

Byzantine echoes in the nineteenth century press and in the writings of Russian intellectuals

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This article traces the sources of allusions to the Byzantine Empire and the reasons for their presence in the writings of intellectuals and the press in 19th century Russia, outlining the major ideological and scholarly trends in which the Byzantine Empire was mentioned, referred or alluded to. The allusions or 'echoes' are analyzed in three contexts depending on the source type and the targeted audience: the writings of intellectuals, newspapers, and the declarations of war against Turkey. This three-layered analysis gives insights into the mechanisms of the Byzantine myth and the ways it worked within the structure of everyday life and the media. Is how that Byzantine echoes were most present in the writings of intellectuals who attempted to give an outside overview of Russian geopolitics or historical development at the level of higher politics, including the opinions of foreign politicians.

Keywords: 19th century, Russia, Byzantine Empire, Slavdom, Orthodox Church, intellectuals, Slavophiles, the media, Eastern Question, ethnicity, nationalism, Russian-Turkish wars

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In the title, I highlight Byzantine “echoes” as opposed to the Byzantine “legacy” or “influences” in an attempt to convey the presence of an elusive ghost or a myth of the Byzantine Empire in 19th century Russia. Numerous trails of the ancient phantom manifested themselves in allusions, references and theoretical speculations that occurred in a variety of contexts: in the writings of intellectuals, newspapers, war declarations and peace treaties.

In order to cut across the different contexts and sources and show the mechanism of the Byzantine myth as it could have worked for different audiences, I structured our investigation as follows. First, we surveyed references to the Byzantine Empire made by intellectuals throughout the 19th century and took note of the circumstances and genres in which they were made. Second, we narrowed the newspaper reports and articles down to those made within days before or after the declaration of another Russian-Turkish war; in so doing, we aimed to catch up with the potential contexts in which allusions to the ancient empire could materialize. And finally, we had to presume the continuity of Byzantine echoes in Russia’s historical memory; *institutionally, artistically, and intellectually.*

In the majority of cases, a given ‘echo’ cannot be interpreted as purely Byzantine: the broader Christian, Orthodox or geopolitical elements are often just as important. Even the events that had been chronologically close to the historical Byzantine Empire cannot be taken for a direct influence. Thus, Ivan III married Zoe Paleologina, the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor, but the idea of her marriage into Muscovy was first proposed by her mentor, Cardinal Johannes Bessarion, and by Pope Paul II.² Therefore, we cannot assert that it was a Byzantine influence; rather it was a geopolitical affair in which the cultural and geographical interconnections between Rus’ and the Byzantine Empire were employed.

Quite naturally, we start out with the fact that Christianity came over to Rus’ from the Byzantine Empire. The initial institutional power of this event is illustrated by

the following facts: the borrowing of the Monastic Typica, the *Jerusalem* or the *Sabbate Typicon* and that of *St. Theodore the Studite* that shaped both monastic and liturgical practices;³ the Council of Russian bishops held in 1551 that produced papers tailored after the Second Council of Constantinople convened by Byzantine Emperor Justinian I a thousand years earlier; and the eventual establishment of the Russian patriarchate in 1589, which, as Victor Zhivov pointed out, “naturally placed the Russian construction vis-a-vis to that of the Byzantine Empire’s.”⁴

The most immediate intellectual influence (not yet an echo) that accompanied the establishment of the patriarchate was the theory of “Moscow as a Third Rome,” the notion of Russia’s succession to the Byzantine Empire which underpinned the myth that there can only be one Orthodox Tsar, and none other but the Russian monarch.⁵ Initially, it was almost vested with institutional power when incorporated into the Deed of the Council of Constantinople that established the Moscow Patriarchate. Though the Deed was signed by Patriarch of Constantinople Jeremiah,⁶ this theory had lost its institutional potential and retreated into the sphere of pure speculations. In fact, this theory received its first full intellectual treatment only in the early 20th century scholarship when it began, in our opinion, to be erroneously extrapolated onto the whole course of Russian history.⁷

In the epoch of Peter the Great, Russia dispensed with the Moscow Patriarchate, obviously a Byzantine institute, and replaced it with the Permanent Council and the Holy Synod. In their oath, the members of the Synod had to overtly confess the Russian Emperor to be their “крайним судьей” (ultimate judge), thus declaring his supreme capacity over the Orthodox Church; but this system had little to do with caesaropapism because the Tsar could not administer the sacraments, which included the ordination of bishops.⁸

Of course, the closeness of the autocratic Tsar to religious affairs was not in itself a Byzantine feature but merely a very common practice to be found in many ancient Empires, not necessarily Christian ones. Yet this interconnection was drawn into contexts of Russia’s historical memory which in the 19th century was still full of flashbacks. In his *History of the Russian Church* (printed in 1847), Filaret, the Archbishop of Chernigov, wrote that “for the Russian Church, the Permanent Council and the Holy Synod *have been the same as the patriarchate.*” [italics mine – P. R.]⁹ These words, regretful in a way, pointed at the origin of the Russian Orthodox Church which from the very start had been better represented by the figure of a patriarch who interacted with the autocracy. Quite obviously, the Archbishop emphasizes the intrinsic continuity of the Moscow Patriarchate in the Russian Orthodox Church even though by then there had been no patriarchs for over a century. Al-

though he does not explicitly turn to the patriarchate as the legacy of the Byzantine Empire, the echo is still clear: *today everything is like it used to be before Peter the Great.*

Another true institutional influence was that of the Byzantine monasticism that manifested itself through, among other things, the Monastic Typica.¹⁰ Monks from Rus’ were known to have lived at the monasteries on Mount Athos in the 11th through 13th centuries.¹¹ In the early 15th century some Russian monks lived on the Sacred Mount to become heads of monasteries on their return to Russia.¹² The contacts between Russia and Athos continued intermittently and were most active in the late 19th century. Among the most important borrowings were the spiritual tradition of the so-called “clever prayer” and “clever doing”, monastic daily routines, including daily reading from the Book of Psalms and the form of monastic self-isolation known as *skete*. In the days of patriarch Nikon, many spiritual books found their way to Russia from Athos.¹³ Since the early 16th century, the Russian Tsars sent rich offerings to the monastery on Mount Athos and endowed the monks with the rights to collect money from Russia for their abodes on the Mount; the right sustained up to the beginning of the 20th century,¹⁴ although in the 17th and 18th centuries the Russian abodes on the Sacred Mount significantly declined.¹⁵

Among the educated Russian individuals and politicians the pull towards Athos spirituality was also remarkable. While in 1821–1829, the years of the Greek war for Independence, there were only a few Russian monks on the Mount, in 1839, the Russian hieromonch Anikita managed to install about 30 monks on Athos that laid the foundation for the first full-fledged Russian monastery there. In 1845, this monastery was even visited by Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich Romanov.¹⁶ The number of the Russian monks on the Sacred Mount grew to about 5,000 by the turn of the 20th century.¹⁷ Back in Russia, the famous *Optina pustyn*, an ancient monastery near Kozelsk, was revived after years of desolation in 1819 by the bishop Filaret (Amfiteatrov); he translated the ancient ascetic literature, knew the religious experience of Paisiy Velichkovskiy, the so-called *starchestvo* (a form of spiritual instruction that survived at the monasteries on Mount Athos for centuries), and introduced it at *Optina* where in 1857 there were 104 monks.¹⁸

Exercising from very early times an institutional influence on the monastic life in Russia, the Athos monasteries had taken deeper roots in the worldview of uneducated people all over Russia; although from the preceding eras we do not have much substantial data, in the second half of the 19th century the Holy Synod considered the alms collected by monks sent from Athos to Russia as a serious capital outflow and persecuted a noticeable number of unlawful alms collectors.¹⁹ Clearly, people gave alms due to a long history of pilgrimages and real contacts with monks from Athos. We have to be careful, though, in considering these

relationships as a 'conscious' Byzantine influence, despite the popularity of Mount Athos: for the majority of uneducated people it was, first of all, connected with their personal religious experience and not at all related to some ancient empire of which they could neither know nor read.

