6 Verbal Semantics and Causal Structuration in SA Constructions

This chapter will look into the reasons why SA constructions admit a very limited set of agentive manner of motion verbs.

6.1 On the Applicability of Verbs in SA Constructions

Heavy restrictions imposed on the repertory of verbs that are admitted into these constructions have been explained in the literature by the inherently monadic, non-causative nature of these verbs, i.e. by the fact that the verbs encode internal causation (cf. Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1994 and 1995). Drawing on Smith (1978), Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1994) have also observed that this construction is barred for verbs describing aimless motion ([stroll, mosey, meander and wander] because these verbs denote internally caused activities that cannot be brought about by coercion (using Smith’s terminology, in aimless motion internal control cannot be relinquished, hence transitive causative use is ruled out). Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1992) observe, too, that distinctions induced by diathesis alternations help to provide insights into verbal meaning. In spite of this contention, however, they hold (Rappaport Hovav and Levin 1998) that the class of manner of motion verbs displays a uniform syntactic behaviour because idiosyncratic properties of verbs (properties that specify various manners of motion) are not syntactically relevant. In line with this observation, they adduce a transitive causative construction of the type The coach ran the athletes around the track among a set of constructions which they claim to be open for all agentive manner of motion verbs. Jackendoff (1983, 1990), in similar fashion, does not treat manner components of the verb’s meaning as relevant for syntax. He claims that the differences between manner of motion verbs (e.g., walk, jog or strut) pertain to spatial structure, not to conceptual structure. Since “any semantic distinction that makes a syntactic difference must be encoded in conceptual structure” (Jackendoff 1990: 34), the verbs are claimed to

17 Levin (1993) examines syntactic alternations and verbs that are admitted into them. She provides a taxonomy of verbs, based in large part on their applicability in various syntactic patterns. An examination of types of verbs and semantic roles that are associated with them and their mapping to various syntactic patterns is also presented in Dixon (1991, 2005).
display syntactic parallelism. Jackendoff’s position is critically examined by Taylor (1996). Taylor holds that an account of the syntactic behaviour of verbs must take into consideration encyclopaedic knowledge that “cannot be accommodated by the algebra of conceptual structure, nor is this knowledge exclusively perceptual in nature” (1996: 3). Faber and Mairal Usón (1999) also emphasize the importance of perceptual information contained in the meaning of manner of motion verbs. They observe that movement (as well as the mover) is characterized by a set of not only semantic but also perceptual components of meaning. Nevertheless, they contend that manner of motion does not affect syntax.

Owing to the apparent restrictions imposed on the applicability of agentive verbs of manner of motion in various constructions, it is clear that the claim that manner of motion is not syntactically relevant cannot be maintained. Boas (2006, 2008) shows convincingly that there are connections between the verb’s descriptivity (roughly, complexity and specificity of the verb’s meaning, cf. Snell-Hornby 1983) and the range of syntactic patterns into which the verb may enter. Nevertheless, as has already been mentioned, his account does not make clear exactly which elements of the verb’s meaning decide on the verb’s usability in a given syntactic pattern. For example, the verbs jump and jog are classified by Boas as belonging to the same verbal group (that which is characterized by a relatively higher degree of descriptivity than walk). Nevertheless, jump can be used in a SA construction but jog cannot. Similarly, the verbs bustle and swim are classed among the verbs in the third group (characterized by an even higher degree of descriptivity), yet swim can be used in a SA construction and bustle cannot.

It thus remains to be answered which meaning components decide on the verb’s applicability in this type of construction. On closer scrutiny it shows that in order to identify those components one has to look more closely into the relationship between the semantic structure of the verb and the causal structuration of the motion situation encoded in SA constructions. It turns out that certain verbs are not admitted into the construction on account of its very specific causal structuration. Put another way, the specificity of the construction’s causal structuration imposes heavy restrictions on the repertory of components that a verb may express. The analysis may thus be taken as evidence in favour of Pinker’s (1989: 103) observation that “subtle semantic distinctions among subclasses of verbs can result

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18 For a critical treatment of Jackendoff’s position see also Deane (1996).
in differences in their syntactic behaviour, often giving the appearance of their being arbitrary lexical exceptions to alternations.”

6.2 Causal Structuration in SA Constructions

The causal structuration of motion situations expressed in SA constructions has a very specific force dynamic patterning, not only in terms of the transmission of energy from the causer to the causee, but also in terms of the relation between the causer’s intention and the causee’s intention – on transitivity and causativity as conceptually related concepts see, e.g., Lyons (1978) and Bierwisch (1975), on transmission of energy as an essential feature of transitivity see, e.g., Croft (1991, 2012), DeLancey (1984), Lakoff (1977) and Langacker (1987, 1990, 1991), on causality as one of the manifestations of force dynamics see esp. Talmy (e.g., 1976, 1988), on the force-dynamic nature of transitivity and causativity see, e.g., Kemmer and Verhagen (1994).19 The causer executes his intention by transmitting some form of energy to the causee (it is important to realize that intention materializes itself in the form of an action and only in this way can it have a causal status). That is, the causer’s transmission of energy is a concrete realization of his intention (the causer’s transmission of energy to the causee triggers and controls the movement executed by the causee). The causee is then the receiver of the energy whose source is the causer. The causee is, at the same time, a source of energy that underlies the actual execution of the movement (cf. Davidse and Geyskens’s 1998 conception of the causee as a second energy source). That is, the causee’s execution of the movement lexicalized in the verb is a physical realization of the causee’s intention.

At this point it may be interesting to mention that Davidse and Geyskens (1998) reject Cruse’s (1972) analysis of the relation between the causer and the causee as based solely on the transmission of will. They regard Cruse’s (1972: 522) “causation by command” as “too unnuanced a concept to capture all the causing types” (Davidse and Geyskens 1998: 163). Davidse and Geyskens’s and Cruse’s positions can, in actual fact, be reconciled by appealing to the fact that the causer’s intention materializes itself in an action, which has certain concrete characteris-

19 In general terms, in force-dynamics the interaction between entities (the Agonist and the Antagonist) is captured as involving transmission of energy. Causality within a force dynamic rubric is viewed as a broad phenomenon, also encompassing concepts such as enablement or resistance.
tics in terms of a concrete form of the transmission of energy from the causer to the causee.

Since the energy underlying the execution of a self-agentive movement operates internally (in that it is confined to the mover’s body, i.e. it does not involve the transmission of physical energy from the mover’s body to an entity external to the mover’s body), the causer’s intention can trigger and control the causee’s movement only under the proviso that the causee accepts the causer’s intention and acts accordingly (that is, the causee’s intention agrees with the causer’s intention). Owing to the absence of explicit coercive force on the part of the causer and of explicit resistance on the part of the causee, the force-dynamic patterning is thus more or less balanced. However, it is not fully balanced because the causer is the controlling, dominant participant. The controlling position of the causer and the controlled position of the causee are iconically reflected in syntax (Haiman 1985). The causer, representing “a starting point in terms of energy flow” (Langacker 1990: 246), occupies the subject position. The causee, representing the receiver of the energy transmitted to him, occupies the direct object position.

