THE ROLE OF Z. Z. STRÁNSKÝ IN PRESENT-DAY MUSEOLOGY

JAN DOLÁK

ABSTRACT/ABSTRAKT:
The demise of significant Czech museologist, associate professor Zbyněk Zbyslav Stránský, raised interest in his work and in its competent evaluation. The authors of individual texts mostly agree with each other in their opinions, but sometimes they have different views, which is understandable. However, several opinions clearly show that their authors misunderstood some of Stránský’s fundamental postulates. This text analyses the international discourse and comments on disputable statements. It explains, extends and critically evaluates the concept by Stránský, and thereby shifts the whole studied problem to a higher level.

KEYWORDS/KLÍČOVÁ SLOVA:

The demise of significant Czech museologist, associate professor Zbyněk Zbyslav Stránský (26 October 1926 – 21 January 2016), raised an international interest in his work and in its competent evaluation. One entire issue of the Brno journal Museologica Brunensia (2/2016) was devoted to the personality of Stránský, and ICOFOM issued in Paris a whole collected volume Stránský: uma ponte Brno – Brasil for the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UNIRIO). Stránský is particularly often mentioned in the collective monograph A History of Museology, which also was published in Paris and was edited by Bruno Brulon Soares. A series of obituaries, texts and personal memories appeared in print. A brief anthology of Stránský’s texts was published in French by François Mairesse – Zbyněk Z. Stránský et la muséologie: Une anthologie (French Edition), with a foreword by Bernard Deloche. The authors of all these works count among recognised prominent members of the international museological community. They agree with each other in many of their comments, but sometimes they have different opinions, which is understandable. In some cases we can find certain misunderstandings or small mistakes in these texts. Therefore I consider it necessary to analyse the previous discourse, summarize the knowledge and thereby shift the whole studied problem to a higher level. In the core of this text I am dealing with reasons for the rejection of Stránský’s concept rather than with its acceptance.

Most authors indeed consider Z. Z. Stránský a significant world-renowned museologist and they accept his approaches with major or minor reservations, in the most cases only partially. General accordance exists that his ideas significantly influenced museology in former Eastern Bloc, inclusive of Yugoslavia. His concept penetrated on a limited scale to Asia and only a bit also to Africa. However, we could also mention Scandinavia or other countries. Stránský’s influence was relatively distinct in Switzerland (Martin Schärer), in West Germany and Austria, above all due to works of professor Friedrich Waidacher1

1 Waidacher’s Handbuch der allgemeinen Museologie was translated into Slovak, Chinese, Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Hungarian, which undoubtedly considerably boosted the dissemination of Stránský’s approaches. Stránský, in my opinion, unfortunately spent too much time commenting on texts of his significant promoters (Waidacher, Schärer), who in fact were influential disseminators of his ideas, although they did it in their own style. Stránský’s review of the book Die Ausstellung. Theorie und Exempel by Schärer consists much empty and critical philosophising, but the reader learns in fact nothing about the content of this book, which, in my opinion, is a very good piece of writing. STRÁNSKÝ, Zbyněk Zbyslav. Schärer, Martin R. Die Ausstellung: Theorie und Exempel. Museologica Brunensia, 2012, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 39–40.
from Graz and activity of publisher Christian Müller-Straten from Munich. Stránský’s influence in French-speaking countries (André Desvallées, Bernard Deloche) and in Spain (J. Pedro Lorente) was rather ambivalent. Quite positive was the response to Stránský in Latin America. We can name for example professor Anaildo B. Freitas from Rio de Janeiro, who even defended a doctoral thesis dedicated directly to the personality of Z. Z. Stránský. Stránský’s influence in English-speaking world was negligible. Museologists from these countries were familiar with his ideas but they mostly did not accept them (Patrick Boylan, Gaynor Kavanagh,2 Susan Pearce and others).3

Zbyněk Z. Stránský was one the leading figures in museological thinking which began to form in Central Europe since about the mid-1960s, with significant contribution of experts from Latin America but also from other parts of the world. I will designate this “school” as “Central European”, fully conscious of some inaccuracy of this term. At that time, the Moravian Museum in Brno was directed by Jan Jelínek – a visionary, who knew very well that museums must get rid of daily routine and be able to look not only “into the showcase” but also “above the showcase”. He felt the need to apply general methods of work in museums. To make his ideas a reality, he found the academic researcher Z. Z. Stránský who established museology as a university subject and began to maintain appropriate domestic and international contacts.4 Stránský’s museology thus acquired a fundamental “genetic” defect. It arose “from below”, in contrast to the other sciences. When geologists found animal fossils, they recognised the necessity of establishing palaeontology. The initial broadly conceived research into human past resulted in specialisation and emergence of archaeology, ethnology etc. Historians cannot do without an at least partial knowledge of ethnology or archaeology. But which representative of present-day social or natural sciences needs the results of museological research in his/her scientific work? Stránský’s museology exhibited a sort of “insularity”; in Czechoslovakia it was totally unconnected with culturology or cultural anthropology, which led to its frequent non-acceptance or to opinions that it should only serve as a sort of training for museum workers. Stránský’s museology has not been “daughter” of some other scientific discipline.

