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The Battle of the Frigidus from a Military and Political Perspective

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Abstract
This article argues that the Battle of the Frigidus was, from a military perspective, a far more important engagement than is usually assumed. The battle depleted the available military reserves of the empire to such an extent that, in the following years, the nascent Western empire found itself unable to conduct any large-scale military operations, or indeed to fend off attackers in its very core – Italy. On the other hand, the religious importance of the battle, traditionally highlighted in scholarly publications, should be downplayed. It can be argued that had the outcome of the battle been any different, no major religious changes to the empire would have occurred. While the political short-term outcome of the battle is obvious (Theodosius’ reassertion of claim to power and the establishment of his dynasty), the long-term political changes resulting from this battle primarily involved the beginning of the decline of the Western empire and its ultimate demise. The article analyses the known data on Roman military strength, its organization, and especially the available operational reserves in the 4th century and compares them with the state of the Roman army at the beginning of the 5th century. Although our sources deny us any data on the strength or losses of either army at the Frigidus, a thorough analysis of all available information and a comparison with other internal wars in the late Roman empire seems to lead to an inescapable conclusion: the battle was a massacre that deprived the empire in its western part of its last hope of holding its entire territory in the following period.

Keywords
Battle of the Frigidus; Theodosius I; late Roman army; Later Roman Empire
The battle of the Frigidus in 394 C.E. is often presented in Czech scholarly publications as the last symbolic showdown of paganism and Christianity. The political and especially the military aspect is somewhat neglected. The battle may have been symbolic, but symbols can be seen in everything and their language can easily be overestimated. Moreover, this approach can be misleading – it can lead to a superficial approach to understanding and interpreting historical facts. The struggle for power was, of course, the sole reason for the conflict at the Frigidus and should not be obscured by other factors. The author intends to avoid all symbolic interpretations and wishes nothing more than to examine the significance of the battle from a military and political point of view, taking into consideration the subsequent history of the empire, especially in its western part, during the following 15-odd years. It can be argued – and will be shown – that the result of the battle, apart from reassertion of Theodosius’ claim to power, was the depletion of the empire’s military forces, which had serious consequences both in the East and, primarily, in the West. Also, it can be argued that even if Arbogast had won the battle and the dynasty of Theodosius had not been established, it would have made no difference to the religious development of the empire. As noted above, scholarly publications dealing with the battle of the Frigidus usually are not interested in its military and political implications, summarizing that the battle further degraded the military capabilities of the empire as a whole.

What were these capabilities in the first place? Let us glance at the military situation of the empire during the 4th century.

David Potter judged that the 4th-century army was either roughly the same size as or even smaller (!) than the army of the Severan dynasty, and that it numbered just 240–360,000 men. Most scholars, however, assume that Diocletian actually increased the number of soldiers, though they vary considerably in their calculations. Averil Cameron concluded that Diocletian’s army had “not much more than four hundred thousand” men, while according to Stephen Williams it had “over 500,000 men”. A. D. Lee estimated the total number of soldiers in the early 4th-century army at 500,000 (and the population of the empire at 50 million). A. H. M. Jones, focusing on the same period, estimated that there were approximately 350,000 soldiers in the Eastern Roman army (and 250,000 in

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1 See e.g. Češka (2000: p. 168), Burian and Oliva (1984: p. 498) or Bednaříková (2003: p. 82). These evaluations obviously derive from a very long tradition, see e.g. Seeck and Veith (1913: p. 467). However, a number of modern scholars note that contemporary literary sources did not, for the most part, see this war as a struggle between Christianity and paganism (see for example Salzman 2010), and point out that many Christians served in Eugenius’ army and many pagans served in Theodosius’ army, some of them in high places (Cameron 2011: p. 99: “Eugenius himself was certainly a Christian, and so were most members of his court and many of his troops. As for the implication that Theodosius’s entire army was Christian, that cannot be true either.”). The matter is best summed up by Hebblewhite (2020: pp. 134–137).

2 See e.g. Southern (2006: 247): “In 378, the disastrous battle of Adrianople between Goths and Romans resulted in the near destruction of the eastern army, and in 394 the western army was very badly mauled.” Similarly Southern and Dixon (2014: p. 39). Halsall (2007: p. 188) uses even stronger language for the impact of the battle of Frigidus (“the western army was slaughtered”).


4 Cameron (1993: p. 35); Williams (2000: p. 97).

the Western Roman army). Warren Treadgold believed that Diocletian increased troop numbers enormously, arguing that the Roman army had about 200,000 men in the Eastern half of the empire alone in around 235 and before 285, and that Diocletian increased this to some 250,000. There was subsequent modest growth under Constantine, who had about 280,000 men in the East in around 324. Treadgold deduces that, by 395, the Eastern Roman Empire’s army numbered about 335,000 men. Jones and Treadgold thus assumed steady growth, at least in the East. As is evident from the above, however, we can only resort to estimates. On what sources are these calculations based?

The Byzantine historian Agathias observes that, in his time (under Justinian), the army had a paltry 150,000 men and was no longer capable of defending the vast East Roman Empire, whereas „under the earlier emperors“ the empire had had 645,000 men at its disposal. The problem with this, of course, is that we do not know which „earlier emperors“ are meant here (he is probably thinking of the 4th century, and perhaps specifically the Constantinian dynasty). The value of this account is further diminished by its polemical nature, which may have compelled the Byzantine historian to exaggerate the size of the army „under the earlier emperors“.

Agathias’ contemporary Joannes Lydus (i.e. John the Lydian) very briefly, but accurately, noted that under Diocletian the Roman army numbered 389,704 soldiers and 45,562 sailors, and that Constantine increased these numbers by tens of thousands after his conquest of the East (i.e. after 324). These figures are so remarkably precise that it is tempting to think that Lydus (who held high state offices in Constantinople) copied them from some well-informed source. We must also take into account that the public servant Lydus, unlike Agathias, evidently had no reason to inflate his numbers. The figure he has recorded looks like it pertains to a specific time in Diocletian’s reign, but which particular moment would that be? It may refer to the beginning of his reign (when the emperor, needing to know how many men he had at his disposal, would have commissioned an accurate census), to the tail end (when he was handing over the empire to the other augusti), or to 293 (when the formation of the four-man imperial college meant that the precise size of the armies needed to be ascertained before they could be divided).

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8 Agathias V, 13, 7. Agathias’ figure of 150,000 men would be plausible if he meant only the mobile army, but excluded the frontier troops, the foederati, the palace guard, the bucellarii (the personal guard in the service of military leaders), and the navy; see Treadgold (1995: pp. 59–63).
9 Agathias is critical of Justinian not just on account of his weak army, but also because he neglected much of the empire’s defence capabilities late on in his reign. For example, in 559 the Kutrigur chieftain Zabergan was able to menace the suburbs of Constantinople with just 7,000 horsemen. See Cameron (1970: p. 125).
11 Ioannes Lydus, De mensibus I, 27.
We can therefore surmise that the empire may have had about 450,000 soldiers at the end of the first tetrarchy, and perhaps somewhat more under Constantine.  

