A DYNAMIC MODEL OF TEXT AND ITS AXIOLOGICAL DIMENSION

1 Introduction

The first part of this paper presents a typology of values which is gradually constructed on the basis of Charles Morris’ theory of values, selected concepts belonging to contemporary humanistic psychology, and on the basis of a typology of values developed by Jadwiga Puzynina. Next, the relationship between texts and values specified in the typology is examined. Michael Halliday’s approach to the text as well as the contributions of Theo Herrmann and Joachim Grabowski make it possible to view texts as phenomena which can dynamically shape reality according to the will of the text producer. It is thus argued that, at least in reference to the typology of values presented here, the properties of texts which enable texts to modify reality might be regarded and investigated as values.

2 The axiological foundations

The axiological framework of this paper is founded mainly on two sources: on Morris’ theory of values and on selected concepts of humanistic psychology. A fusion of ideas stemming from these sources might be treated as a risky endeavor considering the fact that Morris and humanistic psychologists seem to represent two different points of view. Morris (1964: 17), claiming his axiology to be “the study of preferential behaviour” quite openly reveals the affinity of his theory with the behavioural tradition in psychology. Behaviourism, according to Zenon Uchnast (1983: 7), represents an “external” or “objective” point of view which assumes investigations based solely on the observation of man from the outside. Theories of humanistic psychology, in turn, are regarded by Uchnast as ones derived from an “internal” or “phenomenological” point of view which provides an opportunity to account for the individual ability of man to “perceive oneself and the surrounding world in a given situation”. So, apparently, Morris’ concepts and the concepts of humanistic psychology stand in sharp opposition. However, it seems as if there is a possibility of agreement between these two approaches. Morris is interested in an exploration of human behaviour on the
basis of observable data. Yet, in his generalizations concerning axiology he underscores the motivational and teleological aspects of human behaviour which seem to be the focal points of interest for humanistic psychologists (cf. Engler 1985: 275, or Porebska 1991: 46–47). Thus, it would be worthwhile to check if at least some of Morris’ theoretical constructs concerning values could function within one entity with selected theoretical constructs which are present in humanistic psychology and which refer to internal mental processes.

In his book *Signification and Significance: A Study of the Relations of Signs and Values* (1964: 17), as has been noted, Morris identifies axiology with “the study of preferential behaviour”. We can speak of positive preferential behaviour of an organism towards an object or situation when the organism in question “acts so as to maintain the presence of this object or situation, or to construct this object or situation if it is not present”. Negative preferential behaviour towards an object or situation takes place when an organism “seeks to move away from this object or situation, or to destroy or prevent the occurrence of this object or situation” (Morris 1964: 16–17). Proceeding from the notion of positive/negative preferential behaviour, Morris distinguishes three kinds of values: operative values, conceived values, and object values.

Operative value is “the direction of preferential behaviour of a given individual in a variety of situations” (Morris 1964: 19). In this paper, however it is proposed to use the term *operative value* as referring to every purposeful action that is an instance of human preferential behaviour.

Next, preferential behaviour, be it negative or positive, “may be accorded to a signified object or situation” which “need not be present and need not even exist”. In this case, Morris speaks of *conceived values*, simultaneously comparing the idea of conceived value with utopias, on one hand and, on the other, with the approach to value of Clyde Kluckhohn (1951) who identifies values with “concepts of the desirable” (Morris 1964: 19). Additionally, it has to be stressed that “a conceived value may be the source of operative value” if one attempts to “bring about the conceived utopia” (Morris 1964: 20).

Finally, the object value is presented by Morris (1964: 20) as a property “of an object considered in relation to its ability to reinforce preferential behaviour directed toward it by some organisms”. However, in this paper it is assumed that the term *object value* may refer not only to a certain property of an object but also to a property of a situation.