Stránský’s ideas gradually became more known and more accepted within ICOFOM. The 1980 ICOM General Conference in Mexico was partly devoted to “the systematic and the theory of systems in museology”. In the early 1990s, ICOFOM formulated its mission: “establishing museology as a scientific discipline”.5 Nevertheless, it must be remarked that ICOFOM was by far not ideologically heterogeneous and its influence was not omnipresent. Many influential and frequently cited museologists did not search for the scholarly foundations of museology, did not participate in the activities of ICOFOM and did not use its production. This second “non-ICOFOM” stream, in my opinion, is dominant today.

Well, what is the present view on the work of Z. Z. Stránský like? Professor Peter van Mensch, who took an active part in the Brno Summer School of Museology (JSSOM) even before the fall of the Iron Curtain, has probably rightly been considered the major expert in “eastern” museology. Still before Stránský’s demise he correctly wrote that unlike the concept of musealisation, Stránský’s concept of museality was not widely accepted.6 We can add that the term musealisation became known due to Western European thinkers (e. g. Hermann Lübke) rather than by Stránský’s effort. Stránský himself did not contradict this statement, either. Van Mensch shifted the term “muzeality” into the history of museology,7 claiming that it would only be suitable for a breakfast talk, moreover, one with a touch of nostalgia.8 The significant Dutch museologist bases his rejection on a never published lecture held by Stránský in Leiden in 1986, which I consider insufficient from a methodical perspective, and on Stránský’s text for the Summer School of Museology in 1995.10

---

3 Peter van Mensch names correctly a British book, which in the passages about “museum theory” mentions only English written sources, while the “museum theory” began for the authors only with the publishing of the book Peter Vergo – New Museology in 1989. See MENSCH, Peter van. Metamuseological challenges in the work of Zbyněk Stránský. Museologica Brunensia, 2016, vol. 5, no. 2, p. 23. It might be a display of cultural arrogance or only a “democratisation of geniality” (a concept by the contemporary Czech philosopher Václav Bělohradský), i.e. a display of present self-confidence of many authors, who are writing anytime about anything.
4 Speaking of this, we could ask the question how many visionaries lead the world museums today.
5 The 1989–1993 President of ICOFOM was Peter van Mensch.
Van Mensch wrote that the words “authentic”, “truth” and “eternal” were accepted neither in the West nor in socialist countries. In the following part of the text he then writes that the words “truth” and “eternal” do not belong to the vocabulary of present-day museologists who do not strive for “right decisions”, knowing that the heritage values are socially constructed and situational. The definition of heritage, according to van Mensch, is regarded as a collective participative enterprise, not as a museological scientific work.

Where does the fundamental misunderstanding stem from? I think that the word “authentic” should not generate any major problems. In time periods, which are studied for example by palaeontology, we do not know any objects other than authentic evidence (stones, sediments or fossils). What else might be more authentic or more true? The example of palaeontology also applies to other types of museum objects.

And what about “eternal truths”? In the cited work for the Summer School of Museology, Stránský used the word eternal in quotation marks. In his 2005 monograph Archeologie a muzeologie, I found the term “eternal truths” only one time and it was put in quotation marks. The word truth itself (if I do not consider the quotes by other authors) was used only one time: “Museum exhibitions represent a specific visual form of communication, which addresses the society with an important message. Its importance consists in the fact that it mostly deals with authentic evidence bearing the testimony of truth, in contrast to the predominant forms of non-authentic virtual communication.” The discussion about various concepts of truth in contemporary philosophy goes beyond the scope of this text, but if we use the conception of J. Świecimski, then the object is “true” by itself, regardless of whether we interpret it correctly or not. The object itself is not interpretation. Through his life, Stránský used terms like “authentic evidence of reality” (undoubtedly correct), which has some lasting value. The term “lasting value” is presently widely used e. g. with UNESCO documents. Peter van Mensch is therefore absolutely right when he claims that the words “eternal” and “truth” do not belong to the vocabulary of present-day philosophers. However, they also never belonged to the vocabulary of Z. Z. Stránský.

