

Havránek, Bohuslav

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The functional differentiation of the standard language

Bohuslav Havránek



Bohuslav Havránek (1893–1978), a Czech Slavicist and Bohemist, was a professor at Masaryk University in Brno (1934) and at Charles University in Prague (1945). He is best known for his work on the theory of standard language, language culture and comparative analysis of Slavic languages. Among his many publications, he co-authored a textbook on Czech grammar (1952, with A. Jedlička) and *Pravidla českého pravopisu* (1957, with F. Trávníček), which have been widely used to teach standard Czech at primary and secondary schools for decades. In 1935, he founded *Slovo a slovesnost*. The journal, established for the promotion of the study of the theory and culture of language, quickly became one of the most prestigious linguistics journals in the country.

This article is an English version of one of Havránek's classic texts, in which he makes a major contribution to general linguistics by setting out his theory of the standard language. The text clearly embodies the functionalism of the early Prague School scholars, for whom the primary principle for the classification and explanation of linguistic means is considered to be the purpose, i.e. the communicative function served by specific linguistic forms. Havránek's approach is likewise based on strictly functional criteria: after identifying the functions of the standard, he aligns them with 'functional dialects', i.e. systematic variations of language. In this treatise, he also discusses the concepts of intellectualization and automatization, which are helpful in understanding the specific role of the standard language.

In popular speech as well, the use (selection) of linguistic devices is in the concrete act of speech determined by the *purpose of the utterance*; it is directed towards the function of the act of speech. We can see a considerable difference in linguistic devices, according to whether it is, for instance, a matter-of-fact everyday communication or the occasional (solemn) recital of an event, or whether it is a conversation or the coherent recital of things remembered; also, whether it is a conversation among contemporaries or speech to children or to one's elders (cf., for instance, the immediate morphological differences in the use of grammatical person and number in terms of the person addressed), not to mention the lexical differences stemming from different occupations. In the standard language the linguistic devices are likewise determined in terms of the purpose served by the concrete act of speech, but with this difference: the functions of the standard language are more richly developed and more precisely differentiated; in folk speech (for a given community only, of course) practically all the means of expression are shared by everyone, whereas the standard language always will contain some linguistic devices not in general use.

I don't want to start here by enumerating schematically all the different functions of the standard language, but it should be made clear to everyone that the fields in which the standard language is used are more varied than is the case for folk speech and are, in part, such that the devices of folk speech simply are not adequate to serve them; its devices are, for instance, not adequate for purposes of a serious coherent presentation of epistemology or higher mathematics. On the other hand, in areas where folk speech is commonly used, the standard will serve more or less equally well. Utterances in folk speech can on the whole be assigned to the so-called *communicative* function, that is, they belong in the area of everyday communication; in the area of technical communication folk speech includes only some lexical areas, and at times may acquire an esthetic function. The area of *workaday technical* [odborné praktické] communication is almost entirely reserved to the standard language, and that of *scientific technical* communication, completely so; likewise, the regular foundation of *poetic language* is the standard.

In the *communicative function* proper to the domain of folk speech, even a member of a class which ordinarily uses the standard for speaking and writing may use a form of folk speech, such as the colloquial standard¹ or a local or class dialect, to the extent to which he knows how to speak it. But the standard can be used as well, usually in its so-called *conversational form*, that is, in the form used precisely in conversation only (the conversational functional dialect [funkční jazyk]). This conversational form is not, for Czech any more than for other languages, identical with the colloquial standard, although it shares some elements with it and often has some local coloration as well in spite of the fact that for Czech it is not very stable, and therefore has a rather variable scale of transition. The difference between the two is pointed up, among other things, by the conversational and social clichés included in the former which function almost as a mark of class. The difference between these and the clichés of folk speech is considerable, as shown, for instance, by greeting formulae, terms of address, and the like.² One would therefore be tempted to call this conversational form just another class dialect, but from that standpoint the standard as a whole is but a class dialect. We have spoken above about its exclusiveness in terms of class, different at different periods and in different nations: these social clichés are likewise a measure of its exclusiveness, or conversely, of its penetration into the broadest strata.

The *modes* and *situations* of the utterances are likewise more varied for the standard than they are for folk speech: folk speech is usually limited to oral communication and private conversation; the standard language, which is, of course, not excluded from utterances of the formed kind, then is usually made to serve for various kinds of public utterances and written communication.

