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A COMPLEX PREDICATION, NOT A COMPLEX SENTENCE

ABSTRACT

The work is a cognitive revision of the so-called complex sentence. For us, “complicated, complex” is not the qualification of a sentence as a syntax, but a qualification of predication – the way in which the subjectively-predication relation is constructed, i.e. the predication building in certain sentences is complex. Their subject and predicate are expressed not by nominations but by their own predications.

KEYWORDS

Complex predication; subject-predicate; predicative

The syntax defines predication as the main indication of the sentence. It is assumed that a sentence in which there is more than one predication is a complex one. I.e. the sentence is either simple or complex in terms of counting of the predications that make up the sentence configuration or building. Accordingly, the complex sentence has three varieties – composed, compound and mixed. Along with this, the use of polypredicative constructs is also possible. It should be noted that there is no study about predication as a sign of complex sentence. In syntactic studies it is accepted to consider this concept as a linearly accomplished essence of a collective nature, i. e. it is immanent considered multiplicity and component. Therefore, the nomination of *polypredicative constructs* is used in most cases as a synonym for a complex sentence.

The question is how to understand predication when there are at least two predications. In these cases, does predication remain homogeneous in nature, or isomorphism is working and it acquires multiplicity, counting. Is there an oxymoron in naming a *complex sentence* given the definitively of at least two predications, at least two simple sentences? This is even more disturbing in a *complex sentence*

where it is agreed that the sentences are independent. How are they independent, self-contained- two and/or more sentences, and they construct one, two or three compound sentences. How many are the sentences – one, more, other? How to understand composition – in the shape plan or in the content plan; of building or composition? And the composition? Before we proceed with the analysis, we will add more questions that disturb the definition of complex sentences. Why, for example, the composition in homogeneous parts, when they are a subject, does not fall into a complicated complex subject – analogous to a complex sentence – *A young man and an old woman were talking on the bench next to us*? What is it that prevents such an analogy? Why is the effect of isomorphism interrupted? There is also a disturbance when a mixed complex sentence is used. Connections between the components are mixed. But this is the case in the expanded subject like in *A girl with blond hair and heavenly blue dress and boy with a pug nose were holding portraits of the first teachers*. This also violates the rationale with matter unity because the sense unity is inherent in the complex syntax of the paragraph, of the text, since, naturally, the sentence has a sense of communicative value.

In other words, what is complex in the sentence or what is a complex sentence? The first option is important to us – what is complex in the sentence.

This work is an attempt to answer the question of whether a complex sentence is a term or it has a terminological use? Whether the sentence's qualification is complex or a complex sentence is a term? If this is a qualification, what is the nature of this qualification? And where the boundary between the sentence with at least two predications and a polypredicative construction is?

On these issues, the functional syntax does not seem to give a definite answer, or the answer so far is discouraged if we do not “protect” it from the cognitive approach of examining the syntax unit sentence.

The relationship between the elements in the complex compound sentence is not equivalent. The nomination *compound* suggests that the nature of this type differs deeply in the essence and not simply as structuring. I.e. it is an engaged and refined interpretation of composition as a terminological use in itself, of course, not merely as a component in a broader term. A comparative look at the terms that refer to the two variants of a complex sentence emphasizes the relevance of the second elements. In the first type, analyzed above, the complex sentence is achieved by compiling, merging in a linear order of units. In the second type, the complex sentence is built by compilation. Given the hierarchy and subordination as a type of relation, closer contact may be seen so that unity is more homogeneous. Compilation represents the achievement of an explicit essence, in which the elements of the structure are in terms of meaning, supplemented by logic-grammatical meaning. Apart from the fact that some of these elements themselves are predicates, they enter into such relations at a next, higher level, so that a complex predication called a complex sentence is created. The predication of the complex composed sentence is isomorphic



to the predication of the simple sentence. The relationship is an absolutely identical subject-predicate formula.