Peter van Mensch prefers, with reference to Australian approaches, the term “significance” over the term “value”. Other authors write about the “quality of an object”, which I do not consider fundamental. However, we can accept the criticism of values from the perspective of phenomenology. Evaluation can be safely proved, but the values themselves prove to be something secondary, something like the “evaluation sediments”, as the significant Czech philosopher Jan Patočka says. People permanently evaluate something, they have direct experience with this process, but with the concept of a value they in fact additionally try to explain why they prefer something over something else. We often speak about values, but when we want to describe them, we must return to evaluation and define them by circle. Values thus determine our evaluation. Patočka writes that sensory perception gives us the “life-relation of objects” instead of “quality”. This philosophical approach is based on the acts of evaluation rather than on predefined values. A collection object would thus also result from the acts of evaluation rather than from predefined values. This premise, in my opinion, does not cast any fundamental doubt upon Stránský’s conception and it could also comply with the concept by Peter van Mensch.

We can safely prove that for millennia, humans surround themselves with objects of cultural, not utilitarian significance. Why not term this significance (value, result of evaluation) museality and why not term the identification, selection and thesauration of these values (significances) musealisation?

Although Stránský gradually particularised his concept of museality, he never believed that an object per se has some value. Each evaluation process is always exclusively connected with human activity and the scale of values is inevitably influenced by individual or collective approaches, which are changing more or less frequently. Stránský’s museality is not a concept but merely a “name for something”. Humans thus take out objects from the universe e. g. for scientific or aesthetical reasons,
for reason of personal experience associated with these objects, etc. Stránský called this evaluation of objects by humans “museality”. It is therefore a summarising term, a superior concept from the terminological perspective. Nothing less, but also nothing more. It is hard to expect that this term will evolve somehow, as Stránský is blamed for by several museologists. Mere study of museality of course cannot be subject of an independent science. I believe that the concept of museality should be studied from other perspectives than many museologists do. Museality of an object cannot be simplified to the statement “has” or “has not”. Each and every object has some degree of museality. However, a museologist, or rather museum worker, is working with objects which bear the most distinct museality at a given moment. A museologist in the process of selection mostly does not recognise museality or its extent. A museologist on an archaeological or palaeontological site has not the slightest idea what is more and what is less valuable. When a museologist examines a photo of a significant statesman and tries to find out whether it is ordinary or valuable, he does not apply museological methods but methods of historical research. The same is true of any object on the shelf in a depository – a specialist must tell the museologist what is more valuable, more significant, and what is not. Nevertheless, this does not reject museology as such because museology is a final discipline. A political scientist is no profound expert in history, but he cannot do without this knowledge when he constructs the theories of political systems, parties etc. An ecologist is no profound expert in beetles or vertebrates, but on the basis of knowledge from other disciplines he studies the relationships between animals and plants and their environment. Therefore I also regard museology as a “relationship” discipline, dealing above all with the relationships of people to objects. The considered creation of a thesaurus is an exclusively museological activity and its transfer into the sphere of specialised sciences employed in museums or into the mere “participatory level of society” would be quite foolish. If a curator of some national technical museum (professional – not participant!) would collect only passenger cars and no lorries he would not be amateur from the perspective of technical sciences, but from the viewpoint of museology. Such approach can be applied by a private collector, but not by a museum professional who strives to document and present the “world of production and use of cars” in the given country. I do not cast doubt upon positive and sometimes required participatory methods, but they must inevitably be limited somehow (by somebody). Absolutisation of these approaches would unavoidably lead to distinct weakening of sciences employed in museums. Stránský liked to give an example, where a shop with complete original equipment from before the WW2 was discovered in Brno. The selection-making ethnologist took a tool for slicing cabbage and the art historian took a decorative signboard hanging above the counter. Both objects should have been added to museum collections. Stránský, unlike the others, suggested to take the whole shop and add it to museum collections. In this case again, Stránský (from the museological perspective) did not pay attention to values of individual objects in this shop. They were quite worthless from the viewpoint of ethnology or history of art. However, Stránský recognised that the shop equipment is of a unique significance as a whole and that it is an authentic piece of evidence in optimal position for being communicated. This is the role of a museologist within the primary museum selection.

I see a well-built museum collection as a system, more precisely as a structure, which is similar to language. It must be continuously evaluated; in other words, it is necessary to find out whether or not particular objects belong to the collection. For these processes I use the term secondary selection. We can say that a well-structured collection “shouts”: Here is an empty place. Or, vice versa: Here is an overabundance of something. We surely would find many other reasons for the necessity of museological thinking in the process of selection, but it seems as if Stránský in his texts and performances gave precedence to museology over specialised disciplines in the process of selection. “The qualities which change a normal object into a museum item can only be identified with the use of methods specific to museology.” This ambitiousness often led to lack of understanding among the branch specialists and their non-acceptance and rejection of museology.