The *functional and stylistic differentiation of language* is most conspicuously based on a utilization of its *lexical and syntactic* aspects, but *phonological and morphological* devices are used as well, though to a lesser extent. The latter are based primarily on variations in the phonological and morphological structure (the phonemic and morphological patterns), not counting the very clear-cut functional pronunciation styles treated in Weingart's paper. In terms of phonology and morphology, devices borrowed into the standard from another norm, especially from the norm of the popular colloquial standard (the vulgar layer which is, of course, also found in the lexicon),³ are often used for differential purposes: in phonological terms, cl., for instance, functionally different doublets such as *úřad — ouřad* [office], *rypat — rejpat* [dig; gripe], *čichnouti — čuchnout* [smell], and the like, or words such as *ouško* [ear, diminutive], *upejpat se* [be coy] and the like for which there is no equivalent in the standard; here also belongs the functional utilization of certain phoneme groupings such as /č/, /š/, followed by /u/, /ou/ *čuměti* [gape], *šfourati* [poke], and the like,⁴ which are uncommon in the standard, on the phonemic side, and such doublets as *tlučte, a bude vám otevřeno* [knock, and it will be opened for you] versus *netlučte tolik* [don't make so much noise], or the endings *-i* versus *-u* for the 1st p. sg. for verbs such as *káži, češi piji*, versus *kážu, češu, pijú* [I preach, comb, drink], and the like, on the morphological side.

Utilized also are such formal and, in part, syntactic doublets as arise in the norm of the standard as well as in the norm of folk speech, from the fact of the coexistence in them, in some respects, of an older and a newer stratum. Thus, a possible genitive instead of an accusative after a negative verb, or doublets of the type *béře* — *bere* [he takes], and the like, can be used for functional differentiation where one form is clearly archaic or bookish in the language. Stylistic variety, that is, avoidance of tedious repetition of the same form, as well as different rhythmic effects, can, for instance, be achieved by using the two forms of the infinitive ending, *-ti* and *-t*, doublets which are otherwise interchangeable in the standard.

These various devices, primarily lexical and syntactic, of functional and stylistic differentiation do not, however, consist merely of an *inventory of different words or grammatical forms*, but also of *different modes of utilization of the devices of the language or their special adaptation* to the different purposes of the standard language.

The major modes of this special utilization of the devices of the language in the standard and in its various functions can be designated, on the one hand, as the *intellectualization* of these devices, and on the other hand, as their *automation and foregrounding* [aktualisace] in terms of their functional differentiation.

I. Intellectualization

By the *intellectualization* of the standard language, which we could also call its rationalization, we understand its adaptation to the goal of making possible precise and rigorous, if necessary abstract, statements, capable of expressing the continuity and complexity of thought, that is, to reinforce the intellectual side of speech. This intellectualization culminates in scientific (theoretical) speech, determined by the attempt to be as precise in expression as possible, to make statements which reflect the rigor of objective (scientific) thinking in which the terms approximate concepts and the sentences approximate logical judgements.⁵

This intellectualization of the standard language affects primarily the lexical, and in part, the grammatical structure. [...]

In terms of the lexicon, the intellectualization of the standard manifests itself not only by an expansion of the vocabulary by new terms, the abstract meaning content of which is alien to the common man such as *poznatek* [bit of knowledge], *pojmem* [concept],⁶ *představa* [idea, picture], *jsoucno* [being], *podmět* [subject], *přísudek* [predicate], and the like, but also by changes in the structure of the lexicon since, although in the language of science, law, administration or business we talk of things in life around us, we express ourselves differently from the way we would in ordinary conversation:

(a) we need *unequivocal* words: hence, for instance, the use in biology of the word *živočich* [animal] instead of the word *zvíře* with its rather indefinite meaning content; in electrical engineering the word *lampa* [lamp] is not sufficient and there is need for the word *svítidlo* [lighting fixture], and the like;

(b) special distinctions are needed, such as *příčina — důvod — podnět* [cause — reason — stimulus], in legal language *přestupek — přečin — zločin* (contravention — délit — crime) or *vlastník — držitel — majitel* (dominus — possessor — detentor), and the like;

(c) *abstract summarizing terms* are needed, such as *plodina* [crop], *rostlina* [plant], *vozidlo* [vehicle], *výrobek* [product].