The problem of predication in the syntax of the complex sentence is considered by M. I. Cheremisina first, who points out that this notion is not formulated by itself, but is added by the syntax of the simple sentence. Noticing the polypredicative of the complex sentence, the author does not consider it as a multitude, a sum of predications, and recognizes the specifics of the predicative relations within the polypredicative construct (CHEREMISINA 1980, 154).

M. I. Cheremisina and T. A. Kolosova point out that there is no terminology for describing the relation between the parts of the complex sentence, because the classics of modifier, subject, object, etc. is not semantic but functional (CHEREMISINA, KOLOSOVA 1987). In the Bulgarian syntax, corrections of standardized classifications of certain models are made only by Y. Penchev (PENCHEV 1993, 1998).

This brief but eloquent review gives reason to understand the sentence's philosophy, which predication is achieved in a complex way, using phenomenological reduction and cognitive approach.

Predication is a sign that structures the meaning of the sentence. In certain sentences, however, the predicative structure is constructed in a complex way. The predication process is complex. The predication as a type of connection is mediated by one of its components, the subject or the predicate, by another predication, which is realized as an element in the main predication and shapes its structure. Variants are subjectivity, predictability, objectivity, attribute, determination. Since the subject is a principle part of the predication as a connection, and the relation is its semantic-depth equivalent (in its initial understanding it requires two sides), a predication is structured in the first two types of content. And this is the most accurate analogue model of a predicate unit, synthesized by a concentration of predication in the model of spiral.

The other types of subordination – object, attribute, and determination – are not used as a means of realizing predication in a complex way. They are not implanted in predication. They exist not by predication, but by themselves; away and abreast. These connections are between predications, not in predication; between predication structures and not in a predication structure. Once two predicatives are connected, there are related, more precisely, added to each other, two predications. I.e. such an arrangement may be called polypredicative. Polypredicative is a multiplicity of predicative, but it is not the only predicative. The multiplicity can be divided; if not in all cases, then in certain cases. (The only predicative is absolutely indivisible.) In the predicative structure, the determining link is the predication, not the subordination (object, attributor, or determination), as coordination is also not decisive. Coordination and subordination are possible in the composition of the sentence, but not in the structure. Coordination and subordination do not change the status of the sentence. It stays simple in spite of them.

The clarification of predication as a category of fundamental and critical importance and the classification scheme of sentence models are a prerequisite for presentation of the predicate components. One of them is the subject. In some of the sentences, the specific feature of the subject is that it is expressed through a predicate. However, this predicative expressed subject is generally predicated. The special point is, of course, contained in this predicate whose left valence is expressed predicatively rather than nominative. It is indeed a predicate, not another predicative, with which it subjectively also comes into a predication: *The one who works, succeeds, Those, who respect him, have come, Those, who will have an examination, think of the task; The one who knows, can do everything.*

The presence of the relative pronoun in the predications is indicative. The morphology of this type completely fills in the structure. These positions have a purely deixis function and represent the subject inside the predictions, *who works, who respect him, who will have an examination, who knows.* Relativism in their semantics puts them, along with their primary (their own predications), into the position of the non-nominative subject of the independent predicate. Its semantics itself is sufficient and needs a connection with a subject to predict. This need is provoked by the nomination of the predicate, on one hand, and by the relativism of the pronoun in the neighbourhood predicative, on the other. Relativity contributes the nominated predicate to accomplish predication. The position of the predicate and the predication in its neighbourhood does not matter to the structuring of the meaning of the complex sentence: *Those, who respect him, have come - They have come, who respect him.*

The pronouns here are with their classical, deixis characteristic and do not exhibit homonymy. They are a substitute for the absent subject in the predication, which is generally the subject of the main sentence predication.

