In this chapter, I will apply the findings described in Chapters 4 through 6, and compare [V] – [UP] and [V] – [SHANG] using the CG framework to explore how the positive pole of the vertical dimension is utilized in different languages.

First, I will show how the semantic patterning of *up* and *shàng* can be explained in terms of “subjectivity” and “subjectification” (Langacker 1985, 1990, 1999, 2006, 2008). I will introduce some basic terminology and theoretical prerequisites for this discussion in 7.1. After that, in 7.2, I will discuss how subjectification plays a role in the semantic developments of *up* and *shàng*. I will argue that the semantic extensions of *up* and *shàng* both involve the gradual fading away of on-stage conceptual contents, which leaves the role of the conceptualizing subject in the construal more prominent. However, despite their similarity, the semantic poles of these two constructional schemas actually involve different conceptual archetypes. This point will be addressed in 7.3.

85 Langacker (2006: 28–9) points out that subjectification should be viewed as describing a kind of *relationship* between an original and an extended meaning, instead of as a *mechanism* of semantic change (emphasis original). In other words, the way Langacker proposes to look at subjectification is to investigate the gradual, and perhaps multifaceted, attenuation of the onstage conceptual content in the process of semantic extension. This is also my approach in the present study. Interested readers are referred to Lu (2017a) for a partial and condensed subjectification analysis of *shàng*.

86 According to Langacker (1999, 2006, 2008), conceptual archetypes are frequent experientially grounded concepts, fundamental and simple gestals that can be readily apprehended at an early developmental stage. Typical examples include *WANT*, *GO*, *RUN*, *A PHYSICAL OBJECT*, and *THE HUMAN FACE*. Based on this definition, conceptual archetype is considered to embrace the notion of image schemas and to be even more general than that (Langacker 2006: 36–7).

Langacker’s proposal of conceptual archetype also bears some similarity to Tyler and Evans’ (2001, 2003) notion of “proto-scene”, which is a schematic spatial-configurational relation between a tr and a lm for a spatial particle. According to the authors, each proto-scene can be associated with at least one functional element that describes the embodied consequence of interaction between the tr and
7 Subjectification, Attenuation and Conceptual Archetypes

7.1 Subjectivity and subjectification

The concept of subjectivity was first studied by linguists such as Breal (1964 [1900]), Buhler (1990 [1934]) and Jakobson (1957). Benveniste (1971 [1958]) developed a clear definition of subjectivity between the speaking subject and the syntactic subject, describing it as one of the most crucial functions of language. In the 1980s, scholars such as Langacker (1985), Lyons (1982) and Traugott (1989) built on this notion, producing a series of research papers on the subjective function of language. The notion of subjectivity can be roughly defined as “the way in which natural languages, in their structure and their normal manner of operation, provide for the locutionary agent’s expression of himself of his own attitudes and beliefs” (Lyons 1982: 102). Since the 90s, research on subjectivity has flourished within the cognitive-functional camp of linguistics.

Langacker and Traugott focus on the notion of subjectivity and its closely associated concept, “subjectification”, using their respective theoretical frameworks. Langacker’s synchronic approach and Traugott’s diachronic approach are two ways of looking at the subjective function of language, and are partially compatible (Langacker 2006: 2; Traugott 2003: 21). However, in the present study, I follow Langacker’s way of addressing subjectivity for the following two reasons: First, Traugott’s generalization is made using diachronic linguistic data, which is different from the research method of the present study. Second, and more importantly, as has been presented in my earlier analysis, the meanings in use for up and shàng are highly relevant to the image-schematic structure invoked at the conceptual level. The strength of Traugott’s theory is not in providing a conceptualist explanation, but in addressing the pragmatics-induced semantic change in diachrony. By contrast, Langacker’s version of subjectivity is based on a proposed parallel relation between perception and conception, and this conceptualist approach is much more in line with the observation on imagistic structures that I have presented previously. I will therefore use Langacker’s version.

The way Langacker approaches subjectivity and subjectification can be traced back to his seminal publication of 1985, where he did not specifically label the meaning of a linguistic expression as subjective or objective, but only suggested that the degree of subjectivity and objectivity should be addressed relative to the lm. For instance, Tyler and Evans (2003: 180–2) identify containment to be the functional element of the preposition in, and claim that the functional element accounts for the embodied meanings of in. In this sense, the notion of proto-scene for a preposition can also be a kind of conceptual archetype.

87 Traugott (1995) referred to “subjectification” as a diachronic process of semantic change, where the meaning of a lexical item comes to reside in the speaker’s mental domain or evaluation. Langacker (1990, 1999), on the other hand, defines subjectification in terms of the synchronic distribution of meaning. To Langacker, subjectification may, but does not necessarily need to, align with diachronic grammaticalization. I use the term subjectification in Langacker’s sense.
a particular element within a construal. According to Langacker, a construal is best described in terms of a stage metaphor, which is based on a parallel relation between perception and conception. When the viewer of a theater play is off stage and devotes his full attention to what is happening on the stage, he loses awareness of himself and of his immediate circumstances. In this viewing relationship, there is a maximal asymmetry between the subject and the object of perception, and the offstage viewer is perceived totally subjectively. If, in contrast, the viewer himself is on the stage as a part of the theatrical play, he receives partial attention from himself. As a consequence, the asymmetry between the subject and the object of perception is reduced, and the onstage viewer is, as a result, objectively perceived to an extent. Figure 7.1a and 7.1b depicts the viewing relationship in perception, where the subject of perception is fully subjectively or partially objectively perceived, following Langacker (1985, 1999, 2006, 2008) and Lu (2017: 240–241, Lu 2020: 337–338). SP and OP stand for the subject and the object of perception, and MF and OS for the maximal field of perception and the onstage region. The object of perception is in a bold circle since it receives the highest degree of attention. The dashed arrow from SP to OP represents the attention direction of the subject of conception.