The intellectualization of the standard language is also brought about by the need to express the *interrelationships* and *complexity of thought processes*, especially those of judgment and consideration. This is done, first of all, by the creation of words or their adaptation to express various relationships, such as those of existence, possibility, necessity, the relations of causality, finality, parallelism, and the like, as shown by nouns such as *účel* [purpose], *záměr* [intent], *výsledek* [result], *důsledek* [consequence], *následek* [sequel], as well as many verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and prepositions such as *docílití* [achieve] next to *dosáhnouti* [reach], *odpovídati* [correspond], *sestávatí* [consist], *bezúčelný* [purposeless], *bezvýsledný* [without result], *bezpodstatný* [unsubstantiated], *následkem* [in consequence of], *za účelem* [for purposes of], and the like. This leads to an expansion in the standard language, or a formation and specialization, of word-formative patterns; thus, to express abstracted concrete events transferred into the category of substance of quality, verbal nouns (ending in *-ní*), participial expressions, and particularly verbal adjectives (ending in *-cí*), nomina agentis (ending in *-tel* and other suffixes), adjectives ending in *-telný*, and the like, the standard language tends in general towards nominal groupings brought about by combining nouns with attributes or by nominal predication using empty verbs.

In doing this, intellectualization, of course, is affecting the *grammatical structure* of the language and manifests itself particularly in *sentence structure* by the preference of the standard for the normalized sentence with the two constituents, the subject and the predicate, clearly differentiated formally so that linguistics, as long as its syntax was based on the standard only, saw this sentence type as the normal sentence type in general. The desire to achieve parallelism between the grammatical and the logical structure, for instance, contributes to the expansion of the passive voice in the standard. And finally we see in the standard, instead of the free sequence of sentences in the folk speech, a tightly knit and integrated structure of sentences and compound sentences with an elaborate hierarchy of superordination and subordination expressing different relations of causality, finality, parallelism, and the like; this tendency manifests itself in the specialization of conjunctions – thus, for instance, where in folk speech subordinate causal clauses are introduced by the multivalued conjunctions *že* [that], *dyš* (když [when]), in the standard they can be marked specifically by the conjunctions *protože*, *poněvadž* [because].⁷

Let me here add two notes that are important for the practical side of language.

1. The *definiteness* of an expression in an utterance in the standard language is a matter of *degree*: I have already mentioned that it culminates in the language of science in the requirement that words express concepts, if we call this unequivocality required by the language of science “accuracy” and thus differentiate it from the broader concept of “definiteness”, we can indicate these degrees schematically as follows: *intelligibility — definiteness — accuracy* thus gradually narrowing down the broader concept. Simple intelligibility is what we get in the language of everyday contact (conversational), where definiteness is given not only by convention, but also by the situation and the shared knowledge of various circumstances by the participants in the conversation so that the objectivity of the verbal response is quite limited even when the content is as factual as can be; one just has to think of the frequent use of pronouns in conversation, or of the simple fact of everyday experience that a conversation overheard by a non-participant is extremely unclear to him although the linguistic devices used are quite familiar. In workaday [pracovní] language (administrative, business, journalistic) we usually deal with definiteness; it is given by convention or by just so deciding, and by the objectivity of the utterance, that is, its independence of the concrete situation and of concrete personages, and it is much farther-reaching than in conversational speech; compare, for instance, a personal letter to an order for merchandise. In the language of science finally, we deal with accuracy; it is defined and codified and in accord with the accuracy of objective thinking, it tends towards a generally valid objectivity.⁸

It must be noted here that an unequivocal, accurate, or even just conventionally definite expression need not be clear to everyone, that is, intelligible: it may be a term, or have a content, which is simply alien to many speakers; thus, the general intelligibility and clarity cannot be the gauge for the accuracy of expression of a mathematical treatise on imaginary numbers, and the legal difference between *majitel* [owner] and *vlastník* [possessor] is not inaccurate or indefinite just because it is not clear to the layman. It might seem that I am belaboring the obvious, but the terms accuracy, clarity, and intelligibility are often used quite arbitrarily. [...]

II. Automatization and foregrounding

Another mode of the special use of the devices of the language to meet the various functions of the standard has been designated by me as the differing *automatization* and *foregrounding* [aktualisace] of the devices of the language, sometimes of the same ones.