The possibility of participation of these basic predicates to the meaning in other relationships, except for the predicative – determinant purpose, time, cause, deserves attention. For example, *They came to celebrate together; They work because they need money. These naturally make sense, even in themselves, in one-part predications: They came; They work.*

Complicated achieved predication is available in models with predicates of mentality and speech activity in general – *think, know, say, talk* and so on. Without filled valences (at least one) they are not equivalent to predication; they remain a prototype of language as a correlate of thinking as a technology of knowledge. Because they are absolutely primal as semantics (inherent to the subject's mind) and because the subject, precisely with its consciousness, is the bearer of the language, they cannot be communicative in themselves. This is a kind of linguistic tautology, of course, conditionally speaking. The meaning is syncretic, or it is simply a metalingual, a metapredicate, because with the help of these models, a reflection can be refreshed, or a reflection in another, past moment of knowledge.

No compromise can also be found in the subject implanted into the aphorism: *it is said that, it is known that, they say that*, etc., by not mixing or overlapping with the third person the subject and gender category. The content of the person/gender category in the language is the subject. Another question is that the subject of action, state, process is not entirely covered by the subject in a classic sense, with the subject of language.

The impersonal modal verbs should not have a lexical subject, writes Y. Penchev (PENCHEV 1998, 80). (Evaluation is a modality.)

The impersonal predicates, which are a mental product, but with axiomatic, evaluative semantics, allow participation in a sentence with a complicated predication. I.e. they can structure mental technology with a predictably expressed subject.

Such a model of a complex sentence, in which the subject is not nominated, but is predicatively pronounced, build the predicates *it is possible, it is true, it is easy, it is difficult, it is frightening, it is good...* They have free position of the subject with which they enter into a predicative connection. Their predicate (not predicative!) semantics is complete. As they evaluate, they do not contain valence on the right. These do not include relation and therefore they do not imply an object as a party in relation to the subject. With their semantics the volume of information is closed. The situation is due to the presence of the *is*, whose right valence is filled with the words *possible, true, easy, hard, terrible, good*. The left position is free. The appreciated is absent. It is a subject under the structure of the predication. Predicates with evaluation semantics, or predication rating, is impersonal. I.e. everything can be rated, but when is rated by *is*, without the help of another relation – for example, the reconciliation (in the adjectives), then we cannot really think of a person. The alternative presence of the adjectives and their relation through coordination outlines the independence of the evaluation predicates from the nominations. (The adjectives are also present in the composite verbs.) Each nomination is an enlightened subject itself. Thus, the evaluation predicates, different from the evaluators-adjectives and independent from the conciliation, are not a subject in its classical sense. Since the predicate relation involves a subject, the possibility of expressing it is a predication: *It is possible to travel / To travel, is possible; It is true that there is no one here / There is no one here, it is true; It's easy to write about him / To write about him, it's easy*. Positional variants do not change the meaning, and this proves the unity, so to say, the predication of the sense-communicative unit, the sentence with a complex predicate. In both cases, the predicate occupies the position of the subject.

The semantics of evaluative predicates, the copula *is* considered, requires the subject to be filled in.

The subject of mental processes is expressed predicatively rather than nominative, because the emphasis in terms of meaning is primarily borne by the predicate, but in these cases it has no informative perspective. The predicative presentation

itself contains information. Thus, the predicate, nominated a mental process, becomes a predicative structure that expresses fully the unit of reflection of self-consciousness. The object position is meaningfully equally relevant to the subject. Who knows or what someone knows does make sense. The fact that the subject “knows”, “thinks”, “understands” is known because of the prototype as a position in the dialectical interrelation thinking-language.

Hence, naturally, the conclusion that such predicates (a predicate whose content represents activity of consciousness, thought, or speech) in a subjective position may be a predication of a process closely related to the subjective consciousness – in addition to speech activity, because it is a conscious product (*talks, reads, says*).

In these cases, we refer to the composition of the complex predication. The subject must be relatively nominated, because that is how the relation with the nominated mental predicate is ensured; thus achieving equivalent contact. If there is no semantically established relation, the contact will not be equivalent and the free subject position in the predicate relationship will not be filled in. Language forms with a deixis function of course, which mean pure relativity, express semantic-based relation. Deixis does not have a priori relation. And even more precisely, this semantics also requires personality: *who*.