Now, let us consider more thoroughly the relation between values and action. Morris, following George Herbert Mead, understands action as the result of an impulse. The action itself is analyzed as consisting of three phases which are labeled: the perceptual, manipulatory, and consummatory phases. In the perceptual phase, the acting organism “must perceive the relevant features of the environment in which it is to act”. The manipulatory phase embraces the organism’s behaviour “in a way relevant to the satisfaction of its impulse”. Eventually, “if all goes well, it [the organism] then attains the phase of activity which is the consummation of the act” (Morris 1964: 4). Thus, the actions may “differ to the extent to which the three stages of action are predominant (Morris 1964: 22). All
three phases of action are postulated by Morris (1964: 21–22) to possess their counterparts in so called “primary dimensions” of object, conceived, and operative values. The detachment dimension of any kind of value calls for the perceptual stage of action. The manipulatory stage of action is stimulated by the dominance dimension of value, and the dependence dimension of value is involved in the consummatory stage of action. So, differences among particular objective, operative or conceived values might be described in reference to the ratio of the three dimensions. The ratio of the three dimensions, in turn, is responsible for the ratio of three phases of an individual’s action, and thus, it is possible to judge the character of an individual’s values through observation of the individual’s actions (cf. Morris 1964: 22).

What makes Morris’ approach attractive is therefore the fact that, within one theory, he embraced three ways of understanding the notion of value. However, this same fact may serve as a basis for criticism of Morris’ axiological framework. Gerhard Kloska (1982: 29) points out that the notions of object, operative, and conceived values coexist without any superordinate notion. In this paper the understanding of operative and object values is slightly different from Morris’ but it still does not mean that any superordinate notion for the three kinds of values can be found. It does mean, however, that all three kinds of values can be seen as related to one particular concept, the concept of need. Thanks to the concept of need, the three kinds of values may be jointly considered on the level of internal motivation and on the teleological level. However, to speak about motivations and teleological dimensions of human preferential behaviour, it is necessary to breach the borders of purely behaviouristic approaches in psychology.

There have been several attempts to define the concept of human need (cf. Jankowski 1976: 137–139) but, for the purpose of this paper, the most appropriate seems to be the definition provided by Henry Murray (1938). In Barbara Engler’s (1985: 223) interpretation, a need was defined by Murray “as a construct representing a force in the brain that organizes our perception, understanding, and behaviour in such a way as to change an unsatisfying situation and increase our satisfaction […] It motivates us to look for or avoid certain kinds of press”.

Let us now concentrate on the relationships among need, the three kinds of values, and action. An individual feeling a particular need judges which properties of objects or situations it is necessary to achieve if the need is to be satisfied. Then, during the perceptual and manipulatory phases of action, which is an instance of preferential behaviour, the individual tries to bring about the necessary properties, and finally the consummatory phase of action overlaps with the process of satisfying a given need. In such a situation, however, the manipulatory phases of various actions may happen to be of various intensity as certain properties may be more easily accessible than others. The manipulatory phase may be even non existent if the desired properties of objects or situations are brought about by coincidence or by an act performed by another individual. The possibility of such a situation occurring was noticed by Murray (1964: 189) and referred to as “gratification”. One should also remark here that, according to Abraham Maslow (1964: 159, cf. Hilgard 1972: 195), human needs do not have to be sat-
isfied one at a time. This would imply that a particular human purposeful action may be simultaneously motivated by a number of concurrent needs.

Having this in mind, it is possible to state that an individual is likely to regard certain properties of objects/situations as object values and attempt to reach with them through action if, in the individual’s opinion, these properties may satisfy the individual’s needs. As to the notion of operative value, it also can be construed as depending on an individual’s needs. This problem will be discussed at length later and here it is enough to say that purposeful actions that are instances of human preferential behaviour, i.e. operative values in our understanding, may be stimulated by an occurrence of a need and may contribute to the satisfaction of this need. We could also postulate that human needs condition the acceptance of certain concepts as conceived values which, once accepted, may modify the character of needs occurring after the moment of acceptance. Conceived values, then, might be compared to a specific control system that shapes human needs and is therefore reflected in both object and operative values.

Yet, the above reasoning presents man as such in an almost deterministic manner which is not the ultimate intention of the author. One could ask then if it is possible to enrich the theory of values based on the study of behaviour and needs with another level of consideration – the level which could enable us to approach the problem of value while simultaneously taking into account the subjectively perceived dynamic process of an individual’s development. The answer to the question is affirmative, however, it has to be stressed that for the purpose of introducing the next level it will be necessary to resort to the notion of self-actualization and to speculations more characteristic of philosophy than of psychology, although the ideas to be dealt with here do function as the foundations of humanistic approaches in psychology (cf. Engler 1985: 274–343, or Allport 1988, or Jankowski 1976).

So, let us now concentrate on the notion of self-actualization, which seems to be of great importance in humanistic psychology, and which may shed some light on the immediate reasons of the occurrence of human needs.