What do we understand by the different automatization and foregrounding of the devices of the language? Let me start with an example taken from the relationship between different languages where these differences are most conspicuous, if we, for instance,

translate the common Russian greeting formula “*zdravstvuyte*” into Czech by the phrase “*budte zdráv*” [be healthy], everyone who does not know the literal meaning of the greeting *zdravstvuyte*, but knows its use, will immediately note that such a translation is unsuitable; in Czech this greeting has a whole series of equivalents. Why is this? A common Russian greeting form has been translated into Czech by an uncommon form, that is, we have changed an automatized expression into a foregrounded one although, of course, the phrase *budte zdráv* for many other purposes, for instance at the end of a letter, in saying goodbye, and the like, will be a completely common and automatized expression.

Or, to cite the most popular example. When someone translates the French conventional formula “*s’il vous plait*” into Czech as “*líbí-li se vám*” [if you like], he has of course translated each individual word correctly, but has completely changed the meaning of the formula as a whole since the French formula has an automatized meaning more or less in the sense of Czech “*prosím*” please.

By *automatization* we thus mean such a use of the devices of the language, in isolation or in combination with each other, as is usual for a certain expressive purpose, that is, such a use that the expression itself does not attract any attention; the communication occurs, and is received, as conventional in linguistic form and is to be “understood” by virtue of the linguistic system without first being supplemented, in the concrete utterance, by additional understanding derived from the situation and the context.

We thus call automatization what, in the cases of phrases, is sometimes called the lexicalization of phrases. [...] In other words, we can speak of automatization only in those cases where the speaker’s intent does not fail to obtain the desired effect, where the link between intent and effect is not broken, unless there is a change in the environment to which the utterance was addressed, or unless we deal with different periods.

By *foregrounding*, on the other hand, we mean the use of the devices of the language in such a way that this use itself attracts attention and is perceived as uncommon, as deprived of automatization, as deautomatized,⁹ such as a live poetic metaphor (as opposed to a lexicalized one, which is automatized).

Conversation yields good examples of both automatization and foregrounding: all conventional conversational devices are of course automatized, but to liven up the conversation and to achieve surprise (wonderment) foregrounded units are used, that is, linguistic devices that are uncommon in everyday speech, or are used with an uncommon meaning, or in an uncommon context (I am not concerned with content). They can, in accord with the fashion, be either the devices of poetic language or of slang, or other devices, perhaps even those of the language of science.

In a scientific treatise the author uses, on the one hand, words and phrases which have accurate meaning for specialists in the field, by scientific definition or codification or convention, so that he doesn’t have to worry about their meaning, that is, automatized expressions. On the other hand he uses new expressions which, though uncommon, have been given a definitely delimited meaning by himself or his school of thought and which he has

therefore automatized at least for purposes of a given work or a given school, in the sense of having made them intelligible. If, however, such expressions and modes of expression are included in utterances designed for non-specialists, they lose their original automatization in the new context (which in the old context we might have called “technical”), and become either unintelligible, if they are devices totally alien to the layman, or they become automatized in an entirely different way, if, indeed, they are not foregrounded. Thus, every technical term, of course, has an automatized meaning, but if it is transferred into a completely alien environment, it may be foregrounded immediately and even become a swearword (cf. the use as invectives of words such as *synfonie* [symphony], *fysiko* [physics] in [Jan] Holeček's *Naši* [Our Folks] I, 32 and *passim*).

Such a transfer of the automatizations of a certain field into an entirely uncommon environment is at the root of many verbal jokes, which are instances of foregrounding. [...]

The *transfer of automatizations* can, however, not be affected even in the case of less conspicuous differences. Let us, for instance, compare a statement in the language of science for purposes of theoretical formulation to one for purposes of popularization or workaday communication, where the subject matter of the statement may be identical, but its purpose is different!

[...]

