The text focuses on Lem's rejection of the Chinese Room, a prominent challenge to the sufficiency of the Turing test. After outlining Lem's relationship to the Turing test, it offers an exposition of two of Lem's thought experiments, the Gramophone and the Jigsaw, whose critique is directly related to the critique of the Chinese Room. The text shows that Lem's key argument is to point out the computational naivety of the machines that feature in these experiments. The text concludes by presenting some of Lem's views on the nature of machine consciousness.
Lem; Searle; Chinese Room; artificial intelligence; thought experiment
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Psychologism and Behaviorism. The Philosophical Review, 90(1): 5–43. |
DOI 10.2307/2184371
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