An overt signal of the type of force-dynamic patterning is the verb’s meaning. If the force-dynamic pattern is more or less balanced, the verb denotes the type of movement executed by the causee, which is a signal of the fact that the causer’s intention and the causee’s intention agree. For example, when John walks Harry to the station, Harry executes walking; when the general marches the soldiers to their tents, the soldiers execute marching and when the trainer runs the trainees around the track, the trainees execute running.

If the movement is induced by the transmission of coercive force (in other words, if there is a marked imbalance in the force-dynamic patterning of the situation), the verb does not denote the type of movement executed by the causee. For example, when John marches Harry to the kitchen, Harry does not execute marching, and when John runs Harry to the kitchen, Harry does not execute running (non-coercive and coercive caused motion scenarios will be dealt with in Chapters 6.5 and 6.6).

6.3 Intentionality of Action in SA Constructions

SA constructions are unique in that they involve two agentive participants (one initiating and controlling the movement and the other executing the movement), but at the same time, they employ one verb, hence involve one action (albeit composed of two clearly discernible, causally
related sub-events). The fundamental question then is: in which way can verbs in SA constructions accommodate two executors of intention, each assuming a different hierarchical position? Closer scrutiny reveals that an answer to this question must be sought in the layered structure of the intentionality of action.

Searle (1983) draws a distinction between an ‘intention in action’ and a ‘prior intention’. He demonstrates the difference between the two concepts by means of a situation in which “I suddenly get up and start pacing about the room. My getting up and pacing about are clearly intentional actions, but in order to do them I do not need to form an intention to do them prior to doing them. I don’t in any sense have to have a plan to get up and pace about. Like many of the things one does, I just do these actions” (1983: 84). Therefore: “All intentional actions have intentions in action but not all intentional actions have prior intentions” (p.85). So, one’s pacing about the room is always a result of an intention in action. In certain cases, it may also be the result of a prior intention: one raises one’s arm because one wants to vote (/wave goodbye/reach for the book/exercise/try to touch the ceiling), etc. (1983: 105).

Owing to the “transitivity of Intentional causation, the prior intention represents and causes the entire action, but the intention in action presents and causes only the bodily movement” (1983: 95).

Searle’s conception of prior intention and intention in action receives support from writings of other authors. O’Connor (1995), e.g., holds that an agent performs an action not merely in order to perform it but in order to satisfy a desire (or prior intention). Fleming (1964) distinguishes between “intentions that antedate the actions” and “intentions that we have only as we perform the actions intended” and observes that “we can act intentionally and at the same time spontaneously, without any forethought at all” (1964: 310). Miller and Johnson-Laird’s conception of intention also includes a decision “to institute a particular plan of action” (1976: 508), i.e. it includes a kind of forethought.

Schematically (Searle 1983: 94):

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>causes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prior intention ———&gt; intention in action ———&gt; bodily movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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20 Not everything one does represents an action because, as Searle observes, events like sneezing are not actions because they do not contain intention in action.
It is important to realize that intention (irrespective of whether prior intention or intention in action) materializes itself in the exertion of some energy and only in this way can it perform a causative role with respect to a movement. As Searle observes, “if we break the causal connection between intention and action we no longer have a case of carrying out the intention” (1983: 86).

As regards the causal structuration in SA constructions from the point of view of the intentionality of action, a closer look reveals that the causer, instigating (and controlling) the movement, functions as the executor of ‘prior intention’ and the causee, performing the movement, functions as the executor of ‘intention in action’. This makes it possible to render a situation by means of a syntactic construction which employs one verb (hence it encodes one action) but which, at the same time, involves two agentive participants, each with a different hierarchical position. The causer’s action is a realization of his prior intention and the causee’s action (the movement) is a realization of the latter’s intention in action. The two actions (subevents in this complex causative situation) merge; their merging is made possible by the fact that the verb’s structure accommodates both the causer’s intention and the causee’s intention.

At this point in the discussion, it should be pointed out that the specific causal structuration of SA constructions is underlain by a specific operation of intention – more specifically, by the capacity of intention to function as a direct causal factor. As Wierzbicka (1976: 141) puts it, “the human body is the only thing (physical object) in the world the states of which can be caused directly by the will of the person who ‘owns’ that body.” The form of SA constructions is that which is used for events involving direct causation, i.e. events in which there is no intervening (mediating) event between the causing event and the caused event. At the same time, however, SA constructions involve two actions – one executed by the causer and the other executed by the causee. The element effecting the merging of the causing event and the caused event is intention – more specifically, the merging of the causer’s prior intention and the causee’s intention in action.

Prior intention, being antecedent to the movement, represents an “additional cause” of the movement: the causer as its executor thus represents a source of “additional energy” underlying the movement. This line of reasoning receives support from the possibility of forming reflexive constructions of the type John walked himself to the store, in which the mover is explicitly rendered as both the executor of prior intention and the executor of intention in action (reflexive constructions will be dealt with in Chapter 13).
The analysis offered in the following section will demonstrate how the concept of ‘prior intention’ and that of ‘intention in action’ relate to verbal semantic structures – more specifically, to verbal ‘qualia structures’. It will show that the verb’s semantic structure is the factor determining the verb’s usability in the SA construction.

6.4 Verbal Qualia Structures in Relation to Causal Structuration in SA Constructions

This section will look into the causal structuration in SA constructions in relation to the semantics of verbs. The analysis of verbal semantic structure offered here has been inspired, in part, by Pustejovsky’s theory of qualia structure. Pustejovsky (1993, 1995) distinguishes several distinct types of the properties of nominals and calls them qualia. The formal quale includes the taxonomic structure (this quale distinguishes the object within a larger domain), the constitutive quale includes information about the structural properties of objects (the relation between the object and its constituents, or proper parts), the agentive quale carries information about the origin (or “bringing about”) of the object, and the telic quale refers to the activities in which the object takes part, including the purpose and the function of the object.

The analysis will attempt to identify certain principled connections between the character of the verb’s semantic structure and the causative structuration of the motion situation as expressed in SA constructions. It may thus be taken as a confirmation of Jackendoff’s (2002) view that Pustejovsky’s theory of qualia structure can be extended to the structure of verbs (in fact, Pustejovsky 1993 and 1995 himself notes that this possibility is more than plausible). Jackendoff suggests that the formal quale of a verb covers argument structure (e.g., sprint is a type of locomotion and therefore involves a mover and a path). The constitutive quale of this verb includes the rapid (and perhaps effortful) character of the movement. The agentive quale “will perhaps specify that the activity arises from the character’s will to move, i.e. it is not a passive motion like falling” (Jackendoff 2002: 373). Jackendoff suggests, too, that the agentive quale may also include causes and reasons underlying an activity. The telic quale will include information about the purpose of an action (this information may, however, be also included in the agentive quale).