Referring to Allport (1988: 17), we can see the origins of the concept of self-actualization in Baruch Spinoza’s views, particularly in the idea of conatus. Conatus – “the tendency to self-preservation and self-affirmation” – was to explain “the secrets of all development”. Modern humanistic psychologists such as Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers, while dealing with the idea of self-actualization, often refer to Kurt Goldstein’s (1939) views; however, the way in which Maslow (1970) and Rogers (1951) understand the idea of self-actualization undoubtedly shows some resemblance to Spinoza’s conatus. Engler (1985: 517), summing up Rogers’ and Maslow’s investigations, defines self-actualization as “a dynamic within the organism leading it to actualize, fulfill and enhance its inherent potentialities”. A similar assumption was also presented by Kazimierz Obuchowski while defining the notion of developmental autonomy:

the autonomy of man in reference to the surrounding world is based on realizing certain aims created by man in the world. These aims
are not only responses to events which have already happened or to events which are foreseen to happen. These aims constitute the expression of the individual’s life aspirations. We assume that the individual’s life aspirations should serve the purpose of utilizing one’s abilities, the purpose of development and the purpose of bringing oneself to perfection. So, we will regard an autonomy as a full autonomy when the aims created by man require man’s abilities to be used and developed and, moreover, we call this type of autonomy developmental. (Obuchowski 1977: 78)

The tendency to raise the level of self-actualization, or – using Obuchowski’s terms – the tendency to acquire a full developmental autonomy, is supposed to be characteristic of every human being (cf. Świrydowicz 1994: 15). Additionally, we might put forward a statement that it is this tendency that makes particular needs appear in particular situations. Similarly, then, we could conclude that the satisfaction of needs may contribute to the development of an individual’s self-actualization. Values, therefore, presented here as being related to needs, turn out to be inevitably connected with the individually perceived process of development.6

Moreover, it must be stated that having accepted the existence of interdependencies between values and needs, one is bound to postulate that any investigation of values requires in fact embracing investigations concerning the character of human needs. Therefore, it seems justified to deal more thoroughly with at least one problem connected with the phenomenon of need – namely with the problem of classifying needs.

The idea for classifying human needs, as Murray (1964: 177–178) observes, has been opposed by those who claim that every need is unique and that innumerable forms of human behaviour are motivated by an infinite number of combinations of human needs. Still Murray (1964: 180) supports the idea of formulating a classification of human needs stressing that this kind of classification might be a powerful tool of psychology. However, Murray is not the only one to have worked on classifications of human needs. Among the most well known scholars, one has to mention here also Fromm (1996), Maslow (1964, 1970) and Kazimierz Jankowski (1976).

The shortest list of human needs was presented by Jankowski (1976: 134–215). His list contains only two kinds of needs: the need to preserve social contact and the need to preserve an optimum of psychological activity.

Fromm (1996: 44–75), in turn, offered a slightly more elaborated classification embracing five classes which were summarized by Engler as follows:

- relatedness, the need to relate to other people and love productively;
- transcendence, the need to rise above the animal level of creatureliness and become active creators;
- rootedness, the need to feel that we belong;
- sense of identity, the need to become aware of ourselves as separate and unique individuals;
- frame of orientation and
devotion, the need for a stable and consistent frame of reference by which we can organize our perceptions and make sense of our environment. (Engler 1985: 154)

As for Maslow, not only did he classify human needs but also structured the classes in the hierarchy of human needs – the “hierarchy in which the needs that stand at the bottom must be satisfied before those at the top can be fulfilled” (Engler 1985: 308). So, according to Maslow (1964, 1970, cf. Engler 1985 307–310) the lowest level consists of physiological needs which enable the organism to survive biologically. Next come safety needs which “refer to the organism’s requirements for an orderly, stable and predictable world within which to feel secure” (Engler 1985: 309). The third level embraces belonging and love needs. These needs make an individual look for “affectionate and intimate relationships with other people” (Engler 1985: 309). Self-esteem needs form still another class and are divided into two kinds: the needs for self-respect and respect from other people. Self-respect needs subsequently involve needs for competence, confidence, mastery, achievement, independence, and freedom while the needs for respect from others refer to the need for recognition, acceptance, status, and appreciation. Finally, the top of the hierarchy is occupied by self-actualization needs, which turn out to be unique as far as every single human being is concerned. Generally speaking, self-actualization needs motivate an individual to “fully exploit his or her talents and capacities” (Engler 1985: 310). Moreover, to some extent independently of the hierarchy, Maslow speaks of esthetic needs (cf. Świrydowicz 1994: 13), of religious needs (Maslow 1964a) and of the need for knowledge and understanding (Maslow 1964: 150).