We see clearly that, with essentially the same subject matter (the same thematic plane) the linguistic shape of the utterance (the grammatico-semantic plane) changes in accord with its purpose, and that one of the basic components of this difference is the difference in automatization: a scientific subject matter must be rid of technical automatizations in a popular presentation (journalistic and the like) and be expressed, at least in part, by means of the automatizations of everyday language; an everyday subject matter acquires in scientific styling, instead of the automatizations of conversational speech which would be preserved in case of a popular presentation, the corresponding automatizations of technical language. It is, of course, also possible to use the automatizations of conversational speech in a technical paper, thus [the economist Jan] Koloušek in one of his papers speaks of a *vyhladovělý člověk* [starved, very hungry individual], but this is done for purposes of stylistic dissimilation (thus in essence a foregrounding of style) and more frequently in popular presentations than in strictly scientific ones; in the latter, it may be for a pedagogical purpose, when we repeat the same thing “in other words,” that is, in other automatizations. In this article, for instance, I am using, in addition to the technical terminology of a certain school of thought – that is, technical automatizations (which I am frequently citing only in parentheses) – also automatizations and terms of more general use.

On the other hand, the automatizations of the language of science, or even of just workaday technical speech, used in conversational speech (but not, of course, in a technical conversation or discussion) become foregrounded. [...]

We find *maximum foregrounding*, used for its own sake, not only in *poetic language*, but even in the language of *essays*, which is linked to technical speech by the

fact that the communicative intent is not completely in the background, and the devices are selected and arranged in such a manner, be they taken from technical or conversational speech, that they become foregrounded; the language of essays is directed towards the foregrounded expression of a given communication (content), but foregrounded according to a certain pattern just as in poetic language, whereas the language of science is directed towards an accurate expression of the content, the workaday technical language towards a definite expression, and conversational speech towards a generally accessible communication.

[...]

Even this brief and rather simplified comparison of different functional dialects and styles shows that each of them has its own linguistic devices and modes of their utilization; from this it follows that it is *impossible and incorrect to try to raise any one functional dialect or style to the status of a criterion for the others*. The professor who uses the language of science in ordinary conversation is a well-known humorous figure: neither workaday technical speech nor the style of written expression can properly be used in plain conversation.¹⁰ And it is equally incorrect to recommend the so-called “natural” way of expression for other dialects and styles: this means forcing the automatizations of conversational speech, that is, a language suited for just one function, upon other functional dialects and styles. Poetic language can use these automatizations for its purposes in various ways (cf. Mukařovský’s article), but it cannot be limited to them; technical speech, both workaday and scientific, can use them only to a limited extent. One can obviously not ignore the significance for standard French of its conversational base, the usage of the court and society of the 17th and 18th centuries, but one should then not overlook what was the subject matter of conversation in that society, the usage of which served as the basis for Vaugelas’ *Remarques* (literature, philosophy), and what is the subject matter of the conversations recommended to the guardian of Czech usage (women on the market, river sailors, see *Naše řeč* [a purist journal] 1.266 [1917]). How this trend is based on a romantic idealization of the people, the “unspoiled” people of course, can be seen from the fact that in addition to constantly recommending popular conversational usage, there are constantly repeated complaints about every element of slang in the speech of students or young people in general, in spite of [V.] Ertl’s [a Czech historical linguist] ironical remark in *Naše řeč* (8.61 [1924]) that young people will evidently go on doing this as well as other mischief “until [children] will be at least forty at birth”.

[...]

Just as the automatizations of conversational speech cannot be forced upon other functional dialects and styles, so it is impossible to require *definiteness* or *accuracy* of the standard language as such, and use them as criteria to evaluate utterances made in it, as is sometimes done. We did show that definiteness and accuracy as a manifestation of the intellectualization of the standard are important properties of certain of its functions, but let us therefore not forget that *inaccuracy* or *indefiniteness* may be

functionally justified, if that happens to be the purpose of a certain verbal response. It is, for instance, sometimes used in the language of commerce, legal practice, politics, diplomacy, and the like. It is not, and cannot be, a simple *yes* or *no* language, and it sometimes wants to, or has to, express itself noncommittally (cf. the well-known “*I’ll see what I can do*”). Thus, in the *language of business correspondence* there is, in addition to some definite (unequivocal) expressions for the operations of business practice and for the objects of commerce, a need also for some rather neutral formulae which can be used in different situations and on different occasions, because the correspondence is in bulk and is not individualized. Such formulae must therefore be evaluated from the standpoint of their special purpose and not be rejected en bloc as “feeble, anemic expressions which only coarsely render one’s thinking, and where the writer avoids laborious thinking over, clarifying his concepts, and looking for an accurate expression” (*Naše řeč* 14.191 [1930], in [Jiří] Haller’s [a Czech purist] article on business Czech): a secretary cannot think over laboriously, if she wants to get her work done, neither can she “clarify her concepts” too much, since she often doesn’t know too well herself what is involved and might change the meaning of the statement. This is not only the reason, as Haller thinks in the above paper, of these maligned “feeble, anemic expressions,” but also the purpose of such formulae. These neutral formulae, as well as the accurate clichés for business operations and the terms for the objects of commerce, are of course automatized. There are few styles of language as highly automatized as the language of business; nonetheless, it has room for foregrounding, namely in the case of advertising. Then of course it will not avoid “conspicuous novelties and uncommon forms”, which should be avoided in accord with the advice given in the above article in *Naše řeč* (p. 195).