This is the second condition for one of the cases with subject expression in mental representation, which is equivalent to the first as the positions in the predicative relation are equivalent.

A second case of predictive expression of the subject is in non-verbal verbs, which are a specific mental product. This is not about an evaluation that always, besides being someone’s, is something that they are structuring a complex predicative through the copula *is*. It is about predicates whose content is an opportunity, a necessity: *can, must, need*. We clarify that the possibility is understood as a principle, not as a specific thing. The predicate semantics is the criterion that dictates the configurations. We consider the predicate semantics and predication as a categorical sign with a serious and decisive presence in the structure of the sentence, the compound predicate is accepted and agreed (see GEORGIEVA 2009, 71).

A situation is necessary for the subject, according to the subject and it is predicative expressed. Therefore, this predicative is the subject of the assessment; it itself produces the evaluation. The predicative and evaluation are the products of the subject. Its model is a sentence with a complicated predicate with a predicative unit: *It is necessary a meeting to be hold*.

May and *must* are impersonal because they are a subjective product but not its own position. Their semantics a priori is relative, i.e. predicative. They relate to something by predicate it. Therefore, their use is in a sentence with a complex predicative structure. The uses of *may* and *must* are predicatives of meaningful deficiency when they consist of one part – a word-sentence. Such sentences are inseparable, syncretic. The subject in such models is presented as a predication that

builds a sentence with a complex structured subject-predicate relation, occupying the position of the subject in the predicative contact.

In these sentences, there are two predicates – different as positions in a single predicative connection – one predicate is fundamental to predication, and it is the basis of predicative as a sign of communicative unit and the other expresses the subject.

I.e. the complex achievement of a predication is to fill the position of the subject or of the predicate by means of a predication rather than a nomination. Explaining the subject and the predicate with predications rather than nominations means a complex achievement of the predication of this sentence model – through a spiral, so to speak, from predications. This spiral, however, is always around a predicate as the core of the meaning of the sentence, as a kind of depth of the communicative unit.

The thesis is valid for models where the uses of mental predicates are presented with the following: *It is known that I think correctly and continuously on this issue; It is thought I understand you well; It is asked who tells the best fairy tales; Of course I speak well how it should be approached in such a case; It is known I understand that he's telling correctly what I've seen.*

Traditionally, grammar defines verb forms in a third person as being impersonal, and syntax as its component, qualifies complex structures as containing subordinate sentence. Such a qualification is analogous to subjective relation and content, because definitively syntax textbooks (most of them) explain that the subordinate sentence replaces the descriptive missing subject from the self-contained part. (An exception to traditionalism and a little bit of disregarding or inconsistency in respect of the content component in the language and its forms makes Y. Penchev (1993, 1998).

To qualify the subordinate predication as an unfilled subject position or with a subject content, is inaccurate.

First, it is inaccurate to include the verbs, meaning mental processes with the particle *se*, to the impersonal ones (see GEORGIEVA 2009, 86–87). It is paradoxical and even groundless, unknown how and why, to remove the category of personality of predicates that are undoubtedly inherent to the subject. The subject itself, and that is why it is a subject, can produce mentality. Mentality gives it the right to be a bearer of the language. Language is the means to prove its mentality. Everything attributed only to the subject is always implanted with subjectivity and always has the personality category, not just a person as a narrow grammatical characteristic. From no point of view, such a predicate cannot be measured with the third person parameter only. The third person parameter may belong to it, but always last, as a last potential. The tagged member of the paradigm, the invariant, conventionally speaking, is the first person. This is the position of the subject, as evidenced by the reflex *se*; this position is its real position. It is only its and it is impossible

for any other. An object (an essence), which a situation puts in the position of its conditional subject, is something different. Or, more specifically, the conditional, the secondary subjectivity is in a third person. Therefore, the third person is the position of the depersonalized predicates (impersonal verbs).

