Název: A critique of metaethical constructivism
Zdrojový dokument: Pro-Fil. 2025, roč. 26, č. 1, s. 15-29
Rozsah
15-29
-
ISSN1212-9097 (online)
Trvalý odkaz (DOI): https://doi.org/10.5817/pf25-1-40528
Trvalý odkaz (handle): https://hdl.handle.net/11222.digilib/digilib.82409
Type: Článek
Jazyk
anglicky
Licence: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International
Přístupová práva
otevřený přístup
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Abstrakt(y)
Metaethical constructivism, proposed by Sharon Street, has been described as a novel and promising metaethical theory. It is a form of cognitivist anti-realism that purports to be without substantive normative assumptions, while still allowing for the possibility of an agent being mistaken about what is normatively true for them. Here, I present five objections to the theory's purported strengths. I argue primarily that metaethical constructivism cannot do without substantive normative assumptions, that it is not a novel position in metaethics but a kind of relativism, and that the possibility of an agent being mistaken about what is normatively true for them is more limited than it might seem. I also argue that constructivism does not allow us to evaluate distant pasts and futures, and that it blurs the line between normative truth and falsity.
Note
This work was supported by the project "Naturalism and constructivism as competing or complementary philosophical programmes (NATCON)" of the Slovak Research and Development Agency under the Contract no. APVV-22-0397.
Reference
[1] Bratman, M. E. (2012): Constructivism, Agency, and the Problem of Alignment, in Lenman, J. – Shemmer, Y. (eds.) Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 81–98. | DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609833.003.0005
[2] Gibbard, A. (1999): Morality as Consistency in Living: Korsgaard's Kantian Lectures, Ethics 110(1), 140–164, available here. | DOI 10.1086/233207
[3] Hopster, J. (2017): Two Accounts of Moral Objectivity: From Attitude-Independence to Standpoint-Invariance, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20(4), 763–780, available here. | DOI 10.1007/s10677-017-9796-z
[4] Jaeger, G. (2015): The Wisdom of Hindsight and the Limits of Humean Constructivism, Philosophical Explorations 18(1), 45–57, available here. | DOI 10.1080/13869795.2014.940060
[5] Rawls, J. (1999): A Theory of Justice, 2nd ed., Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, available here https://books.google.cz/books/about/A_Theory_of_Justice.html?id=CGJHAAAAMAAJ.
[6] Stratton-Lake, (2018): Reasons Fundamentalism and Value, in Star, D. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 275–296, available here. | DOI 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.13
[7] Street, S. (2006): A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value, Philosophical Studies 127(1), 109–166, available here. | DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-1726-6
[8] Street, S. (2008): Constructivism About Reasons, in Shafer-Landau, R. (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume III, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 207–245. | DOI 10.1093/oso/9780199542062.003.0009
[9] Street, S. (2009): Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, 213–248, available here. | DOI 10.1080/00455091.2009.10717649
[10] Street, S. (2010): What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics? Philosophy Compass 5(5), 363–384, available here. | DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00280.x
[11] Street, S. (2012): Coming to Terms with Contingency: Humean Constructivism about Practical Reason, in Lenman, J. – Shemmer, Y. (eds.) Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 40–59. | DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609833.003.0003
[12] Vavova, K. (2014): Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism, Philosophy Compass, 1–13, available here. | DOI 10.1111/phc3.12194
[13] Westacott, E. (n.d.): Moral Relativism, in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online], [accessed 2025-03-04], available here https://iep.utm.edu/moral-re/.
[14] Williams, B. (1995): Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame, in Making Sense of Humanity: And Other Philosophical Papers 1982–1993, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 35–45, available here. | DOI 10.1017/cbo9780511621246.004
[2] Gibbard, A. (1999): Morality as Consistency in Living: Korsgaard's Kantian Lectures, Ethics 110(1), 140–164, available here. | DOI 10.1086/233207
[3] Hopster, J. (2017): Two Accounts of Moral Objectivity: From Attitude-Independence to Standpoint-Invariance, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20(4), 763–780, available here. | DOI 10.1007/s10677-017-9796-z
[4] Jaeger, G. (2015): The Wisdom of Hindsight and the Limits of Humean Constructivism, Philosophical Explorations 18(1), 45–57, available here. | DOI 10.1080/13869795.2014.940060
[5] Rawls, J. (1999): A Theory of Justice, 2nd ed., Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, available here https://books.google.cz/books/about/A_Theory_of_Justice.html?id=CGJHAAAAMAAJ.
[6] Stratton-Lake, (2018): Reasons Fundamentalism and Value, in Star, D. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 275–296, available here. | DOI 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.13
[7] Street, S. (2006): A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value, Philosophical Studies 127(1), 109–166, available here. | DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-1726-6
[8] Street, S. (2008): Constructivism About Reasons, in Shafer-Landau, R. (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume III, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 207–245. | DOI 10.1093/oso/9780199542062.003.0009
[9] Street, S. (2009): Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, 213–248, available here. | DOI 10.1080/00455091.2009.10717649
[10] Street, S. (2010): What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics? Philosophy Compass 5(5), 363–384, available here. | DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00280.x
[11] Street, S. (2012): Coming to Terms with Contingency: Humean Constructivism about Practical Reason, in Lenman, J. – Shemmer, Y. (eds.) Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 40–59. | DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609833.003.0003
[12] Vavova, K. (2014): Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism, Philosophy Compass, 1–13, available here. | DOI 10.1111/phc3.12194
[13] Westacott, E. (n.d.): Moral Relativism, in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online], [accessed 2025-03-04], available here https://iep.utm.edu/moral-re/.
[14] Williams, B. (1995): Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame, in Making Sense of Humanity: And Other Philosophical Papers 1982–1993, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 35–45, available here. | DOI 10.1017/cbo9780511621246.004