Journalistic language is likewise in need of a store of various formulae (clichés), but we shall speak of this in another connection.

A verbal response can be *evaluated* only in terms of its *adequacy to the purpose*, whether it meets the given objective suitably.

To these two practical remarks flowing for the critique of linguistic usage from the discussion of the functional differentiation of language, let me add a third: I am thinking of the *impossibility of evaluating individual words* detached from their functional utilization and automatized combinations, as well as the impossibility of considering the automatized meaning of a word in a single combination and in a single function its only possible meaning.

[...]

In conclusion to this section on the functional differentiation of the standard language, let me give a *schematic survey of this differentiation*. It is not a classification of all the functions of language, but a systematic listing mainly of those differences which have been mentioned and which are most significant for the various purposes of the standard language. It therefore does not include the otherwise important and basic difference between the emotional and the intellectual aspect of verbal responses, nor that between overt and subvocal speech; for these differences, see at least the thesis on the functions of language

presented by the Linguistic Circle of Prague to the First Congress of Slavic Philologists, Prague, 1929 (Section II, Thesis No. 3, in French in *TCLP* 1.14 ff. [1929]).

Functions of the standard:

1. communication
 2. workaday technical
 3. theoretical technical
 4. esthetic
- } communicative

Functional dialects:

1. conversational
2. workaday (matter-of-fact)
3. scientific
4. poetic language

Re 1. unified semantic plane

free relation of lexical units to referents
incomplete verbal responses
intelligibility, given by the situation and by conversational automatizations

Re 2. unified semantic plane

relation of lexical units to referents definite by convention (terms)
relatively complete responses
definiteness, given by defined or codified automatizations (terms and formulae)

Re 3. unified semantic plane

relation of lexical units to referents accurate (concepts)
complete responses
accuracy, given by defined or codified automatizations

Re 4. complex (multivalued) semantic plane

relation of lexical units to referents, completeness and clarity of the utterance determined by the structure of the literary work and given by its poetic foregrounding

Functional styles of the standard language:

A. According to the *specific purpose* of the response:

1. matter-of-fact communication, information
2. exhortation (appeal), suasion
3. general explanation (popular)
4. technical explanation (exposition, proof)
5. codifying formulation

B. According to the *manner* of the response:

private – public

oral – written

oral: 1. private: (monologue) – dialogue
2. public: speechmaking – discussion

written: 1. private
2. public: (a) notice, poster
(b) journalistic
(c) book writing (magazine writing)

Notes on the Scheme

1. I have classed *poetic language* with its esthetic function as a fourth functional dialect simply because I am giving here a mere listing. There is an essential difference between the first three functional dialects listed which are always used to communicate something (have a communicative function) and between poetic language which is not primarily communicative. – For the same reasons of listing I have simply included among the functional styles that of *exhortation and suasion*, although there is a fundamental difference between this style and all others. – The listing in terms of the manner of the response can hardly be considered complete.

2. The difference between *functional style* and *functional dialect* [funkční jazyk] consists in the fact that the functional style is determined by the specific purpose of the given verbal response – it is a function of the verbal response (of the act of speech, “parole”), whereas the functional dialect is determined by the over-all purpose of the structured totality of means of expression, it is a function of the linguistic pattern (“langue”).

In verbal responses, we thus encounter functional dialects in different functional styles.