### Organisation of the Roman army in the 4th century

We may therefore take as a reasonable estimate of the total strength of the Roman army at the beginning of the 4th century half a million men. How was this mass of manpower organized? Under Diocletian, the command of military units in the provinces was given to commanders with the title *dux* (plural *duces*). Their area of responsibility did not always coincide with the boundaries of the provinces, and some of them commanded units in more than one province. Probably in the second half of Constantine’s reign, perhaps after 324, these *duces* were no longer responsible to the praetorian prefects but to two generals whose office Constantine introduced: *magister peditum* and *magister equitum* (general of infantry and general of cavalry). The two generals actually commanded both infantry and cavalry; hence the neutral term *magister militum* was also used. These generals commanded not only (through *duces*) the troops in the provinces, but also the newly formed mobile or field army – the corps *comitatenses*.

The question of whether the division of the Roman army into *comitatenses* and border troops (*limitanei* or *ripenses*) is the work of Diocletian or of Constantine is disputed, since the first references to this division date from the second half of Constantine’s reign. In any case, the *comitatenses* played the role of a central reserve, which was subordinate to the two generals, who were directly responsible to the emperor. In addition, regional armies of *comitatenses* soon arose, stationed in different parts of the empire. As a result of these changes, the two generals came to be called “the generals in the presence of the emperor” (*magistri militum in praesenti* or *praestales*), as the were supposed to be present at the imperial court, just as their “praesental armies” would be located near the capital. Thanks to the document *Notitia Dignitatum*, we can learn more.

The *Notitia Dignitatum* is essentially a comprehensive list that describes the civil and military structure of the Roman Empire as it existed in the late 4th century in the eastern part and early 5th century in the western part. Thus, in the East, by the time Theodosius was preparing for war with Eugenius, we have, in addition to the two chief generals

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13 For a detailed analysis, see Doležal (2022: pp. 419–442).
15 Constantine’s law CTh VII, 20, 4 (of the year 325) speaks of *comitatenses et ripenses milites*. Zosimus (II, 34) claims that this was a decision of Constantine. If he is right, then the question arises at what stage of his reign this decision was made. Some have suggested that the most appropriate occasion may have been the period after the battle of Mulvian Bridge in 312 (Jones 1964: p. 97; Southern 2004: pp. 157 and 271–272), while others are inclined to think that it was more likely to have occurred after the victory over Licinius in 324 (Elton 2007: p. 331), and still others attribute this decision to Diocletian (Potter 2004: pp. 453–454; Pohlsander 2004: p. 10; Češka 2000: p. 36; Barnes 2014: p. 154). The undecided are represented by Campbell (2008: pp. 121–122).
(magistri equitum et peditum in praesenti duo), three other regional generals: the magister equitum et peditum per Orientem, the magister equitum et peditum per Thracias, and the magister equitum et peditum per Illyricum.\textsuperscript{18}

They commanded 36, 36, 31, 28 and 26 units, respectively – a grand total of 157 units of the comitatenses, called legiones, vexillationes or auxilia. Opinions vary as to their paper strength. For example, according to Goldsworthy, legions could number 1,000–1,200 men, vexillationes probably 600, auxilia perhaps 500–600.\textsuperscript{19} Lee gives 1,000 men for legions, 500 for vexillationes, and 500–800 for auxilia.\textsuperscript{20} Treadgold reckons simply 1,000 for legions and 500 for both auxilia or vexillationes.\textsuperscript{21} Jones assigned 1,000 men to legions, 500 to vexillationes, and 600–700 to auxilia. Thus, Jones arrived at a figure of 104,000 men in the East for the field army only.\textsuperscript{22} It is obvious, however, that reliable figures cannot be arrived at and we must be content with approximate estimates. If we stick more to Treadgold’s model, we come up with approximately 20,000 men for each of the two “praesental” armies. As a basis for further discussion, then, let us assume a number of about 40,000 men as the approximate strength of the army under the two generals-in-chief, that is to say, a corps that was readily available for a campaign whenever the Emperor in the East chose to lead the army in person.\textsuperscript{23} This does not mean, however, that the army following the Emperor to war could not have been larger. The emperor Julian for his Persian campaign in 363 probably added to the two “praesental armies” a regional army of the East, which may have numbered 20,000 men, and after adding the palace troops (scholae palatinae, 3,500 men in total) we approach the figure of 65,000 given by Zosimus.\textsuperscript{24} We may assume, however, that the standard strength of the army of comitatenses personally led by the emperor was about 40,000 men. Can such a hypothesis be supported by evidence?

The “Emperor’s Army” of the 4th century

In 312, Constantine invaded Italy. The size of his invading army, as well as the total number of troops Constantine had at his disposal in his territories, is unknown. However, it seems reasonable to conclude that although Constantine must have had to leave a considerable force in Britain and Gaul, he could still afford to allocate 35–40,000 troops to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} Notitia Dignitatum, Or. I, 5–8.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Goldsworthy (2003: p. 206).
\item \textsuperscript{20} Lee (2008: p. 214).
\item \textsuperscript{21} Treadgold (1997: p. 106).
\item \textsuperscript{22} Jones (1964: p. 682).
\item \textsuperscript{23} Elton (2018: pp. 98–100).
\item \textsuperscript{24} Zos. III, 12–13; Elton (2018: p. 81); Doležal (2022: p. 427). Zosimus’ text can even be interpreted to mean that the invading army originally numbered 83,000 men, from which a portion of 18,000 men was detached and the remaining 65,000 were further divided into two parts (cf. Eutr. X, 16). The division of the army into several parts was probably necessitated by supply difficulties.
\end{itemize}
the Italian campaign. This is the figure that emerges from an analysis of our sources. In a panegyric to Constantine, delivered in 313 at Trier after Constantine’s victory over Maxentius, an unknown author says that Constantine led “scarcely a quarter of his army” across the Alps against Maxentius’ 100,000 troops; elsewhere in the same work it is said that Constantine had less than 40,000 soldiers with him. This actually makes sense. This is the army that can be moved quickly and kept supplied on the go. Let’s provisionally call this force “an emperor’s army”.

In 357, Caesar Julian (according to Ammianus Marcellinus) had only 13,000 men at the battle of Argentoratum. However, this was not an army of the reigning Augustus, only of his representative in Gaul who, forced by circumstances, embarked on a dangerous enterprise. By contrast, the general of infantry Barbatio, who was to cooperate with Julian, had 25,000 men at his disposal at the time. But Julian had no choice but to give battle alone and understandably, Ammianus captures his fears of having to engage the enemy “with only a small number of soldiers, however brave.” Libanius gives somewhat higher numbers – 30,000 for Barbatio and 15,000 for Julian. These 38,000 to 45,000 men can be seen as the operational reserve of the West at the moment, and this figure is consistent with the assumption presented earlier. We have also seen above that Julian was later able to gather together an unusually large number of troops for his Persian campaign; but this was clearly an exceptional situation, necessitated by requirements of a grand campaign against an external enemy.