Peter van Mensch finished his contribution in Museologica Brunensia with a sigh that Stránský wasted a lot of energy proving that museology is a science. A simple question arises in this regard: And what else should he have been occupied with? Should universities be engaged in science or should they only turn into a training centre for practice?

---

18 The example is taken from a Czech museum.


The influence of Stránský on Latin America, which is said to have risen after 1989, is competently evaluated by Professor Tereza Scheiner from Rio de Janeiro. She correctly remarks that his approaches were used by several authors to defend the positions of the so-called new museology or sociomuseology, with which Stránský’s ideas were not “directly linked”. Scheiner states that Stránský was influenced by phenomenology and partly also by dialectical materialism. We can add that Stránský sometimes mentioned the works by M. Heidegger on a general level, but he based himself minimally on E. Husserl, J. Patocka, R. Ingarden etc. Stránský used “phenomenon” in a general sense of the word, but not in terms of phenomenology. Tereza Scheiner also notices minute differences in the concept of museality by Stránský and by Gregorová. “In Gregorová, it is a specific relation between man and reality, in Stránský, it is a specific relation of man to reality (our emphasis).” I believe that neither Anna Gregorová nor the translators of her article into English and French have considered these differences.

The influence of Stránský on Spanish museology has been studied by Francisca Hernández and J. Pedro Lorente, the influence on Russian museology then by Anna Leshchenko and Maria Gubarenko.

A well-founded overview of acceptance, but also non-acceptance and misunderstanding of Stránský’s ideas is offered by Professor Markus Walz from Leipzig. The accordances and differences in the approaches of Stránský and Waidacher are addressed by Bernadette Biedermann. The article from this recognised Austrian museologist is a little unclear in the following passage: “As he (Stránský) argues, it corresponds to the epistemological basis of a ‘scientific discipline’ which has not yet been falsified.” Biedermann refers thereby to a work of authors from the French-speaking area, in which, however, I found neither the word falsification nor the name of Karl Popper. Biedermann also writes that “Taking into account K. R. Popper’s scientific epistemology of falsification Stránský concluded that, in an academic discipline, neither the museum nor the museum objects could be object of investigation in museology,” and that Stránský studied Popper’s works for the first time in a private library of his friend Friedrich Waidacher. The truth is that Stránský personally met Waidacher for the first time in 1980, but the premise that the museum is not the object of museology was already pronounced by him in 1965 at the latest, when he did not yet know the works by Waidacher and Popper.

Biedermann also claims: “Without required logical falsification of Stránský’s theories, which would be necessary in recourse to K. Popper, the assumption that the knowledge system developed by Stránský does not meet the requirements of an academic discipline remains an unverified thesis.”

Now we leave aside the fundamental difference between Popper’s falsification and the (un)verified thesis. I have already dealt with the analysis of critical attitudes of many philosophers (e.g. O. Neurath, T. S. Kuhn, P. Feyerabend, J. Heft, Z. Neubauer) to Karl Popper’s approaches, therefore we will cite only the Czech philosophy professor Břetislav Horyna: “In social and cultural sciences and in humanities, whose structure is more or less narrative, the seemingly absolutely rational requirement for falsification can only hardly be applied. The theories emerging in this type of sciences can only be determined by language, because historical events, social phenomena or literary stories cannot be adequately communicated with the help of mathematical or logical formulas. The efforts for a ‘rigid science’, which are expressed by implementing the methods of exact sciences in humanities with the aim to raise the semblance of higher science, usually result in formulation of empty scientistic or technicistic ideals.” The main

---


22 Ibidem, p. 85.


35 HORYNA, Břetislav. Teorie vědy. Úvodní poznámky. In HORYNA, Břetislav and Josef KROB...
The museologist Hildegard Vieregg from Munich wrote that Prague and Brno had created museology “on a socialistic (Marxist-Leninist) source”. She also remarks that it is not clear on which philosophic foundations Stránský has proceeded. She mentions the influence of Morris and Schopenhauer, which should be explained in more detail. Anyway, only few philosophical systems were so far away from Marxism like the irrationalism and pessimism of Arthur Schopenhauer. We can add that Stránský was educated at the university by people who were not affected by Marxism, so that he did not know it in depth. Stránský formulated his opinions by his own, we might say a philosophical, way and used various ideas, partly also ecletic, which were suitable for justification of his approaches. Mainly at the end of his scholarly career, he wrote and lectured with pleasure about his approaches. Mainly at the end of his scholarly career, he wrote and lectured with pleasure about his approaches. It is true that Stránský did not succeed in falsifying his theories, but at the same time we must add that he never tried to do so and it also would not be possible.