In Figure 7.1a and 7.1b, the subject of perception directs his attention to the object of perception in the onstage region, which is always objectively perceived. The only difference between the two viewing situations is whether SP is included in the maximal field of perception. In 7–1a, SP locates outside of MF, so is not at all aware of his own existence, and therefore acts as a mere viewing subject. In comparison, SP in 7–1b moves into MF and starts to play a more active role in the theater play. It is in this sense that he loses the full status of the subject of perception and becomes partially an object of perception.
Langacker (1985) proposes a parallel relation between perception and conception, and the model of subjectivity in CG can be constructed after the perceptual model laid out above, as shown in Figure 7.2a and 7.2b, where SC and OC stand for the subject and the object of conception:

Parallel to the perceptual relation set out above in 7.2a, the conceptualizing subject stays offstage and assumes full status of the subject of conception, which is also termed “optimal viewing arrangement” (Langacker 1985, 1987) or “subjective construal” in his later publications (Langacker 1999, 2008). In contrast, as SC moves onto the stage and into the maximal field of awareness, as we see in 7.2b, the conceptualizing subject more actively participates in the construal and loses the original status of the fully conceptualizing subject, which is called “egocentric viewing arrangement” (Langacker 1985, 1987) or “objective construal” (Langacker 1999, 2008).

The gradual development from Figure 7.2a to 7.2b captures exactly what is meant by subjectification, which reflects an increasing degree of involvement of the conceptualizing subject in a construal. To Langacker, a linguistic ex-

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88 The way Langacker uses the terms “subjective” and “objective” differs from how Traugott and other researchers refer to those terms outside the CG paradigm, since Langacker’s distinction is based on the prominence of the role played by the conceptualizer and the conceptualized in a construal. An egocentric viewing arrangement is an objective construal of the conceptualizer, since the subject of conception partially plays the role of the object of conception. By contrast, in an optimal viewing arrangement, the conceptualizer is subjectively construed, in the sense that the subject of conception is almost entirely offstage and barely participates in the construal.

89 Paradoxically, a process of subjectification where the subject of conception receives more attention and becomes increasingly prominent in the onstage region results in a more objective construal of himself. In other words, the conceptualizer is more objectively, or less subjectively, construed as a result of subjectification.
pression may invoke different viewing arrangements in different usage events, with different degrees of participation by the conceptualizing subject. At one extreme, where the conceptualizing subject takes on the full role of the subject of conception, he stays clear of the stage, with his attention fully devoted to the interaction between the objects of conception onstage. Example (7–1) represents this viewing arrangement:

(7–1) *The child hurried across the busy street.* (cited from Langacker 1999: 301)

In this instance, the conceptualizing subject does not play an active role in the construal. What happens onstage is that the child, as the tr of across, traverses the lm, which is elaborated by the busy street, along a path to physically occupy successive points in space. The subject of conception stays entirely offstage and conceives of the tr occupying various positions from its origin to its destination.

On the other extreme side of subjectivity, we may see participation from the subject of conception in a usage event that also involves across. Instance (7–2) represents this other extreme:

(7–2) *There is a mailbox right across the street.* (cited from Langacker 1999: 299)

To fully understand this utterance, we first need to pay attention to the role played by the subject of conception to make this construal possible. Unlike the dynamic tr in (7–1), which physically occupies a location at the source of the path, we cannot find an originating source for the tr of across in (7–2), which is elaborated by a mailbox. In order to pinpoint the exact location of the tr of across, the subject of conception now becomes involved by providing a reference point (notated as R in Figure 7.3 below) in this construal. In addition to the participation of the conceptualizing subject as a reference point, the conceptualizing subject also traces the fictive motion of the tr from the reference point to its destination. Therefore, no objective motion is conducted by the tr. Instead of an objective motion of the tr, what makes the construal possible is the direction of his attention to an imaginary mental path by the subject of conception. Figure 7.3a and 7.3b (after Langacker 2006: 23) show the objective motion of the tr in (7–1) and the mental path from R to its final location is in dashed line, indicating no actual motion but only a potential or fictive motion.90

90 The case of across was also brought up in Langacker (1999: 300), but the configurations in 1999 and 2006 are slightly different, since in the earlier version, Langacker put the subject of conception outside of the maximal field of awareness. However, since the maximal field of awareness does incorporate some aspect of the conceptualizing subject (Michel Achard, p.c.), it makes better sense to put the conceptualizing subject within the MF, as is the practice in Langacker’s 2006 version.
As I discussed above, the development from Figure 7.2a to 7.2b constitutes a typical case of subjectification. This process is instantiated here by the development of *across* from Figure 7.3a to 7.3b. In 7.3a, the conceptualizing subject starts as a mere observer who is not involved in what is happening in the onstage region, but in 3b, the conceptualizer becomes an active participant that is both involved as a reference point and engaged in the subjective scanning along the dashed mental path.

