguish such part of pragmatics as operates within language "dead", or in other words, constitutes part of a language user's apparatus preconditioning the actual use of a given language (internal pragmatics), from external pragmatics, representing language "live" and dealing with actual situations (and their parameters) at the moment of utterance. In terms of this conception, I shall make an attempt to abstract from the actual situation at the moment of utterance and deal with tenses within ordered triples, i.e., within language "dead".

Let us approach the problem from the very opposite angle. Suppose we have a set of temporally defined possible worlds. By means of tenses a language user may locate, not a proposition of the possible world $PW_1$ with respect to the actual world-state at the moment of utterance, but himself in a possible world $PW_2$ (which may be identical with or different from $PW_1$) with respect to the possible world $PW_1$ of the proposition. (Whether $PW_2$ is identical with the actual world-state at the moment of utterance or not is another question.) Popularly speaking, a language user may locate, not a proposition with respect to himself, but himself with respect to the proposition. If we regard a language user's locating himself with respect to a given proposition as one way of presenting himself in the act of (possible) communication, we arrive exactly at what was described in Chapter One as a kind of the language user's attitude. By means of applying different temporal attitudes to a given proposition of a certain possible world, representing the semantic component of an ordered triple, we can—with respect to tense, of course—generate all the potential sentences of all the potential language users, relating to the same proposition. Hence it is, not the language user, but the proposition as the semantic component of an ordered triple, that represents the firm point of departure in dealing with tenses. For example, by applying different values of $A^4$ to the proposition $K(c, m)_{PW_1}$, we obtain the following ordered triples:

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Is this not what we aim at when constructing the system of language "dead", a prerequisite, which is at the disposal of any language user at any time? I should say it is the above ordered triples (and many others if the values of other co-ordinates are applied) that at any time stand at any language user's disposal, and in this way the temporal co-ordinate of the ordered triples is justified without having to consider the moment of utterance.

It may perhaps be objected that in the act of communication, in language "live", the choice of the temporal attitude or the respective ordered triple is given by the moment of utterance anyway, and that it is rather superfluous to introduce tenses as attitudes. I should like to argue that this is not the case. Take the following examples.

(17) I entered the room and couldn't believe my eyes: Charlie was kissing Mary and she didn't make a single movement to prevent him from doing so.

(18) I entered the room and couldn't believe my eyes: Charlie is kissing Mary and she doesn't make a single movement to prevent him from doing so.

In these cases we have to deal with language "live", with ordered triples employed in a situation $S_1$, where the possible world of the proposition $K(c,m)$ coincides with the world state at 20.00 GMT, April 1, 1973, the moment of utterance occurring at 15.00 GMT, April 10, 1973. In spite of the fact that in both examples the proposition $K(c,m)$ refers to the same extralingual event and the moment of utterance is the same, the tenses employed are different. They are not onesidedly dependent on the moment of utterance, but they are chosen by the language user. In (17) he presents himself in one definite possible world out of those which follow the possible world of the proposition, while in (18) he presents himself in the possible world of the proposition. Take another two examples.

(19) Charlie kissed Mary.
It has long been recognized that the employment of tenses in (19) and (20) is not a matter of the mere relation between the extralingual event and the moment of utterance, but that it is given by the language user's attitude. In terms of the above suggestions, we can say that in (19) the language user presents himself through the temporal attitude in one definite possible world out of those which follow the possible world of the proposition, while in (20) he presents himself in all (any of) the possible worlds that follow that of the proposition.

If the moment of utterance and the extralingual event are temporally located as in $S_1$, it is possible for a language user to employ any of the triples (5)—(12). This does not mean that the different temporal attitudes are interchangeable, that they do not perform different temporal functions. These functions, however, are not determined by the relation between the moment of utterance and the moment of the (possible) extralingual event. This relation has at most the power to impose certain restrictions on the range of different temporal functions (the number of temporal attitudes) to be employed. In our case the given situation $S_1$ excludes the use of “future” attitudes (13)—(16). A situation $S_j$, where the moment of utterance is the same as in $S_1$, but the possible world of the proposition $K(c, m)$ is one of those following the moment of utterance, will probably exclude the triples (5)—(10) and will allow the employment of the triples (11)—(16). Hence, on the one hand, the moment of utterance seems to be an important factor that imposes restrictions on the range of possible temporal attitudes, but on the other hand does not determine them; it is not to be identified with the temporal presentation of a language user's self in the act of communication. Whatever restrictions may result from the relation between the moment of utterance and the world-state referred to by the proposition, there always seems to be more than one possible choice of temporal attitude for the language user to exercise. In other words, the language user always seems to have the possibility of making his choice.