As we shall see, especially important for the principled connections between the verb’s semantic structure and the causal patterning of the motion situation are the relations holding between the verb’s agentive
quale (this quale is conceptually related to the verb’s telic quale) and the verb’s constitutive quale. The agentive quale of, for example, the verb walk (*John walked, John walked to the station*) is homogeneous in that it involves intention only. The movement lexicalized in this verb may be underlain by the operation of ‘intention in action’ only (i.e. not necessarily by the operation of ‘prior intention plus intention in action’), in spite of the fact that it involves a complicated physical pattern and a traversal of a path (irrespective of whether a directional phrase is used or not). As Searle points out, the agent can move “spontaneously”, without any forethought at all. Consider the following example illustrating the possibility of an absence of prior intention:

(6.1) The path through the beeches was narrow, and Merrill, against her will, found herself walking with Luke as Sam staunchly strode ahead, matching his wife’s energetic pace. *(BNC)*

Owing to the homogeneousness of the verb’s agentive quale, the constitutive quale (carrying information about the character of the movement) is devoid of additional features pointing to the agent’s inner state (whether mental or physical). The verb denotes one of the basic types of human locomotion, i.e. a bipedal self-agentive locomotion in which one foot is always on the ground. The telic quale encodes information about the purpose of the motion, which is, canonically, the attainment of a certain spatial goal. Nevertheless, it may be an aim that transcends the strictly kinetic domain (one may walk, e.g., to relieve pain).

The qualia structures of the verbs *swim, run, march* (used in its “military” sense), *dance* and *waltz* display similar structures. Their agentive qualia are homogeneous: they include prior intention and/or intention in action (admittedly, prior intention is typically the case because the verbs denote quite complicated movements, hence they presuppose a high degree of the mental processing of the impulse triggering the movement). Their constitutive qualia encode information about the type of kinetic patterns: the verbs denote the most basic types of human locomotion (it should be added that, in this respect, the verb *waltz* falls outside this verbal group; this issue will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 11). What is of interest for us is the fact that the verbs’ constitutive qualia do not include components that point to the inner state of the executor of the motion. The telic qualia of the verbs in question include information about the purpose of the motion, which may be the attainment of a spatial goal or the execution of the motion for its own
sake (as mentioned above, the purpose of the motion may transcend the purely kinetic domain, so to say - one may, e.g., swim or dance to loosen up). The character of the purpose of the motion (that is, the character of the telic quale of the verb) may also be related to the type of the kinetic pattern (that is, the verb’s telic quale may be related to the verb’s constitutive quale). Under standard circumstances, one does not, e.g., dance (waltz) to reach a certain location or to move towards a location. By contrast, the movement lexicalized in run is prototypically goal-oriented. This, however, does not mean that run can only be used to denote movements involving prior intention (and intention in action). Consider, e.g.:

(6.2) They finally left, with Consuelo unable to stop herself from running to the door when she heard the sound of a big, powerful expensive engine being started. (BNC)

It is evident that verbal qualia are not isolated, self-contained units. There are connections between them: the character of the agentive quale is related to the character of the constitutive quale and to the telic quale as well. What is of importance for the purpose of the present discussion is the connection between the character of the agentive quale and the character of the constitutive quale and, also, the role that these qualia play in the formation of SA constructions.

In view of the fact that, owing to their semantics, the verbs march and run may be used as indexes (that is, they may be used to refer to the inner state of the executor of the motion), a few remarks on their basic, non-evaluative meaning are in order. Consider the non-evaluative, “military” march first:

(6.3) A body of soldiers in sports kit marched past at a slow, rhythmic pace, singing loudly. They were all in step and looked very smart. (BNC)

Owing to the character of the manner of the movement, the agentive quale of this verb includes, apart from intention in action, also prior intention.\(^{22}\) The potential absence of prior intention is, more naturally, implied in contexts in which the “military marching” (or, put more precisely, the “military type of walking”) is not executed by soldiers, cf.:

\(^{22}\) The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993: 1695) characterizes the “military” march as “walk in a military manner with a regular and measured tread; (of a body of troops) walk in step and in time with a regular and uniform movement”.\(^{22}\)
(6.4) I slightly lengthened my stride, feeling self-conscious as I always do if I find myself marching in step with martial music, when I deliberately break step and try to walk between the beats, as it were, in as unmilitary a way as possible. (BNC)

The constitutive quale of the military, i.e. non-evaluative *march* is, owing to the homogeneousness of the agentive quale, devoid of physical features that point to the inner state of the executor of the motion. The same is valid for the non-evaluative, “basic” meaning of the verb *run*:

(6.5) Two small boys ran from the damp gloom of a back close, closely pursued by a third, who raced after them /…/. (BNC)

Owing to the character of their basic meaning, the verbs *march* and *run* lend themselves easily to be used in evaluative contexts (in the light of this fact, we may say that, owing to its potential to serve as a basis for the evaluative use of the verb, the basic meaning can be viewed as exhibiting a considerable degree of primacy). The verb *run* in *Why don’t you run downtown and buy a new pair of shoes?* need not denote a situation in which one actually “runs”. By the same token, the verb *march* in *She marched to the door and yanked it open* does not denote the military “marching”, but, roughly, “walking carried out in a determined way”.

The potential evaluative status of these verbs is made use of in caused motion situations that imply coercive force exerted by the causer. The sentences *John ran Harry out of the room* or *John marched Harry to the bathroom* encode situations which can be worded, roughly, as “John used coercive force and made Harry move somewhere” (the use of the verbs in question in coercive SA constructions will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 6.6). At this point, it need merely be stated that the verbs *march* and *run* can enter into non-coercive SA constructions if they are devoid of the speaker’s evaluation of the situation, i.e. if they are used in their non-evaluative, “basic” meaning. The non-coercive, “basic” *march* is thus used in military contexts (*The sergeant marched the soldiers to the barracks*). By the same token, the non-coercive *run* is also used in contexts that ensure that the basic meaning of the verb is preserved (*The trainer ran the athletes around the track*).

At this point in the discussion, a terminological remark is in order. The terms ‘coercion’ or ‘coercive’ will be used to cover only those caused motion situations which involve an explicit imbalance in their force-dynamic patterning. An explanation is in order.
Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1994) contend that induced action alternations (which also include transitive causative constructions with agentive manner of motion verbs) involve coercion. Certainly, such an account cannot be reasonably disputed. The causer is the controlling, dominant participant, inducing the action executed by the causee by imposing his will, and the causee is the controlled participant. That is, imposing one’s intention equals mental coercion. In this sense, then, coercion in SA constructions is always implied. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to reserve the terms ‘coercion’ and ‘coercive’ for constructions like John marched her to the bathroom or John ran her to the bathroom (which involve an even higher degree of force exerted by the causer) because one outcome of this imbalanced force-dynamic patterning is the change in the verb’s semantics (this point will be dealt with in greater detail later). That is, the verb’s semantics functions as a signal of an imbalance in the force-dynamic patterning of the situation. It is also worth noting in this connection that Cruse (1972) does not associate the act of “giving a command” with the presence of resistance on the part of the causee. Also Klaiman (1991: 113) observes that “one may act voluntarily even when one’s situation or one’s choices are affected by external manipulation: a person may voluntarily do what another obliges him to.”