As we can see, Maslow distinguishes a separate class of needs called self-actualization needs. However we do not have to feel obliged to think that the general tendency to self-actualize mentioned earlier in this paper reveals itself only in some particular needs belonging to this class. On the contrary, it is postulated that the general tendency to self-actualize may stimulate the occurrence of every need mentioned in Maslow’s classification, and that the class of self-actualization needs may embrace any need(s) from the lower classes the satisfaction of which contributes to the development of self-actualization more than the satisfaction of the remaining needs. So, for every individual, the needs comprised by the class of self-actualization needs would be various and the differences could be explained by the suggestion that individuals accept their own sets of self-actualization needs based on a subjectively estimated role of satisfaction of certain needs in the overall process of self-actualization.

The last classification of needs to be discussed here is Murray’s. In one of his articles (1964) he presents a number of ways in which human needs might be divided. There, he differentiates between activity needs, which can be satisfied by the pure fact of performing certain actions not necessarily aimed at any concrete outcomes, and effect needs, which can be satisfied by achieving particular results. However, the most popular of Murray’s (1938) classifications is his list of 12 physiological needs, which enable a human being to survive physically and
psychogenic needs. The psychogenic needs were divided into six larger groups named successively as follows:

A. Needs connected with inanimate objects.
B. Needs being the expression of strong will, of the desire for achievements and prestige.
C. Needs connected with opposition to or subordination to the authority.
D. Needs connected with causing harm to oneself or to others.
E. Needs related to the relationships among people.
F. Additional needs of a social character such as the need to play, the need for knowledge, the need to explain. (Hilgard 1972: 193–194)

The lists of needs proposed by Jankowski, Fromm, Maslow, and Murray are described thoroughly enough to notice that all of these classifications do not exclude one another. What is more, the classifications frequently seem to overlap and to be compatible in their scopes. That is why our further investigations will be based on all of the above classifications and will treat the classifications to some extent as heterogeneous but still complementary attempts to describe and classify needs.

3 A typology of values based on classifications of needs

So far, we have discussed the division of values (into object, operative and conceived values), the relation of values to human needs and actions, as well as selected ways in which needs may be classified. This all has been done on the basis of psychological theories. However, we must not forget that values have also been the object of study for philosophers, who frequently came up with proposals for typologies of values. Is it then possible to construct a typology of values which would stem from philosophy itself and which would simultaneously take into consideration the characteristics of values taken from psychology and suggested in this paper?

Again, a construction of such a typology might seem to be a very risky task if we refer to a remark of Ralph Linton, who noticed a relatively big gap between the study of values within philosophy and the study of values conducted within psychology and sociology. According to Linton, philosophical studies of values have been based on vaguely defined notions (e.g. truth, good, beauty), and on supernatural factors. Besides, the language of philosophers appears to be too abstruse for other scientists. All in all, the conclusions of philosophers “turn out to be not as useful as one might expect” as they lack grounding in the achievements of modern sociology and psychology (in Kloska 1982: 10).

Still, a total rejection of philosophical studies of values would be unjustified. At least for the purpose of this paper, it is possible to find a typology rooted in philosophy which could be developed so as to embrace the division of values
into object, operative, and conceived values, the relationships holding between values and needs, as well as psychological classifications of needs.

The typology in question is the typology proposed by Jadwiga Puzynina and presented below in Figure 1.

**Figure 1** The typology of values presented by Puzynina (1991: 136)

The author of the typology is mainly preoccupied with linguistics but the typology itself seems to be predominantly of philosophical origin. As we can see in Figure 1, values as such are distinguished from the group of features, states, activities and objects on the basis of an individual’s attitude towards the members of the group. Next, the typology divides values into positive and negative values. Continuing, a distinction is made between absolute values and instrumental values, which always function in relation to any value of an absolute kind. Sometimes, as Puzynina claims, absolute values may happen to function as instrumental ones in reference to other absolute values. Another level offers a distinction between transcendental and non-transcendental values. Transcendental values are identified with religious values. Non-transcendental values are further divided into traditionally understood aesthetic, moral, epistemological, vital values, and the values of psychic/physiological feelings, which overlap with again traditionally understood hedonistic values and which additionally embrace “general experiences of happiness, joy (not necessarily of a hedonistic nature)” as well as “closeness (to persons, nation, motherland etc.)” (Puzynina 1991: 132–133).