The loss of the physical sense of *across* shown in Figure 7.3a and 7.3b exemplifies “attenuation”, which is symptomatic of subjectification (Langacker 1999: 301). Langacker points out that, if the onstage conceptual content is completely attenuated, the conceptualizer fully loses his role of the subject of conception and takes on a partial role of the object of conception in a relative sense, leaving behind only a barely tangible version of the original subjective construal. This remaining vestige represents the participation of the conceptualizing subject in an objective construal, which is also immanent in the original subjective construal. In comparison, a construal with an elaborate conceptual content tends to mask the participation of the conceptualizer, rendering his role more subjective, while a construal with a more rarified conceptual content means that the involvement of the conceptualizer in the conceptualization is more salient, resulting in a more objective construal.

This can be illustrated with the above pair of *across*. On one hand, in Example (7–1), the subject of conception participates in the construal only by means of

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91 As I footnoted in the beginning of this chapter, as Langacker (1999: 314–5) has disclaimed, an account based on subjectification is not intended to reconstruct what happened in the diachronic dimension. According to Langacker, the beauty of an analysis based on subjectification is the unified nature that underlies diverse phenomena that in the past were usually regarded as isolated cases.
7.2 Subjectification and attenuation in the semantic extension of up and shàng

Perceptually scanning along the path traversed by the tr, keeping track of the moving tr all the way through. Given the relatively rich conceptual content of motion in space, this subjective participation passes unnoticed in the conceptualization, which results in his full status of subject of conception and hence a subjective construal. On the other hand, in Example (7–2), the subject of conception similarly directs his attention along the imaginary path in dash, though no actual path is traversed by the onstage tr. Mental simulation is also present in the processing of this particular instance, but without the tangible conceptual content of motion in space, the subjective scanning is more easily noticeable than in (7–1). In comparison, the conceptualizer in (7–2) does not have a full status of the subject of conception, but instead takes on a partial role of the object of conception, hence a more objective construal of him. Therefore, subjectification should be understood as a process of attenuation of the onstage conceptual content which brings the subjective processing to the fore; the subjective processing is present in the conceptualization all along, with the role played by the conceptualizer changing from a totally subjective one to a less subjective, or a more objective one.

According to Langacker (1999), attenuation can be observed along at least four dimensions: change in focus; change in status; change in locus of activity or potency; and change in domain. The ordering of these dimensions is arbitrary. I will measure the paths of semantic extension for up and shàng against the above four parameters in 7.2.

7.2 Subjectification and attenuation in the semantic extension of up and shàng

In Chapters 4 through 6, I discussed how CG, supplemented with PP, can adequately describe the semantic clustering of up and shàng with the arsenal of constructional schema. I have mentioned in various places the presence of subjectification and attenuation in both semantic networks. Below, I turn to a detailed discussion of the respective semantic clusters of up and shàng in terms of subjectification and attenuation.

7.2.1 Change in status in the semantic extension of up and shàng

Langacker’s (1999) first criterion of attenuation refers to a change in the nature of motion from an actual one to a potential one, and from a specific one to a generic one. A comparison of Examples (7–1) and (7–2) instantiates a change in status, in the sense that across in (7–1) codes an actual trajectory in space traversed
by a specific tr, while the motion in (7–2) is a potential one, possibly carried out by a generic tr.

Following the above criterion, a change in status is present in the semantic extension of *up*. First, the sense of ‘approaching’ invokes an upward trajectory which is not an actual motion in space but only a simulated movement observed from a certain perspective, if we compare it to ‘vertically higher’. A comparison between (4–9) and (4–17), repeated here as (7–3) and (7–4), illustrates this point.

(7–3) *I was able to soar up, to fly, I could rock in the air like that balloon.*
(7–4) *The Doctor set off down the slope. Francis caught up with him.*

Excerpt (7–3) is a typical instance of ‘vertically higher’, where *up* encodes an actual vertical motion in space. But in (7–4), *up* linguistically elaborates not an actual motion, but merely a non-vertical motion observed from an onstage point of view.

A further examination of the extension from ‘approaching’ to ‘completive’ also attests to a change in status, in that the upward trajectory no longer has to do with an actual motion in any sense. Rather, the sense of motion has completely faded away and leaves behind only a barely identifiable residue of mental scanning by the subject of conception. A consideration of (4–25), which is a typical case of ‘completive’, repeated here as (7–5), attests to the above point.

(7–5) *Now he’ll come up with all sorts of bright ideas like tying me up or pumping me full of tranquillizers for my own safety.*

A comparison of (7–4) and (7–5) reveals a further change in status. In (7–4), although the trajectory is non-vertical, it is still instantiated in the domain of space. However, no spatial sense can be observed in (7–5). The upward trajectory has completely lost its status as an actual motion and has shifted into a potential motion instantiated in an abstract conceptual domain.