In associate professor Stránský we can observe a significant shift in his theoretical thinking. First he tried to sharply define and establish museology as an independent science, to separate it within humanities. Late in life, on the contrary, he even tended to some kind of cognitive science, interconnecting various disciplines into a single science studying the cognitive processes. He searched the way almost as far as to the “Theory of Everything” or the “Final Theory”, in which museology would play a significant or even leading role, something like deus ex machine. Most of the other theoreticians proceeded in opposite direction, that is from theory of the discipline towards solving the practical problems.

Stránský verbally criticised the sloppy work in science and he did not admire movements like New Age, but some changes had impact on him. He often referred to the theory of memes, to Rupert Sheldrake, Susan Blackmore, sympathized with the so-called alternative museology of his wife Edita Stránská, etc. Stránský frequently brought these authors together in a sort of mixture, which a less knowledgeable reader might have perceived as highly theoretical, but in fact, it was rather eclectic. According to Mairesse, “his speeches sometimes appeared like a kind of shamanistic experience enhanced by secret formulas.” Vladimír Podborský also believes that the use of a strange “metalanguage” was one of the reasons why Stránský was not accepted by the Czech academic community.

A specific view is offered by the museologist Bruno Brulon Soares from Rio de Janeiro. He considers the approaches of Stránský as a “zero point” within the systematic thinking in museology, but casts doubt upon museality as a “relationship of man to reality”. According to Soares, it is a wrong separation of man from reality and a prerequisite to existence of material reality, which is separated from society. These are two sociological mistakes, which we should avoid in museology, Soares says. Museology should concentrate on a wide spectrum of associations between various agents rather than on the study of

---

38 The word paradigm became almost a magic formula for him, he regarded the state of affairs in nature and society as an existential crisis.
40 Ibidem, p. 18.
41 A term by the British science theorist Mark McCutcheon. I remark that each science, if it indeed was a science, must have been cognitive since the earliest origins already.
42 The term “deus ex machina” was borrowed by Stránský from theatre studies, where it signifies a suddenly appearing, unexpected solution.
of relations. Soares claims that the breach between a subject and object is fabricated by a particular appropriation of reality, and with reference to Victor Turner he writes about the “museum performance”. Cultural performances are thus always connected with real events, but they are rather “magical mirrors of social reality”. It means that they are not reflective but reflexive, and this statement is well acceptable. Soares does not perceive museums as the object of museology, either. He accepts to a considerable extent Stránský’s meta theoretical approaches and finds the way, evidently under the influence of P. Bourdieu, in the so-called reflexive museology. According to Soares, Stránský was limited by the western perception of the “man-reality” relationship.

In his division of museology into normative, theoretical and reflexive, Soares counts Stránský among leading figures in normative museology and among structuralists. In this he is right when we understand structuralism as the opposite to analytic approaches. Structuralism thus turns the attention from analytical examination of individual elements and components (mainly language) to the study of their mutual relations and roles within the whole system. Stránský often cited the significant Czech structuralist Jan Mukařovský.

It is necessary to remind that Stránský always wanted to establish museology as a normal science, that is “museology without attributes”. On the whole, it is logical because we also speak first of archaeology, history or ethnology and only subsequently we specify these names by adjectives, such as processual, prehistoric or aerial archaeology.

The prominent French museologist François Mairesse concisely writes that today’s museology is not perceived as the “idea of the discipline but rather a field of research and practices, as developed in the Anglo-Saxon logic (e.g. Leicester in UK) that dominates”. Here I see the fundamental problem: there is as good as no interest in Stránský’s and his theories but it does not mean that the development goes the right way.

**Criticism of Stránský from the viewpoint of philosophy**

The critics of Stránský have undoubtedly based themselves on their own knowledge, including their possible education in philosophy, sociology, anthropology etc. Detailed description of all concepts goes beyond the scope of this text. However, Stránský also had a loud critic in the so-called “socialist camp”, namely Wojciech Gluziński (1922–2017) from Poland, who has been considered, side by side with Stránský, the most significant philosophising museologist in Central Europe. Gluziński devoted the major part of his fundamental work *U podstaw muzeologii* to the critical analysis of Stránský’s conception, which he reproaches for a low theoretical level and ahistoricism. Nevertheless, Gluziński disliked most the concept of museality, claiming that museology as a science of museality would be a science of fiction. Gluziński asks whether this theoretical concept is also subordinate to observation concepts and whether the whole construction of museality is perhaps not an empty name and he blames Stránský for a lack of observation. Evident here is the influence of Rudolf Carnap. It is also worth mentioning that Carnap gradually mitigated his radical statements, whereas Gluziński worked with his 1935 book *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*, that is with early (and very radical) Carnap. While Carnap strived for a unified language of all sciences the neo-Kantian philosophers, for example Heinrich Rickert, based themselves on the idea of a fundamental difference between natural and so-called spiritual sciences, with which we are more familiar in terminological regard. Gluziński does not accept the three elements of museology by Stránský: theory of selection, thesauration and presentation, and emphasizes only two main aspects (components) of museology – materialisation of the world (in fact selection) and communication, which I respect. The middle function, inserted by Stránský – thesauration – does not play any significant role from a theoretical point of view. Stránský rightly reminds that in this phase the collection objects enter new relationships, build up a collection, and we can see whether or not they belong to one another. However, in fact it is still a selective process, something that I term “second selection”. The other activities