Let us now suggest a transformation of Puzynina’s typology which is presented below in Figure 2.
Figure 2 A typology of values based on classifications of needs

Now, not only does the typology contain the idea of operative, object, and conceived values but it is also explicable in terms of the phenomenon of needs and their classifications.

In our typology (Figure 2), values belong to the superordinate group of actions, concepts-utopias, and properties of objects/situations. So, on this level we added concepts-utopias to Puzynina’s proposal simultaneously assuming that properties do not exist on their own but are always properties of objects or situations. We preserve the idea concerning the role of an individual’s attitude in distinguishing values and non-values. However, we further develop Puzynina’s idea by stating that the recognition of properties of objects/situations, concepts-utopias or actions as values is stimulated by an occurrence of need(s). This means that the properties of objects/situations, concept-utopias and actions are regarded as values subjectively when an individual perceives their positive role in the process of satisfying the individual’s needs. Values, then, are actions, concepts-utopias, and the properties of objects/situations which, according to the individual, may contribute to the satisfaction of the individual’s needs and which therefore always induce positive preferential behaviour on the part of the individual. Non-values embrace actions,
concepts-utopias, and the properties of objects/situations which are perceived by
the individual either as unimportant for the process of satisfying the individual’s
needs or as obstacles in the process of satisfying the individual’s needs and which
therefore always induce negative preferential behaviour on the part of the individ-
ual. Thus, our typology does not include the distinction between positive and
negative values since the phenomena regarded by Puzynina as negative values
overlap here with the group of non-values treated as obstacles in the process of
satisfying the individual’s needs and inducing negative preferential behaviour on
the part of the individual. Therefore, the next step is the division of values into
object values, operative values and conceived values.

In the case of object values, they are understood as properties of objects or
situations which may contribute to the satisfaction of an individual’s need(s).
They are divided into absolute or instrumental object values again according to
the criterion proposed by Puzynina. Absolute object values are those properties
of objects/situations which in the consummatory phase of action simply satisfy
one’s needs. Instrumental object values are those properties of objects/situations
which themselves do not satisfy needs but which are perceived as indispensable
for achieving absolute object values or absolute operative values described in
detail in the following paragraphs.

Now it is possible to present the relationships between operative values and
needs more thoroughly. Parallel to the definition of object values, we may state
that operative values are actions themselves (consisting of perceptual, manipula-
tory and consummatory phases) which may contribute to the satisfaction of
one’s needs. Operative values are also divided into absolute and instrumental.
Absolute operative values are those actions which satisfy one’s needs while be-
ing performed and which do not aim at creating any particular results. So in ac-
tions regarded as absolute operative values, one’s needs are satisfied during the
consummatory phase of the action but the consummatory phase overlaps with
the perceptual and manipulatory phases. Instrumental operative values are ac-
tions which aim at creating particular object values of an absolute or instrumen-
tal character. Therefore, in the case of instrumental operative values, it is not the
action itself but a particular outcome of the action which may, directly or indi-
rectly, satisfy one’s needs. It is worth noting that the need to distinguish between
absolute and instrumental operative values might be confirmed by the aforemen-
tioned Murray’s (1964) division of human needs into activity needs and effect
needs. Thus, activity needs are satisfied by absolute operative values and instru-
mental operative values contribute to the satisfaction of effect needs.

Instrumental operative values and instrumental object values do not have to be
divided further as, following Puzynina, we could claim that they always function
in reference to absolute values. Hence, potential further description of instru-
mental operative values and instrumental object values could be easily carried
out through establishing the relationship between an instrumental value and the
absolute value in reference to which a given instrumental value functions.