Let us come back to the analysis of the semantic structures of the verbs walk, swim, dance, waltz, the non-evaluative march and the non-evaluative run. We have seen that the agentive qualia of these verbs are homogeneous in that they only include intention. In addition, the constitutive qualia of these verbs only include information about the purely physical aspects of the motion. That is, the constitutive qualia are devoid of features that point to the inner state (mental or physical) of the executor of the motion. The character of the agentive qualia and of the constitutive qualia are the factors that license the use of the verbs in question in SA constructions: John walked Harry to the bathroom, The trainer the athletes around the track (a “running contest” scenario), John swam the cattle to the shore, John danced (waltzed) Mary around the ballroom, The sergeant marched the recruits to the barracks.

The possibility of the formation of these constructions is underlain by the potentially composite (yet homogeneous) character of the agentive qualia of the verbs in question. To repeat, their agentive qualia contain not only intention in action but, potentially, also prior intention, which makes it possible for the verbs to enter into SA constructions. The slot for prior intention is taken up by the causer, who instigates the motion from outside, so to say (this fact is consistent with the status of prior intention as a causal factor that is “external” to the action in that
it is antecedent to it). The causer thus enters into the qualia structure of the verb and, at the same time (and no less importantly), does not have to execute the motion lexicalized in it. The slot for intention in action is taken up by the causee, who is the actual executor of the motion. This is, again, consistent with the status of intention in action as a causal factor which has a more “immediate” position with respect to the movement in that it underlies a release of energy that is needed for the actual execution of the motion (let us recall that, as Searle 1983 observes, without intention in action there would be no action at all). This configuration of the agentive qualia of the verbs in question enables the causer and the causee to participate in the motion event as co-agents and, at the same time, to assume hierarchically ordered positions.

The homogeneous character of the agentive qualia of the verbs in question is made possible by the character of their constitutive qualia. If the causer is to enter into the agentive quale of the verb, the verb’s constitutive quale must be devoid of the information about the inner state of the causee, who is the actual executor of the motion. In other words, the causee’s inner state cannot play a causal role in the execution of the movement. If this were not the case, the causer could not take up the subject position in the syntactic configuration ‘NP-VP-NP(-PP)’. Let me offer an explanation.

Consider first:

(6.6)  Harry staggered to the door.

Due to the intervention of the mover’s state (physical and/or mental), not all aspects of the movement encoded in the verb *stagger* are subject to the operation of intention in action. In other words, some aspects are not subject to the conscious control on the part of the mover.\(^{23}\) True enough, Harry’s movement may involve prior intention: for example, Harry may,

\(^{23}\) Certainly, one may stagger *on purpose*, but this presupposes the extension of the literal sense of *stagger* and must be evaluated as the verb’s recategorization as illustrated by the identity test with *so*:

a) Harry staggered to the door and so did John.

b) ? Harry, illustrating how he portrayed a drunk on stage, staggered to the door, and so did John, who was so drunk that he could barely walk.

The *so* test in (a) yields either an unintentional reading (both Harry and John staggered, but not on purpose) or an intentional reading (both Harry and John staggered on purpose). However, the sentence in (b) is odd because Harry’s intentional staggering is coordinated with John’s unintentional staggering (on intentionality and identity tests see, e.g., Zwicky and Sadock 1975).
for whatever reason, want to reach the door. Moreover, “staggering to the door” is a goal-directed movement, which means that the desired spatial goal must be built into the motor plan of the movement from its very beginning. This means that Harry’s “staggering to the door” is, at least to this effect, intentional. However, as noted above, Harry’s movement is not, due to the intervention of his state, successfully controlled in all its physical aspects. As a result, Harry staggers, not walks to the door. We can, therefore, conclude that Harry’s action is “intentional” in so far as it involves intention in action. But owing to the presence of certain physical features that fall outside the mover’s successful control, Harry’s staggering is unintentional.

In view of the character of the intentionality of action as implied in the sentence *Harry staggered to the door*, the following facts can be stated: Owing to the operation of the agent’s (mental or physical) state, intention in action does not cover all the aspects of the movement. The agent’s inner state thus functions as a factor that not only has a bearing on the manner of the movement but also curtails the operational scope of intention in action. This means that the causal function is fulfilled not only by intention in action but also by one’s inner state because one’s inner state is responsible for the occurrence of certain physical features of the movement. The verb *stagger* thus displays the following qualia structure:

The agentive quale is heterogeneous: it contains not only intention in action but also the mover’s inner state. The agentive quale may contain prior intention, too (to repeat, one may stagger to the door in order to reach the door). The potential presence of prior intention may be illustrated by way of the following example:

(6.7) Stumbling with weariness, she forced herself to stagger towards Ember. (BNC)

The expression *force oneself* also demonstrates that prior intention functions as an “additional” causal factor owing to the fact that intention fulfils a causal role with respect to the actual occurrence of a movement if it triggers a release of energy whose receiver is the mover. In other words, it fosters the causative operation of intention in action. The constitutive quale of the verb thus contains two types of physical features: (a) physical features that are causally related to the operation of ‘inten-

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24 This is in accordance with Macháček’s (1965: 36) observation that if the grammatical subject is to encode the recipient of the action (as is the case in, e.g., *I forced myself to go there*), “the place of the recipient must be taken by the forms in –self”.
tion in action’ and (b) physical features that are causally related to the mover’s inner state.

To repeat, it is important to realize that, in the motion situation under consideration, the potential presence of prior intention is not a guarantee that the actual movement is “wholly” intentional, i.e. that all its aspects are under the successful control of the mover. Harry’s prior intention is not to “stagger” to the door, i.e. Harry’s prior intention is not to “reach the door by means of staggering”. His prior intention (if present) is to reach the door by some other type of motion, most probably by walking (it is thus possible to form the phrase to walk with a stagger). That is, prior intention and intention in action cover only certain aspects of the motion (those that are involved in “walking”), including the directionality of the motion. One can thus say Although Harry staggered, he managed to walk to the door (/to reach the door), Harry almost staggered to the door or John helped Harry stagger to the door.

The heterogeneous character of the agentive quale of the verb stagger (including causal factors other than ‘intention in action’ or ‘prior intention plus intention in action’) prevents the verb from entering into SA constructions. The reason is obvious: external causation carried out along a volitional axis excludes the causative operation of the causee’s inner states. That is, it requires that the execution of the motion be underlain by the causee’s intention only (be it ‘intention in action’ or a composite operation of ‘prior intention plus intention in action’). Seen from the point of view of the verbal qualia structure, the external causation along a volitional axis requires that the verb’s agentive quale exclude the causative operation of one’s inner states. It is thus not possible to say

(6.8) a) *John staggered Harry to the door.
   b) *John stumbled (/strutted/ambled) Harry to the door.

In sum, secondary agent constructions are barred for self-agentive locomotion verbs that carry information about the physical and/or mental state of the executor of the motion, e.g. for the verbs scurry, scuttle, scamper, cavort, toddle, plod, trudge, scramble or wander (wander encodes an aimless motion and, in this way, points to the inner state of the mover – it points to the “relaxed” mental state of the mover; the same is valid for roam). Let me illustrate the point in greater detail with respect to the verb strut. Snell-Hornby (1983:25) describes strut as a composite expression consisting of the verb-core “walk” and the “modificant” represented by a “semantic complex further analyzable into visible char-
acteristics (stiff, erect) and value-judgements passed on the character of the agent and his manner of walking (self-satisfied, proud, pompous, with affected dignity). We can thus say that the verb fulfils a dual role: by encoding purely physical properties of the motion it fulfils a descriptive function, and by pointing to the inner state of the mover (which is, in itself, not directly observable) it fulfils an indexical function.