---

48 François Mairesse also writes in this regard that the communication science exists but “mobilephonology” does not. MAIRESES, François. What is Zbyněk Z. Stránský’s “influence” on museology? *Museologia Brunensia*, 2016, vol. 5, no. 2, p. 28.

49 It would be worth mentioning what Soares understands under the term “non-western perception” and what he himself accepts from this concept.


52 GLUZIŃSKI, Wojciech. *U podstaw muzeologii*. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1980. 451 p. The book was published and distributed under the declared state of emergency in Poland. It is hardly accessible in libraries, even those in Poland. It is often mentioned but only rarely cited in museological literature. It was never translated and I believe that due to its complicated philosophic language it was read by very few foreign museologists, including the native Slavic-speaking colleagues. It is worth mentioning that the book contains not a single reference to classics of Marxism, but many references to philosophers of the “Vienna Circle” or to Umberto Eco.

within thesauration (recording, storage, conservation, etc.) have museographic rather than truly museological relevance. Interesting is that Stránský never entered into a serious dispute with Gluziński. Perhaps he did not want to weaken the position of “his” museology or he even did not dare to begin a controversy with the erudite Pole. When we compare the approaches of both these leading figures in Central European museology, we must say that they represent one and the same stream of museological thinking. Both of them reject museum as an instrumentally organisational, technical component (facility), as the object of museology studies. Gluziński sees the object of museology in a museum as an (unchanging) abstraction. According to Gluziński, museum is a “material objectification of consciousness”. I tightly believe that between the “material objectification of consciousness” (Gluziński) and a “museality-bearing object” (Stránský) we can almost put an equality sign.

**Museology influenced by Marxism?**

One of the reasons for non-acceptance of Stránský’s ideas has taken place on the background of a politically divided world. Stránský was sometimes considered a representative of Marxism in social sciences. His museology was regarded as a system of rigid rules, as something that restrains freedom in the free world. One of the loud critics of Stránský was George Ellis Burcaw, who criticised the so-called “lexicon of Brno” from the viewpoint of terminology. All English terms that were unknown to this American were thus automatically considered incorrect by him. Burcaw rejects museology of the Eastern Bloc and considers it a “fictitious problem generated by those who love theorising”. Burcaw shows a very sceptical attitude towards documentation of the present outside of Sweden and of countries of the Eastern Bloc. He further writes: “Whether or not museology is considered a science, it has little significance beyond the scope of materialistic philosophy and maybe also beyond the political systems which are based on this philosophy.” However, Burcaw sympathetically pleads in favour of the worldwide unified “one general profession and one general museology”. Stránský surely would agree, the same way as André Desvalleès, who writes that “in the committee of museology, it could only exist one single museology, neither old nor new”. It is evident that all three prominent museologists regarded the unified museology as something totally different. In his 1992 doctoral theses, van Mensch defines three “schools of thought”:

1. The Marxist-Leninist, in which the museum is an ideological instrument;
2. New museology, which is dissatisfied with museum praxis and seeks a way out in the Heritage as a whole;
3. Critical museology, which poses questions and then seeks adequate answers for them.

Van Mensch also writes later that after the break-up of the Eastern Bloc, “museology inspired by Marxism-Leninism lost much of its credibility”.

I wrote about the so-called “new museology” and “critical museology” recently, therefore I will concentrate now on the so-called “Marxist-Leninist” museology. Peter van Mensch is right when he says that museums in the Eastern Bloc were part of the ideological apparatus of the political regime. The description of several events (“Great October Socialist Revolution”) or personalities (V. I. Lenin) was a mere credo, a confession of faith. Permanent exhibitions, for example those focused on the Middle Ages, were far less affected by ideology, and the exhibitions devoted to nature or technology almost completely lacked this aspect. However, the selection of topics of museum activity and their presentation, the decision about what good and what bad happened in the past absolutely does not correspond to theoretical postulates of museology. To put it in simple words: museology is not the study of museum practice, although we must admit that it would be difficult to find any clear dividing line between these terms.