The rise of the Russian monastery on Mount Athos in the 19th century coincided with Russia's geopolitical struggle in the Near East, which had a long history. In the centuries after the fall of Constantinople, many Greeks from the former Byzantine Empire, including several Orthodox patriarchs, had visited Rus' in search of support as long as the Russian tsar, in any event, was indeed the only Orthodox monarch to be found in Europe.²⁰ Yet admittedly, none of the Tsars developed a consistent international policy around the 'Byzantine' legacy.

Russia's struggle for the Black Sea, deemed to be the starting point of such a complex cultural and geopolitical issue as the Eastern Question, began in the reign of Peter the Great,²¹ who indeed, used some of the allusions from Byzantine history. After the conquest of Azov (1696), he made the Turkish prisoners march by the triumphal arch with an image of Constantine the Great.²² There is also a manuscript from the Petrine epoch where Peter the Great is routinely compared to "the Great and Equi Apostolic Constantine", but the text remained unprinted and came out as an archive find of the historian Gregory Esin only in 1863.²³ In the late 18th century Ivan Golikov wrote a book comparing Peter the Great to Constantine the Great but this parallel did not appeal to academic historians.

The power of the initial institutional influences of the Byzantine Empire in the sphere of religious practice, theology and Church art had little to do with the subsequent expansive and Western-looking policy of Peter the Great.²⁴ However, because the Byzantine Empire would always be perceived in the context of Christianity and Orthodoxy, the justifications of subsequent wars against the Ottomans would gradually acquire the motifs of revenge on the part of Russia as a Christian Empire. Later in the 18th century, Voltaire, in his famous letters to the Russian Empress Catherine II, most persistently guided the thought of his Royal addressee to undertake another crusade against the Ottoman Empire, the idea that was embodied in the famous and unfulfilled Greek Project.²⁵

According to Voltaire, Catherine II would have to defeat the Turks, enter Constantinople and take over the dominant role in the region. Although the philosopher did not insist on religious issues, Catherine II wrote: "my cause is the cause of all Christianity"²⁶ and managed to become a guardian of the Christian population in the Ottoman Empire; as was stated in the Kuchuk Kainarji peace treaty (1774), the only treaty with the Turks in which protection for Christians was stipulated in a separate clause.²⁷ So by extending a hand of fellowship to the oppressed Christian

peoples of Greece and the Balkans, Russia in an indirect way supported them in their rights which they used to enjoy before the fall of Constantinople.

Voltaire was also one of the first Westerners to allude to the legendary death testament of Peter the Great; the mere idea of such a document, not to say its actual existence in the form of an apparently forged manuscript, added fuel to the fire whenever anybody in the West raised the question of Russia's far reaching plans in the Near East. Created back in the Petrine epoch, the text was first put to use in 1812 in a book by French historian Ch. Lesur, in which it was explained that Napoleon's war against Russia was a demarche preventing her claim to world supremacy. The full text of the 'testament' was eventually published in France in 1836.²⁸

The Eastern Question persisted throughout and beyond the 19th century, evoking Byzantine echoes in the writings of intellectuals during every Russian-Turkish war. But were such echoes present in the minds of people reading mass newspapers? In the beginning of the 19th century, the mass media as well as the mass readership were yet to be born and that is why we have chosen to start our analysis with Russia's first private newspaper, whose editor was conscious of the fact that "Having created a common opinion, it is very easy to manage it like one's own business; we know all the secret powers behind it."²⁹

The journalist Fadey Bulgarin, the future editor of *Severnaya Pchela*, the first private Russian newspaper (3,000 subscribers by 1830)³⁰ wrote these words in his note to Tsar Nicholas I in May 1826; in April 1828 his newspaper began to cover the Greek War of Independence in which Russia along with the United Kingdom and France entered in April 1828 to fight the Ottoman Empire. Less than a month later, *Severnaya Pchela* published an essay on the present state of the city of Constantinople,³¹ ostensibly by a Russian traveler whose name was given merely as *И. Б. в.* The author presents the reader with the image of the country that used to be on the territory now occupied by the Turks. "Where ancient fighters prepared themselves for battles, where Poets and sages were wreathed with laurel, where there were all the Muses, now there dominates superstition, the feelings of slavery and ignorance are celebrating their joyless celebrations, there, from the depths of hearts an outcry of the oppressed and humiliated descendants of the Hellenes and all other Christians is heard! But the time of redemption seems to have come; at least many of the Turks themselves predict their fall, not being able to hold back the words: the Russian infidel will be in Istanbul."³²

Not stressing the Byzantine past, the passage clearly rings with empathy towards Hellenism and Christianity. But Russia was not going to fight for the Hellenes; in the war declaration, Nicholas I highlighted the abortive attempts to reach a peaceful reconciliation, the detention

of the Russian ships in the Bosphorus, and the hindrances to the Black Sea trade, and finished off by saying that “We bear arms in defense of our Holy Orthodox Church and our beloved Fatherland.”³³ Hence, for the mass reader, Russia entered a holy war, not a war of political liberation for the Greeks.