The system of temporal attitudes is not so symmetric as might have appeared from the above examples. “Future” attitudes especially reveal many specific features in comparison with the “present” and the “past”. The asymmetry of “future” attitudes may be attributed to the fact that the possible worlds that follow the possible world of a language user's presentation are often looked upon as such hypothetical worlds as cannot be identified with any of the actual world-states. Hence “future” attitudes are often combined with attitudes expressing ‘will’, ‘compulsion’, ‘necessity’, ‘intention’, and the like. As has already been pointed out, the latter attitudes are to be represented by a separate co-ordinate, which has not yet been introduced.

Chapter Five

CO-ORDINATE $A^5$

The co-ordinate $A^5$ represents such attitudes as are generally treated under the heading of functional sentence perspective (FSP). As for English, the theory of FSP has been most successfully developed by J. Firbas, whose
systematic treatment of these phenomena has revealed both the general principles of FSP as well as the specific nature of means of expressing FSP in different natural languages. In this respect the reader is referred to the following works by the above author: (1959a), (1964a), (1965), (1966), (1969).

In the present chapter I shall merely confine myself to

(i) commenting on the ordered triples illustrating the application of different values of $A^5$ in the paper on the ordered triple theory (see p. 170 of the present volume) and

(ii) inserting a few additional remarks on the character of $A^5$ and its relation to external pragmatics.

Before starting the commentary on the examples, I should like to prevent some unnecessary confusions by reminding the reader of the fact that the syntactic component $E$ of an ordered triple has been restricted to the sphere of written language (see p. 161) and does not therefore contain any prosodic features. J. Vachek (1959) has clearly shown that the written norm of language is not a mere imperfect reflection of the spoken norm, but each of them performs specific functions of its own, employing different means to reach different ends. Of course, the written and the spoken norm are closely interrelated and have a great deal in common, but owing to the different means they employ and the specific functions they perform, they can be regarded as two systems, each of which may be investigated separately.

In the present discussion different values of $A^5$ are represented by such attitudes applicable to one and the same conceptual core as bring about changes in the corresponding formal (written) expression of language. Take the following examples where the predicate $P = 'develop out of$', the first argument $a = 'our "who"$', the second argument $b = "swa hwa swa"$. (It is to be borne in mind that in the predicate calculus notation the positions of arguments within the brackets with respect to a given predicate are fixed. In our case the first argument of $P$ represents the object developed, while the second argument of $P$ represents the object out of which something develops.)

(1) $P(a, b), \text{Our "who" has developed out of "swa hwa swa".}$

$\langle 1, \ldots, 1, A_{\text{rise}, b} \rangle$

(2) $P(a, b), \text{Out of "swa hwa swa" has developed our "who".}$

$\langle 1, \ldots, 1, A_{\text{rise}, a} \rangle$

(Cf. G. O. Curme 1931.208.)

Applied to one conceptual notation, the value $A_{\text{rise}, b}$ marks $b$ as rheme proper of the sentence putting it after the theme ($a$) and the transition ($P$), while the value $A_{\text{rise}, a}$ marks $a$ as rheme proper, putting it after the theme ($b$) and the transition ($P$). In the case under discussion these two different attitudes are reflected in the corresponding formal expressions by means of a change in word order.

(It is generally known that in spoken language we can put the sentence \textit{Our "who" has developed out of "swa hwa swa"}. into various kinds of perspective by employing different stress and intonation without changing the formal sequence of words. I wish, however, to abstract from this possibility and merely deal with written language. Nevertheless, to meet the objection that even written language presupposes certain stress and intonation, let us presuppose
here the most frequent (most natural) stress and the most frequent (most natural) intonation of the given sentence. The results of J. Firbas' research have already shown that the phonetic marks (supplied by expert phoneticians) confirm the conclusions about FSP drawn merely on the grounds of written language.)

In some synthetic languages (the majority of Slavonic languages) most syntactic and semantic relations among the elements of a given sentence are sufficiently signalled by word endings, which permits their comparatively free word order to perform the role of a highly important means of FSP. In English, however, many syntactic and semantic relations are merely signalled by word order, which brings about its comparatively rigid character and in consequence prevents it from being used as a means of FSP to the same extent as in the majority of Slavonic languages. As can be clearly seen in Firbas (1964b), the assumption that, because of its rigid word order, English is rather insusceptible to different FSP attitudes has not proved to be justified; English meets the requirements of FSP by employing a number of other means than mere word-order changes.

In examples (1) and (2), the semantic relations of the elements of the formal expression $E$ are sufficiently signalled by non-word-order means (by prepositions), which enables us to change the FSP attitude by a mere change of word order. If the same procedure is applied to the following examples, the attempt will end in a failure.