Secondary agent constructions are also barred for self-agentive locomotion verbs that carry information about the circumstances of the motion because these supplementary aspects of the movement are not subject to the causee’s intentional control. To give some examples, the verb wade denotes walking through water that impedes free motion, the verb paddle (in one of its senses) bears information about the medium in which the movement is carried out (mud or shallow water) and jog (in the sense “to run slowly for exercise”) encodes a purpose of motion that transcends the motion per se (this aspect of the motion situation cannot be part of the causee’s intention in action because intention in action only covers the execution of the movement itself, i.e. it does not cover any aspects that go beyond the movement itself).

As we have seen, SA constructions do not admit verbs that carry information about the physical and/or mental states of the mover because such aspects of the motion are causally related to these states. In other words, SA constructions do not admit verbs whose agentive qualia are heterogeneous in that they contain causal factors other than intention. In addition, SA constructions are barred for verbs that carry information about the circumstances accompanying the motion because such aspects of the motion are not subject to the mover’s volitional control either.

In SA constructions with animal causees the situation is, however, different. Owing to the specificity of animal agency, verbs lose their potential to convey information about the mental and/or physical self of the animal executor of the motion and/or about the circumstances of the motion, which, in its effect, enables them to freely enter into SA constructions. SA constructions with animal causees thus freely admit verbs like gallop, jog, canter, jump, amble or prance (animal agency will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 10).

We can thus conclude that SA constructions are only open for verbs that denote movements that fall under the mover’s control in their entirety. This fact manifests itself at a syntactic level, namely, in the total inclusion

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25 An account along similar lines is proposed by Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976: 527). They introduce the term ‘semantic incorporation’ and regard predicate adverbials as its main candidates.
of the object in the verbal action (cf. Anderson 1971). By this it is meant that participants in the direct object position are totally included in the action. That is, they are completely, not partially affected by the action. Since in SA constructions the causing event is superimposed on the caused event and the causee is agentive, both the causer and the causee must have control. (Using Goldberg’s 1995 terminology, SA constructions encode “the co-extensiveness of the causal force”.) Viewed from the perspective of the specific causal structuration of SA constructions, the requirement for total control is a logical consequence of the fact that the element uniting the causing event and the caused event is the merging of the causer’s prior intention and the causee’s intention in action.

The analysis has so far concentrated on the relation between prior intention and intention in action on the one hand and verbal qualia on the other. Nevertheless, certain aspects of the relation require closer consideration. For example, how is it that the causee in SA constructions executes his intention in action, and does not act spontaneously? This question poses itself in view of the fact that acting spontaneously, without any forethought, involves the execution of intention in action (even though it does not involve the execution of prior intention, cf. Searle 1983). This and related questions will be addressed in the next chapter.

6.5 Non-Coercive SA Constructions

The syntactic configuration ‘NP-VP-NP(-PP)’ encodes the merging of the causing event and the caused event. However, the merging of the two events is, in view of their nature and in view of the relationship that holds between them, a complex matter. At the present stage of our discussion, it may perhaps come as a surprise to learn that one cannot merely contend that the nature of the causing event consists in the transmission of energy from the causer to the causee along a volitional axis (and that this energy may potentially be – especially in animal movements – accompanied by the causer’s physical contact with the causee or by his manipulation of the causee) and that, as has been discussed, the causer acts as the executor of prior intention and the causee acts as the executor of intention in action. That is, one cannot merely contend that – given the syntactic configuration which expresses one event (hence it employs one verb) but which accommodates two agentive participants (assuming different hierarchical positions) – the slot for prior intention in the verb’s agentive quale is taken up by the causer and the slot for intention
in action is taken up by the causee. These facts do not grasp the situation in its complexity. The analysis has to take into consideration the following facts:

1. The external causation of a self-agentive movement excludes the eventuality that the executor of the actual movement carries out the movement spontaneously. In other words, it excludes the eventuality that the causee’s movement is underlain by the execution of his intention in action only, not by a composite operation of his ‘prior intention plus intention in action’.

2. There is the question of how the causee is induced to execute the movement without being forced to do so. Let me, in this connection, mention Dixon’s observation concerning the difference between “basically an intransitive verb in a transitive construction” and a periphrastic construction (Dixon 2000: 72):

   (6.9) a) He walked the dog in the park.
       b) He made the dog walk in the park.

According to Dixon, the construction in (6.9a) implies that the dog wanted to walk, whereas the construction in (6.9b) implies that it did not want to. As opposed to (6.9b), the causee in (6.9a) is thus a “willing” participant.

3. The causer’s activity does not involve the execution of his prior intention only – the execution of prior intention necessarily involves the execution of intention in action, and the same is valid for the causee’s activity (to repeat, the causee cannot execute the movement “spontaneously”). At this point, let us recall, too, that prior intention and intention in action can act as causal factors (i.e. they can bring about a movement) if they are underlain by a release of some energy.

A closer look at SA constructions reveals that they encode caused motion situations in which the causing event is superimposed upon the caused event not only in that it brings about the movement and controls its course but also in that it transcends the movement per se. The causer’s activity thus encompasses two spheres: the strictly kinetic sphere (roughly speaking, “the causer makes it happen that the causee moves”) and the sphere that goes beyond the movement itself. In this latter sphere, the causation of the movement serves (for the causer, that is) as a means to some end. John may thus “dance Mary to the other end of the ball-room” because he wants her to be in a given location, or John may “walk Harry
to the kitchen" because he wants to show him something there or John may “walk the dog” in order to keep it fit (by the same token, John may want to “run the athletes around the track” in order to exercise them). Although the SA construction (employing verbs that encode basic kinetic patterns and that are mute about any additional information) does not express coercive force on the part of the causer and resistance on the part of causee, the causer’s activity may be underlain by motives that are related to his dominant position in a given situation: the causer is the participant that triggers the movement and controls its course. Therefore, e.g., “dancing somebody round the terrace” is not the same as “dancing with somebody round the terrace” (cf. also the difference between “walking somebody to the kitchen” and “walking with somebody to the kitchen”). The former scenario may imply, e.g., that the causer assumes a dominant position with respect to the causee (meant in a psycho-social sense). The latter scenario presents the causer’s movement as a concomitant event. Needless to say, the dominant position of the causer is, in constructions with non-evaluative verbs (non-coercive verbs), expressed by syntactical, not lexical means (this issue will be dealt with in the chapter on coercive constructions as exemplified by John marched Harry to the bathroom or John ran Harry to the bathroom).

In sum, the causer’s intention is twofold. The causer has the prior intention to instigate the movement and control its course. He executes this prior intention by transmitting some form of energy to the causee, inducing him in this way to execute the motion. The transmission thus involves the operation of the causer’s intention in action. The causer also has the prior intention to achieve an aim that transcends the motion itself (the motion thus has, in this respect, an instrumental position) and executes this prior intention by inducing (and controlling) the motion of the causee. The causer’s prior intention thus encompasses two spheres: the purely kinetic sphere (the causer brings about the movement – or, put more precisely, brings it about that the causee executes the movement wanted from him by the causer) and the sphere that transcends the movement itself (i.e. that involves the purpose that is to be achieved via the motion). This “transcendent” character of the causing event is the reason why SA constructions may be endowed with a variety of pragmatic meanings (this may especially be the case in well-established situations involving certain types of participants and certain types of goals like “walking the dog” or “walking somebody home”).