Conversely, in France, the Greek War for Independence was so popular that there were bazaars and exhibitions organized to collect funds to help the patriots; many writers and artists were inspired by ancient Greek civilization.³⁴ Meanwhile, the Greek patriots were restoring not the Byzantine Empire but the Greece of Areopagus, a Boule, nomarchs, demarchs, prytanes, etc. Children were baptized with names such as Anaximander, Aristotle, Pelopidas, Olympias, and Aspasia, while the Byzantine tradition was discarded, at least in its outward manifestations: in 1833, the Greek Church made itself independent of the Ecumenical Patriarch.³⁵

As the Russian troops marched into the territory of Turkey, *Severnaya Pchela* followed them by reporting the impressions of the officers from a camp at the town of Isaccea on the right bank of Danube. “These tidings would not convey to you all the feelings with which we are all so animated, the commanders, officers and soldiers alike, the enthusiasm with which we set foot on the Turkish land, headed by our Monarch. As we marched, we recalled in our memory the times of Svyatoslav and his battles beyond the Danube River, counting victories the Russians had won under the personal leadership of their Monarchs.”³⁶ Beyond the Danube River, the Varangian (i.e. the Viking) Svyatoslav had not only raided the Byzantine Empire but established himself as a diplomat and even negotiated a treaty with Byzantine Emperor John I Tzimisces in 971, although the legendary Varangian could not have dreamt of defending the Orthodox faith. It is clear, however, that the image of entering the realm of History is as emphatic in this passage as in the extract from a letter allegedly written by an anonymous officer to his wife, reporting the first victory at the fortress of the Danube port Brăila:

“The first movement of the Monarch’s noble soul was to acknowledge the All-Merciful Divine Providence. [...] At the camp, on the vast valley near the famous Trajan’s Wall, the troops were arranged in a semi-square with an altar set before them; and at 7:20 p.m. the litany, administered by ober-priest Mozovsky, began. The litany was preceded by prayer chanting, ‘O Heavenly King, Comforter...’ etc. Then: *God is with us! Understand this, O nations, and submit yourselves.* [...] Picture yourself a vast valley, [...] the even ranks of troops, our Monarch amongst them, surrounded by his magnificent retinue, the Holy Priesthood in front of him, the adorable voices of singers...”³⁷

In the situation when the Russian media had to justify the military operation to a wider audience, journalists infused public opinion with the notion of a holy war in the settings of mythical Russian history with the figure of the Monarch and the Orthodox Church together withstanding the barbarian Turks. An uneducated Russian reader of such news would never see or hear in them anything remotely Byzantine. As it follows from the quotes, the news coverage on the whole was shot through with religious connotations; it is very likely that they provided the language that helped journalists to get hold of the difficult issues.

After the Decembrists’ uprising of 1825, liberal-minded Russian intellectuals felt much constrained and spoke about the absence of the public opinion.³⁸ For example, take the case of Peter Chaadaev, who was prosecuted and interrogated twice for his views. First, right after the uprising, when, above all, he was asked about his religious books and, second, in 1836 when he managed to publish his *Philosophical letters*, which had been drafted no earlier than 1828.³⁹ In them, he held to a very narrowly Westernized, very much pro-Catholic, external-to-Russia standpoint concerning the Byzantine Empire and Russia’s historical estrangement from Europe, so that compared to the mainstream pro-Orthodox ideology maintained in the press, his writing seemed to be sheer lunacy. “In the times when the edifice of modern civilization was being erected amidst the struggle between the barbarity of the Northern peoples, filled with strength, and the lofty thought of religion, what were we doing? Obeying disastrous fate, we turned to moral doctrine, which would have to educate us, to the miserable Byzantine Empire, the subject of the deepest contempt amongst all these nations.”⁴⁰

On October 20th Sergey Semionovich Uvarov, the Minister of Public Education, reported to Nicholas I about his grave shortcomings in letting *Philosophical Letters* slip into press. “I must confess, Sire, that I am in total despair to see that such an article has been published in the time of my tenure. I consider it as a downright offence against the national dignity [*narodnoy chesti*] and a crime against religious, political and moral dignity likewise.”⁴¹ Uvarov’s fierce indignation was natural; the minister was the author of the ideological formula “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and *Narodnosti* [Nationality]” which had been offered to the public in the very first issue of *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosvetsheniya* in January 1834.⁴²

While the terms Orthodoxy and Autocracy were familiar, *Narodnost’* (Nationality) was a novelty.⁴³ Andrey Zorin has demonstrated that Minister Uvarov developed this term not without advice from Friedrich Schlegel, to whom he sent his projects.⁴⁴ In the report to the Tsar, S. S. Uvarov explained “In order that the Throne and the Church remain in power, it is necessary to sustain the feeling of Nationality which binds them together.” The question of

Autocracy and that of Nationality “originate from the same source and come together on every page of the History of the Russian people.”⁴⁵

As it clearly follows from the triad, the idea of the closeness of the Church to the Monarch was augmented with another entity, i.e. *Narodnost*, which, at first glance, may look like a germ of nationalism. Yet hardly anyone in Russia at that time could feel any sort of *national* movement *en masse* and even the Slavophiles of the late 1840s were not regarded as such.⁴⁶ Yet some undercurrent trends were already under way, particularly in architecture, which in those days was going through what some art historians call “the artistic takeover.”⁴⁷

The prerequisite for the new *true* architecture was its closeness to the spirit of the Russian people and the styles of the preserved buildings and Churches. The respective official circular that brought up the issue of the preservation of the old buildings and Churches was disseminated in December 1826.⁴⁸ And because the new approach required the architect to perform quite a romantic journey to the roots of the national history, the Byzantine past was immediately drawn into the category of meaningful contexts. The story of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior is most illustrative here. Its first project was designed by A. L. Vitberg, who envisioned it as a universal edifice, “satisfying not only the requirements of the Greek-Russian churches,”⁴⁹ and believing that it would have to “exceed the glory of St. Peter’s Cathedral in Rome.”⁵⁰ But in 1831–1834, the old school of architects, along with A. I. Vitberg, were replaced by the team of K. A. Ton, who would become the builder of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior and the Emperor’s Palace in Moscow.⁵¹

As a result, in 1840, some anonymous art-critic reported on the advances in modern architecture, and particularly, on K. A. Ton’s Cathedral. “Somehow the project goes with the Byzantine style but, in its major principles, dimensions, as well as in details, it is of the Roman style, or, more precisely, it is of an original style, created by an artist given to the idea of his own style, the national [*narodniy*] style.”⁵² According to the critic, the major features of the *advanced* architecture (including the Emperor’s Palace in Moscow) are *narodnost*’ and its authenticity to the historical Churches and buildings of Moscow as the ancient capital. The third most important feature was the Byzantine style that replaces classicism (examples given in the report are the Church in Tsarskoe Selo, Peterhof and the Church for the Semenovsky regiment).⁵³ Speaking of the newly-built Church of Saint Catherine the Martyr at the Kalinov Bridge, the critic adds that the architect “Ton assured himself that the Byzantine style, having passed over to us together with the religion, could not have remained absolutely intact and not to have fallen under the influence of our *narodnosti*...”⁵⁴

In fact, that was a very rare, if not first-ever, instance in the Russian press anything Byzantine being juxtaposed

with the authentically Russian, and it is important that the critic sees *narodnost*’ in style as something developed from the Byzantine Empire.

At the same time it should be noted that all these motifs were not upheld by Nicholas I. In the government’s paper *Moskovskie Vedomosti* in April 1845, Nicholas I congratulated the builders of the Emperor’s Palace in Moscow by saying that both the Kremlin’s Palace and the Cathedral of Christ the Savior “were quite agreeable with the surrounding buildings, which are holy to Us in the reminiscences of the centuries gone by and in the grand events of the history of Fatherland.”⁵⁵ In fact, the only context the Tsar chose to allude to publicly was that of authenticity to the historical spirit of “the former Russian architecture” and “the present moment”, leaving out even *narodnost*’.