On the lowest level in our typology, both absolute object and absolute opera-
tive values split into transcendental (religious) values and non-transcendental
values such as aesthetic, epistemological, vital, and values of psychic and/or physiological feelings – all of them understood in the way proposed by Puzynina. This split could be again explained in terms of the aforementioned classifications of human needs found in the writings of Jankowski, Fromm, Maslow, and Murray. We could then try to ascribe needs specified in the discussed classifications to particular types of values. It means that needs will be used here for the purpose of delimiting the borderlines of the phenomena which might be regarded as representatives of particular types of values. The arrangement of particular needs and types of values could be as follows:

1. Absolute transcendental operative/object values would be the actions/properties of objects or situations satisfying religious needs noticed by Maslow.
2. Absolute non-transcendental aesthetic operative/object values would be the actions/properties of objects or situations satisfying aesthetic needs noticed by Maslow, and the need to create actively noted by Fromm.
3. Absolute non-transcendental epistemological operative/object values would be the actions/properties of objects or situations satisfying need for knowledge and understanding noticed by Maslow and Murray.
4. Absolute non-transcendental vital operative/object values would be the actions/properties of objects or situations satisfying the need to survive biologically listed by Maslow, and the human physiological needs in Murray’s understanding.
5. Absolute non-transcendental operative/object values of psychic or physiological feelings would be the actions/properties of objects or situations satisfying needs such as: human psychogenic needs noticed by Murray; safety needs, belonging and love needs, self-esteem needs noticed by Maslow; the need to preserve social contacts and optimum of psychological activity noticed by Jankowski; the needs of relatedness, rootedness and sense of identity noticed by Fromm.

Let us now shift our attention to conceived values. In this paper, borrowing Morris’ assumptions, conceived values were defined as concepts resembling utopias which call for being realized. Additionally, we stated that concepts-utopias may be accepted as conceived values or rejected in reference to an individual’s needs, and that conceived values to some extent shape the character of occurring needs which in turn influence the choice of operative and object values. The particular need responsible for the acceptance of conceived values might be the need to possess a certain “frame of orientation and devotion” (Engler 1985: 154) noticed by Fromm. The division of conceived values in our typology overlaps with the division of object and operative values but not entirely. First of all, conceived values are not supposed to split into instrumental or
absolute values as it seems that they always function as abstract models pushing one to aim at them in an absolute way. Next, we distinguish transcendental (religious) conceived values and non-transcendental: aesthetic, epistemological, vital, and values of psychic/physiological feelings. On this particular level, the division is based on the kinds of object or operative values which can be influenced by a given conceived value. However, as is shown in Figure 2, moral values constitute a detached group of a higher rank in the typology. The separation of moral values from other kinds of conceived values is founded on the conviction that the influence of moral values is not limited to any specific group of object or operative values but may embrace all types of object or operative values. That is also why moral values are treated here as exclusively conceived values which do not possess any specific counterpart(s) among object or operative values.

Summing up the discussion of values, we can state that all types of values which are of philosophical origin and which are included in our typology might be explicable in reference to needs classified by psychologists such as Jankowski, Fromm, Maslow, and Murray. The arrangement of needs and types of values would then only partially confirm the earlier quoted claim of Linton concerning serious discrepancies between psychological and philosophical studies of values.

4 A dynamic model of text and its relationships with values

Having suggested a typology of values, let us concentrate on the relationships between values and language. For this purpose, we will first have a look at the ways in which Morris and Puzynina view this kind of relationship as the ideas of these two authors constitute the foundation of our understanding of the phenomenon of value and our typology of values.

Morris (1964) does not speak explicitly about language in reference to values but he notices links between signs and values. However, if we assume that language itself is of a sign nature, then, the claims of Morris may be treated as dealing with language too. According to Morris, signs may function in a direct connection with the phases of action which, in turn, correspond to the primary dimensions of values. So

In the perceptual stage of the act, the detachment dimension of value is involved […] The signs appropriate to this stage of action are primarily designative. They serve to signify what sorts of things the actor will encounter.

In the manipulatory stage of act, the dominance dimension of value is involved […] The signs corresponding to this phase of action are primarily prescriptive. They signify appropriate courses of action in the given situation.

In the consummatory stage of act, the dependence dimension of value is involved […] The signs at this stage are primarily appraisive. They
signify the consummatory properties of objects in relation to his [the individual’s] guiding impulses. (Morris 1964: 21–22)

Puzynina (1982: 25), in turn, sets out to investigate “the world of words and their meanings” treating it as the sphere in which language and values may make contact. Yet, since our understanding of values is slightly broader than Morris’ and Puzynina’s, there seems to be at least one more possibility to link values with language or, to be more specific, values with texts.

So far we have been considering values in relation to human needs which may be satisfied by performing certain actions (operative values) or by establishing contact with certain properties of objects/situations (object values) which can be brought about by actions. The needs themselves may be modified by a system of accepted concepts-utopias (conceived values). The relationships between language and values noticed by Morris and Puzynina appear to be based on the conviction that a text may purely refer to values – in our case, to the desired actions, properties of objects or situations, and concept-utopias. However, if we take into consideration the following remarks of Herrmann and Grabowski and of Halliday, we recognize that the relationship between texts and values could be analyzed not only on the basis of the phenomenon of reference.