3) $(K(c, a), \text{Cain killed Abel.}, \langle A^{\text{con}}, A^{\text{dec}}, A^{100\%}, A^{\text{past}}, A^{\text{rise.e}} \rangle)$

4) *$(K(c, a), \text{Abel killed Cain.}, \langle A^{\text{con}}, A^{\text{dec}}, A^{100\%}, A^{\text{past}}, A^{\text{rise.e}} \rangle)$

$(K = \text{‘kill’}, c = \text{‘Cain’}, a = \text{‘Abel’}; the asterisk denotes unacceptability, for clarity’s sake the letters denoting the arguments in the conceptual notation are also used as superscripts of $A^5$ instead of the more appropriate respective reference to the first and second argument $(a, b)$.)

Under normal circumstances no native speaker of English would read (4) in the sense of ‘He who killed Abel was Cain’, but would (with regard to (3)) reverse the roles of the ‘killer’ and the ‘person killed’, which is of course at variance with the respective conceptual notation. Let us see what happens if the same two FSP attitudes are applied to the conceptual notation $K'(a, c)$ ($a = \text{‘Abel’}, c = \text{‘Cain’}, K’ = \text{‘be killed’}$), which is different from, but closely related (see p. 217) to $K(c, a)$.

5) $(K'(a, c), \text{Abel was killed by Cain.}, \langle., ., ., ., A^{\text{rise.e}} \rangle)$

6) *$(K'(a, c), \text{By Cain was killed Abel.}, \langle.., ., ., ., A^{\text{rise.e}} \rangle)$

In (5) the application of the attitude $A^{\text{rise.e}}$ to the given conceptual notation caused no difficulties in constructing the formal expression. In (6), however, it resulted in a syntactically unacceptable formal expression. (I do not take here into account various “degrees” of possible acceptability.) A comparison of (3), (4) and (6), (5) will show that in each pair out of the two triples with the same attitude only one is acceptable.

7) $(K(c, a), \text{Cain killed Abel.}, \langle.., ., ., ., A^{\text{rise.e}} \rangle)$

8) $(K'(a, c), \text{Abel was killed by Cain.}, \langle.., ., ., ., A^{\text{rise.e}} \rangle)$
Hence the triples (7) and (8) are complementary in that each of them reflects such value of $A^5$ as could not be successfully applied within the remaining triple if the mere word-order principle were employed. Does this mean that applying different attitudes may entail a change of the conceptual core? Certainly not. It is to be borne in mind that the semantic component of an ordered triple has been introduced as an independent component, irrespective of what sort of attitude is applied to it. $K(c, a)$ and $K'(a, c)$ have to be considered (two different (though, in a sense, related) conceptual notations, each of them having its own paradigm of formal expressions (sentences) when various FSP (and also other) attitudes are applied. If we take $K(c, a)$ and apply different FSP attitudes to it, we obtain a number of ordered triples that are broadly synonymous (because their conceptual notations are identical, while their formal expressions and their points in the attitudinal space are different, cf. p. 171 of the present volume). Suppose, however, that the attitude $A^{\text{rise, c}}$ is the only one that is, for the above reasons, not applicable to $K(c, a)$. Then we shall have either to put up with the empty place in the respective paradigm of the "active" conceptual notation or to look for some approximation in the related paradigms. Suppose, further, that the approximation is the ordered triple (8) belonging to the related paradigm based on the conceptual notation $K'(a, c)$. Hence the empty place would be taken by an ordered triple that contains a conceptual notation different from the notations of all the remaining triples of the paradigm, which seems to me rather counterintuitive.

On the other hand, if we do not regard word order as the only way of signalling different FSP attitudes, but employ other means as for example "borrow" suitable formal expressions (sentences) from other paradigms, we arrive at the following solution:

(9) $<K(c, a), Cain killed Abel,.(,<,.,.,A^{\text{rise, a}}>)$
(10) $<K(c, a), Abel was killed by Cain,.(,<,.,.,A^{\text{rise, c}}>)$
(11) $<K'(a, c), Abel was killed by Cain,.(,<,.,.,A^{\text{rise, c}}>)$
(12) $<K'(a, c), Cain killed Abel,.(,<,.,.,A^{\text{rise, a}}>)$

In (10) Abel was killed by Cain is regarded as the result of applying $A^{\text{rise, c}}$ to the "active" conceptual notation $K(c, a)$. We have, in fact, "borrowed" not the whole triple but only the formal expression whose correctness is guaranteed by its existence in an ordered triple with a closely related conceptual notation and the same value of $A^5$. The same solution can be suggested for the "passive" notation $K'(a, c)$ as is shown in (11) and (12).