Silently, though visibly, the architecture prefigured what would have to become the major trend in the minds of various intellectuals before and (on a greater scale of publicity) after the Crimean War. While exploration of what remained of the architecture of the old Rus’ evoked Byzantine echoes through copying the ruins of the past, the developments of the Eastern Question relied on the existing geopolitical situation of the present, where ashes of the Oriental empire were still alive.

In 1839, in the letters of Michael Pogodin, an ultra-patriot, to S. S. Uvarov we read detailed statistics about Slavs in the Balkan region and Europe.⁵⁶ In the same year Aleksey Stepanovich Khomyakov, the leader of the Slavophiles, wrote a highly controversial article for the circle of friends called *On the Old and the New* in which he raised the question: “Where could be the inner bond?” that brought together the Slavs, currently isolated from each other.⁵⁷ It is namely in the context of such ethno- and geopolitical writings that we begin to hear genuine Byzantine echoes merged with Russian *narodnost*’, Orthodoxy and Slavism. The most remarkable text of the period is a note to Nicholas I written by the poet Fedor Ivanovich Tyutchev in the autumn of 1843.

Being in dire straits, Tyutchev aimed to receive a diplomatic position as an official editor of articles about Russia in the foreign press and wrote to the Tsar to relate his views on “the issues of the days.” The head of the Third Section of His Imperial Majesty’s Own Chancellery, Count Alexander Benckendorff, let him know that his views had been favorably received by the Tsar, which made the man of letters conclude that he had actually “hit the truth.”⁵⁸

Alluding to the outcomes of the War for Independence of Greece, the country that “elevated” the Orthodox East with the cross, Tyutchev sees Russia as “the Eastern Empire” and “Eastern Church” that “existed before Europe” and as a “direct successor to the supreme power of the Caesars.” Russia “bears its own principle of power but it is harmonized, constrained and blessed by Christian-

ity.”⁵⁹ “The Orthodox East, this grand world, elevated by the Greek Cross” will never subject itself to Pope or Turks. To insure this, God “created the Moscow Tsar.”⁶⁰ “Our church [...] had not only become national in the common sense of the word but in its essential form, the ultimate expression of a certain *narodnost*, of the whole nation and the whole world.” “As for the first Eastern [Byzantine] Empire” it “had attracted only the smallest part of the nation [*i.e.* the Slavs] on which it should have relied par excellence.”⁶¹

The text was so radically imperialistic and resonant with the echoes of the old Empire that those who kept an eye on Tyutchev’s attempts to become an editor of the foreign press could not help frowning upon it. The correspondence between P. A. Vyazemsky and A. I. Turgenev reveals their discontent with Tyutchev’s “easterness” which, in the words of A. I. Turgenev, “in Moscow sounds like hilarious Khomyakhovschina but in [the newspaper] *Allgemeine Zeitung* is transformed into political contrivances which ignorant Europe is afraid of and, hence, there are superfluous troops, both ours and theirs.”⁶²

But the most formidable theories of all constructed by the intellectuals using Byzantine echoes was that of Constantinople as a new capital of some ‘imaginary’ Oriental Empire created through Russia’s military efforts. In summer 1845, on his pilgrimage to Mount Athos the archimandrite Porfiriy Uspenskiy kept a traveler’s journal. In the first pages, where he describes himself lying in a steamboat cabin heading from Solun’ to Constantinople and pondering about why the Slavs had not united themselves in one nation, he admits that the Bosphorus and Dardanelles are strategically important for Russia and in the same passage gives himself up to day-dreams: “Constantinople [...] is to be made into the City of God, the city of the permanent Ecumenical Council in which wise and saintly men from all nations, and not only clerics but laities, will have to reside and steer the course of all earthly affairs of the whole world, judging civil governments, if the latter are guilty of anything before God and the peoples.”⁶³

In fact, it is difficult to consider such wild dreams as primarily Byzantine echoes because their predominant motifs were ethnic and geopolitical with the overarching context of the Orthodox faith. We can only surmise that the image of the Byzantine Empire served as a retrospective and mythical storyline that sanctioned such speculations.

But more consistent in alluding to the Byzantine legacy were historians who began to merge it with Slavism. In 1850, even such an overt ‘Westerner’ and opponent of the Pan-Slavists as the historian T. N. Granovsky felt it appropriate to pose the following problem, “Wouldn’t it be superfluous to talk about the importance of Byzantine history for us Russians? From Tsargrad we accepted the origins of education. The Eastern Empire ushered the young Rus’ into the realm of the Christian peoples. But of all these respects,

we are bound with the destiny of the Byzantine Empire by the mere fact that we are Slavs. The Western scholars did not and could not do the justice to the last circumstance... We bear a kind of responsibility to assess this phenomenon (that is, Byzantism) to which we are so indebted.”⁶⁴

This is the first time known to historians that the word *Byzantism* was employed to refer to the bond between Slavdom and the Byzantine legacy. From these words onwards, there followed a steady flow of publications whose authors attempted to cross the intellectual boundaries between the Byzantine Empire and the Slavs living in the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁵ However officially, Slavism did not reach the level of such ideological schemes as Uvarov’s triad and was still in the making. The geopolitical and historical interests of some individuals in the South Slavs did not affect the news coverage of the Crimean War or the opinions of politicians; the main message was still religion.

On December 20, 1852, commenting on the question of the Holy Places in Bethlehem (widely understood as a pretext to the Crimean War), James Howard Harris, 3rd Earl of Malmesbury, then Foreign Secretary of England, wrote in a letter that “the Holy Places question, if roughly handled, is one that may bring on trouble and war. It is one of those points upon which the moral power of the Emperor of Russia rests, and I can as much believe that he would give up the despotic principle by having a Russian House of Commons as surrender his prestige over the populations of the Greek faith by any appearance of cession on this claim.”⁶⁶ The Foreign Secretary appeared to be well-informed about the ideological doctrine of Nicholas I and how closely entangled the Orthodox faith was with the figure of the Russian Monarch and his “despotic principle.”

On June 1, 1853, *Severnaya Pchela* summarized the issues: we are not “pursuing to expand our territories;” “His Imperial Majesty wants neither destruction nor extermination of the Ottoman Empire;” “predilection of the Port towards the Catholics;” “damage to the centuries-old privileges of Orthodox believers;” and “the main violation”: “the key of the main doors of the Bethlehem Church was handed over to the Catholic Patriarch.”⁶⁷ In the war declaration published in *Severnaya Pchela* on June 16, 1853, Nicholas I reminded readers that the clauses of the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774) “provided for the rights of the Orthodox Church.”⁶⁸

As compared to the news rhetoric surrounding the Greek War, the figure of the Tsar grew in its might: as a direct follow-up to the war proclamation, *Severnaya Pchela*, not waiting for any victories, printed *A Letter to a Friend Living in the Village* by the professional writer and censor Pavel Navosilsky, which contained an account of the author’s friend living in the countryside who informs him about the enthusiasm that inflamed his neighbours as they were reading the proclamation. “Great is the Russian God! Mighty is

the Russian Tsar! Strong is the Orthodox Rus' [...] Rus' is strong with the fear of God, with love towards the Orthodox Tsar [...] With a wave of our Tsar's hand, the countless army will rise. With the Tsar's word, any faithful subject will sacrifice his life and well-being and will go to the end of the universe."⁶⁹

The archetypal notions of 'Tsar' and 'Orthodoxy' would definitely strike home, yet the third element, Nationality, was not used in Navosilsky's patriotic exhortations: the adjective 'Russian' was applied only to God and to Tsar; the adjective 'Orthodox' only to Rus'; but the subjects were neither called 'Russian' nor a 'nation' (*narod*), they were still *sons* of the Fatherland. And unlike in 1828–1839, when during the litany the figure of the Monarch was depicted on the battlefield together with the priests of the Holy Synod, this time the press portrayed Nicholas I as the *Russian* Tsar mentioning him along with the *Russian* God.