Moreover, a change in status is also witnessed in the semantic extension from the prototypical sense to the metaphorical senses, since the upward trajectory for these metaphorical senses is similarly not an actual motion but only a generic mental simulation in non-spatial conceptual domains. Excerpt (5–2), repeated here as (7–6), is an example:

(7–6) *By experimenting with the languages of several indigenous nations, they formed a pidgin with which they could communicate. Then she began to pick up English with astonishing rapidity.*
7.2 Subjectification and attenuation in the semantic extension of up and shàng

Following the same parameter, a change in status can also be observed in the semantic network of shàng. The sense of vertical motion is lost in the extension from ‘vertically attained’ or ‘vertically higher’ to ‘forward’, since the latter is not an actual upward motion but a fictive trajectory observed from an onstage vantage point. A look at Excerpts (6–1) and (6–24), repeated here as (7–7) and (7–8), is indicative of the change in status:

(7–7) 擔心 這場雪 太大, 屋頂
dānxīn zhè-chǎng-xuě tài dà wūdìng
worry this-CL-snow too big roof
吃不住, 待會 我爬上 屋頂
chī-bú-zhù dāihuì wǒ pá-shàng wūdìng
contain-NEG-PFV later I climb-SHANG roof
go 鎬一鏟 雪。
chǎn-yì-chǎn xuě
shovel-TNTV-RED snow
(I) worry that the snow is too heavy for the roof to take. Later, I’ll climb onto the roof to shovel the snow.”

(7–8) 她 顯然 舒服 多了 我
tā xiǎnrán shūfú duō le wǒ
she obviously comfortable much CRS I
又 倒了 杯 水, 送上 藥
yòu dào-le bēi shuǐ sòng-shàng yào
again pour-PFV cup water give-SHANG medicine
“(h)er obviously felt better... I poured another cup of water and gave (her) the medicine.”

In (7–7) and (7–8), shàng goes through a change in status. In (7–7), shàng encodes an actual upward motion to the roof, while in (7–8), shàng elaborates a non-vertical motion reported from an onstage point of view. However, the trajectory is not vertical in essence but only appears vertical via the intervention of the non-default point of view, hence the motion is potential.

A change in status can also be seen in the extension from ‘vertically attained’ to ‘attached’, in the sense that the upward trajectory in ‘vertically attained’ is an actual motion in space, whereas it is much less so in the cluster of ‘attached.’ If we compare (7–7) with (6–28), repeated here as (7–9), the contrast is clear:
A loss of the vertical sense is evident as we juxtapose the examples. Shàng in (7–7) bears a strong sense of vertical elevation and a sense of attachment, depicting the primary figure’s upward trajectory to the roof and the final state of staying on that particular surface, whereas shàng in (7–9) codes merely the state of paint being attached to the surface without following an actual vertical trajectory prior to that. Therefore, the vertical trajectory is actual in ‘vertically attained’ but only potential in ‘attached’.

A change in status is also evident in the extension from ‘attached’ to ‘complete’ and finally to ‘inceptive’. If we compare Excerpts (6–33) and (6–39), which are repeated here as (7–10) and (7–11), the above point becomes clear:

“The rabbit kept laughing until its lips split, and its lips have still not come together.”
Subjectification and attenuation in the semantic extension of up and shàng

In comparison, the conceptual element of an actual surface is intact in (7–9) as an instantiation of ‘attached’ but is much less so for the shàng meaning ‘completive’ in (7–10), which invokes only a conceptual remnant of contact. Furthermore, the conceptual content of actual contact is even further reduced in (7–11) as a typical instance of ‘inceptive’ and becomes only a potential and abstract closeness in the psychological domain.

7.2.2 Change in focus in the semantic extension of up and shàng

The second parameter of attenuation (Langacker 1999) is a change in conceptual profile. As we examine (7–1) and (7–2) again, it is the path that stands out from the conceptual base in (7–1) and the goal that gets the most attention in (7–2). Given the above shift in conceptual profile, a change in focus is evident.

As we turn to measure the semantic network of up against this criterion, we can see that a change in focus is obvious. In particular, the profiled elements are different among the core senses. For the prototypical sense of ‘vertically higher’, it is the path that receives the most attention, while the sense of ‘approaching’ is both path- and goal-prominent. A comparison between Instances (4–10) and (4–3), repeated here as (7–12) and (7–13), illustrates this claim:

(7–12) Practice had made perfect: she hardly made a sound. Peter slept on. Rung by rung, she crept up the ladder.
(7–13) She swam in what she hoped was the direction of the stairs, only to come up against a wall.

The above two instances profile different bits of a similar conceptual base. In (7–12), what is brought to focus among the source-path-goal schema is the

7.2.2 Change in focus in the semantic extension of up and shàng
portion of path, and in (7–13), it is the path and the goal that are underscored. Therefore, a shift in focus is obvious in the extension from ‘vertically higher’ to ‘approaching’.