As has been observed, the causer operates as a triggering and a controlling participant of the actual motion. That is, he executes his prior intention to induce the motion (which is carried out by the causee). The
operation of the causer’s prior intention can be illustrated by way of the following examples:

(6.10) He’s not suffered any leg problems since then and I wanted to run him [=the horse] at Newcastle but he was a little flat in November. (BNC)

(6.11) I do not want to swim the cattle to the shore.

(6.12) “That was your amigo Miguelito on the phone. Wants to walk you home next Saturday.” (BNC)

As stated above, the execution of the causer’s prior intention necessarily involves the execution of the intention in action. That is, it involves exertion of some energy that the causer imparts to the causee. The energy may take various forms of realization. The sentences, e.g., John walked Harry to the bathroom, The sergeant marched the recruits to the barracks, John ran the boys to the other end of the street (encoding “a running contest” scenario, not a coercive scenario) or John danced (/waltzed) Mary round the terrace thus express situations in which the causer not only instigates the motion (as is the case in, e.g., John made Harry walk to the bathroom) but, also, controls the motion in its course.

That is, the SA construction expresses the co-extensiveness of the causal force as is canonically the case with lexical causatives. Consider:

(6.13) He walked me slowly out to the garden gate /…/. (BNC)

The execution of the causer’s prior intention additionally involves the execution of his intention in action. That is, it involves an exertion of some energy that the causer imparts to the causee (to repeat, the energy may take various forms of realization).

It should be stressed, at the same time, that the causer need not be the executor of the actual movement lexicalized in the verb (let us recall that verbs in SA constructions denote movements underlain by physical energy that operates “internally”, i.e. that is confined to the physical limits of the body). For example, in the sentences

(6.14) The trainer swam his trainees to the other end of the swimming pool.

(6.15) The general marched the soldiers to the barracks.

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26 This is in line with Goldberg’s observation (1995: 173) that in caused motion situations the entire path of the motion must be subject to the causal force.
The trainer ran the athletes around the track.
The lion-tamer jumped the lion through the hoop.

the motion is executed by the causee, who is not only the executor of intention in action but also the executor of prior intention because the external causation along a volitional axis excludes spontaneousness on the part of the causee.

In sum, then, both the causer and the causee are executors of their prior intention and intention in action (let me point out that now we are talking about the causer’s prior intention that does not transcend the movement, i.e. that does not relate to the purpose of the movement superimposed on it by the causer). At the same time, however, the causee is the controlled participant. The bearer of the primary responsibility for the movement is the causer, who “acts upon” the causee (by transmitting energy to him), in this way inducing him to carry out the motion. This aspect of meaning is encoded in the syntactic configuration ‘NP-VP-NP (-PP)’, in which the position of the controlling participant is taken up by the causer representing “the starting point” of the entire situation, i.e. the participant acting as the source of energy triggering the whole situation (cf., e.g., Langacker 1990, 1991), and the direct object position is taken up by the causee as the receiver of the energy (the participant that is causally affected by the activity of the agent).

In spite of occupying the direct object position, the causee, as the actual executor of the motion, has to retain its agentive role. This means that, as has already been mentioned, the external causation of a self-agentive movement excludes the eventuality in which the causee acts spontaneously, i.e. without prior intention.

A question now arises, namely, how the causee’s agentivity can be reconciled with the type of syntactic configuration in which there is one verb, hence one action (albeit a complex one), and the action is predicated both of the causer and of the causee. This problem is also related to the structure of the agentive quale of the verb, which, as has been observed, has to accommodate two causal agents and, at the same time, ensure that they both occupy different hierarchical positions (the causer occupies the slot for prior intention and the causee occupies the slot for intention in action).

As has been observed, the causer is not a mere executor of prior intention. Given the fact that prior intention plays a causal role with respect to the motion only when it underlies an exertion of energy that brings about the motion, the causer can only execute his prior intention by means of executing some action (by “acting upon the causee”).
Closer scrutiny reveals that the causee can act as the controlled participant and, at the same time, as the executor of the motion lexicalized in the verb and, hence, can occupy one of the slots in the agentive quale (while preserving his subordinate position with respect to the causer) owing to the fact that his intention in action agrees with the prior intention of the causer (that which operates in the caused event, i.e. in the motion, not that which transcends the motion). In other words, the causee’s execution of his intention in action is the execution of the causer’s prior intention: when John dances Mary, Mary dances, i.e. she executes the type of motion that is wanted from her by the causer. The causee executes the type of motion that is intended by the causer and, in this way, he does not act “spontaneously.”

The question now is: how can the causee identify himself with the causer’s prior intention? The causer acts upon the causee (in some way or other), realizing in this way his prior intention (the intention to induce the movement in the causee). From this it follows that his “acting upon the causee” is the concrete realization of his prior intention. That is, the way the causer acts upon the causee provides the causee with the information about the causer’s prior intention.

In addition, SA constructions do not encode coercive caused motion situations. They encode situations in which the causee “allows the causer to act upon him” and also (and no less importantly) complies with the causer’s prior intention (as it manifests itself in the way in which the causer acts upon the causee). Put in plain words, the causee executes the motion “wanted from him” by the causer. This is the reason why the verb in SA constructions lexicalizes the type of motion executed by the causee. From

(6.18) John walked (/danced) Mary to the bathroom. it follows that
“Mary walked (/danced).”
and, also, that
“John wanted Mary to walk(/dance).”

These facts are of considerable importance because there are caused motion situations like

(6.19) a) John marched Mary to the bathroom.
    b) John ran Mary to the bathroom.

which encode coercion and in which, symptomatically, the causee does not execute the motion that is lexicalized in the verb and that is wanted
from him by the causer. Coercive constructions of this type will be dealt with in the next chapter. At this point in the discussion, it need merely be stated that the entailment of *John marched (/ran) Mary to the bathroom* is neither “Mary marched (/ran) to the bathroom” nor “John wanted Mary to march (/run) to the bathroom”.

In sum, then, the causee’s intention in action is a realization of the causer’s prior intention (that which does not transcend the motion itself, i.e. that which operates in the caused event). This means that

a) the causee’s intention in action agrees with the causer’s prior intention (as it manifests itself in the causer’s acting upon the causee)

b) the causee does not act “spontaneously.”

From the facts in (a) and (b) it follows that the situations encoded by means of SA constructions do not involve coercion on the part of the causer.