During and after the Crimean War the Eastern Question kept fuelling Pan-Slavism. In May 27, 1854, M. Pogodin was musing over the idea of an All-Slavic "Danube Union" with its capital in Constantinople, though he did not print this in his *Moscovitianin*.⁷⁰ With the subsequent thawing of the political atmosphere following the war, the concerns over the South Slavs finally reached a wider audience. In 1856, the first Slavic Charitable Committee was established in Moscow, with 40% of the board made up of University professors and its objective to collect charity for the lands of Slavs.⁷¹ In 1867, the Slavic Charitable Committee summoned the Slavonic Congress and an ethnographical exhibition in Moscow. By the end of the 1860s, the Slavic charitable cause had turned into a movement, with Committees established in Saint Petersburg, Odessa, Kazan, Khar'kov, Vladikavkaz and other major cities. In 1876, the movement went so far as to financially support a volunteer army, buy an armory and recruit volunteers in Russia to help the Serbs in their struggle for freedom. Modern-day researchers argue that the movement in defense of the Slavs went around the official policies.⁷² This circumstance was also clearly seen by European politicians.

After the Bulgarian uprising of 1875, Sir George Cambell, M.P., "more than once" informed the Parliament that "Since the Crimea War great changes have taken place... [...] We should put ourselves as far as we can in their [Russians'] place, consider the feelings which we should have if our position was what theirs [Russians'] is, and make some allowances for their reasonable and natural sympathy for the Slav cause and for the excitement which the massacre of those whom they consider their brethren has caused among them. [...] Can we be surprised that Russian sympathy for the oppressed Christians of Turkey has run very high indeed? Can we blame the volunteers who have gone to aid their cause? [...] I believe there is no doubt whatever of this that volunteers are genuine volunteers; that the money to

send them, and the means by which they were supported, were found by private subscription in Russia, and not by the Government."⁷³

Being thus observant, Sir Cambell still drew a somewhat too generalized picture, since official newspapers, such as *Moscovskie vedomosti*, *Severnaya Pchela*, *Sankt-Perburgskie Vedomosti*, or even the liberal *Golos*, would never promote the Pan-Slavonic cause alone on an issue-to-issue basis. The more frequent tone of the official press was support for Russia's expansion towards the East. Prior to the war Sir Cambell wrote: "But suppose the worst – suppose that by some turn of events the Russians reach Constantinople. Constantinople is not one step nearer to India than they already are; their route evidently is by Turkistan and the Caspian, not through Asia Minor. No doubt, if Russia had completely absorbed Turkey, she might be a great Power, and in one sense more dangerous."⁷⁴

On April 12, 1877, Russia declared her eleventh war against Turkey. The pro-government position was voiced by Mikhail Katkov, the editor-in-chief of *Moscovskie vedomosti* (obligatory reading for provincial state officials⁷⁵), who related the issues of the ensuing military conflict to a sacramental formula: "to lighten the fate of the Christian subjects in Turkey."⁷⁶ Following the tragic events in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the murders of the German and French ambassadors, Katkov sees war as unavoidable, especially once it was declared by Serbia and Montenegro.⁷⁷ When the military operation proved to be successful, Katkov repeatedly explained, in four issues running, that Russia would have to secure its achievements by taking Constantinople, Gallipoli, and the Bosphorus.⁷⁸ Another peculiar idea of Katkov's war propaganda was that of the uniqueness of Russia in the Eastern Question. Unlike the countries of Europe, "Europe is abstractedness... Europe is an idea, not a force deciding and acting... [...] and if there comes a time to act, then who if not Russia will."⁷⁹

Sharing the militarism of Katkov and the idea of Russia's unique fate, the editor of the private liberal newspaper *Golos* (which faithfully conveyed the views of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs⁸⁰), Andrey Alexandrovitch Kraevsky, also welcomed the war from the front pages, calling it Russia's "saintly vocation" and picturing Russia as a young country whose "years of moral renaissance" started with "the first luminous event" of February 19, 1861 (the abolition of serfdom) when we "began to cast away the Old Man..."⁸¹ *Golos* apparently maintained a pro-Western view: "We are going to fulfill the calling that is recognized and formally approved by all of Europe, and put forward the demand of the reforms which Turkey does not wish or cannot implement."⁸² Yet similarly to Katkov, it did not count out the invasion of Constantinople as "a means of pressure" on the Porte, as well as the importance of the "national and religious bonds" and "material interests."⁸³

Looking at the same issues from different standpoints, the editors share the religious aspect of the war and, more importantly, the idea of the unique role that Russia was going to play in it. At the same time, they both played down the nationalistic aspect and even the figure of the Tsar remained in the background. Very possibly the editors of these newspapers did so because they were aware that their primary readership may not readily understand the ethnicity issues among the Slavs in the Ottoman Porte in their relation to Russians. Indeed, the question of Slavdom, essentially an ethnic issue, at the peak of popularity before and during the war, was not at all a clear concept for the intellectuals and, unfortunately, for many Russian politicians. As V.N. Vinogradov pointed out, after the Preliminary Treaty of San Stefano was signed, Serbs, Greeks and Romanians took a strong stance against it: for them it meant Bulgarian domination, and moreover it did not take into account the complex borderlines between different ethnic groups.⁸⁴ The redrawing of the borders at the Berlin Congress provoked a wave of disappointment in Russian society, for expectations after the war had been very high. The war was welcomed not only in the official newspapers but by numerous intellectuals, including the philosopher and writer Konstantin Leontiev, who is often considered to be the coiner of the term *Byzantism*.⁸⁵

Of all the other intellectuals, Leontiev's ideas about Russian politics of expansion in the Balkan region and its connection to the legacy of the Byzantine Empire were the most profound due to his unique biography. From 1869, K. Leontiev worked at the Russian consulate in Yanina, Adrianopoly and Tulchy. His chief, Nikolay Pavlovich Ignatiev, was the famous head of the Russian Mission in the Ottoman Porte and the author of the Treaty of San Stefano.⁸⁶ In December 1878, Leontiev reminisced, "In Constantinople, I would often have arguments with Bulgarians and Greeks, and very shortly had a chance to see it clearly as to what extent the Bulgarians are canonically wrong and how we Russians are acting wrong and so *overtly* encouraging their riot and insidiousness." [...] "I had an inner conviction that in this question I am more genuine, more impartial than Ignatiev, who sought for a formal success alone and treated such ticklish Church affairs too audaciously. I felt it and, burning with flames of diligence, in fear of a Church schism with the Greeks, in whose hands are all the Holy Places [...] I began [...] *Byzantism and Slavdom*."⁸⁷