The extension to ‘completive’ involves a further shift in focus, since the sense is exclusively goal-prominent. If we consider (4–26), shown again here as (7–14), the shift in focus is clear:

(7–14) The smell is so terrible you want to throw up. The men have been locked up in their cells since day one of their imprisonment.

A comparison between (7–13), which is a typical instance of ‘approaching’, and (7–14), which is an instantiation of ‘completive’, shows that an important conceptual difference between the two senses is a shift in conceptual profile. In particular, what is conceptually highlighted in (7–13) is the path and the goal, whereas the profiled element in (7–14) is the endpoint, or the goal, of the processual predication.

With the above illustrations from (7–12) to (7–14), I have shown that in the semantic development of up, there is a gradual shift in profiling from path to goal, with an intermediate stage in between, which attests to the parameter of change in focus. On the other hand, a change in focus is also present in the semantic network of shàng, especially in the extension from ‘vertically attained’ to ‘attached’. A juxtaposition of (6–2) and (6–29), replicated here as (7–15) and (7–16), illustrates this claim:

(7–15)完工的時候,他登上城墙,從東門到北門,巡視了周。

完工的時候, 他登上 城墙, 從 東门 到 北门, 巡视了i 周。

When (the construction work was) finished, he climbed onto the top of the city wall, and patrolled from the East Gate to the North Gate to examine (the construction).
7.2 Subjectification and attenuation in the semantic extension of up and shàng

As can be seen in (7–15) and (7–16), the conceptual profile of \([V] \rightarrow [SHANG]\) shifts from being both \textit{path}- and \textit{goal}-prominent to being exclusively \textit{goal}-prominent. In (7–15), \textit{shàng} ‘vertically attained’ involves an upward trajectory elaborated by the verb of mounting, and a surface as the destination, elaborated by \textit{chéng qiáng} ‘city wall’. These elements encode both the \textit{path} and the \textit{goal}. In (7–16), for \textit{shàng} ‘attached’, it is the external wall of the building as a \textit{surface}, or the \textit{goal}, that receives the most attention, with the trajectory of the paint receiving relatively much less attention. Therefore, a shift in focus is evident.

In addition to that, there is a change in focus in the extension from ‘completive’ to ‘inceptive’, which results from the verb types that collocate with \textit{shàng}. For illustration, consider (6–34) and (6–38), replicated here as (7–17) and (7–18) respectively:

\[(7–17)\]

defines the printer and CD-ROM as long as they are plugged in.

\[(7–18)\]

“\textit{(Nowadays,) printers and CD-ROMs can be used as long as they are plugged in.”
“What if he met another girl, or if I fell in love with you, what shall (we) do?”

As we can see, (7–17) is an instance of \( shàng \) ‘completive’, which encodes the resultant state of two objects coming to potential contact, or the goal of the simulated mental trajectory if put in the source-path-goal schema, while with \( shàng \) ‘inceptive’ in (7–18), it is not the state of entering contact that gets profiled but rather the state following contact, i.e. the state of two entities remaining close, or the resultant state of reaching the goal in the mental simulation in terms of the source-path-goal schema. Hence, a change in focus is also obvious in the transition between these two senses.

### 7.2.3 Change in domain in the semantic extension of up and shàng

The criterion of change in domain is also straightforward in both semantic networks. For \( up \), the core senses of ‘vertically higher’ and ‘approaching’ are both instantiated in the domain of space, while ‘completive’ no longer has to do with space but with time instead. This is also the case in the semantic network of \( shàng \). Its senses of ‘vertically higher’, ‘forward’ and ‘vertically attained’ are strictly instantiated in the domain of space, whereas the other meanings are less typical of this concrete domain; this is especially true for ‘completive’ and ‘inceptive’.

### 7.2.4 Change in the locus of activity or potency in the semantic extension of up and shàng

According to Langacker (1999), the final parameter of attenuation is a change in the locus of activity or potency. A comparison between (7–1) and (7–2) again illustrates this criterion. For (7–1), the mover is an onstage profiled participant,
but in contrast, the mover in (7–2) is no longer onstage, but is the offstage and default conceptualizer; hence there is a change in the locus of activity.

For the semantic network of *up*, attenuation can be observed with respect to the above parameter. The locus of potency of the upward movement for ‘vertically higher’ resides almost entirely in the onstage tr, with minimal participation of the conceptualizer. In contrast, in the usage of ‘approaching’, the onstage tr is not the exclusive locus of potency of the upward movement. Rather, it is only in the eye of the onstage conceptualizer that the non-vertical motion of the tr is coupled with an upward trajectory, hence the locus of potency has somewhat shifted, given a greater extent of participation of the conceptualizer. Consider (4–12) and (4–19), repeated here as (7–19) and (7–20), for clarification:

(7–19) ... projects ranged from rock hauling, taking rocks out of the creek, picking them *up*, hauling them up the hill, putting them in a pile.
(7–20) Further along the road there’s another gate. You’ll come across the house halfway *up* the drive.

The locus of activity is different in the above examples. On one hand, for (7–19), the locus of the upward motion resides completely in *rocks* as the actual onstage participant that travels in *space*. On the other hand, the locus of the upward motion in (7–20) resides not in the onstage tr but in the conceptualizer projected to the onstage region, since as we discussed in 4.3, the upward trajectory is merely a potential motion simulated by the onstage conceptualizer.