Let us now come back to the agentive qualia of the verbs in SA constructions. The slot for prior intention is taken up by the causer’s prior intention, whose realization (in the form of “acting upon the causee”) does not involve the actual execution of the motion lexicalized in the verb (i.e. the causer does not have to execute the motion at all). The slot for intention in action is taken up by the intention in action of the causee, who is the actual executor of the motion encoded in the verb. The problem that the verb’s agentive quale accommodates intentions borne by two different agents (albeit assuming different hierarchical positions) is solved by the specific way in which the intention (prior intention and intention in action) borne by the causer and the intention (prior intention and intention in action) borne by the causee interact. The outcome of this interaction, which has been, I hope successfully, described above, is that the causer’s prior intention (that which operates in the caused event, not that which is superimposed upon the entire event and is thus conceptually related to the purpose of the motion) agrees with the causee’s intention in action. This fact makes it possible for the two types of intention (borne by two separate agents) to operate in the verb’s agentive quale.

As has also been observed, the fact that the causer’s prior intention agrees with the causee’s intention in action is of particular importance because it enables us to form SA constructions that do not involve coercive force on the part of the causer (as will be demonstrated in the following chapter, if the causee’s intention in action does not agree with the causer’s prior intention, it is a signal of coercion):

(6.20) John walked Harry to the door.
(6.21) John swam the trainees to the other end of the swimming-pool.
(6.22) John danced (/waltzed) Mary round the terrace.
(6.23) John ran the trainees around the track.
(6.24) John marched the soldiers to the barracks.
(6.25) John galloped (/cantered/pranced/trotted) the horse.

In sum, then, the formation of SA constructions is made possible by the fact that the causee’s intention in action agrees with the causer’s prior intention that operates in the caused event. This makes it possible

a) to use a single verb in reference both to the action carried out by the causer and to the action carried out by the causee and, at the same time,

b) to use the verb in reference to the type of motion that is carried out by the causee.

Consider the sentence

(6.26) *John staggered (/strutted/ambled) Harry to the window.

First, let us recall that the verbs stagger, strut and amble in intransitive constructions

(6.27) Harry staggered (/strutted/ambled) to the door.

denote movements that are not “wholly covered” by the agent’s prior intention (if present). As has been discussed, Harry’s prior intention covers only some aspects of the movement. Harry’s prior intention is not to “stagger (/strut/amble) to the door” but (most probably) to “walk to the door”. By the same token, Harry’s intention in action does not cover all the aspects of the motion, either (owing to his inner state, Harry staggers, not walks to the door).

The impossibility of forming constructions of the type *John staggered Harry to the door is underlain by the fact that, owing to the intervention of Harry’s inner state, Harry’s intention in action cannot agree with John’s prior intention to “walk Harry to the door”. Needless to add, John cannot have the prior intention to “stagger Harry to the door”. As has been discussed in the chapter dealing with the character of agentive qualia of verbs that are admitted into SA constructions, the external causation of a self-agentive motion along a volitional axis requires that the agentive qualia be homogeneous in that they cannot include causal factors other than intention.

It cannot be overlooked that the requirement for the total overlap of the causer’s prior intention and the causee’s intention in action is in
line with the holistic meaning borne by the patient (on the holistic, i.e. not partitive meaning of the participant in the direct object position see Anderson 1971). The sentence *John staggered Harry to the door* violates the requirement for the total inclusion of the patient (in the direct object position) in the action of the agent. The total object inclusion also explains why it is possible to form reflexive constructions of the type *John walked (/marched/ran) himself to the window* and why it is not possible to form reflexive constructions of the type *John staggered himself to the window* (this issue will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 13).

### 6.6 Coercive SA Constructions

As has been discussed in the preceding chapter, SA constructions of the type *John walked Harry to the bathroom* (*John danced Mary around the room, John marched the recruits to their tents, etc.*) encode situations in which the causee is not forced to move (the force-dynamic patterning is thus more or less balanced). In these situations the causee’s intention in action agrees with the causer’s intention (that which operates in the movement itself, i.e. not that which includes the purpose of the movement intended by the causer).

In coercive caused motion situations, by contrast, the causee’s intention in action does not agree with the causer’s prior intention. Consider:

(6.28)  
\begin{itemize}
  \item a) John marched Harry to the bathroom.
  \item b) John ran Harry to the bathroom.
\end{itemize}

The coercive interpretation of these sentences follows from the interpretation of the meaning of the verb. In concrete terms, Harry did not march (/run) but walked (probably quickly). In other words, the fact that the verbs do not encode the precise types of movements executed by the causee serves as a signal of coercion, i.e. as a signal of the fact that the causee’s intention in action is not identical with the causer’s prior intention. This type of construction will be termed the ‘coercive secondary agent construction’ (‘coercive SA construction’ henceforth).

Both non-coercive SA constructions and coercive SA constructions have the same configuration: the absence of an explicit (analytic) causative, hence the use of one verb encoding an action that is predicated of both the causer and the causee (with the causer in the subject position and the causee in the direct object position).
A question now arises as to which meaning components in the verb’s semantics make it possible to form coercive SA constructions. To provide an answer, we have to look into the semantics of the verbs *march* and *run* in their intransitive evaluative use. Let us first consider *march*:

(6.29) “Then you can burn in hell for all I care!” he burst out, and, turning on his heel, he marched to the door and flung it open. (BNC)

(6.30) He took his gun and marched to the house of his best friend, Phil Lowe, where Miss Gibson was staying, and demanded to see her. (BNC)

(6.31) He got out of bed and looked in his cabinet for his clothes: it was empty. He marched purposefully down the central aisle of the ward until he found the sister. (BNC)

The verb *march* denotes a type of walking that is carried out in a determined, resolute manner. This type of movement may thus include some of the features that are present in the military marching, namely, greater effort, which has a bearing on the manner of the movement, cf.:

(6.32) She put the thought out of her mind, and forced herself to march harder, peering determinedly through the rain for any signs of life, almost willing the barn to appear /…/. (BNC)

Greater effort involves a higher degree of force. Since force implies (or, rather, may imply) higher speed, dictionaries generally specify the evaluative *march* as “walking quickly and with determination”. It appears, however, that higher speed as implied in the evaluative *march* is related to the mover’s inner state rather than to the speed of the movement itself. Evidence for this observation comes from the fact that it is possible to modify the evaluative *march* by means of the adverb *reluctantly*, cf.:

(6.33) Mellor marched reluctantly into the lions’ den to address the annual charity gala for the Newspaper Press Fund. Normally the event is attended by the Prime Minister of the day. (BNC)

Let me support the observation that higher speed implied in the evaluative *march* is associated with the mover’s inner state rather than with the

27 Symptomatically, *The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* (1993) does not include speed of the motion as one of the features of the evaluative *march*.
actual speed of the motion also by appealing to the possibility of using the adverb *slowly* with the non-evaluative, “military” *march*, which does not bear reference to the mover’s inner state and encodes purely physical characteristics of the movement. Consider, e.g.:

(6.34) All the audience saw were twelve soldiers marching slowly towards them apparently from miles away. (BNC)

We see, then, that higher effort (a higher degree of force) as implied in the evaluative *march* is underlain by the specific mental state of the mover and functions as an indication of his determination. Determination (resolution, awareness of the urgency of the situation, etc.) is a type of mental state that enforces the operation of the mover’s prior intention and, hence, also the operation of the intention in action (as it manifests itself in the actual execution of the motion). In other words, the higher degree of energy is a result of the more forcible operation of prior intention and intention in action. In yet other words, the mover “acts upon himself” in a way that is a reflection of his mental effort.