Thus, the quintessential article on the history of Byzantine echoes in 19th century Russia was written right before the next war with Turkey, in the atmosphere of the conflict between Greeks and Bulgarians (1872–1874),⁸⁸ for the latter were against subordinating themselves canonically to the Patriarch of Constantinople. Above all, it coincided with some crucial changes in Leontiev's spirituality, particularly his growing interest in the ancient tradition of

starchestvo. In 1871–1872, he paid several visits to the *startsy*, elderly monks, and experienced a conversion of which he would write in *My Conversion and Life on the Sacred Mount Athos*.⁸⁹ Later, in 1887, in a letter to a student, he recalled, "Two of my works, *Odysseys* and *Byzantism and Slavdom*, I wrote after a year and a half of contacts with the Athos monks, reading of ascetic writers and the hardest struggle against myself, both carnal and spiritual."⁹⁰

Unlike other intellectuals who turned to the Byzantine Empire retrospectively, Leontiev saw the presence of its legacy in his time but generalized and transformed it into *Byzant-ism*, "specific kind of education or a culture."⁹¹ In a way, Leontiev was closer to the true legacy of Byzantine Christianity than other intellectuals because he saw it in the light of ascetic ideals of the monasteries on Mount Athos, the only living institutional body that preserved the ancient traditions of Byzantine spirituality. Moreover, the potential audience of his work consisted of people who knew *Optina pustyn* well or had even visited it: Dostoevsky, Soloviev, Tolstoy and many others. The second page of it reads: "The Byzantine ideal does not have that lofty and in many instances over exaggerated understanding of the earthly human personality [...]; it is disenchanted in "everything earthly, in happiness, in the strength of our chastity"; [...] "We know that (like Christianity in general) it rejects hope in the universal wellbeing of the nations; that it is an ever strong antithesis to the idea of a universal humanity that is understood as the earthly equality of all, the universal earthly freedom, perfection and satisfaction."⁹²

The rest of Leontiev's definition partly resembles the triad Autocracy, Orthodoxy and Nationality (*narodnost*). In Russia, "Byzantism found its flesh and blood in the generations of Tsars, which are holy to the people;" or else: "Byzantism in a state means Autocracy. In a religion it means Christianity with certain features that distinguish it from the Western Church, from heresies and schisms."⁹³ Yet Leontiev reformulated Uvarov's triad by replacing the term *narodnost* with the more specific and ethnic-centered notion of Slavdom. Working on his article and seeing ethno-religious conflicts between Bulgarians and Greeks and forecasting the problems with the ethnic borders, Leontiev suggested that Russia can be a force of reconciliation between the Slavs. "The power of Russia is necessary for the existence of the Slavs. In order to be powerful, Russia needs Byzantism. [...] Those who are fighting against Byzantism, are unknowingly and indirectly fighting against all of Slavdom; for what is tribal Slavdom without an abstract Slavism? It is an unconfined mass that can be easily broken into pieces and easily blended with the republican All-Europe."⁹⁴

In our analysis of the official media reactions to the wars against the Ottoman Empire we showed that most immediate contexts were primarily built around the figure of the Tsar, and the image of Russia as the country of the



1 - Konstantin Thon, *Cathedral of Christ the Saviour*, 1839-1860. Moscow

Orthodox faith, but the 'Russian people' (ethnically or as a nation) were almost never, so to speak, "at war" with the Ottomans. Perhaps, such context did not have a universal potential with the mass readership. Despite the political slogans in favor of Balkan Christians, the government had failed to create an ideology of a nation appealing to the majority of the media audience. That is why, perhaps, in the opening passage of *Byzantism and Slavdom*, Leontiev wrote: "Slavdom, taken in its entirety, is still a Sphinx, an enigma."⁹⁵

But neither the vision of a united Slavdom coupled with Russian Byzantism, nor the ascetic ideals of Mt. Athos could become part of the Russian geopolitical program. In 1875, Leontiev sent the draft of *Byzantism and Slavdom* to Mikhail Katkov but the editor refused to publish it in his famous and influential *Russkiy vestnik* (with a print-run of over 3,000 copies since 1857);⁹⁶ it was printed in the same year but as a separate edition largely unnoticed by critics.⁹⁷ And likewise the relationship of the Holy Synod with the Russian monks active on the Mount Athos staggered in the course of the following conflicts with Turkey. Neither the Holy Synod nor the Russian consulate in Constantinople could control the life of the monks. According to the Russian law of 1816, any Russian subject who took monastic vows on Mount Athos was not regarded a monk if he crossed the Russian border, while on the Mount, he was considered a subject of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, many simple people in Russia were ready to support Athos monks financially; many wanted to buy a priory there, but neither the Ottomans nor the Russian government could benefit from their prayers politically.⁹⁸ In the course of tensions over the status of the Athos territories the number of the Russian hermits fell from 5,000 to 2,460 before the revolution of 1917.⁹⁹

In our investigation, we left out the discussion about Russian Byzantinists because their works were not echoes but studies of the historical Byzantine Empire and as such would deserve a different approach, though of course, some of the scholars were much involved in politics.¹⁰⁰ Thus for example, at the 8th Archeological Congress, V. I. Modestov, a well-know scholar of Roman antiquity, suggested establishing archeological institutes in Athens and Rome, but the Russian ambassador in Turkey A. I. Nelidov and the prominent Byzantinist F. I. Uspenskiy won over in the discussion: a Russian institute in Constantinople could be used as a political instrument.¹⁰¹ In a way, this controversy repeated that of Vitberg and Ton earlier: between a 'more classical' and a 'more Byzantine' perspective. The Russian Archeological Institute in Constantinople was founded in 1895 and closed at the beginning of the First World War.

Echoes of the Byzantine Empire in 19th century Russia had a very limited reach on the readers of the initial mass media. The mass reader was never presented with comparisons between contemporary Russia and the

Byzantine Empire, even during the wars against the Ottomans, when such contexts could be expected. Neither the theory of "Moscow as a Third Rome" nor the closeness of the Russian Tsar to the Orthodox Church was interpreted as 'consciously' Byzantine features. The same is true about the institutional influence of Mount Athos and its monastic traditions: while they did influence the minds of believers in general, they were not consciously perceived as Byzantine (in the same way that they are not perceived as such by most Russians nowadays). The architects and their critics may have consciously followed the patterns of Byzantine art, but the newspapers would not translate these ideas *en masse*, since this would exceed the generally low level of education among the readership. We therefore see that the institutional and artistic influences of the Byzantine legacy were stripped of all historical perspectives (unless we talk about a community of scholars like Uspenskiy or Kondakov).