A closer scrutiny of ‘completive’ reveals a further shift of the locus of potency, since for ‘completive’, the locus of potency no longer resides in the profiled onstage tr but in the offstage and default conceptualizer, with the remnant of the upward trajectory toward an endpoint existing only in the mental simulation of the conceptualizing subject.

Based on the same parameter, attenuation can also be observed in the semantic development of *shàng*. As I showed in Chapter 6, the extension from ‘vertically higher’ to ‘forward’ involves an onstage conceptualizer, and it is only through the existence of the onstage conceptualizer that the orientation of *up* can be coupled with *forward*. Therefore, unlike the sense of ‘vertically higher,’ the locus of potency of motion for the cluster of ‘forward’ does not reside exclusively in the onstage tr but partially in the onstage conceptualizer. A comparison between (6–3) and (6–6), replicated here as (7–21) and (7–22) substantiates this claim:
7 Subjectification, Attenuation and Conceptual Archetypes

(7–21) 從海中升上海面登陸

from sea LOC rise-SHANG sea surface land

時，拍岸的浪潮變兇了。

when pat shore LK waves become CRS

“When (everyone) went up from under to the sea surface, the waves that lapped the shore became stronger.”

(7–22) 幹員发觉郭長榮準備逃逸，立即擁上，逮捕郭嫌。

agent find Guo Changrong ready escape immediate swarm-SHANG arrest Guo suspect

“(When) the agent(s) found that Guo Changrong was about to escape, (they) immediately swarmed to arrest the suspect, Mr. Guo.”

The locus of activity in the above examples is different. In the former the locus is the onstage tr, and in the latter it is the onstage conceptualizer. The potency of the upward motion in (7–21) resides entirely in the unspecified tr, whereas in (7–22) the potency of the vertical trajectory does not lie in the tr, but partially in the onstage conceptualizer that coincides with the agent. This is because it is only through the intervention of the onstage vantage point that the non-vertical motion of the tr, 幹員 ‘agent’, can be construed as being vertical.

We can see a similar shift in the locus of potency in the extension from ‘vertically attained’ to ‘attached’. For the meaning of ‘vertically attained’, the locus of potency of the upward movement resides completely in the onstage tr, whereas in the cluster of ‘attached’, the onstage conceptual content of vertical elevation has faded away, with the upward trajectory being only a barely identifiable trace that exists only in the conceptualizer’s mental scanning.92 Compare (7–15) with (6–31), which is repeated here as (7–23), and the above claim will become evident:

92 The conceptual archetype of vertical elevation can be seen as a combination of two basic image schemas, viz. the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema plus the vertical schema. However, such a fine-grained analysis would not help much in understanding the difference between up and shàng, since vertical elevation is a shared commonality between the two. Therefore, I present the conceptual representation at this level of specificity and not in a more detailed manner.
7.2 Subjectification and attenuation in the semantic extension of *up* and *shàng*

(7–23) 我 就 用 一 張 紙，寫 上 「媽媽 過 節 快 樂」 六 個 字。

wǒ jiù yòng yī-zhāng zhǐ xiě shàng ‘māma guò jié kuàilè liù-ge zì

“*I then used a sheet of paper and wrote on it six characters: Happy Holiday, Mom!*”

The locus of potency in the above instances resides in different participants in a conceptualization. In (7–15), the conceptual content of *vertical elevation* is linguistically elaborated and the potency is present in *tā ‘he’* as the on-stage tr. However, the locus of potency in (7–23) does not lie in an on-stage participant and the conceptual content of *vertical elevation* is not even identifiable. This is because the locus of potency has shifted entirely to the off-stage conceptualizer, with the conceptual content remaining only in the conceptual base and the locus of potency residing only in the conceptualizer’s mental scanning.

Attenuation can also be observed in the extension from ‘attached’ to ‘completive’, in the sense that the conceptual content of *rest on a surface* has been further reduced in ‘completive’, where the element of *surface* is no longer strictly identifiable, leaving behind only a less elaborate *contact*. The attenuation of the on-stage conceptual content reveals the mental simulation of the conceptualizer, so that it comes to be considered the main locus of potency of the sense of attachment. In addition, attenuation is also present in the extension from ‘completive’ to ‘inceptive’, since for the sense of ‘inceptive’, the profiled element has shifted to the resultant state after two entities enter a state of *contact*. The potency of this change in the windowing of attention cannot be attributed to any on-stage profiled participant, but resides in the default conceptualizer.

7.2.5 Interim summary for the semantic extension of *up* and *shàng*

Up to this point, I have showcased how the semantic extension for *up* and *shàng* are clear cases of attenuation and subjectification. I first showed that the polysemy of *up* should be understood as a case of subjectification based on the conceptual archetype of *vertical elevation*, as a result of attenuation along various dimensions in Langacker (1999). I similarly argued for the presence of attenuation and subjectification in the semantic development of [V] – [SHANG]. In particular, I showed that the semantic extension of *shàng* should be understood as a case of subjectification based on the conceptual archetypes of *vertical elevation* and *rest on a surface*, as a result of attenuation along various dimensions.
7.3 Domains, co-text and semantic attenuation

In this section, I will analyze the textual level and discuss the possible connection between change in co-text and semantic attenuation. In particular, I will show how change in co-text can induce semantic extensions of *up* and *shàng* from the concrete domain to an abstract domain.