Second, the particle *se* (reflex, part of reflexive personal pronoun) has its semantic workload that model the predicates as reflexive even when their own semantics is not reflective or the result of reflection – move, go. Combined with its own reflexive predicates, such as the mental ones, it cannot and does not model their semantics, because its linguistic function is to substitute the subject itself as a self-producing, or it is a function of self-consciousness; *se* somehow is an autoreflexia, a substitute. Additionally added to predicates, whose semantics is mentality, *se* “catches” reflection, concentrates reflection, “radiates” reflection. The position of the third person does not model semantics because it is relative to the subject. The third person form is a function of the mental predicate with *se*. *It is known* means not only a third person, but another, and at the same time everyone else, without me and you, and everyone else. The meaning of *It is known* is commonality. I. e. the meaning is narrowly predicative. The implantation of *se* in the third person enhances reflexivity, which is both an undeniable subjectivity and an implicit unconditioning, as an emphasis on predicate semantics. Such a semantic structure with such an accent cannot bear the third person – *He knows/They know*, because the lack of *se* reduces reflexivity, the implanted subjectivity. *Se*-form is not impersonation, because the predicate semantics belongs to the person itself. The *se*-form as reflexive is the catalysing of subjectivity; a means to conceive mentality as a cognitive construct, essential and, of course, in its specific projection, but as content. This is a balancing of the constituents of mental representation.

Ideally, the predicate link scheme is a predicate-subject. However, this is a model, a structuring mechanism that is invariant and working; it is not possible to disintegrate. It is possible to inverse, but this means that it is possible to transform, we emphasize, a predicate-subject transformation. Inversion is not a baseline model; it is not an invariant. If a model is claimed to be predicate-subject, it must be possible to return to the original scheme, the classical, the actual subject-predicate. Reconstruction *To work with him, it is thought, (that) he works successfully, it is thought* is impossible. Here, the most compromised approach, and even the most tendentious, even with the counterparty, can be commented on either the inserting or the joining. Both these ways, together, prove the absence of a sentence with a complexly expressed subject – by predication, no matter what predicative structure it is. Insertion or joining is a polypredicative structure with a particular type of coordination that is not the subject of the study.

By way of comparison, the analyzed illustrations with a predicative-expressed subject are presented with a variation of the predicative scheme without changing the meaning and without questioning the model.

Applying the cognitive approach proves that the impersonality of the predicates cannot be grammatically categorized without regarding to the subjectivity (personality) and to the semantics of the predicate. I.e. shape shifting and any formal unification or analogy are ineligible. Totally isomorphic this thesis refers to the criterion differentiation of subjective and predicate relations in the complex predicative of a sentence in which the left or right valence is filled with predications rather than nominations.

“Compound” is not synonymous to a lineage of predications, but rather an invariant of the composition of the sentence structure – subject and predicate in which the subject or predicate is expressed by predications rather than nominations. The model of thought is a subject – predicate, and that is an axiom. In other cases, there is a linearity of such models, i.e. these are polypredicative constructs with the coordination or subordination of elements of linearity from patterns. The syntax has one basic unit – a sentence. The elements of the subject-predicate structure can be expressed both with nominations and with predications, and this means a simple sentence and a sentence with a complex predicative structure. In all other cases where elements of the composition and not the structure of the sentence – it is one and only one – are pronounced with predications, we talk about polypredicative constructions (with objectivity, attributory or deterministic – in variations) and not for types of sentences. Relations are type, not sentences.

The links between relatively self-contained as structure and semantic predicative units cannot be an etymon for a sentence nomenclature. This paradigm subordinate to the sentence paradigm, not to another, equivalent to it. And last but not least, the relation and the means for its expression are not signs of the sentence to serve its qualification and classification. The paradigm of the sentence is based on its features by definition. Nothing else, nothing more than that.

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