3. The *completeness of the response* is evaluated in terms of the degree to which the linguistic aspects of the response are complete or have gaps as compared to what the response is intended to express (in terms of the relationship of the grammatico-semantic plane to the thematic plane). – In conversational speech, there are gaps in the verbal response from the standpoint of the gradual development of the subject matter which are filled in from the extralinguistic situation and by extralinguistic means. In the language of science and in workaday speech, the continuity of the linguistic aspects of the response (the grammatico-semantic plane) is given only linguistically; the language of science, especially in the case of codifying formulation, then attempts to achieve the maximum parallelism possible in the given language between the linguistic expression and the gradual development of the subject matter; in workaday speech, there rather seems to be a conscious disturbance of this parallelism, and thus the progression of linguistic expression as compared to the progression of the subject matter is interrupted by repeating things “in other words,” or by deliberately leaving gaps to be filled in by the listener or reader so that only part of the thematic progression (usually its high points) find their expression, without, of course, the automatic intervention of the extralinguistic situation.

A more naive point of view will, instead of the thematic plane, think of reality (facts) as the thing to be expressed; this is an improper oversimplification. The thematic plane is not to be held identical with extra-linguistic reality; the two may be variously related to each other.

Notes

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¹ By colloquial standard is meant an overall dialect [interdialekt], that is, a dialect used over a larger area in which otherwise local dialects are used, for instance. Czech colloquial standard, but also Haná colloquial standard, Lašsko colloquial standard, etc. (dialect areas in Moravia) (cf. 51.265 [1924]).

² Misunderstandings often arise when such formulae are not well known.

Let us not forget that in Czech popular social clichés are quite elaborate; thus, the well-known supplement to the invitation formula to the fair: “and don’t you dare not come,” without which the invitation is a mere polite formality, in Josef Holeček (1853–1929, a rural novelist), *Naši* (Our Folks) I, 1st ed., 123 (for another example, cf. *ibid.* 38).

On the other hand, the greeting “May the Lord help you” is perceived as a mark of class and its meaning changes if a member of another class uses it.

³ On such a layer, but from a prehistoric standpoint, cf. V. Machek’s work *Studie o tvoření výrazů expresivních* (A Study of the Formation of Expressive Forms), 1930.

⁴ Cf. my article in *Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague* IV (1931), p. 276, and V. Mathesius: *Naše řeč*, 15.38 ff. (1931). It is sometimes erroneously asserted that palatal phonemes in general have a certain (emotional) functional coloring: this view is rightly rejected by Fr. Trávníček: *Prace filologické* 15.2. 163 ff. (1931).

⁵ We can thus speak of the logicity of language only when it has this function, and judge the manner in which the verbal expression is adapted to rendering logical thinking, with the reservation brought up below in note 8. Recognition of the essential difference between the logical evaluation of thinking in terms of correct or incorrect judgments, and between the structure of the language, its material, and the utterances

which by themselves are neither logical nor illogical, as well as of the fact that logical and grammatical categories are not identical, this recognition has long been part of the ABC of linguistics. [...]

- ⁶ The words *poznatek*, *pojem*, as well as *dojem* [impression], *rozsah* [range] and many others, were first introduced into the Czech standard language by Antonín Marek in *Logika* (Logic), 1820.
- ⁷ It could, for instance, be ascertained statistically what compound sentences and what types of subordinate clauses are found in folk speech. [...]
- ⁸ We must of course differentiate between accuracy of expression (of terms) and accuracy of concepts or thinking; we may have, for instance, arrived at an accurate concept and not yet found a term; I may reject a term as inaccurate and admit the concept as accurate, etc.
- ⁹ Cf. Jan Rozwadowski in *BSL* 25.106 (1925), where the term deautomatization is used, but in an evolutionary sense.
- ¹⁰ Cf. Vendryès' famous statement "un homme qui parle comme il écrit nous fait l'effet d'un être artificiel, anormal." (*Le langage*, 1921, p. 326).

Comprehension questions

1. What does Havránek mean by the phrase "intellectualization of language expression"? What evidence does he give to lend support to his argument?
2. What attitude does Havránek have towards language change, e.g. in connection with the speech of young people?
3. What arguments does Havránek use against the linguistic purism common among some linguists of his time?
4. What is the distinction between "functional styles" and "functional dialects"?
5. Discuss the following statement by Havránek and put it into the context of contemporary linguistics: "A verbal response can be *evaluated* only in terms of its *adequacy to the purpose*, whether it meets the given objective suitably."