Quite naturally, it required the minds of intellectuals to see the Byzantine Empire as an intrinsic element of Russia's history and to project this understanding onto the country's geopolitics and even its future development. From the beginning of the 19th century, intellectuals (including state officials) ascertained the necessity of having an ideology that would involve a wider audience in the sphere of public opinion. Inevitably, such an ideology would have to bear religious, geopolitical, ethnic and historical connotations that could be identified as reference points for the country's fledgling identity. But the official triad of Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality, the ideas of the Slavophile movement and later the ideas of united Slavdom – all of them being candidates for such a national ideology – could not be straightforwardly infused with Byzantine connotations for two main reasons: the first Eastern Orthodox Empire had not been able to withstand the onslaught of the infidels, and its history had been devoid of any attempts to merge the true Orthodox faith or the figure of the *basileus* (king) with the component of *narodnost'* (nationality). Indeed, we have seen that the term *narodnost'* was never used in pro-government newspapers either immediately prior to or after the declaration of another war against Turkey (and never in the declarations themselves). Likewise, the Pan-Slavistic connotations were avoided by journalists whenever they had to explain reasons for another war, even in the mid-1870s when sympathies for the suffering South Slavs reached a crescendo. Instead of nationalistic ideas, we rather find that the dominant connotations in both the press and the writings of intellectuals were religious ones (protection of the Orthodox faith and concerns for the Christian brothers in the Ottoman Empire).

In conclusion, it is important to note that the majority of 'Byzantine' parallels were brought up by intellectuals (Chaadaev, Tyutchev and Leontiev are the best examples)

looking at Russia from an external perspective. This is a specific characteristic of Byzantine echoes as a communicative and cognitive model. It was appealing for intellectuals because it provided images for formulating an All-Russian objective that had to be reached. The ultimate development of such reasoning was the image of the con-

quered Constantinople transformed into a sacred capital of all nations of the East. Interestingly enough, this image was shared both by intellectuals concerned with Byzantine parallels and by the editors of the major newspapers. However, this subject is broad enough to merit a separate discussion in the future.

Photographic credits: 1: William Craft Brumfield, *A History of Russian Architecture*, Cambridge 1993, p. 398.

Notes

¹ For the modern theory of historical memory see: Olga Leont'eva, *Istoricheskaya pamyat' i obrazy proshlogo v rossijskoj kul'ture XIX – nachala XX veka*, Samara 2011, pp. 6–9.

² Nikolay Karamzin, *Istoriya gosudarstva Rossiyskogo v 12 tomah*, Tom 6, Sankt-Peterburg 1819, p. 58. – Tatyana Panova, *Velikaya knyaginya Sofya Paleolog*, Moskva 2005, p. 58. – See also Krystyna Chojnicka, *Narodziny rosyjskiej doktryny panstwowej: Zoe Paleolog – między Bizancjum, Rzymem a Moskwa*, Krakow 2001 (reviewed by Vladimir Schukin, *Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie* 5, 2001, p. 379).

³ *Nastol'naya kniga svyashchennosluzhiteley*, Tom 1, Moskva 1992, pp. 5–12.

⁴ Viktor Zhivov, *Izcerkovnoj istorii vremen Petra Velikogo: issledovaniy i materialy*, Moskva 2004, p. 227.

⁵ See the extensive monograph on the subject: Nikolay Kapterev, *Harakter otnoshenij Rossii k pravoslavnomu vostoku v XVI i XVII stoletiyah*, Sergiev posad 1914, p. 24. – Also see possibly the earliest monograph on the theory of “Moscow as a Third Rome” Olexander Ogloblin, *Moskov'ska Teorija III Rimu v XVI–XVII stolet'jah*, Mjunhen 1951.

⁶ Nina Sinicyna, *Tretij Rim. Istokii evolyuciya russoj srednevekovoj koncepcii (XV – XVI vv.)*, Moskva 1998, pp. 11, 299.

⁷ Perhaps, one of the earliest works was Vasyly Malinin, *Starets Elizarova monastiria Filofei i eg poslaniya. Istoriko-literaturnoissledovanie*, Kiev 1901. – See also Pavel Milyukov, *Ocherki po istorii Russoj kul'tury. Chast' vtoraya*, Sankt-Peterburg 1905, p. 24.

⁸ Zhivov (see note 4), pp. 208–210.

⁹ Filaret, episkop Chernigovskiy, *Istoriya Russoj Tserkvi. Period pyatyiy. Sinodalnoe pravlenie (1721–1826)*, Moskva 1848, p. 4.

¹⁰ Among the models for Russian monastery life were abodes in Palestine, Mount Sinai and Mount Athos. See more on the subject in: Nina Sinicyna (ed.), *Monashestvo i monastiry Rossii. XI–X veka. Istoricheskij ocherk*, Moskva 2002, p. 116.

¹¹ Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus' (ed.), Afon, in: *Pravoslavnyaya entsiklopediya*, T. 4, Moskva 2002, p. 146.

¹² Ibidem, p. 148.

¹³ Kirill (see note 11), p. 149.

¹⁴ Porfiry Uspenskiy, *Vostok hristianskiy*, Afon, Sankt-Peterburg 1892, p. 345.

¹⁵ Kirill (see note 11), p. 154.

¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 160.

¹⁷ Lora Gerd, *Ruskiy Afon. Ocherki cerkovno-politicheskoy istorii*, Moskva 2010, p. 156.

¹⁸ Sinicyna (see note 10), pp. 235–236.

¹⁹ Gerd (see note 17), pp. 85, 91.

²⁰ Filipp Ternovskiy, *Izuchenie vizantijskoj istorii v ee tendentsioznom pri-lozhenii v Drevney Rusi*, Vyipusk 2, Kiev 1876, pp. 31–111.

²¹ Kamal Sido, *Rossiyan «vostochnyj vopros» v istoriografii stran Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka (Konets XVII–70-e godyi XIX veka) Avtoferat dissertatsii na soiskanie uchenoy stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk*, Moskva 1989, p. 14.

²² Mikhail Bogoslovskiy, *Petr I: Materialy dlya biografii*, T I–V, Moskva 1940–1948, p. 346. – See also Zhivov (see note 4), p. 38.

²³ O zachatii i zdanii tsarstvuyushchego grada S.-Peterburga. V leto ot pervago dni Adama 7211, po rozhdestve lisusa Hrista 1703. May, *Ruskiy arhiv. Istoriko-literaturniy sbornik*, Vyipusk 10 i 11, (Izdan pri Chertkovskoy biblio-

teke), Moskva 1863. The modern edition: Yury Bespyatikh (ed.), *Peterburg Petra I v inostrannykh opisaniyakh*, Leningrad 1991.

²⁴ On the Church politics of Peter the Great see Vitkor Zhivov, *Iz cerkovnoj istorii vremen Petra Velikogo: issledovaniyai materialy*, Moskva 2004, pp. 366–377.

²⁵ Andrey Zorin, *Kormya dvuglavogo orla. Russkaya literature i gosudarstvennaya idelogiya v posledneytreti XVIII – pervoytreti XIX veka*, Moskva 2001, pp. 33–64.