I think that the possibility of getting Abel was killed by Cain. by means of two procedures (namely by applying $A^{\text{rise, c}}$ either to $K'(a, c)$ or to $K(c, a)$) is fairly intuitive in that it reflects the two traditional approaches to the passive in English:

(i) Active sentences and their passive counterparts were not regarded as synonymous and it was argued that these two sentence types had different semantic properties and should therefore be kept apart not only in syntax, but also in semantics. (This aspect can be illustrated by the comparison of (9) and (11).)

(ii) Active sentences and their passive counterparts were regarded as synonymous and it was argued that on condition they were exact counterparts
(13) (a) \( <K(c, a), \text{Cain killed Abel.}> \)  
\( <\ldots \ldots, A \text{rise} > \)  
(b) \( <K'(a, c), \text{Cain killed Abel.}> \)  
\( <\ldots \ldots, A \text{rise} > \)  

(14) (a) \( <K(c, a), \text{Abel was killed by Cain.}> \)  
\( <\ldots \ldots, A \text{rise} > \)  
(b) \( <K'(a, c), \text{Abel was killed by Cain.}> \)  
\( <\ldots \ldots, A \text{rise} > \)  

(15) (a) \( <K(c, a), \text{Cain killed him.}> \)  
\( <\ldots \ldots, A \text{rise} > \)  
(b) \( <K'(a, c), \text{Abel was killed by him.}> \)  
\( <\ldots \ldots, A \text{rise} > \)  

(16) (a) \( <K(c, a), \text{It was Abel whom Cain killed.}> \)  
\( <\ldots \ldots, A \text{fall} > \)  
(b) \( <K'(a, c), \text{It was Abel who was killed by Cain.}> \)  
\( <\ldots \ldots, A \text{fall} > \)  

(17) (a) \( <K(c, a), \text{It was Cain who killed Abel.}> \)  
\( <\ldots \ldots, A \text{fall} > \)  
(b) \( <K'(a, c), \text{It was Cain by whom Abel was killed}> \)  
\( <\ldots \ldots, A \text{fall} > \)  

(18) (a) \( <K(c, a), \text{Kill him, Cain did.}> \)  
\( <\ldots \ldots, A \text{fall} > \)  
(b) \( <K'(a, c), \text{Killed by him, Abel was.}> \)  
\( <\ldots \ldots, A \text{fall} > \)  

(19) (a) \( <K(c, a), \text{Cain killed Abel.}> \)  
\( <\ldots \ldots, A * > \)  
(b) \( <K'(a, c), \text{Abel was killed by Cain.}> \)  
\( <\ldots \ldots, A * > \)
(the agent in the passive was not omitted, etc.), they frequently referred to the same phenomena but differed in the emphasis laid on them (which was not a matter of semantics any more). (This aspect can be illustrated by the comparison of (9) and (10).)

On the one hand, the present solution keeps some of the differences claimed by approach (i), but on the other, offers the possibility for the active and passive sentences to overlap. The two sets of examples (13)—(19) will show it more clearly. (Examples (13a)—(19a) are taken from the paper on the ordered-triple theory (see p. 170 of the present volume) where they are there to illustrate the different kinds of FSP attitude.)

A comparison of examples (a) and (b) shows that there are two cases ((13) and (14)) in which the actives and the passives overlap. If applied either to \( K(c, a) \) or to \( K'(a, c) \), \( A^{rise,c} \) may be expressed only by\( Cain killed Abel. \) and \( A^{rise,c} \) only by \( Abel was killed by Cain. \) Other FSP attitudes lead to different results according to whether they are applied to \( K(c, a) \) or to \( K'(a, c) \).

If we introduced a more refined division of FSP attitudes, indexically recording theme proper and the other thematic element(s), we should come to the conclusion that even the pairs of examples (15) (a) — (b), (16) (a) — (b), (17) (a) — (b), and (18) (a) — (b) are complementary in their function, each of them having a different structure of the thematic section. This can be seen from exx. (20) — (29) (cf. (13) — (18)), where the possible "refined" kind of indexical notation of \( A^5 \) is replaced by a more or less current way of direct attachment of symbols to the respective elements. (\( T_p = \text{theme proper}, T = \text{thematic element}, T_r = \text{transition proper}, T_r = \text{transitional element}, R = \text{rhematic elements}, R_p = \text{rhemre proper}, c = \text{co-conveyor of CD}, I = \text{indicator of communicative position}, i = \text{indicator of inferiority}; superscripts denote the rank, for further explanation of symbols see Svoboda 1968.)