It is known that the size of the Roman army at the battle of Adrianople is unknown. We must content ourselves with the dry statement of Ammianus Marcellinus that “it is known that scarcely a third of the army escaped”. Peter Heather wrote that he could not imagine how this battle could have been any bloodier than the battle of the Somme, when the British lost 21,000 men in a single day; and he estimated Roman losses at 10–15,000 men. That would mean an army of 15,000–22,000 men. But Valens hardly went into Thrace with such a weak army, and Roman history gives us numerous examples of Roman armies being virtually annihilated on the battlefield in a single day, and

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25 I agree (Doležal 2022: p. 425) with this estimate by Timothy Barnes (2014: p. 81). Elliott (1996: p. 58) and Pohlsander (2004: p. 20) estimate the number of Constantine’s soldiers at 40,000; Odahl (2013: p. 100) calculates that Constantine marched no more than 25–40,000 men into Italy. Češka (2000: p. 53) assigned Constantine for his Italian campaign “only about 30,000” soldiers.

26 Pan. Lat. XII (9), 3, 3 (vix enim quarta parte exercitus contra centum milia armatorum hostium Alpes transgressus es); 5, 1–2 (Alexander… numquam lamen maiores quadraginta milium copias duxit … tu vero etiam minoribus copiis bellum multo maius aggressus es).

27 Amm. Marc. XVI, 12, 2. Drinkwater (2007: p. 238) concurs with this estimate.

28 Amm. Marc. XVI, 11, 2.

29 Amm. Marc. XVI, 12, 6 (cum paucis, licet fortibus).

30 Libanius, Or. XVIII, 49.

31 For detailed discussion of the strength of Roman armies in 4th to 6th centuries, see Jones (1964: pp. 684–685).

32 Amm. Marc. XXXI, 13, 18.

those were entire consular armies – tens of thousands of men – as at Arausio in 105 BC, or at Cannae in 216 BC. Although Ammianus does not directly mention the size of Valens’ army, the phrases *cum abundante milite* (“with a large force”) and *ducebatque multiplices copias nec contemnendas nec segnes* (“he led a great force that was neither desppicable nor opposed to fighting”) strongly suggest that it was a substantial contingent, which explains both Valens’ confidence and his belligerence when, before the battle, his scouts brought him the news – quite unsubstantiated news, as it soon turned out – that the enemy numbered no more than 10,000. It is inconceivable that Valens’ army would be anything less than 30,000 men, and probably numbered as many as 40,000. The losses, therefore, must have been in a region of 22,000–27,000 men, and it will not be unreasonable to put them at 25,000. In short, a veritable military catastrophe.

In the same year (378), at the battle of Argentaria or Argentovaria, the emperor Gratian’s soldiers certainly did not face 40,000 Alamanni Lentienses outnumbered. Again, we are led to believe that the number of 40,000 soldiers was the standard size of a moving army under the leadership of an emperor in the 4th century. In other words, such was approximately the immediately available reserves of the East or West, which could be deployed at any time into battle without compromising the protection of the empire.

Of course, it must be reckoned that the two eastern “praesental armies” numbered about 40,000 men only from the time of their creation (probably about the end of Constantine’s reign or the beginning of the reign of Constantius II) until the battle of Adrianople, i.e. 337–378 or about 40 years. After this battle, we may assume a sharp decline in its numbers (down to 15,000 men, as we have seen above), which were probably never replenished to their full strength; the numbers of troops calculated by the document *Notitia Dignitatum* can only be regarded as paper figures. Otherwise, it is impossible to explain why, merely ten years later, Theodosius, for his campaign against Maximus (388), would have had to gather “all the Scythian peoples”, of whom there were supposedly so many that no Roman soldiers seemed to be present in his army! Pacatus even enumerates the Goths, Huns and Alans, talking about the size of the army and the supply difficulties.

Also, Zosimos confirms that Theodosius was very keen to include the Goths from the failed Odotheus’ invasion in his army for the campaign against Maximus.
Roman losses in internal wars

Whenever a Roman army faced an external enemy, it was frequently able to achieve a convincing victory with minimal losses of its own. For example, the battle of Mount Graupius in northeastern Scotland in 83\(^40\) resulted in a crushing victory for the Romans, who lost only 360 men to the Britons’ 10,000, according to Tacitus.\(^41\) By contrast, internal wars within the Roman Empire were usually utterly devastating for the Roman army, especially when the forces were evenly matched. Battles usually involved large numbers of soldiers, and regardless whether it was a civil war of the Republic, or a clash between claimants to the imperial throne, or a war between a usurper and a legitimate emperor, the result was often a horrific massacre.\(^42\)

Therefore, it is understandable that soldiers sometimes tried to avoid such senseless bloodshed, such as in 253, when a certain Aemilianus had his soldiers proclaim him emperor. He marched into Italy against the legitimate emperor Trebonianus Gallus, and the two armies met at Interamna (now Terni, about 100 km north of Rome). However, the battle never took place, because Gallus was killed by his own soldiers, who (according to Zosimus) realised that they were outnumbered or (according to Aurelius Victor) expected a reward from Aemilianus.\(^43\) But Aemilianus soon met the same fate – he was killed at Spoletium (now Spoleto, about 120 km north of Rome) by his own soldiers, who learned that the able general Valerianus was marching against them with a large army. Similarly, after the death of Emperor Claudius II in 270, Claudius’ younger brother Quintillus and the experienced army commander Aurelian clashed in a struggle for the throne. Quintillus marched his troops out of Rome against Aurelian; the latter resolutely marched out of Sirmium with a larger army. But there was no battle. When Quintillus reached Aquileia, his soldiers murdered him (or Quintillus himself committed suicide).\(^44\)

When Aurelian marched against Tetricus, the last emperor of the so-called „Gallic Empire“, in 274, it is said that a secret negotiation took place, on the basis of which Tetricus was to capitulate with his entire army shortly before the battle. If some sort of secret agreement was made, something obviously went wrong; the two armies actually clashed in battle which, although victorious for Aurelian, was apparently very bloody.\(^45\) Several

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\(^40\) On the date: Jones (1992: p. 132).
\(^41\) Tac. Agr. 37.
\(^42\) We are usually not fully informed of the casualties or the size of the armies involved, but we do have some hints. For example, at the battle of Mutina in 43 B.C., both sides suffered fifty percent casualties (Appian, Bellum civile, III, 72); at the battle of the Colline Gate in 82 B.C., there were 50,000 dead on both sides (Appian, Bellum civile, I, 93); the two battles of Bedriacum (in A.D. 69) cost the Roman state 40,000 dead in total (Cassius Dio, LXIV, 10: ἐπεσον δὲ τάσσαρες μυριάδες ἀνδρῶν ἐκατέρωθεν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πρὸς τῇ Κρεμῶνι γενομέναις); the battle of Munda in 45 B.C. cost the Pompeians nearly half of their army (30,000 dead, according to De bello Hispaniensi 31), and so on.
\(^43\) Zos. I, 28, 3; Aur. Vict. 31, 2. See also Southern (2004: p. 78).
\(^44\) As to the manner of death, suicide is mentioned by Zosimus (I, 47) and Historia Augusta (Aurel. 37, 6); killed by the soldiers: Historia Augusta, Claud. 12, 5. The place of death is given by Jerome (Chron. s. a. 271).
\(^45\) The battle took place, according to Eutropius (IX, 13), in the Catalaunian fields (apud Catalaunos); near
more times in the 3rd century, the Roman army, in an instinct of self-preservation, tried to avoid a massacre, preferring instead to remove its commander.⁴⁶

We also find examples of betrayal by subordinate commanders – during the battle of Margus in 285, for example, when Carinus’ praetorian prefect Aristobulus switched sides and was duly rewarded by Diocletian for it, or during the battle of Nakoleia in Phrygia in 366, when the general Agilo betrayed his leader, the usurper Procopius, and defected to the side of emperor Valens together with many of his soldiers.⁴⁷ The battle of the Frigidus had its traitor, too – on the night after the first day, one of Eugenius’ commanders, named Arbitio, surrendered to Theodosius with his men.⁴⁸ As we shall see below, his betrayal was not the decisive moment of the battle, but it probably contributed to Theodosius’ decision not to retreat from the battlefield and face the enemy the next day.