²⁶ Vladimir Chuiko (ed.), *Vol'ter i Ekaterina II., Perepiska, Seriya Evropejskie myslitel i pisateli*, T. IV, Sankt-Peterburg 1882, p. 65.

²⁷ See Clause 7 in Trofim Yuzefovich, *Dogovory Rossii s Vostokom politicheskije i torgovie*, Sankt Peterburg 1869, p. 28 (in the later peace treaties with Turks the clause was sometimes referred to).

²⁸ Nikolay Pavlenko, *Tri tak nazyivaemykh zaveschaniya Petra I, Voprosyistorii* 2, 1979, p. 142.

²⁹ The full text of the note published and analyzed in: Alexander Altunyan, «*Politicheskije mneniya» Fadeya Bulgarina. Idejno-stilisticheskij analiz zapisok F.V. Bulgarina k Nikolayu I.*, Moskva 1998, pp. 171–172.

³⁰ Alexander Pushkin, *Polnoe sobranie sochineniy v 17 tomakh*, T. 15, Moskva 1996, pp. 205–206.

³¹ The name for Istanbul in the Russian presses in the 19th century; otherwise called by the Old Slavonic name Tsargrad.

³² *Severnaya pchela*, 15.05.1828 g., No. 58, p. 3.

³³ *Pribavlenie k Ruskiy invalid*, 15.04.1828, No. 96.

³⁴ Anna Efstathiadou, *Representing Greekness: French and Greek Lithographs from the Greek War of Independence (1821–1827) and the Greek-Italian War*, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 29, Number 2, October 2011, pp. 195–196.

³⁵ Cyril Mango, *Byzantinism and Romantic Hellenism*, *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 28, 1965, p. 39.

³⁶ *Severnaya pchela*, 09.06.1828, No. 69, p. 3.

³⁷ *Severnaya pchela*, 19.06.1828, No. 73, p. 4.

³⁸ See, for example, Pushkin's opinion in: Alexander Pushkin, *Polnoe sobraniesochineniy*, T. 9, Moskva 1954, p. 210.

³⁹ Petr Chaadaev, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i izbrannye pis'ma v 2 tomah*, Tom 1, Moskva 1991, p. 576.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, p. 97.

⁴¹ Ibidem, p. 529.

⁴² Konstantin Serbinovich (ed.), *Zhurnal ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniya*, Yanvar 1834, pp. 5–7.

⁴³ The word ‘narodnost’, ‘the national way of life’, seems to have been invented only in 1819. Peter Christoff, *The Third Heart: Some Intellectual-Ideological Currents and Cross-Currents in Russia, 1800–30*, The Hague and Paris 1970, pp. 22–24.

⁴⁴ Zorin (see note 25), pp. 354–355.

⁴⁵ Sergey Uvarov, *O nekotorykh obshchikh nachalah, moguschih sluzhit' rukovodstvom pri upravlenii ministerstvom narodnogo prosveshcheniya*, in: Alexander Schiryants (ed.) et al., *Russkaya social'no-politicheskaya mysl' pervaya polovina xix veka*, Moskva 2011, pp. 303–307, esp. p. 305.

⁴⁶ In winter of 1839, A. S. Khomyakov and the audience of his article were not yet full-grown Pan-Slavists, with reference to Khomyakov's editor A. I. Koshelev, this fact was discussed by Raymond T. McNally in his article *Chaadaev Versus Xomjakov in the Late 1830's and the 1840's*, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 27, No. 1, 1966, pp. 77–78.

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- 48 *Ibidem*, p. 72.
- 49 Aleksandr Vitberg, *Zapiski akademika Vitberga, stroitelya hrama Spasitelya v Moskve*, *Russkaya starina. Ezheimesyachnoe istoricheskoe izdanie*, Tom 5, Sankt-Peterburg 1872, p. 26.
- 50 *Ibidem*, p. 20.
- 51 *Ibidem*, p. 71.
- 52 Anon., *Uspehi arhitektury v Rocsii za poslednee trehletie*, *Biblioteka dlya chteniya* 38, 1840, p. 136.
- 53 *Ibidem*, p. 133.
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- 57 Aleksey Khomyakov, *O Starom i novom* (1839), in: Alexander Gilferding (ed.), *Polnoe sobranie sochineniy v 8 tomakh*, T. 3, Moskva 1900, pp. 11–29, esp. p. 21.
- 58 See textual notes on the memorandum in: Fedor Tyutchev, *Polnoe sobraniesochinenij v 6 tomah*, Tom 3, *Publicisticheskie proizvedeniya*, Moskva 2003, pp. 286–288.
- 59 *Ibidem*, p. 130.
- 60 *Ibidem*, p. 134.
- 61 *Ibidem*, p. 137.
- 62 *Ibidem*, p. 230.
- 63 Porfiriy Uspenskiy, *Vostokhristianskiy. Pervoeputeshestvie v Afonskiemona-stiriiskiti v 1845 godu*, Chast' I., Kiev 1877, p. 3.
- 64 Timofey Granovskij, *Sobranie sochinenij*, Moskva 1890, p. 378.
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- 66 James Howard Harris, 3rd Earl of Malmesbury, *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister. An Autobiography*, London 1885, p. 287.
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- 81 “The Old Man” is a quote from the Apostle Paul (Epistle to Romans 6:6); *Golos, Gazeta politicheskaya i literaturnaya. Ezhednevnoe izdanie*, Sankt-Peterburg, 1877, No. 91, 3. (15.) 4., p. 1.
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- 83 *Ibidem*, 1877, No. 98, 10. (22.) 4., p. 2.
- 84 Viktor Vinogradov, *Russko-tureckaya vojna 1877–1878 godov: vlast' i obschestvo, Slavyanovedenie* 5, 2008, pp. 7–8.
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- 88 *Ibidem*, Tom 7 (2), Sankt-Peterburg 2006, p. 663.
- 89 *Ibidem*, p.782.
- 90 The Letter from July 24–27, 1887, RGALI, F.2, Ed. hr. 669, L. 6 in: Leont'ev (see note 88), p. 663.
- 91 Konstantin Leont'ev, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenij v 12 tomah*, Tom 7(1), Sankt-Peterburg 2005, p. 300.
- 92 *Ibidem*.
- 93 *Ibidem*.
- 94 *Ibidem*, p. 351.
- 95 *Ibidem*, p. 300.
- 96 Galina Izmet'seva, *Istoricheskie portrety. Mihail Nikiforovich Katkov, Voprosy istorii* 4, 2004, pp. 71–92, esp. p. 76.
- 97 Konstantin Leont'ev, *Pro et contra, v 2 knigah*, Kn. 2, Sankt-Peterburg 1995, pp. 71, 567.
- 98 Gerd (see note 17), p. 54.
- 99 Gerd (see note 17), p. 156.
- 100 See for instance, the article by Fedor Uspenskiy, *Russkie interesy na Afone*, in: Gerd (see note 17), pp. 163–169.
- 101 Ekaterina Basargina, *Proekty sozdaniya russkikh arheologicheskikh institutov zarubezhom, Vestnik drevnej istorii* 4, 2008, pp. 205–213, esp. p. 205.