Je nemonotónní logika logikou?

Title: Je nemonotónní logika logikou?
Author: Pezlar, Ivo
Source document: Pro-Fil. 2012, vol. 13, iss. 1, pp. [41]-51
Extent
[41]-51
  • ISSN
    1212-9097
Type: Article
Language
License: Not specified license
 

Notice: These citations are automatically created and might not follow citation rules properly.

Abstract(s)
Nemonotónní logika vznikla za účelem systematicky zachytit tzv. zrušitelné uvažování, tj. typ každodenního uvažování, které vede jen k provizorně platným argumentům, jenž mohou být následně staženy s příchodem nových informací. Tím se ovšem nemonotónní logika dostává do ostrého kontrastu s klasickou logikou, která je monotónní, tj. žádné dodatečné premisy nemohou zrušit jednou již platné argumenty. To bylo pro mnohé dostatečným důvodem k tomu, aby nemonotónní logice upřeli status logiky. V tomto textu si ukážeme, že takový závěr je příliš unáhlený a že nemonotónní logika má právo se nazývat logikou.
Nonmonotonic logic was devised in order to capture so called defeasible reasoning, i.e., sort of everyday life reasoning, which leads to tantatively valid arguments that can be later retracted in the light of new information. This brings nonmonotonic logic to sharp contrast with classical logic, which is monotonic, i.e., no additional premises can invalidate once already valid arguments. Many took this as a sufficient reason to claim that nonmonotonic logic is not really a logic. In this paper we try to show that such a conclusion is very hasty and that nonmonotonic logic has a right to call itself a logic.
References
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