\[
\begin{align*}
(20) & T_p & T_r T_r & T_p & R_p & Cain killed Abel. \\
(21) & T_p & T_r & T_r & c & R_p & Abel was killed by Cain. \\
(22) & T & R_p & T_r & T_p & Cain killed him. \\
(23) & T & T_r & R_p & c & T_p & Abel was killed by him. \\
(24) & I^6 & T & c & R_p & T_p & It was Abel whom Cain killed. \\
(25) & I^6 & T & c & R_p & T_p & It was Abel who was killed by Cain. \\
(26) & I^6 & T & c & R_p & T_p & It was Cain who killed Abel.
\end{align*}
\]
Exx. (22) and (23) (analogically (28) and (29)) have the same transitional and rhematic elements, but differ as to which of the two thematic elements is regarded as theme proper. In (24), (25) and (26), (27) the thematic sections are represented by subfields (communicative or distributional fields of lower order) with different internal arrangements of their elements. (Cf. Svoboda 1968.) If such niceties were taken into account, exx. (20) — (29) could be looked upon as the unique results of the application of the above "refined" kinds of FSP attitude, irrespective of whether the conceptual notation were \( K(c, a) \) or \( K'(a, c) \). In such a case the scope of overlapping would be extended to all our examples with the exception of (30) and (31) (cf. (19a, b)), where the rhemes proper are the same and the themes are by definition without any relevant internal perspective.

(30) \[ \frac{T_p}{R_p} \]
Cain killed Abel.

(31) \[ \frac{R_p}{T_p} \]
Abel was killed by Cain.

((30) and (31) are special cases belonging to the sphere of second instance. According to J. Firbas (1959a,43), second-instance sentences contain one heavily contrasted word, which constitutes rheme proper, all the other elements forming an extensive theme proper. As can be seen from the following examples, any element may be set in contrast and hence may become rheme proper.

(32) \(<K (c, a), Cain killed Abel., \>

(33) \(<K (c, a), Cain killed Abel., \>

(34) \(<K (c, a), Cain killed Abel., \>

(35) \(<K (c, a), Cain did kill Abel., \>

(36) \(<K' (a, c), Abel was killed by Cain., \>

(37) \(<K' (a, c), Abel was killed by Cain., \>

(38) \(<K' (a, c), Abel was killed by Cain., \>

(39) \(<K' (a, c), Abel was killed by Cain., \>

It is worth mentioning that within the second instance the value of \( A^5 \) may single out as rheme proper not only elements of the respective conceptual notation, but also some values of the co-ordinates of \( A \) (cf. (35) and (39)).

When reading the manuscript of this paper, P. Materna voiced a suggestion
throwing new light on the relation between the conceptual notations $K(c, a)$ and $K'(a, c)$: Each notation refers to a propositional concept. As the concept has been defined as a set of identification procedures (cf. p. 163 of the present volume), each notation refers to a set of identification procedures. It is apparent that the procedures corresponding to $K(c, a)$ differ from the procedures corresponding to $K'(a, c)$ at least in the identifications of $K$ and $K'$. If, however, the two sets of procedures are applied to various possible worlds, we may come to the conclusion that the results of their applications are exactly the same and that we are dealing with two sets of procedures that are intensionally equivalent. This seems to be the case with $K(c, a)$ and $K'(a, c)$. Abel was killed by Cain. is true (false) if and only if Cain killed Abel. is true (false). Two sets of procedures that are intensionally equivalent represent one concept and hence $K(c, a)$ and $K'(a, c)$ have to be regarded as one and the same propositional concept. If we accept this solution, it will be convenient to distinguish between a conceptual notation, referring to a given set of identification procedures, and a conceptual core, representing all the sets of identification procedures that are intensionally equivalent. In this sense we may say that $K(c, a)$ and $K'(a, c)$ are two different conceptual notations constituting one conceptual core.

A further point to be discussed concerns example (40) (cf. ex. (15) and also ex. (38) on p. 170 of the present volume).

(40) $\langle K(c, a), \text{Cain killed him.}, \langle ., ., ., A_{\text{rise}, K} \rangle \rangle$

How is it possible that argument $a$ of the conceptual notation is translated not by Abel, but by him in the formal expression $E$? According to one of Firbas’ rules (cf. J. Firbas 1959a.46—7, and 1969.49), a contextually independent object carries a higher degree of CD (communicative dynamism) than the finite verb; in the absence of another element carrying a still higher degree of CD, the object becomes rheme proper. This is the case with the written sentence Cain killed Abel. As for English, the most frequent possible way of making the verb (kill) rheme proper is to thematize its object(s), which in our case can be done by replacing Abel by the corresponding personal pronoun. Being regarded as contextually dependent, the pronoun enters the thematic section of the sentence while the verb remains in the non-thematic section, its notional component (kill, not the so-called temporal and modal exponent $ed$), becoming rheme proper.

