Dobrý život, autentický život

Variant title
A good life, an authentic life
Author: Sobek, Tomáš
Source document: Pro-Fil. 2015, vol. 16, iss. 2, pp. [105]-128
Extent
[105]-128
  • ISSN
    1212-9097
Type: Article
Language
Czech
License: Not specified license
Abstract(s)
Máme tři hlavní teorie blahobytu. První je hédonismus. To je teze, že blahobyt jednotlivce zcela závisí na tom, jak se cítí. Blahobyt prostě spočívá v potěšení. Pro člověka je dobré, aby ve svém životě prožíval příjemné zážitky. A je pro něj špatné, aby trpěl. Nejlepší život je pak takový, který znamená největší možnou převahu potěšení nad bolestí. Druhá je teorie touhy, která znamená, že něco je pro někoho dobré, protože to splňuje jeho touhu. Je na tom lépe do té míry, do jaké dostane to, po čem touží. Blahobyt tedy spočívá v realizaci subjektivních preferencí. Třetí teorie blahobytu je perfekcionismus. To je názor, že pro člověka je dobré, aby rozvíjel schopnosti, které jsou charakteristické pro lidský druh. Tyto schopnosti zahrnují zejména racionalitu, teoretickou i praktickou. Blahobyt spočívá v sebe-zdokonalování, v životě excelentní a ctnostné aktivity, resp. v dobrém fungování lidské bytosti. Počiny, jako jsou úspěšné projekty, poznání, estetická zkušenost, rodičovství a přátelství, jsou konstitutivní pro naši lidskou prosperitu. V tomto článku dospívám k závěru, že tyto tři konkurenční teorie ztělesňují odlišné koncepce autenticity.
We have three main theories of well-being. The first theory is hedonism. It is the thesis that individual well-being wholly depends on how he feels. Well-being simply consists in pleasure. What is good for him is the enjoyable experiences in his life. And what is bad for him is the suffering in his life. The best life is that with the greatest balance of pleasure over pain. The second one is the desire theory. It means that something is good for someone because it fulfils his desire. He is better off insofar as he gets what he wants. Briefly, well-being consists in the realization of subjective preferences. The third theory of well-being is perfectionism. It is the view that the development of certain characteristically human capacities is good. These capacities include, in the first place, our rationality, both theoretical and practical. Well-being consists in the self-perfection, in a life of excellent or virtuous activity, or well-functioning as human being. Endeavours such as achievements, knowledge, aesthetical experience, parenting and close friendships constitute our human flourishing. In this paper I conclude, that these three rival theories represent different conceptions of authenticity.
Document
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