What is in fact Marxism? It is an ideological system based on class struggles, rigid materialism and atheism. Marx was one of the first who criticised some of the older, quite optimistic opinions, e. g. those of the late 18th century French philosophers. His “destructive” approaches thus cannot be completely rejected. Marx’s “constructive” approaches, on the other hand, were entirely misleading. His intentional system leading to classless society, whose

---

existence was determined by the slogan “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”, is an eschatology and a sort of religion. But Stránský never wrote about such things. Stránský was not Marxist, which he defended e.g. on the pages of Museum Aktuell. We find a collected volume edited by Stránský, which begins with a quote by V. I. Lenin, but the content of the collected volume has nothing in common with Marxism. In his 1984 university textbook Stránský cites a treatise by V. I. Lenin: “a glass beaker is not only a glass cylinder and drinking vessel, but it has other countless properties, qualities, aspects, mutual relations etc.”. We can only hardly find any arguments against this statement. Until 1989, Stránský surely had to manoeuvre between the Possible and the Allowed by official authorities. He never forgot to cite other museologists from the so-called socialist camp. The loudest among them was Klaus Schreiner from East Germany. At that time he was in fact right when he claimed that Stránský’s concept was affected by “bourgeois idealistic values”. If we would use the then Marxist-Leninist terminology, dividing all philosophical streams into materialistic and idealistic and subsequently into agnostic and Gnostic, Stránský undoubtedly would be an idealist. His constantly floating values (museality) are not materialistic, but he was Gnostic rather than agnostic. Fundamental problems of acceptance or non-acceptance of Stránský’s approaches thus did not take place on the Marxism – non-Marxism line. They took place in different thinking concepts.

Museology in captivity of modernism and postmodernism

Approximately since the beginning of the 1970s we have experienced here the emergence of a new way of thinking and world perception, which J. F. Lyotard named postmodernism. Science in West Europe and North America launched a new direction. Great narratives began to be doubted (first the world religions, later also other issues), minority votes were preferred, repeated deconstruction was demanded, former colonialists began to ease their bad conscience and former colonies began to claim their real as well as their putative rights. The high-developed world searched for differences rather than for accordance, which we can see in our everyday life as a limitless admiration of everything different, as an unbounded desire for (proclaimed?) otherness. The stream of museological thinking, which I not very exactly call “Central European”, encountered a totally different way of thinking and totally different concept of science. When we use a comparison with literature, then we can say that until the 1990s, Stránský represented Enlightenment and classicism. The present-day museological production is for the most part romantic, putting emphasis on individualism, experience and fantasy.

Major part of the world was concerned about a low impact of museums on the public and reacted to socio-political changes after 1960 by development of the so-called “new museums”, accentuating the social functions of museums. This concept was in most cases successful and brought new knowledge to museology. This knowledge, however, did not disprove the “old” or “traditional” postulates, it only extended museology. This opinion is by far not new; it was always advocated by both Stránský and Waidacher. If we accept the widespread opinion on the onset of “new museums”, then we can say with only a small exaggeration that “new museology” was never established. The collapse of the Soviet Bloc occurred in a period when several significant figures in museology passed away (Razgon 1989, Rüssio 1990, Schreiner 1990, Mikhailovskay 1992) or went gradually into retirement. Stránský successfully defended his post at the university, but he was “old,
A widespread opinion exists that many sciences were at least partly plunged into a crisis since about the 1970s. Museology would in this regard indeed be one of the “leading sciences”. The truly scientific methods – deduction, induction, abduction, experimental research etc. – are applied only rarely in museology. The unbounded desire of most museologists for “novelty” and “originality for any price” results in accumulation of words, not ideas. I would call the vast majority of present-day museological production by the term “impressionology”.

It must be emphasized that Stránský never pursued “rigid rules” in the topics of the museum discourse. He did not deal with the question of whether the museums should prefer a bug, locomotive, history of World War II or gender problems. Stránský tried to weave a net, which is then thrown on a problem and it has to function, no matter what we put into the mesh – a bug, feminism or a locomotive. However, weaving such a net is little interesting today, even though the situation already begins to change. Stránský strived to grasp the fundamental principles of museology, which then must be (almost) identical all over the world. Following the example of other sciences (e. g. sociology or philosophy) we probably might suppose the existence of “museologies of linguistic areas”, which Stránský would undoubtedly agree with. Anglophone museology, influenced by pragmatism, thus prefers the solution of practical questions, Francophone museology, on the other hand, is focused on different issues. An interesting reflection comes from the museologist Milan Popadić from Belgrade, who casts doubt even upon the subtitle of the fundamental work by Maroeević – his book Introduction to Museology: the European Approach. Popadić asks whether something like European approach exists at all. As if the iron curtain between the eastern (theoretical) and western (practical) museology also existed in contemporary research.

Stránský: to follow or not?