On the other hand, the sentence Cain killed him. can be obtained by means of applying the same attitude as in (40) to a conceptual notation containing the so-called signalized expression in the place of $a$ (for type $\sigma$ see pp. 179—181 of the present volume).

(41) $\langle K(c, h), \text{Cain killed him.}, \langle ., ., ., A_{\text{rise}, K} \rangle \rangle$

($h = \text{‘he’, which has the type } \iota \sigma \text{ or } \iota \mu \sigma$, i.e. in any communicative situation identifies a certain individual or a certain individual concept.)

The difference between (40) and (41) consists in that him in (40) will always identify the individual or the individual concept denoted by the word Abel, while him in (41) will identify different individuals or individual concepts according to different communicative situations. What may be of interest in this connection is the fact that exx. (40) and (41) bear a certain resemblance to the active-passive examples (10) and (11). In order to apply the given attitude
to \( K(c, a) \) in the case of (40), the language user as it were “borrows” the formal expression of (41). Contrary to actives and passives, the procedure of “borrowing” formal expressions from triples with sigmalized expressions operates only in one direction. It is not possible, for example, to apply \( A^{\text{rise}, h} \) to \( K(c, h) \) and to obtain the “borrowed” formal expression of (40), \( \text{Cain killed Abel.} \). This is because \( h \) identifies the respective individual or individual concept according to the communicative situation given by E-pragmatic indices. As the examined triple is not provided with these indices, it is not set in a certain situation and it is impossible to say what individual or individual concept will be identified by \( h \).

Viewed from this angle, not all of the different kinds of FSP attitude can be applied to conceptual notations containing sigmalized expressions. This restriction of the applicability of FSP attitudes seems to be quite natural if we take into account that sigmalized expressions are “a priori” regarded as contextually dependent (situation-bound) and that they can be rhematized only by special means (cf. even, it is… that, etc.) which do not cover all the possible attitudes.

A restriction on applicability may also be seen in connection with conceptual notations containing predicate expressions with a different number of arguments. It is clear that the number of possible FSP attitudes applicable to a predicate expression with seven arguments is much higher than the one applicable to an expression with only two arguments. What remains basically the same is the theme-rHEME (rise) and the rheme-theme (fall) sequence, but there is a different number of possibilities as to which arguments may play the role of rheme proper and other rhematic elements (from the viewpoint of our “rough” division). All the attitudes applicable to a two-place predicate expression are also applicable to a seven-place expression, but this does not hold good vice versa.

If the various kinds of FSP attitude are generated quite independently of the conceptual notation (as is the case on pp. 172–176), they will have to cover all the possibilities for \( x \)-place predicate expressions where \( x \) will be the highest presupposed number of arguments. This seems to be rather inconvenient for expressions with a lesser number of arguments than \( x \), because the lesser the number of arguments with respect to \( x \), the greater the number of attitudes to be ruled out as inapplicable to a given predicate expression. I fear that in practice the “drop out” will many times outnumber the cases of applicable attitudes. Hence from the practical point of view, my suggestion is to regard the generation of an \( O_c \) as preceding the application of various attitudes, which means that a certain point \( A \) will be applied to the already given \( O_c \). (This view has in effect been tacitly entertained throughout the present paper.) This grants us the possibility of dismissing all the inapplicable attitudes before they are employed, their employment being known to be futile, because we already know the number of arguments of the given predicate expression and therefore apply only the applicable ones. Such a procedure presupposes the classification of FSP attitudes according to the number of elements to which it is applied. This can easily be done, since the compilation of different values of \( A \), i.e., of different FSP attitudes, most conveniently consists in finding out the different possibilities with one-place, two-place, three-place, etc., predicate expressions.
It may seem rather strange that while the different values of $A^1$, $A^2$, $A^3$, $A^4$ are "always" applicable irrespective of the internal structure of $O_c$, the values of $A^5$ may be restricted by the character of $O_c$ and in this sense are dependent on it. This phenomenon is closely connected with the different nature of $A^5$. For $A^1$—$A^4$, the internal structure of $O_c$ is irrelevant, because the attitudes are applied to a conceptual notation that is regarded as one whole; they are applied to a "compact" propositional concept. In contrast to this, the values of $A^5$ are based on the assumption that there exists a certain internal structure of the propositional concept and that the propositional concept cannot be represented in a natural language as an indivisible whole, but has to be linearized in a certain way either in time (in spoken language) or in space (in written language). From a certain point of view the necessity of linearization may be regarded as a serious defect of natural languages, but as there is usually more than one way of linearizing a given propositional concept, the language user makes a virtue of necessity and employs different linearizations to serve his different intentions. (Since the linearized elements refer to the component parts of the given propositional concept, its internal structure has to be taken into account as well.)