But the most common culmination of internal war in the empire does seem to be a regular battle, which both sides entered determinedly, hoping for the best possible outcome. The end of the battle was defined by the willingness of one side to retreat after the fight and leave the battlefield to its opponent, or to surrender to his mercy. In either case, the battle routinely resulted in heavy casualties, usually on both sides. Let us now discuss the individual cases of the numbers of Roman soldiers involved and killed in the internal wars of the 4th century.

In 313, a showdown took place between the last two tetrarchs of the East, Licinius and Maximinus Daia. Maximinus is said to have had 70,000 troops at his disposal, while Licinius had barely 30,000, as he was unable to muster all his troops. Yet Maximinus Daia was defeated in Thrace on 30 April 313, and supposedly half his army fell in battle; the rest fled or surrendered. That means 35,000 dead (Licinius’ losses are unknown).⁴⁹ At the battle of Cibalae in 316, during the first war between Licinius and Constantine, Licinius reportedly lost 20,000 men, mostly infantry.⁵⁰ Yet Licinius is said to have had a stronger army: the anonymous Origo Constantini imperatoris speaks of 35,000 soldiers on Licinius’ side and mere 20,000 on Constantine’s side, claiming that after Licinius lost 20,000 of his soldiers, he saved himself with most of his cavalry by fleeing. For the second war with Licinius in 324, Constantine is said to have amassed 200 warships and more than 2,000 transports, as well as 120,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. Licinius had...
150,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry. Zosimus tells us that at the battle of Adrianople (July 3) “about 34,000” men fell on the side of Licinius. In the following naval battle of the Hellespont, Licinius lost another 5,000. Finally, at the battle of Chrysopolis (18 September), “barely 30,000” of the men Licinius still had escaped. If we believe Zosimus, Licinius would have lost 139,000 soldiers during this war. Of course, these figures cannot be true, at least as far as the number of dead is concerned. In the space of eleven years (313–324) the Roman army as a whole actually may have lost about 200,000 soldiers – just mostly not on the battlefield. Tens of thousands of men were retiring from the army every year; to this we must add losses due to desertions, disease and the effects of wounds, and then of course the actual dead on the battlefields.

We have detailed data for the battle of Mursa (28 September 351) between Constantius II and the usurper Magnentius. Mursa, more correctly Aelia Mursa maior, is today’s Osijek; it lay on the important Via Militaris road leading from Sirmium. Although the battle ended with the victory of Constantius (who was not present on the battlefield), it did not end the civil war – which lasted until 353 – and, above all, it caused great losses to the Roman army as a whole. Although the battle is mentioned by a number of authors, only the Byzantine author Zonaras gives numbers: Constantius II had about 80,000 men at his disposal, and lost about 30,000 in the battle; Magnentius had 36,000, and lost 24,000. That would mean 54,000 dead. The large number of dead on both sides is also mentioned by Zosimos and hinted at by Julianus. As we saw above, such numbers are not implausible and if they are true, the battle of Mursa was probably the bloodiest battle of the 4th century. Some authors, however, pass over the battle without much interest. Only the evaluation by Eutropius and the Epitome de Caesaribus is of note. The former complains of the number of casualties of the Roman army as a whole and grimly concludes that those soldiers who perished “would have been suitable for any external war, and would have brought many triumphs and greater security to the empire”. The latter source is even more pessimistic: “In this battle, more than ever, the

51 Zos. II, 22, 1–2.
52 Zos. II, 22, 7; 24; 26, 3.
53 A correction is offered by the Origo (5, 27) which states that 25,000 of Licinius’ soldiers fell at Chrysopolis.
54 Estimates of the number of recruits needed to replenish the Roman army in the period of the Tetrarchy each year vary widely: according to Williams (2000: p. 97) we are looking at 90,000 men, but Stephenson (2010: p. 98) suggests the figure was as low as 20,000.
55 The town should be distinguished from the neighbouring town of Mursa minor, which was located near the present-day town of Petrijevci, about ten kilometres to the west, on the Drava in Croatia. Date: Consularia Constantinopolitana, s. a. 351 (Burgess 1993: p. 237).
58 Philost. HE III, 26; Socr. HE II, 32; Soz. HE IV, 7; Aur. Vict. 42, 10.
59 Eutr. X, 12, 1 (non multo post Magnentius apud Mursam profligatus acie est et paene captus. Ingentes Romani imperii vires ea dimicatione consumptae sunt, ad quaelibet bella externa idoneae, quae multum triumphorum possent securitatisque conferre).
Roman forces were consumed and the fortunes of the whole empire were thrown into ruin.  

The size of armies at the Frigidus

If we turn our attention to what our sources have to say about the size of the two armies at the Frigidus, we will not be satisfied. There are simply no figures pertaining to the size of either army. Theodoret suggested that Theodosius’ army was weaker; Orosius, on the other hand, suggested that the forces were balanced, and this view is supported by other sources. The only source that tells us at least some specific number is Jordanes. He speaks of the participation of the Gothic federates, settled on Roman soil: “From these the emperor led more than twenty thousand soldiers, knowing that they were friends loyal to him, against the usurper Eugenius, who had killed Gratian and occupied Gaul.”

Obviously, Jordanes here mixed up Theodosius’ campaign against Eugenius with that against Maximus, being dependent on Orosius, whom he probably read rather carelessly and confused the two events; Orosius, however, only says that 10,000 of these Gothic federates fell in the battle. It is possible that Jordanes judged that the Goths had 50 percent losses, and adjusted the figure he found in Orosius accordingly.

Some scholars trust the Jordanes’ figure without question, but it is unlikely, not least because Jordanes is frequently quite generous with the numbers. For example, he tells us that in the reign of the emperor Philippus Arabs in 248 or 249 the Romans faced the Gothic king Ostrogotha, who had more than 300,000 men with him; or that the Gothic king Cniva made an invasion of Roman territory in 250 with more than 70,000 men; that Attila had half a million men in arms; that 180,000 men fell on both sides on the Catalaunian fields in 451; and even that the battle between the Lombards and the Gepids in Pannonia, which occurred in his lifetime, in 551 or 552, had more than 60,000 dead.