Remember that “A-D alignment” (Langacker 1987) and “conceptual unity of domain” (Croft 1993) constitute an important part of our previous discussion. These two notions help us understand that variation in co-text, especially change in the collocating verb, is an important factor to the semantic attenuation of *up* and *shàng*. The verb plays a pivotal role for the conceptual dependence of *up* and *shàng* relative to the verb, and the possible repertoire of domains associated with the verb influences the semantics of the particles, as I showed in Chapter 5.

A scrutiny of the verbs in [V] – [UP] and [V] – [SHANG] illustrates this claim. For ‘vertically higher’ and ‘vertically attained’, all their collocating verbs are instantiated in the domain of *space*, and invoke a vertical motion. The verbs that precede *up* ‘approaching’, *shàng* ‘forward’ or *shàng* ‘attached’ are also instantiated in the domain of *space*, and invoke a motion that is non-vertical. Hence, we can see that a change in the verbal collocations in the route of semantic extension can be associated with the fading away of the conceptual content of *vertical elevation*. As we further examine the verbs that co-occur with the completive readings of *up* and *shàng*, we can see that the verbs no longer invoke the conceptual substrate of *vertical elevation*, and that the absence of physical sense should be seen as a further step of the semantic shift from the domain of *space*.

However, the completive readings of *up* and *shàng* are both as temporal concepts, which means that the semantic clusters are instantiated in the domain of *time*. How does this abstract domain of *time* come into play?

In addition to semantic attenuation, the other key to explaining the semantic extension from *space* to *time* is the processual nature of verbs (Langacker 1987, 1999). According to Langacker, verbs are processual predications, as opposed to non-processual predications such as nouns, adjectives, prepositions and other parts of speech. This means that *time* is an inherent element in a verb, regardless of its semantics. Therefore, as the verb loses its spatial nature in the usages of *up* and *shàng* ‘completive’, the concept of *time*, which has always been there, is revealed and causes the entire usage event to be instantiated in the domain of *time*. 
7.4 Conceptual archetypes in the embodied meanings of _up_ and _shàng_

So far, I have discussed how the various core meanings of _up_ are extended from its prototypical meaning of ‘vertically higher’, with the other senses more or less reflecting this prototype as a result of semantic attenuation. I have also addressed how the core senses of _shàng_ extend from its sanctioning sense of ‘vertically attained’, and how the conceptual archetype of rest on a surface is involved in some of its core senses. Below, I address the role played by conceptual archetypes in the semantic networks of _up_ and _shàng_.

7.4.1 Archetypal conception and the core meanings of _up_

According to Langacker (2008: 538), the prototypical meaning of a grammatical notion is “an objectively construed conceptual archetype.” For our current case of _up_, its prototypical meaning of ‘vertically higher’ is the conceptual archetype of vertical elevation construed most objectively, with the most onstage conceptual content and the lowest extent of participation from the conceptualizing subject. As I showed in 7.2, along its course of semantic extension, the onstage conceptual content of vertical motion is gradually diminished, but the subjective mental scanning which is also present in the objectively construed meaning remains. The above attenuation of the onstage conceptual content bears two important consequences: First, it results in a more prominent degree of participation from the conceptualizing subject for ‘approaching’ and ‘completive’. Second, it results in a more abstract residue of vertical elevation in ‘completive’. This remnant is schematic in the sense that it exists both in the more subjectively construed version and in the objectively construed version of vertical elevation. Therefore, this most subjectively construed meaning of ‘completive’ should be viewed as a highly schematized version of vertical elevation.

Following from this argument, the relation between the core senses of _up_ and their conceptual substrate of vertical elevation can be described as follows: each of the three core senses is a symbolic representation abstracted from their respective sub-groups of exemplars. Each usage cluster has its own distinct pattern of co-text at the phonological pole; at the semantic pole, each usage cluster also prompts a distinctive imagistic structure. As has been discussed above, a juxtaposition of the core senses forms a clear case of semantic attenuation, which is reflected by the change from a solid vertical line to a dotted one at the semantic pole, which I showed previously. Finally, at the semantic pole, an instantiation of
VERTICAL ELEVATION with the highest level of schematicity is inherent in all the core senses of *up* and their local instantiations.93

### 7.4.2 Archetypal conception and the core meanings of *shàng*

In this section, I show that the prototypical meaning of *shàng* ‘vertically attained’ involves the additional conceptual archetype of *rest on a surface*, in addition to *vertical elevation*.

My previous analysis showed that the semantic network of *shàng* subsumes two tracks of semantic extension: one from ‘vertically attained’ to ‘vertically higher’ and ‘forward’; and the other from ‘vertically attained’ to ‘attached’ and finally to ‘completive’ and ‘inceptive’. I discuss each of these two tracks below.