What do we understand by the language user's intentions when speaking of different linearizations of a propositional concept? Suppose we have fourteen propositional concepts that represent a certain part of a situation $S_i$ and wish to describe the respective part of $S_i$ by fourteen ordered triples whose $O_c$'s are represented by the fourteen propositional concepts. Let us further suppose that we have made our decision as to the succession of the respective propositional concepts and, in this way, have made our choice of the route through the described part of $S_i$. Whether this route will be "rough" or "smooth" will much depend on what FSP attitudes will be applied to the respective propositional concepts, or in other words, into what perspectives the propositional concepts will be linearized. M. A. K. Halliday illustrated this by the following two paragraphs (1969b.18):

(42) It's the sun that's shining; the day is perfect. The astronauts come here. The great hall they're just passing; he'll perhaps come out to greet them, the president. No, it's the ceremony that the prime minister's taking. The prime minister has great dignity. What he's shaking with them now is hands. Why only two are present puzzles me. The two navy men are in view; anywhere I can't see the space doctor. What the space doctor aroused was most of the excitement. With all those cheers the crowd must be welcoming him now.

(43) The sun's shining; it's a perfect day. Here come the astronauts. They're just passing the great hall; perhaps the president will come out to greet them. No, it's the prime minister that's taking the ceremony. He has great dignity, the prime minister. He's shaking hands with them now. What puzzles me is why only two are present. The ones that are in view are the two navy men; the space doctor I can't see anywhere. It was the space doctor who aroused most of the excitement. It must be him the crowd are welcoming now with all those cheers.

Although one may ask whether one or two of the corresponding sentences are really based on the same conceptual notation, the above two paragraphs
may be regarded as a good illustration of the employment of ordered triples with inadequate (42) and adequate (43) FSP attitudes.

Another route through the part of situation $S_i$ may be found by merely choosing the first of the fourteen concepts, setting it into a certain kind of perspective (i.e., applying to it a certain value of $A^5$ apart from other attitudes), and then looking for the next concept which would be most suitable (for example, because of having partly identical arguments with the preceding concept) and applying to it another suitable point $A$, etc. (Halliday's example, probably an extract from a running commentary, reveals such a procedure.) In this case the choice of the propositional concept (and also the respective triple) has been influenced by the FSP attitude chosen in the preceding ordered triple (which is just the opposite procedure in regard to the above suggestion with the given succession of concepts).

The question as to which ordered triple is to be employed in regard to its FSP attitude is, of course, decided by external pragmatics. It has been touched upon here, because it is especially in this way that the relevance of different FSP attitudes within ordered triples can be demonstrated. Needless to say, if we abstract from the communicative situation (as we really do when dealing with ordered triples of language "dead"), then any FSP attitude is as good as any other. None of the ordered triples in (1) and (2) can be said to be more adequate than the other unless there is a communicative situation (given by E-pragmatic indices) to go by. (In this connection the reader may be reminded of the temporal attitudes of $A^4$, where from the viewpoint of "dead" triples any tense is as good as any other, but its relevance is revealed when the respective triples are provided with E-pragmatic indices, i.e. when they are set into a given communicative situation.)

By way of concluding the present chapter, I should like to emphasize the fact that the FSP attitude of an ordered triple may prove its relevance even when this triple is employed alone. In such a case the FSP attitude is, in my opinion, the decisive factor in shaping what has recently been termed the pool of presuppositions. This, however, would be a further problem.

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RESUMÉ
Ještě k vnitřní pragmatice

Tento příspěvek je možno považovat za pokračování článku o tříšložkové teorii jazyka (publikovaného v tomto svazku studií na str. 159—186). Autor zde zaujímá postoj k řádu otázek, které byly vznoseny těm, kdo diskutoval o tomto článku předchozího, a zároveň se snaží o bližší osvětlení systému vnitřní pragmatiky. V první kapitole si vžádáme mezi sémantikou a vnitřní pragmatikou. Připouští, že prvky vnitřní pragmatiky je možno považovat za koncepty, které by byly teoreticky možno řešit v rámci sémantiky, avšak vzápětí ukazuje, že takovéto řešení je z hlediska metody zkoumání nevyhodné, protože koncepty zařazené do sféry vnitřní pragmatiky se od ostatních konceptů mimo jiné podstatně liší tím, že mají obligatorní charakter. Chceme-li mluvit o čemkoli komunikovat, musí kromě toho, o čem komunikující, použít jistého počtu obhajobních konceptů, které jsou vždy úzce spojeny s jeho zaujímavým stanoviskem. Obligatornost, zaujímavé stanovisko a zřetelně soustavy konceptů jsou vlastnostmi, které vyčlenuji v rámci daného jazyka omezený počet konceptů souvisejících v morrisovské koncepci jazyka. Z aturdne systém sémantiky pracující s neobligatorními koncepty je možno ve výběru z klasického jazyka vytvářející koncepty vedle sémantiky. Klasická konceptuální každý systém vnitřní pragmatiky představuje prostor obecného pokusu o obecné, vnitřní pragmatiky představovaným prostorou postojů (vytvářenými obhajobními koncepty) se může u různých jazyků lišit jak počtem vnitřní pragmatiky těsné, tak také počtem jeho hodnot.