Herrmann and Grabowski state that

Human beings (who sometimes produce language) can be conceptualized as information-processing systems. A system of this kind shows divergencies between its actual and its preferred state; these divergencies should be minimized by regulating operations. Alternatively the system is in a state of equivalence between its actual and its preferred state, which is to be maintained by regulating operations. For certain situations, the system has learned that regulation will work best by producing language. (Herrmann and Grabowski 1995: 69)

Halliday (1977: 197–198) writes that

The text is a continuous process. There is a constantly shifting relation between a text and its environment, both paradigmatic and syntagmatic: the syntagmatic environment the ‘context of situation’ (which includes the semantic context and which for this reason we interpret as a semiotic construct) can be treated as a constant for the text, but is in fact constantly changing, each part serving in turn as environment for the text. And the ongoing text creating process continually modifies the system that engenders it, which is the paradigmatic environment of the text. (Halliday 1977: 197–198)

The first fragment, then, points at the role of the individual’s goals which govern the process of text production, while Halliday draws our attention to the influ-
ence of a situation on the process of text production, as well as to the fact that the text may also modify the situation in which it occurs. Therefore, the model of text emerging from the above quotations might be called a dynamic model of text, which would view the text as the outcome of the use of language in a given situation that (1) depends on the intentions of the text producer and on the situation in which the text is produced and (2) shapes the situation in which it is produced by, for example, influencing the behaviour of the text receiver.\footnote{8}

Now, having briefly outlined our understanding of the dynamic model of text, we can concentrate on the way in which the text perceived as a dynamic phenomenon may be linked with values specified in our typology (Figure 2).

Based on the assumptions concerning the dynamic model of text, we might postulate that a text itself may be a desired outcome of human action – an outcome possessing a set of properties which can modify or even create a situation according to the will of the text producer who may be trying to satisfy his needs by bringing about this particular situation. Then the very act of producing the text could be identified with an instrumental operative value, the situation resulting from the appearance of the text may be said to possess absolute object value(s); and, finally, the text itself could be regarded as possessing instrumental object value(s). In other words, a text may serve as the means of satisfying human needs by shaping reality, and these features of a text which participate in the process of shaping or constructing reality might be called here instrumental object values.\footnote{9}

Any investigation of the instrumental object values of texts would be a complex endeavor embracing several phases. First, a situation out of which the investigated text emerges would have to established. According to Halliday (1977: 200–201), while describing situations in which texts appear one should refer to:

1. the social action: that which is ‘going on’, and has recognizable meaning in the social system; typically a complex of acts in some ordered configuration, and in which the text is playing some part; and including ‘subject matter’ as one special aspect,
2. the role structure: the cluster of socially meaningful participant relationships; both permanent attributes of the participants and role relationships that are specific to the situation; including speech roles, those that come into being through the exchange of verbal meanings,
3. the symbolic organization: the particular status that is assigned to the text within the situation; its function in relation to the social action and the role structure; including the channel or medium, and the rhetorical mode.

Having specified the properties of the situation in which a given text appears, we could pass on to a closer analysis of the text itself. Utilizing a number of tools borrowed from text linguistics, discourse analysis or pragmatics one could then concentrate on:
• the properties of the situation which remained unchanged after the production of the text,
• the properties of the situation which were enhanced by the production of the text,
• the properties of the situation which were mitigated by the production of the text,
• the properties of the situation which were caused to appear by the production of the text.

Next, it would be necessary to state which of the speaker’s needs could be satisfied by the particular properties of the situation modified by the text. These properties might be then regarded as absolute object values of the situation.10 We have already assumed that any instrumental value always functions in subordination to a certain absolute value. So, finally, if we establish which properties of the text are responsible for the occurrence of absolute object values possessed by the situation the text creates, then, these established properties of the text may be called instrumental object values in the text.