In sum, mental force as outlined here functions as the enforcement not only of the mover’s prior intention but also of his intention in action, which is the reason why the evaluative *march* may be used in coercive SA constructions. When “John marches Harry to the kitchen,” John acts upon Harry in a more forcible manner. Note, however, that although Harry’s movement is “wholly” intentional in that it does not include causal factors other than intention, the prior intention is coerced upon Harry (cf. the non-coercive scenario *John walked Harry to the kitchen* versus the coercive scenario *John marched Harry to the kitchen*). That is, Harry’s intention in action (as it manifests itself in the manner of the execution of the movement – note that Harry does not walk “in a determined way”, but “merely” walks) does not agree with John’s prior intention owing to the fact that John’s prior intention realizes itself in the forcible acting upon Harry. In other words, it includes coercion.

The facts adduced thus far are in line with the character of the agentive quale of the verb *march* as used in *John marched Harry to the kitchen*. The slot for prior intention is occupied by John’s prior intention and the slot for intention in action is occupied by Harry’s intention in action. However, Harry’s intention in action is not identical with John’s prior intention because John’s prior intention (and, necessarily, also intention in action, i.e. the way he acts upon Harry) includes coercive force that adds to the operation of John’s prior intention. In line with this, then, Harry does not execute some kind of “forcible” walking
(walking in a determined way) but executes “mere” walking (even if quickly). Consider:

(6.35) He marched the 22-year-old mother-of-three across fields before telling her: “You do not deserve to live.” (BNC)

(6.36) /…/ and then marched the nurse into the CSSD store. “Right, young lady, there are a few things you need to know about how I run this unit, and the first is that my nurses don’t loll around in the corridors indulging in idle chatter with strange men!” (BNC)

(6.37) He marched the twins in the direction of the nearest station and prepared for a long, boring wait. (BNC)

Let us now concentrate on the verb run in coercive SA constructions. As with the verb march, an imbalance in the force-dynamic patterning of the situation is reflected in the verb’s meaning. The verb does not carry information about the concrete type of the movement, whose interpretation is thus largely dependent on the context. Hence when John runs Harry to the kitchen, John probably does not run but walk (maybe quickly). Cf.:

(6.38) “Finding her like what?” asked Vernon, but at that moment a young man rushed in from the street. He was wearing some sort of outlandish costume and his lips were rouged. “Come quick,” he cried, and tugging at Meredith’s arm he toppled him from his stool and ran him out of the door. They cancelled the rest of the performance. (BNC)

(6.39) It’s a nuisance really. If you run the dog down the field, you look over your shoulder all the time, waiting for one to hit you. (BNC)

As has already been mentioned, the vagueness of the verb’s meaning serves as a signal of the evaluative status of the verb, namely, as a signal of a coercive caused motion scenario. Such a use is typical of this verb. In actual fact, run appears in non-coercive SA constructions only exceptionally (owing to its semantics run lends itself easily to be utilized in caused motion constructions with a force-dynamic imbalance). The very fact that in non-coercive constructions run must be used in its basic sense (otherwise the verb would signal coerciveness, i.e. an evaluation of the situation) virtually reduces the repertory of situations in which the verb may appear to a running-contest scenario – cf. the oft-cited sen-
tence The trainer ran the athletes around the track (a non-coercive use of run with animals may be exemplified by the oft-cited sentence The scientists ran the mice through the maze).

A question now arises as to what licenses the use of run in coercive SA constructions. Kudrnáčová (2010: 55–67) suggests that, as with the verb march, an answer to this question must be sought in the verb’s basic, non-evaluative self-agentive bipedal meaning. The meaning components that license the coercive use of run are ‘a (relatively) high speed’ and ‘a (relatively) high degree of force’. In the basic, non-coercive use of the verb, speed and force are interdependent. In a coercive use of the verb, speed functions as a signal of pressure on the part of the causer. In other words, the conceptual link between speed and force (i.e. the exertion of pressure on the part of the causer) in coercive caused motion is underlain by a link between speed and force (physical effort) in non-coercive motion. In coercive caused motion situations, speed forms part of the meaning of the verb (i.e. it is inherent in the motion lexicalized in the verb), but force (signalled by speed) is ascribed to the causer, not to the causee (who is the actual executor of the movement lexicalized in the verb). In these situations force pertains to the mental sphere and realizes itself in the physical sphere in the coercive (i.e. forcible) inducement of the causee’s motion.

We have seen, then, that an increase in the verb’s vagueness (as to its reference to the character of the movement carried out by the causee) is accompanied by an increase in the degree of coercive force on the part of the causer. That is, the verb serves as a signal of a marked imbalance in the force-dynamic patterning of the situation. Since the character of the movement is not explicitly stated, it is up to the context to provide information needed for the decoding of the message. The verb run in particular is heavily context-sensitive, which is an outcome of the fact that it is burdened with a heavy lexical load (see, e.g., Evans 2005, Nida 1997, Ritter and Rosen 1996 and 1998).

At this point a remark might be added on the evaluative use of verbs in intransitive constructions. As we have seen, the (partial) loss of the verb’s reference to the concrete manner of the movement also serves as a signal of evaluativeness (cf. ex. 6.33, in which the mover marches reluctantly into the lions’ den). By this it is meant that the verb serves as the expression of the speaker’s subjective evaluation of the motion situation (including the mover’s state, his relation to other participants involved in

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28 It is thus not possible to modify the evaluative run by means of slowly (*He slowly ran him out of the door, *He slowly ran the dog down the field).
Let me illustrate the point in the semantics of the verb *trot*. In its evaluative use, *trot* is characteristically used in situations that imply a more relaxed mental state of the mover, cf.:

(6.40) “Harold, I would very much like to talk to you and Arnold by yourselves.” Harold acceded at once and I trotted dutifully after him to a small anteroom adjoining the Cabinet room. (BNC)

As with the verb *march*, the characteristics of the movement encoded in the evaluative *trot* in its intransitive use may be utilized in the transitive causative use of the verb. The feature “a more relaxed inner state” implies that a relatively low degree of coercive force is transmitted by the causer to the causee. This seems to be the reason why the transitive causative construction with the evaluative *trot* is resorted to in situations that imply an absence of the urgency of the situation (cf. example 6.41). In this respect, then, the transitive causative construction with the evaluative *trot* may be seen as a contrastive variant of coercive constructions with the evaluative *march* or *run*. This issue clearly needs further investigation. Consider:

(6.41) /…/ somebody might erm be homeless, but no hostel in town will take them on /…/ we can return to that hostel with the person saying “Don’t worry about these other problems, just fill in the bits you can, the accommodation, and we’ll sort out the other bits.” Meanwhile, we’ll be trotting them along to probation or a solicitor or whatever and getting that side of things dealt with, etc. etc., so we try to stitch together some sorts of packages for people who otherwise fall through. (BNC)

29 The evaluative use of the verb may create tension in that the decoder is not given unequivocal information about whether the verb is used as an index or whether it describes purely physical characteristics of the movement. This tension is certainly desirable because it does not deprive the decoder of his active involvement in the processing of the information.