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60 Epitome 42, 4 (Hoc tempore Constantius cum Magnentio apud Mursiam dimicans vicit. In quo bello paene nusquam amplius Romanae consumerunt et totius imperii fortuna pessumdata).
61 Thedoret. HE V, 24 (τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν ολίγους εἶναι τοὺς συμπαραταττόμενους φησάντων); Oros. Hist. 7, 34, 13.
63 Oros. Hist. 7, 34, 19.
64 In the Romana, however, Jordanes asserts that Theodosius killed 10,000 of Eugenius and Arbogast’s soldiers in the battle (see note 69 below).
68 Jord. Get. 91 (Ostrogotha); Get. 101 (Cniva); Get. 182 (Attila); Get. 217 (Catalaunian fields). The Lombards and Gepids: Rom. 386. Jordanes also emphasizes that this was a one-day battle (una die). Procopius (bell. VIII, 25, 11–15) merely speaks of a hard battle in which very many Gepids fell. See also Paulus Diaconus, Historia Langobardorum I, 23 (caesisque quam plurimis); see Curta (2001: p. 87).
Orosius, as we have seen above, tells us the number of the fallen Gothic federates – 10,000. Not only is this number problematic, but Orosius also asserts that Theodosius had no other casualties; he literally says that “the civil war was quenched by the blood of two men”, meaning Arbogast and Eugenius. Orosius considers the loss of 10,000 Goths not only acceptable but even a great advantage to the empire: “their loss was our great gain, and their defeat was our victory.” On the other hand, the Epitome de Caesaribus tells us that Arbogast’s side lost 10,000 warriors. If we were to take these figures seriously, this would mean a loss of 20,000 soldiers in a two-day hard battle. Other sources, which will be discussed later, indicate that the losses were probably much higher. This brings us finally to the data on the composition of the armies involved.

The composition of armies at Frigidus

Eugenius’ army should theoretically correspond to the entire Western corps of comitatenses, i.e. primarily the “praesental army” under the supreme general present at the imperial court at Milan (magister utriusque militiae praesentalis); we can also assume the presence of units of the regional general in charge of Gaul (magister equitum per Gallias); however, we must assume that many units of comitatenses remained in Britain, Africa and Hispania. Taken together, therefore, the total number (at least on paper) of Eugenius’ army was perhaps 60,000 men, but in reality the number was probably lower. Apart from the fact that we have to reckon with the considerable losses of Western troops in the war between Theodosius and Maximus – not counting other military campaigns – the question arises whether some of the troops mentioned in the Notitia Dignitatum, which was not compiled for the West until sometime around 420, even existed at the time of Eugenius’ war with Theodosius.

As a confirmation of our suspicion that the Western units of the comitatenses were at least undermanned, we have the information that Arbogast recruited many Franks into his army. Errington includes the Alamanni, which is still plausible; Crawford adds the Burgundians as well, which appears unlikely and remains pure speculation. We also have the testimony of Ambrosius’ biographer Paulinus, who recounts a war of Arbogast against his fellow-tribesmen, i.e. the Franks, in which many Franks fell; with the remaining ones Arbogast is said to have made a treaty, inviting the Frankish kings to a banquet on that occasion. We do not know what the exact content of the treaty was, but the provision of recruits for the Roman army seems logical. Similarly, Arbogast may have

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69 Epitome 48, 7 (Eugenium quoque tyrannum atque Arbogasten superavit deletis eorum decem milibus pugnatorum); Jordanes (Rom. 317) closely follows this source (Eugenium quoque tyrannum atque Arbogasten divino auxilio praeditus vicit deletis eorum decem milibus pugnatorum).

70 Orosius VII, 35, 11–12.


72 Paulinus, Vita sancti Ambrosii 30: Per idem tempus Arbogastes comes adversum gentem suam, hoc est, Francorum, bellum paravit, atque pugnando non parvam multitudinem manu fudit, cum residuis vero pacem firmavit. Sed cum in convivio a regibus gentis suae interrogaretur, utrum sciret Ambrosium; et respondisset nosse se virum, et diligi ab
negotiated contracts with other Rhenish tribes to replenish his army or to create new units. This is all that can be said about the state of Eugenius’ army. Yet if we are to commit ourselves to any estimate, we may put its size (including the recruited Germans) at 50,000 men; and Theodosius’ army was probably similarly large.73

As for the army of his adversary, we are somewhat better informed at least as to its composition. Zosimus74 explains that while the regular Roman army (i.e., those detachments of comitatenses which the emperor had managed to assemble) was commanded by Timasius, with Stilicho acting as his deputy (or perhaps chief of staff), the barbarian allies were commanded by Saul, Gainas, and Bacurius. This division, though it says nothing about the ratio of Romans to non-Romans in Theodosius’ army, indicates the emperor’s desperate efforts to obtain contingents from all the barbarians who could be approached for help. The impression we get regarding the preparations for war is that both sides frantically tried to strengthen their forces, summoning any Roman or non-Roman militants within their power.75

Let’s start with the first named commander, Saul, because we do not know much about him. One source mentions the ethnicity of the warriors Saul commanded – they were Alans.76 Zosimus is the only other source that names Saul, but he gives us nothing except that Saul commanded part of Theodosius’ barbarian allies. Saul survived the battle (see below) and later apparently joined the Western army, as a certain Saul fought for Honorius at Pollentia against Alaric in April 402. However, we cannot be quite sure whether this Saul is identical with the commander at the Frigidus. If so, he was fighting against his former comrade-in-arms, because Alaric took part in the battle of the Frigidus, too.77

How the Alans came into the Roman service in the East we do not know, but it is not difficult to guess. After 376 groups of Alans appeared in the Balkans and took part in battles with the Romans; the emperor Gratian, marching in 378 to the aid of his uncle Valens towards Thrace, was suddenly ambushed at Castra Martis (in the province

73 See Crawford (2012) for a detailed discussion (with unconvincing arguments) of the maximum numbers of the two armies involved; for the battle of Frigidus he reckons with over 150,000 soldiers on both sides, a highly exaggerated number at any case. Hebblewhite (2020: p. 138) does not give any numbers but opines that the two armies “were evenly matched” or perhaps Theodosius enjoyed “a slight numerical advantage”.

74 Zos. IV, 57–58.

75 This impression is reinforced by Claudianus (de III cons. Hon. 102nn.), who speaks of the participation of “many tribes from the East” (gentes remotas Aurorae) on Theodosius’ side (namely, from Asia Minor, Syria, Arabia, or Armenia).


77 Saul at Pollentia is mentioned only by Orosius (Hist. VII, 37, 2) who describes him as a barbarian commander and pagan; he even ascribes to him the supreme command in this battle, which suggests that this Saul had at least the rank of comes rei militaris. See PLRE II (p. 981, Saul); cf. PLRE I (p. 809, Saul).
of Dacia ripensis) by the Alans. Indeed, a few years later Gratian recruited some Alans into his (Western) army. Many Alans also took part in the Rhine crossing on 31.12.406. It is reasonable to assume that in addition to many Goths, Theodosius also recruited many Alans into the Eastern army in the 80s or 90s of the 4th century, and put Saul in command of them.

Gainas commanded mainly the Gothic federates, settled in the Balkans as a result of the treaty of 382, who allegedly formed a kind of vanguard of the whole army. But, as we shall see below, we have in fact no certainty that Gainas did not also command barbarians other than those Goths who were bound by the treaty with Theodosius; nor is it clear what position his men occupied in the battle arrangement. Even the rank of Gainas in the battle escapes us; as leader of the federates he may have had none. He did, however, survive the battle and in the following year, he is attested as a comes (rei militaris?); still later, at the time of the great internal crisis of the Eastern Empire in 399, he briefly became a general. Zosimus claims that Gainas hailed from beyond the Danube, not from the Roman Empire. Alaric, who also took part in the battle of the Frigidus, was born on the Peuce island, a large area at the mouth of the Danube.