5 Conclusions

In summation, it could be stated that this paper proposes a typology of values which enables us to perceive texts as objects not only referring to values but also as objects possessing values and contributing to the creation of values. The values possessed by texts are claimed here to be the properties of texts which allow texts to modify reality according to the will of the text producer who is using linguistic means for the purpose of satisfying his needs. Unfortunately, this paper leaves aside at least two important questions requiring further discussion. The first question is connected with the problem of relations between people and values. In our paper, we have dealt with values only in reference to individuals taken separately. Therefore, it would be interesting to see if the concept of value defined on the basis of subjectively perceived needs may function as an idea complementary to theories which consider the phenomenon of value in reference to whole societies. The second, more technical, question concerns the very procedures to be utilized while establishing the role of the text in the creation of reality and satisfaction of individual needs. It was pointed out that the methods of pragmatics, text linguistics, and discourse analysis might be of some help here. Yet, to provide the researcher with a satisfactory set of procedures, those methods would have to be combined with particular psychological methods for measuring the process of need satisfaction.
Notes

1 All quotations from the sources published in Polish are made by the author.

2 Roman Ingarden (1966: 92) also seems to represent a similar approach when he claims that any value, so as to exist, has to be possessed by a particular object.

3 Humanistic psychology, according to Teresa Świrydowicz (1994: 9), has emerged out of Wilhelm Dilthey’s philosophy, Martin Heidegger’s existentialism, Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and Erich Fromm’s neopsychoanalysis. Gordon Allport (1988: 13, 17), being one of the founders of humanistic psychology himself, reaches even further back in history and points at the affinity of humanistic psychology with concepts of Gottfried Leibniz, who, standing in opposition to John Locke, presented the human mind as active in its nature and claimed that man is the source of purposeful action.

4 In this paper we adopt the term self-actualization which is more characteristic of Abraham Maslow. Carl Rogers, in turn, tends to use the term actualization of the self. Both Maslow and Rogers, however, define these two terms in very similar ways (cf. Oleś and Oleś 1981: 149).

5 Although the postulated phenomenon of self-actualization is often criticized as a relatively vague notion, various kinds of psychotherapies based on the acceptance of the idea of self-actualization have turned out to be effective (Wade and Tavris 1990: 404–405).

6 The theory of values developed in this paper strongly links the notion of value with human needs and individual development. Then, one could try to consider the place of this theory among other approaches to the problem of value occurring in humanistic sciences. Because of obvious limitations, the discussion of this particular problem will be restricted only to a brief comment on Weiskopf’s classification of axiological theories. Weiskopf, as Matuszewicz notes (1975: 17–18), differentiates three approaches to the problem of value in contemporary considerations. The naturalistic approach is based mainly on sciences such as biology and physics. Human reality is supposed to be constructed on the basis of signals coming from the five senses. In this context, values are treated as “tools of evolution” assuming that the organism aims at survival. The humanistic approach tends to deal with values, treating human experience in a more holistic way. This approach involves paying attention not only to sensual impulses but also to the internal world of an individual. Eventually, the ontological approach attempts to describe values through the analysis of being itself. So, in reference to Weiskopf’s distinctions, the theory and definitions of values appearing in this paper could be rather regarded as a continuation of the humanistic approach.

7 Since the need to preserve the optimum of psychological activity is treated very broadly by Jankowski, it could be as well mentioned in reference to: absolute transcendental operative/object values, absolute non-transcendental aesthetic operative/object values, absolute non-transcendental epistemological operative/object values.

8 The dynamic model of text seems to underlie a number of investigations carried out within modern linguistics, but a detailed survey of these investigations exceeds the scope of problems discussed in this paper. Here, very generally speaking, we could only point at investigations within text linguistics (see e.g. Beaugrande and Dressler 1990, Dressler 1978, ), pragmatics (see e.g. Kalisz 1993, Leech 1983, Leech and Thomas 1990, Lenartowicz 1991, Levinson 1983) and within discourse analysis (see e.g. Brown and Yule 1983, Sinclair, Hoey and Fox 1993).

9 This approach to the possibility of studying the relation between texts and values continues the idea of Zdzisław Wąsik (1997: 349) who proposed to distinguish and investigate “those needs of people that might be satisfied by verbal means exchanged in the interpersonal communication”.

10 At this point one could have some doubts of methodological nature, as the proposed procedure consists in speculation about human needs, which belong to the individual’s internal world, carried out on the basis of the external data, that is on the basis of a situation which is assumed to be caused intentionally. However, the possibility of investigating human internal states through the analysis of external, and thus accessible, data is defended in e.g. Władysław Witwicki’s (cf. Rzepa 1995: 198) writings devoted to the methodological aspects of the investigation of human feelings.
Works Cited