I base myself on the idea that the science called culturology is dealing with general problems of human culture. This research also comprises study of museum culture, which is the domain of museology. Museology thus studies museum culture in both synchronic and diachronic aspects, its creation and use. Museum culture has never been connected only with the organisation (institution) which is called museum.

The present dispute is not about whether we adopt a major or minor part from Stránský’s concept. It does not consist in endless arguments about whether a museum object has a value, significance or quality. Museology cannot be stuck in never-ending epistemological self-definitions and methodological manifestations. The calling for a clearly unified terminology throughout the world is in vain. Let us talk about the general direction of museology. In other words, let us decide whether we will foster museology as a theoretical study on general principles of museum culture, or whether we will veer towards the “saving practicality”. Gluziński is right in claiming that an error is made when we think that a theory which serves the practice should be the theory of practice. It means that the best theory for practice is not the theory of practice! The “theory of practice” cannot stimulate progress. Gluziński adds: “the stagnation of productive practices transferred by means of such types of knowledge from generation to generation is well known in history”. Museology thus does not have pretensions to replace anything or anybody. We absolutely do not pursue the removal of museum specialists and their replacement by “omniscient” museologists. Museology is an “added value” for the museum worker or for the employee of a memory institution. Nothing more, but also nothing less. Stránský never saw any eternal truth in museum objects, which means that museality does not represent their fixed quality. Quite the opposite. Values are changing and they are given to objects by people or by human society, respectively. The collections thus are not and will never be a mirror, but mere reflection of the history of society or nature. Then we can talk about the relationship of man to reality (Stránský), but maybe also about reflexivity (Soares) or about that “the discursive construction of heritage is itself part of the cultural and social practices that are heritage” (Smith).

So, what are the tasks of today’s museology? To finish the creation and then further develop the own theoretical foundations of the discipline. To examine the changing position of museums in contemporary society. To study

---


69 How is the unified terminology in today’s philosophy or sociology?


museum culture from a diachronic and synchronic perspective. To study the general principles of museum communication, including the use of the most modern technologies. To implement the research results of contemporary pedagogy and psychology in the museum practice, etc. Stránský’s conclusions can be beneficial for all of these areas. Nevertheless, museumology must get rid of the ballast which was brought to the discipline partly by Stránský himself (and by his contemporaries) late in life, but mainly by his successors. The compound production containing the word “museology” is immense. Even so immense that most of us are only surfing within, instead of embracing the whole extent of the problem. However, about 90 % of this production are dealing with museum practice and museums, not with museology. If somebody writes about museums and somebody else writes about museology (general problems of museum culture), then we do not put the authors in a position good – bad, but rather in a position different – different. About 5 % of the texts pretend museology. Such an author begins with a quotation of his favourite philosopher, the Germans do not forget Heidegger or Hegel, the authors from Romanic countries will prefer Foucault, Bourdieu, Latour or Derrida, the authors focused on art science will surely mention Crimp or Malraux. These authors will soon go over to a traditional “case study”, for example about an ecomuseum with four hundred buffaloes. These articles have a negligible theoretical level, moreover, they even can be destructive due to their misunderstanding of all philosophical correlations. In fact, only the remaining 5 % of all texts are indeed devoted to museology. There is no choice but to repeat the 1963 sigh of complaint by W. Glužiński: “No other specialised scientific discipline than museum study attracts so many wiseacres. It is the easier because where is a lack of exhausting scientific analysis and solid theoretical foundations, everybody finds an open space for unlimited creation of non always correct and usually absolutely baseless ideas.”\(^72\)

**REFERENCES:**


GLUZIŃSKI, Wojciech. Problemy współczesnego muzealnictwa. Roczniki Etnografii Śląskiej, 1963, no. 2, pp. 178–230. Most authors cite this source insufficiently (e. g. WAIDACHER, Friedrich. Handbuch der Allgemeinen Museologie. Wien: Böhlau, 1993, p. 728) and state inaccurately that the work was published in Warsaw instead of Wrocław. It is evident that somebody confused Wrocław (probably F. Waidacher) with Warsaw and the others no longer cited (read) the original article but only the transcription of a wrong reference in order to improve the image of their own article.

72 GLUZIŃSKI Wojciech. Problemy współczesnego muzealnictwa. Roczniki Etnografii Śląskiej, 1963, no. 2, pp. 178–230. Most authors cite this source insufficiently (e. g. WAIDACHER, Friedrich. *Handbuch der Allgemeinen Museologie*. Wien: Böhlau, 1993, p. 728) and state inaccurately that the work was published in Warsaw instead of Wrocław. It is evident that somebody confused Wrocław (probably F. Waidacher) with Warsaw and the others no longer cited (read) the original article but only the transcription of a wrong reference in order to improve the image of their own article.