Socrates Scholasticus specifically speaks of a large number of barbarians residing across the Danube, who joined Theodosius in 394 (‘Απιόντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸν κατὰ Εὐγενίου πόλεμον πλείστοι τῶν πέραν τοῦ Ἰστρον βαρβάρων ἐπηκολούθουσιν, συμμαχεῖν κατὰ τοῦ τυράνου προωφούμενοι). We may therefore assume contacts between Theodosius’ commanders of Gothic origin, such as Gainas and Alaric, with the barbarians living beyond the Danube. Tempted by the reward, the barbarians crossed the Danube and reported for duty. Needless to say, these were not just the Goths. Joannes Antiochenus says that at Frigidus, there were also present “many Huns from Thrace with their tribal leaders” (πολλούς τε τῶν Θρᾳκῶν Οὔννων, σὺν τοῖς παρεπομένοις φυλάρχοις), and that “the Scythian army was commanded by Gainas”. Obviously, the term “Scythian” is used very loosely here – the author describes even Stilicho himself as being of Scythian descent (ὅς ἦν μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀνέκαθεν τοῦ Σκυθικοῦ γένους). Sozomenus, too, affirms that Theodosius’ army was joined by “a number of allies living by the Danube” without disclosing their

78 Amm. Marc. XXXI, 11, 6.
79 Zos. IV, 35.
80 On the history of the Alans at this time, see Bachrach (1973: pp. 27–29).
81 PLRE I (pp. 379–380, Gainas).
82 Zos. V, 21, 9.
83 Alaric’s birthplace: Claud. de VI cons. Hon. 105–106; his participation in the battle is attested by Zos. V, 5, 4; Socr. HE VII, 10.
84 Socr. HE 5,25
85 Also, the Goth Tribigildus, later infamous for his rebellion in Asia Minor, may have been a relative of Gainas, as suggested by PLRE II (p. 1125, Tribigildus, “relative of Gainas”), since Socrates’ expression (HE VI, 6, 5) Τριβιγίλδου δὲ ἐνὸς τῶν αὐτῶι συγγενῶν can be translated as “one of his relatives”; but, according to Sozomen (HE VIII, 4, 2), it seems that Tribigild only “belonged to the same tribe” (ὅς αὐτῷ γένει τριβιγίλδου). In any case, it can be assumed that he, too, came from the Transdanubian regions.
ethnicity (συνείπετο ὃ τῷ καὶ πλήθος συμμάχων τῶν παρὰ τὸν Ἰστρὸν βαρβάρων). In any case, Theodosius’ barbarian allies at Frigidus came from both sides of the Danube and certainly included more than just the Gothic federates.

These and other barbarians suffered the full brunt of the attack on the first day. Zosimus testifies that “a large part of the barbarian allies” of Theodosius were destroyed, and that Bacurius, who fought at the head of his troops, fell after a brave fight. Bacurius came from a royal family in Iberia (modern Georgia), joined the ranks of the Roman army, and took part in the battle of Adrianople. Apparently, he was still young then, because 16 years later he was still serving, and even personally fought at the head of his troops at Frigidus. Sometime between 378 and 394 he served as provincial commander of Palestine (dux Palaestinae), after which he became a comes domesticorum; however, we do not know his official position at the battle of the Frigidus and it is just possible that he was a magister militum vacans. At Frigidus, he was given command of part of Theodosius’ barbarian allies, and according to Zosimus, he bore the brunt of the enemy pressure during the first day (Zosimus lumps the two days of the battle into one, dividing the battle into two phases). It even seems that by tying the enemy’s forces to himself he enabled the others, that is, Gainas and Saul, to retreat and save themselves unexpectedly (τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους παραλόγως ἢμα τοῖς περιλειφθέισι διαφυγεῖν). Rufinus and Socrates Scholasticus both affirm that Bacurius saved the day at a critical moment, when he rushed into the middle of the battle, broke the enemy’s ranks, and made the enemies to retreat. Another ecclesiastical historian, Theodoret, confirms that Theodosius lost many of his barbarian allies in the battle (στρατεύσας ὁ βασιλεὺς πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων παραταττόμενος κατηκόντισε, πολλοὺς δὲ τῶν ἐπικουροῦντων αὐτῷ βαρβάρων ἀπέβαλε), and also Philostorgius says that the battle was severe and the losses on both sides were severe.

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87 Soz. HE VII, 24.
88 Zos. IV, 58, 3.
89 According to Zosimus (IV, 57, 3) he came from Armenia, which must be an error, since other sources (Ammianus Marcellinus, Rufinus and Socrates Scholasticus) speak of Iberia.
90 Amm. Marc. XXXI, 12, 16 (sagittarii et scutarii, quos Bacurius Hiberus quidam tunc regebat et Cassio).
91 PLRE I (p. 144, Bacurius). See Rufinus, HE I, 10 (Haec nobis ita gesta, fidelissimum vir Bacurius, gentis ipius rex, et apud nos domesticorum comes (cui summa erat cura et religionis et veritatis) exposuit, cum nobiscum Palaestini tunc limitis dux, in jerusolymis satis unanimiter degeret). Socrates Scholasticus (HE I, 20) picked up the story: Ταῦτα φησὶν ὁ ῾Ρουφῖνος παρὰ Βακουρίου μεμαθηκέναι, ὡς πρότερον μὲν ἦν βασιλίσκος ᾿Ιβήρων, ύστερον δὲ ᾿Ρωμαίοις προσελθὼν, ταξίαρχος τοῦ ἐν Παλαιστινῇ στρατιωτικοῦ κατέστη· καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα στρατηλατῶν τὸν κατὰ Μαξίμου τοῦ τυράννου πόλεμον τῷ βασιλεί Thedosioi συνηγωνίσατο. Τοῦτον μὲν τὸν τρόπον καὶ ᾿Ιβήρης ἔχυστανάνασε ἐπὶ τῶν Κωνσταντίνου χρόνων.
92 Zos. IV, 58, 3.
93 Socr. HE 5, 25 (Βακούριος γὰρ ὁ στρατηλάτης αὐτοῦ τοσοῦτον ἐπερρώσθη, ὡστε σὺν τοῖς πρωταγωνιστάσις εἰσδραμεν, καθ’ ὃ μέρος οἱ βαξβαροὶ ἐδωκόντο· καὶ διαρρήσει μὲν τῆς φαλάγγας, τρέπει δὲ εἰς φυγήν τοὺς πρὸ βραχέως διώκοντας); Ruf. HE II, 33 (et præcipue Bacurius, vir fide, piètate, virtute et animi et corporis insignis, et qui comes esse et socius Theodosii mererentur, proximos quosque conto, telis, gladio passim sternit, agmina hostium conferita et consipita perrumpt. Ier per milia ruentium ad ipsum tyrannum, ruptis agminibus, et acervatim fusi stragibus, agit).
94 Theodoret. HE V, 24, 3.
heavy (μάχης καρτερᾶς γενομένης καὶ πολλῶν ἐκατέρωθεν ἄπολλυμένων). Rufinus, who wrote the last book of his Ecclesiastical History only a few years after this battle, describes the massacre of Theodosius’ barbarians in the battle, whereupon he relates that Theodosius prayed on high ground in sight of both armies during the battle; his prayer is said to have encouraged his commanders, and especially Bacurius, who rushed into the fiercest battle to try to kill Eugenius himself.