Druhá kapitola je věnována problematice týkající se zavedení souřadnici A, která zachycuje souhlas či nesouhlas mluvčího vzhledem k sémantické složce daného uspořádaného trojice. Jelikož otázka kladné a záporné propozice je řešena v rámci sémantiky, mohlo by se zdát, že zavedení souhlasného a nesouhlasného postoju je zbytečné. Autor však ukazuje, že hodnoty souhlas — nesouhlas jsou zcela nutné například pro zachycení dvou různých typů situací, ve kterých se používá imperativy. Kladný imperativ pak může být výsledkem uplatnění souhlasného postoju k propozici kladné či nesouhlasného postoju k propozici záporné a záporný imperativ uplatněním souhlasného postoju k propozici záporné či nesouhlasného postoju k propozici kladné. Z hlediska mimojazykové situace jde v podstatě o to, že při použití téže formy imperativu se jedná o zachování stavu věci v připadě jednom a o jejich změnu v případě druhém. Nezbytnost zavedení souřadnici A je tedy zřetelně projevij při pokusech o formální získání výrazu ano a ne.

Třetí kapitola pojednává o souřadnici A, která představuje modalitu v širším slova smyslu, a o souřadnici A, která pokrývá tzv. úzkou modalitu ve štěj pevzédpodobnostních postojů. Autor se zde podrobí například zabývá otázkami zjišťovacími a přitom ukazuje, že jednotlivé hodnoty na různých souřadnicích nejsou na sobě zcela nezávislé, ale že se v mnoha případech ovlivňují. Tak např. anglické kladné zjišťovací otázky bez použití modálních sloves jsou úzce spojeny s pravděpodobnostním postojem 50 % na A a zároveň neutralizují hodnoty souhlas — nesouhlas na A. Pravděpodobnostní skalu je však možno doplnit označovacími větami s tzv. question-tags, zápornou otázkou a použitím pravděpodobnostních modálních sloves. Zajímavou závislost hodnot vykazují větě příběh, kde desiderativní postoj na A se váže s hodnotou nesouhlas na A a přitom se může pojit s kteroukoli hodnotou na A, která je rozdílná od 0 %. V návaznosti na zjišťovací otázky se autor dotýká některých problémů otážek doplňovacích a v souvislosti s větami příčin se vyslovuje k problematice tzv. belief-sentences.

Čtvrtá kapitola se soustředí na otázku zařazení slovesných částí jako hodnot souřadnice A do rámce vnitřní pragmatiky. Autor zde polemizuje s názorem, že slovesný čas je čistě sémantickou záležitostí, protože úzce souvisí s pravdivostní hodnotou dané propozice, a snaží se ukázat, že tento názor má koeny v tradičním předpokladu, podle kterého mluvčí časově zařazuje mimojazykové údaje vzhledem ke jednomu pevnému bodu na časové ose, totiž k okamžiku výpovědi. Toto pojetí je však možno obratit a říci,

Pátá kapitola přináší komentář k příkladům z předešlého článku, u nichž se jednalo o aplikaci hodnot souřadnice A^3 (aktuálního členění) na dané konceptuální jádro, a zabývá se obšírněji okolnostmi komplementárního výskytu aktivních a pasivních vazeb. Autor si též všímá zájmen, která mohou být jednak výsledkem uplatnění jedné z hodnot A^1, jednak formálním vyjádřením tzv. sigmalizovaných konceptů. Při zkoumání vztahu aktuálního členění k mimojazykové skutečnosti se ukázalo, že souřadnice A^5 skýtá jakýsi zásobník postojů, které jsou mluvčímu daného jazyka k dispozici, chce-li mimojazykovou skutečnost zachytit z různých zorných úhlů. Samotný systém postojů aktuálního členění patří do pragmatiky vnitřní, avšak konkrétní použití postojů v rámci dané promluvy souvisí s charakterem situacíních indexů, a je tedy v úzkém vztahu k pragmatice vnější. Na rozdíl od souřadnic A^1 až A^4, u nichž se při aplikaci jednotlivých hodnot považuje konceptuální jádro za kompaktní celek, již samotné hodnoty souřadnice A^5 jsou konceptuální vedle jeho vnitřní členění.