Hodnota poznania a hodnota porozumenia

Variant title
The value of knowledge and the value of understanding
Source document: Pro-Fil. 2018, vol. 19, iss. 2, pp. 28-39
Extent
28-39
  • ISSN
    1212-9097 (online)
Type
Article
Language
Slovak
License: Not specified license
Abstract(s)
Názor, že poznanie je hodnotné, tvorí kľúčový predpoklad epistemológie. Vo svojej klasickej podobe je vyjadrený komparatívnou tézou, že poznanie je hodnotnejšie než pravdivá mienka. Rôzne teoretické pokusy o vysvetlenie hodnoty poznania však doteraz neboli definitívne úspešné. Môže za to najmä tzv. problém pohltenia, v dôsledku ktorého akýkoľvek konštituent poznania nad rámec pravdivej mienky nemôže byť zdrojom hodnoty poznania. Časť autorov preto obracia pozornosť k fenoménu porozumenia, ktoré označujú za primárnu epistemickú hodnotu, pričom skúmanie hodnoty poznania odsúvajú do úzadia. V tejto situácii spočíva možné riešenie problému hodnoty poznania v odmietnutí predpokladu, že vysvetlenie hodnoty poznania musí byť univerzálne. Tým sa otvára priestor pre pluralistické koncepcie, ktoré rozličným poznatkom pripisujú odlišné druhy hodnôt.
The view that knowledge is valuable is a key assumption in epistemology. In its classical form it is expressed as the comparative claim that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. However, various theoretical attempts to explain the value of knowledge have not been definitively successful. A major obstacle is the so-called swamping problem, which results in the conclusion that no constituent of knowledge beyond true belief can be a source of the value of knowledge. Some authors, therefore, turn attention to the phenomenon of understanding, which is referred to as the primary epistemic value, and the exploration of the value of knowledge is put aside. In this situation, it is possible to address the problem by rejecting the assumption that the explanation of the value of knowledge must be universal. This opens up space for pluralistic conceptions that attribute different values to different kinds of knowledge.
Note
  • Táto práca bola podporovaná Agentúrou na podporu výskumu a vývoja na základe Zmluvy č. APVV-14-0510. Táto práca vznikla s podporou štipendia Vzdělávací nadace Jana Husa.
Document
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