The two-day battle, therefore, seems to have been very costly to both sides, brought no resolution, and made Theodosius hesitant about how to proceed. It should be noted at this point that most sources simplify the plot considerably and summarize all events in a single day; also, not all of them mention the betrayal and defection of Eugenius’ commander Arbitio (see above) or other details. About half of our sources, however, agree on the curious ending of the battle. After Bacurius had saved the day and averted disaster from Theodosius’ army, a violent wind arose and blew against Eugenius’ soldiers, making it impossible for them to fight; the thrown spears were said to have come back, piercing the unfortunate combatants.

This element of the narrative seems to be quite authentic, as the so-called bora is a well-known natural phenomenon in Slovenia. It is particularly common in the Vipava valley, where it can reach speeds of over 17 m/s, and gusts may reach values larger than 50 m/s. On the Beaufort scale, the higher value means the twelfth, strongest degree; the effects of the wind can be devastating, and it is easy to imagine that sudden gusts could make it impossible for soldiers not only to fight man-to-man, but also to walk. And it is also easy to imagine the religious imagery that both sides associated with this natural phenomenon; Theodosius’ army was probably greatly emboldened, and the sol-

95 Philostorg. HE XI, 2.
96 Rufinus HE XII, 33 (fundebant auxilia barbarorum et terga iam hostibus dabant. Sed fiebat hoc non ut Theodosius vinceretur, sed ne per barbaros vicere videretur ... Bacurius, vir fide, pietate, virtute et animi et corporis insignis, et qui comes esse et socius Theodosii mererentur). Other sources try to document Theodosius’ piety in the midst of battle in an absurd way, see e.g. Ambrosius, de obit. Theod. 7, according to which the emperor jumped off his horse during the battle and stood in front of the battle line of his soldiers to pray.
97 Rufinus, HE XII, 33; Oros. hist. VII, 35, 17–19; Augustine, de civ. Dei V, 26; Theodoret. HE V, 24; Socr. HE V, 25; Soz. HE VII, 24. Other sources do not mention it, and Zosimus (IV, 58, 3) speaks of a solar eclipse instead, which is obviously impossible because there was no eclipse between 16 May and 11 October 394, see https://eclipse.gsfc.nasa.gov/SEcat5/SE0301-0400.html.
99 It is unnecessary to argue (like Heblewhite 2020: p. 139) that the actual effects of bora on the fighting were probably overstated for narrative effect. Nor can we seriously consider this phenomenon to be a mere literary topos. Not only is bora a frequent guest in today’s Vipava valley, especially in autumn and winter, but some of our sources seem to be well informed about how this phenomenon affected the outcome of the battle – especially Claudian, who wrote two years after the battle (Panegyric on the Emperor Honorius’ Third Consulate 93–95: te propter gelidis Aquilo de monte procellis / obruit adversas acies revolutaque tela / vertit in auctores et turbine reppulit hastas), and Augustine, who refers both to Claudian’s Panegyric and to eyewitnesses: “Soldiers who were there have told me that the missiles which they were hurling were snatched from their hands by a strong wind blowing from the direction of Theodosius against his enemies. Not only did this increase the velocity of the missiles which were being hurled at them: it even turned their own missiles back against them, to pierce their own bodies” (de civ. Dei V, 26, trans. by Dyson 1998).
diers could effortlessly hurl spears or shoot arrows with great impact and range against an enemy who was unable to react in any way. The demoralized remnants of Arbogast’s army surrendered and Eugenius was executed; Arbogast escaped his fate by only a few days, committing suicide while fleeing in the mountains.

How costly was the battle for the Roman army as a whole? Let us shortly sum up a few comparable civil wars discussed earlier. In a battle with Licinius, on 30 April 313, Maximinus Daia lost 50% of his troops. On 8 October 316, at the battle of Cibalae, 20,000 of Licinius’ soldiers fell, which is 57% attrition rate. In the second war with Constantine in 324, Licinius lost 34,000 men at the battle of Adrianople alone; at Chrysopolis, there were at least 25,000 more dead. Attrition rates are unknown in these cases but must have been horrible. At the battle of Mursa, Constantius II lost about 30,000 men, Magnentius 24,000 men; that constitutes 37% and 66% attrition rates, respectively. And we know that at the battle of Hadrianopolis, Roman casualties were about 67%. We also briefly analysed some of the battles of various civil wars in the 1st century B.C. and 1st century A.D., and arrived at similar attrition rates. Under extreme conditions at Frigidus, 50% attrition rate for both armies is a reasonable conclusion. We have seen that it is not unreasonable to suppose that the armies at Frigidus had about 100,000 soldiers between them. Therefore, the number of about 50,000 dead on the battlefield during this two-days hard battle is plausible.

After 378, there was increasingly difficult for any Emperor to muster 40–50,000 soldiers for a campaign; but after 394, it was impossible, at least in the West. Indeed, if the famous term “Pyrrhic victory” can be applied to any battle of late antiquity, it is the battle of the Frigidus. That there must have been considerable loss of life was shown by the next 15 years in the West: we shall see that by 394–410 the strength of the Western army had degraded to the point where even Italy itself was no longer a safe part of the Empire.

**The consequences of the battle of the Frigidus**

First of all, let us address the alleged high losses of the Gothic federates. There is an obvious problem here: if most of the Goths were slaughtered in the battle, it is hard to see how Alaric and the remaining Goths could have posed any serious threat to either of the two empires just a few years after the battle. Besides, we know of other Gothic commanders who were operating with their Gothic troops in the East at the same time, and who had nothing to do with Alaric and in any case did not join his rebellion; the contingent of Gothic federates with which Gainas and Alaric went into battle at Frigidus could not therefore have suffered such heavy losses.\(^{100}\)

Our sources, as we have seen, otherwise speak in general terms of the heavy losses of Theodosius’ barbarian allies, and give no figures at all or at least no indication of the total number of dead or of the military impact of the battle. Nor, of course, can we

\(^{100}\) See *PLRE* I (p. 283, Eriulfus; he died shortly before the battle of the Frigidus), then *PLRE* II (pp. 1125–1126, Tribigildus) and *PLRE* I (pp. 372–373, Fravitta); perhaps also Sarus (*PLRE* II: pp. 978–979). See also Doležal (2008: pp. 228–230, 241–244 and 246–248).
expect them to do so. What mattered to Orosius, church historians, or other Christian sources was the victory of the orthodox emperor, not the defensibility of the empire ten years after the battle.

And the empire was really under threat, especially in the West. We have indications of manpower shortages in the army already at the beginning of the 5th century, even for the frontier and for the defence of Italy itself. Field armies also seem to suffer from this problem. O’Flynn argued that recruiting recruits for the Roman army was the main purpose of Stilicho’ Rhine campaign in 396. When Mascezel was sent by Stilicho to Africa in 398 to put down the rebellion of his own brother Gildo, he was given a totally inadequate number of men to accomplish his task – no more than 5,000. It is possible, however, that most of the Western comitatenses were still unavailable for the African campaign because of Stilicho’s expedition against Alaric in the Balkans in the previous year. And it is true that in 402 the Western army still fought satisfactorily when Stilicho defeated Alaric directly on Italian soil at Pollentia and Verona.