The first route of meaning extension is largely based on the conceptual archetype of **vertical elevation**. The prototypical sense of ‘vertically attained’, following Langacker’s claim, should be considered **vertical elevation** and **rest on a surface** construed in the most objective manner. The subsequent sense along this track, ‘vertically higher’, as I have mentioned, is similar to the prototypical sense due to their shared conceptual content of **vertical elevation** and to an objective construal of the conceptual content. The next sense along this track, ‘forward’, is a result of the vertical sense being reduced, resulting in some residue of **vertical elevation** that is immanent in all the three senses. This remnant is schematic in the sense that it exists both in the objectively construed ‘vertically attained’ and ‘vertically higher’, and in the less objectively construed ‘forward’.

The second route of meaning extension involves the conceptual archetype of **rest on a surface**, in addition to **vertical elevation**. Since the sense of vertical motion and the sense of physical contact are rather obvious in *shàng* ‘vertically attained’, this usage cluster instantiates both conceptual archetypes construed in the most objective manner. In comparison, as we move to the meaning of ‘attached’, the vertical sense is much less evident, with the conceptual content of **vertical elevation** having become weaker and construed less as an object of conception. But for ‘attached’, the archetypal meaning of **rest on a surface** is less

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93 The present account of the semantics of *up* and *shàng* is usage-based, and should not be misidentified with a “monosemic” account (Ruhl 1989, 2002), which assumes one single abstract meaning for each lexical item, from which all its uses can be generated by rules. A major challenge to this proposal is whether the abstract meaning can allow us to generate the actual and precise range of how the lexical item is conventionally put to use (Langacker 2008: 38). Accordingly, the single abstract representation alone would fail to fully and accurately describe a speaker’s knowledge of the actual usage of a lexical item. In addition, a monosemic account does not say anything about the relationship between all usages of a lexical item, claiming only the possibility of generating the various usages from the central abstract meaning. This feature is also quite different from my usage-based account, which is founded on an observation of semantic attenuation.
obvious and is construed less objectively, with the sense of verticality imminent in rest on a surface having faded away. As we get to ‘completive’, we can see that this conceptual archetype is further reduced, with the element of surface having faded away, leaving behind only a residue of potential physical contact. Finally, as for the inceptive meaning, the conceptual content of contact has further diminished and has become barely readily identifiable. For this final usage cluster of ‘inceptive’, with very little conceptual content remaining onstage, the status of contact as the sole object of conception can no longer be retained, since the mental simulation of the conceptualizer now plays a more prominent role in the construal. By the same token, since the archetypal meaning of vertical elevation has greatly attenuated, it likewise barely plays a role of an object of conception. At this stage, the conceptual substrates are instantiated in a highly abstract manner, and this abstract instantiation is schematic, since both traces of the archetypal meanings are present in all the senses along this path.

Based on the above discussion, the relation between the core senses of shàng and the associated conceptual archetypes, vertical elevation and rest on a surface, can be summarized as follows: similar to what we have seen for up, each sense of shàng is also an aggregation of sub-groups of exemplars and has its own characteristics at both the phonological and the semantic pole. The most schematic version of the conceptual archetypes is similarly immanent in all instantiations. However, for the senses of ‘vertically attained’, ‘attached’, ‘completive’ and ‘inceptive’, the conceptual archetype of rest on a surface is also involved, in addition to vertical elevation.

7.4.3 Schematized archetypal meaning in the metaphorical meanings of up

In this section, I address the role of schematized archetypal meaning in the metaphorical meanings of up.

In Chapter 5, I showed how the various metaphorical transfers of up from space to abstract domains are induced by an autonomous predication in its context. Now that we have seen how the core meanings can instantiate a conceptual archetype with different levels of specificity of conceptual content, this question arises: Do the metaphorical senses also instantiate the same conceptual substrate with the core senses? If so, in what way?

The answer to this question depends on the parameters of attenuation in Langacker (1999). According to these parameters, the metaphorical senses should be viewed as an attenuated version of the prototypical sense, for two reasons. First, a change in status is evident in the semantic extensions, since the prototypical sense of ‘vertically higher’ instantiates an actual upward motion, whereas the
metaphorical senses only instantiate an abstract upward motion, as a result of the fading away of the conceptual content that leaves behind only the subjective mental scanning. Second, an obvious shift in domain from space to abstract ones is witnessed. Therefore, semantic attenuation is straightforward in the development from ‘vertically higher’ to the metaphorical senses.

This attenuated version of upward motion is also immanent in the prototypical sense, and is hence schematic. Put another way, what occurs in the abstract domains is a schematic version of vertical elevation, which is construed in a less objective manner than the prototypical meaning. Therefore, each of the metaphorical senses, along with the prototypical sense, elaborates the schematic vertical elevation in its own fashion at the semantic pole, with each metaphorical sense also accompanied by its own pattern of co-text at the phonological pole.

With the above discussion, I have shown that the elements of archetypal conception, schematization, and the participation of the subject of conception are three crucial components in making sense of the semantic network of up and shàng. These three elements work in a collaborative fashion and on meanings instantiated in all conceptual domains.94

94 Although the metaphorical senses of shàng are not covered here, I would expect to see a similar mechanism at work in that part of its semantic network.