Article
| Title: | God, worship and freedom |
| Author: | |
| Source document: | Pro-Fil. 2021, vol. 22, iss. 2, pp. 45-55 |
| Extent: | 45-55 |
| ISSN: | 1212-9097 (online) |
| DOI: | 10.5817/pf21-2-2310 |
| Type: | Article (English) |
| Stable URL: | http://hdl.handle.net/11222.digilib/144824 |
| License: | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International |
PDF
Abstract(s):
In this article, the authors give an answer to the question of whether God would be worthy of worship had He created (or even permitted) a world where no human action was freely done. Presupposing God's omnibenevolence in applying the doctrine of no responsibility for actions not freely done, we consider two possible answers to the question of why God would create such a deterministic world. Whichever of these answers proved to be true, we conclude that God would be worthy of worship because He would provide the best outcome for everyone.
Keywords:
determinism; forknowledge; free will; incompatibilism; responsibility
Note:
Tvrtko Jolić is supported by the Croatian Science Foundation (Grant Number: HRZZ-UIP-2017-05-4308).
References:
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