The invasion of Radagaisus in 405 represented a much more serious crisis. It must be emphasized that it took Stilicho more than half a year to gather enough troops to confront the Germanic leader at all. According to Zosimus, Stilicho gathered only 30 units (arithmoi) of the regular army (not counting the Alannic and Hunnic federates) against Radagaisus in August 406. A. H. M. Jones judged that these 30 units meant approximately 20,000 men, while Burns and Heather lean more towards the figure of 15,000. Anytime in the course of the 4th century this would have been a ridiculous force, while at the beginning of the fifth century, it was clearly the maximum number of soldiers Stilicho could muster in the West, at the cost of recruiting slaves into his army and ruthlessly withdrawing units from the Rhenish limes. Needless to say, the latter decision backfired on the Western Empire later that year, as the Rhenish frontier, now only weakly protected by Frankish federates, was overrun by the invasion of Gaul by the Vandals, Alans and Suebi (Prosper gives the exact date as 31 December 406). And even before

101 Burns (1994: p. 164): “The archaeological data make it manifest that the passes in the Julian Alps were never again systemically defended after their denudation in 394.”
102 O’Flynn (1983: p. 33): “Now he was left with western troops alone, the remnant of the army that Theodosius had defeated at the Frigidus, and his first concern was recruiting more troops. For this purpose, he made an expedition along the Rhine in 396.”
103 Southern and Dixon (2014: p. 56; Source: Orosius VII, 36, 6).
105 Zos. V, 26. Heather (1995: pp. 12–13): “Radagaisus was executed on 23 August 406; four months later, on 31 December, groups from a number of different peoples crossed the Rhine into Gaul.”
107 On this, see Wijnendaele (2016: p. 271).
108 Prosper, Chronicon, s. a. 406 (Vandali et Alani Gallias trajecto Rheno ingressi II. k. Ian.). Zosimus (VI, 3, 1) confirms the year 406. The date 31.12.406 is not doubted by Drinkwater (1998: p. 271) and Thompson (1977: p. 303), although the latter thought that the transport of very many men, women and children certainly did not take place in the single day; he took the day of the beginning of the invasion. Kulikowski
this invasion, in 406, there was a revolt of the legions in Britain, when a certain Marcus
was proclaimed emperor, followed early in 407 by a certain Gratianus, and finally, probably
in May 407, by Constantine III.

Although Stilicho succeeded in crushing Radagaisus’ forces, his first concern was to
replenish the thinning ranks of his army. Olympiodorus claims that after the victory over
Radagaisus, Stilicho incorporated 12,000 prisoners into his army. In this, Olympiodorus
seems to disagree with Zosimus, according to whom Radagaisus’ horde of 400,000 men (!) was almost completely destroyed and only very few survivors were incorporated into
Stilicho’s army.\textsuperscript{109} Prosper and Augustine also speak of large number of barbarians who
were killed.\textsuperscript{110} Another version of events is offered by Orosius, followed by Marcellinus
Comes and Jordanes: 200,000 barbarians surrendered without a fight and were sold into
slavery.\textsuperscript{111} Jeroen Wijnendaele shows convincingly that Orosius’ version is to be ignored:
there was indeed a regular battle with losses on both sides; Radagaisus may have had
some 40,000 warriors (taken together with women and children, he could perhaps have
led 200,000 souls into Italy), but he divided his warriors into three groups, which Stilicho
and his commanders were able to handle individually, even though the Roman forces
were clearly outnumbered 2:1.\textsuperscript{112}

But even if the victory over Radagaisus was relatively bloodless for the Western Roman
army, the Romans clearly needed to replenish their forces. This became apparent in the
following years, when war again raged on Italian soil: in 409 only 6,000 men (5 \textit{tagmata}
according to Zosimus) could be sent for the defence of Rome; these soldiers came from
Dalmatia, and were to reinforce the garrison in Rome.\textsuperscript{113} Similarly, in 410 the emperor
Honorius had to make do with 4,000 soldiers (6 \textit{arithmoi} according to both Sozomen and
Zosimus) who were sent to his aid from the East to Ravenna.\textsuperscript{114} Stilicho, it seems, had

\textsuperscript{109} Olympiodorus, frg. 9 (ἀπευθέρευσεν διά φόβους, ὡστε μηδενα σχεδὸν ἐκ τοῦτων περισσοθένεν,
πλὴν ἐλαχίστους ὅσους αὐτὸς τῇ Ῥωμαίων προσέθηκεν συμμαχίᾳ), cf. Zos. V, 26. But Zosimus is generally un
reliable as to the reported numbers of barbarians in battles. For example, he tells us (III, 3, 3) that at the
battle of Argentoratum in 357, Julian’s army slew 60,000 Alamanni, and the same number of his enemies
are said to have drowned in the Rhine, while according to much more reliable Ammianus Marcellinus
(XVI, 12, 63) the number of Alamani dead on the battlefield was counted at 6,000, and other unesti
mable numbers were carried away by the river, while the Roman losses were only 247 men (ex Alamannis
vero sex milia corporum numerata sunt in campo constrata et inaestimabiles mortuorum acervi per undas fluminis
ferebantur).

\textsuperscript{110} Prosper, \textit{Chronicon}, s. a. 406 (multis Gothorum milibus caestis); Augustine, \textit{civ. Dei} V, 23 (multo amplius quam
centum milium prosterneretur).

\textsuperscript{111} Orosius VII, 37, 4–16; Marcellinus Comes, s. a. 406; Jord. \textit{Rom.} 321.

\textsuperscript{112} Wijnendaele (2016: p. 271).

\textsuperscript{113} Zos. V, 45.

\textsuperscript{114} Zos. VI, 8; Soz. \textit{HE} 9,8. On the basis of these and similar data, it can also be concluded that a legion or
comparable unit of a mobile army had approximately 1,000 men (see discussion above). Jones (1964:
p. 682) judged it to be more like 600–700, but these particular units mentioned by Zosimus may have been
understaffed.
no choice in 406; he had to reinforce his army and the 12,000 captured barbarians were a significant help at the time.

**Conclusion**

This dismal state of the Western Empire’s military forces just 15 years after the battle of the Frigidus clearly points to the culprit. We have seen above that the casualties of the Roman armies in the civil wars of the 4th century, according to our sources, seem to have been in principle anywhere between a third and a half of the troops involved, at least in the case of the defeated army (however, we have seen that Mursa, for example, was costly to both sides, and the total casualties in this case were 46%). The battle of the Frigidus was apparently a horrific massacre that probably reduced the operational reserves of the entire empire by as much as 50%. For either part of the Empire after 395 and over the next few decades, it was not possible to fight two wars simultaneously, nor to send large expeditionary armies against external or internal enemies, nor to effectively defend the borders of the Empire against major invasions. And for the Western part of the empire, an imaginary clock began ticking, inexorably counting down the time until its collapse.

**Bibliography**

**Primary sources**


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115 Heather (2010: p. 175) agrees that “close to 50 per cent of the western Roman field army” disappeared between 395 and 410.


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