Suárez's critique of inner sensual knowledge of Aquinas' conception
Source document: Studia philosophica. 2011, vol. 58, iss. 2, pp. -72
ISSN1803-7445 (print)2336-453X (online)
License: Not specified license
This paper mainly deals with Suárez's theory of inner sensual knowledge – one of the traditional issues in the works of Aristotle's disciples, but nowadays hardly reflected. The aim of this paper is also to show the reader how Francisco Suárez deals with the inner sensation problem in his commentary of Aristotle's De Anima, and also to demonstrate how Suárez criticizes the Aquinas' analysis of this problem and offers his own simpler solution. Suárez refuses any possibility of plurality of inner senses and also denies any possibility that inner senses can somehow reason about things as well as the intellect.